Savage v. Baltimore City Community College

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

LEONARD SAVAGE, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Case No. 1:23-cv-1003-JRR

BALTIMORE CITY *

COMM. COLL., et al.,

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The court has before it Defendants Baltimore City Community College (the “College”),

Kurt Schmoke, Maleika Hawkins, and Karen Tillary-Williams’ (collectively, the “Individual

Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28; the “Motion) the Complaint (ECF No. 1) under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Motion is unopposed.1 For

reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

I. INTRODUCTION

The court accepts as true all well-plead facts set forth in the Complaint for purposes of

1 Also before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Waive Administrative Exhaustion at ECF No. 4, which will be denied

as moot; and Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the complaint without prejudice (ECF No. 36), which

Defendants oppose (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff’s articulated reasons for his request to dismiss the complaint without

prejudice are that he lacks faith in the court, he is not prepared to litigate his claims, and Defendants’ “resistance.”

In view of the time, expense and effort Defendants have invested in this action, the court agrees that Defendants will

suffer needless and unfair prejudice if called upon to defend this action in the event Plaintiff elects to institute

another action on the same bases set forth in the complaint. The court therefore exercises its discretion to disallow

Plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing this action and will rule on the Motion. Fed R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Because

Plaintiff has elected not to respond to the Motion, the court is “entitled, as authorized, to rule on the [] motion and

dismiss [the] suit on the uncontroverted bases asserted therein.” Pueschel v. U.S., 369 F. 3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004);

see also Daulatzai v. Maryland, 340 F.R.D. 99, 105 (D. Md. 2021) (providing that “[g]enerally, courts will only

deny unopposed motions to dismiss ‘when the motion is plainly lacking in merit.’”)(quoting White v. Wal Mart

Stores, Inc., Civ. No. ELH-14-0031, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2014)). As more fully set forth

herein, the Motion has merit.

ruling on the Motion. The Complaint consists of 29 (mostly) handwritten pages, as well as

approximately 70 pages of various exhibits. It is difficult to navigate. As the court understands

it, Plaintiff quotes and relies upon various internal policies of the College, the United States

Constitution, and statutes to complain that the College and the Individual Defendants violated

the College’s policies and protocols, and the law, in connection with Plaintiff’s effort to enroll

in a class in the fall of 2022 with the aid of financial assistance. Specifically, Plaintiff

complains he struggled to complete FAFSA forms (Free Application for Financial Student Aid)

and that the College and Individual Defendants violated school policy, and his due process and

other rights, by failing to assist him, which, he alleges, caused him great harm. Plaintiff also

alleges that he is elderly and that Defendants victimized him based on his status as an elderly

and vulnerable person, and that he suffers from severe mental illnesses (to include suicidal

ideation) which cause him to feel “tortured” by Defendants’ actions/inactions. Plaintiff

contends that Defendants helped other students and applicants, failed to help him, victimized

him, defrauded him, and basically violated their duties to him, which resulted in his inability to

enroll (and receive financial assistance) and other enumerated harms.

Plaintiff is a Baltimore City resident in his 70s. The College is a state institution of

higher education located in Baltimore City. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 16-503. Defendant Kurt

Schmoke is the President of the University of Baltimore and chairs the College Board of

Trustees of the College. Defendants Maleika Hawkins and Karen Tillery-Williams are College

employees; Defendant Garcia is also alleged to be a College employee.2

Plaintiff enrolled in a constitutional law class at the College in August 2022. In connection

2 The court takes judicial notice of Schmoke’s status in these regards, as it is a matter of public record. Garcia is not

represented by counsel for movants; and she appears never to have been served with process. The court notes

further that the Complaint makes reference to an unknown individual College employee (whom Plaintiff refers to as

“Jane Doe” and identifies as a Defendant). The court’s analysis inures to the benefit of all Defendants – including

College employees or officers that Plaintiff has not served or identified by proper name.

with his enrollment, he tried to complete FAFSA forms for financial aid. The Individual

Defendants working in the College offices did not help Plaintiff in a manner he felt was

satisfactory; they did, however, assist other students, including Black students. After that, in

December 2022, a College professor helped Plaintiff to set up an account with ECSI, a third

party student aid processor for the College. Nonetheless, Plaintiff continued to encounter

difficulty with the financial aid forms. During this period, Plaintiff was “denied knowledge” of

the standard student orientation process. Shortly thereafter, in December 2022, Defendant

Hawkins told Plaintiff that his FAFSA forms had not been properly completed, but in February

2023, ECSI informed Plaintiff that he had been sent a student aid refund via paper check, even

though Plaintiff asked for an electronic deposit.

Based on these perceived wrongs, Plaintiff brings this action seeking redress for

violation of his constitutional rights, elder abuse, fraud, and other wrongs.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Barnett v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 3d 515, 518 (D. Md. 2016).

“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Trump, 416 F. Supp. 3d 452, 479

(D. Md. 2019). Subject matter jurisdiction challenges may proceed in two ways: a facial

challenge or a factual challenge. Id. A facial challenge asserts “that the allegations pleaded in

the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. A factual challenge

asserts “that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.” Id. (quoting Kerns v.

United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). “In a facial challenge, ‘the facts alleged in the

complaint are taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient

facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.’” Trump, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (quoting Kerns, 585

F.3d at 192 (instructing that in a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff enjoys

“the same procedural protection as . . . under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.”)). “[I]n a factual

challenge, ‘the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject

matter jurisdiction.’” Id.

Defendants raise a facial challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that

the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s recovery. The defense of sovereign immunity

is a jurisdictional bar, because “sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to

hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the

action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Cunningham v. General Dynamics Info. Tech.,

888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207

(5th Cir. 2009)). Because sovereign immunity is akin to an affirmative defense, a defendant

bears the burden of demonstrating that sovereign immunity exists. Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773

F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It does not resolve

contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v.

City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,

178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted

if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and drawing all

reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the

plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Edwards,

178 F.3d at 244 (citing Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)).

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption

that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). “A complaint that provides no more

than ‘labels and conclusions,’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’ is

insufficient.” Bourgeois v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The [c]ourt must be able to deduce ‘more than the mere possibility

of misconduct’; the facts of the complaint, accepted as true, must demonstrate that the plaintiff is

entitled to relief.” Evans v. 7520 Surratts Rd. Operations, LLC, No. PX-21-1637, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 221041, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2021) (quoting Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,

126 F. Supp. 3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015)).

III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The College is immune

from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv’s for City of Balt.,

901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir. 1990). Further, sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against the

College, because it is an instrumentality or agency of the state. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-102 (1984); Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md. App 483, 521

(2000); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 16-503 (“The College is an institution of higher education of

the State of Maryland.”); MedSense LLC v. Univ. Sys. of Maryland, 420 F.Supp.3d 382, 391 (D.

Md. 2019). While exceptions to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity exist, none applies

here. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Frew ex rel. Frew

v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S.

613, 618 (2002); Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s Cnty. Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir.

2012). Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Savage’s § 1983 civil

rights claims against the College.

IV. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are immune from

claims for damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would know. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017).

Whether qualified immunity applies requires examination of (1) whether the alleged facts

establish a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). Importantly, the court need not conduct this analysis in that order and if “it is plain

that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is

such a right,” the court need not reach the first inquiry. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237

(2009).

Plaintiff offers no basis for the court to conclude that a reasonable government official

(College employee or officer) would have believed there was a clearly established constitutional

right to the College student handbook, College orientation, or any other alleged component of the

College enrollment process. Further, Plaintiff has alleged no facts to suggest he has established

property right or constitutional entitlement to financial aid, and the court finds none. See Bd. of

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); 34 C.F.R. § 690.6(c)(4); see also

Calculating the Federal Pell Grant https://fsapartners.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2021-

03/0102Vol3Ch2calcVer4.pdf.

V. RACE-BASED DISCRIMINATION

Giving the Complaint a liberal construction, to the extent Plaintiff alleges he was subject

to race-based discrimination, he fails to allege even rudimentary allegations on which to pursue

such a claim under any rubric. Other than general averment that he observed Defendants

assisting Black students and that he did not receive help, Plaintiff’s Complaint states no basis

on which relief could be granted for alleged race-based discrimination in the college enrollment

process or financial aid acquisition.

VI. FEDERAL ELDER JUSTICE ACT

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the Elder Justice Act, a federal

health and welfare program to promote elder justice. 42 U.S.C.A. §§1397j – 1397m-5. The

Elder Justice Act does not create a private cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a

claim for relief on this basis.

VII. CONVERSION, FRAUD, CIVIL CONSPIRACY, AND FAMILY LAW

Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants converted his property by failing to assist him

to obtain financial aid – specifically, Pell Grant funds. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants

defrauded, and conspired to defraud, him in this regard. As best the court can discern, Plaintiff

seeks to bring state common law tort claims for conversion, fraud, and civil conspiracy (to

engage in conversion and/or fraud). The court declines to extend supplemental subject matter

jurisdiction over these claims in view of the absence of any viable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3), Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff also refers to the Maryland state Family Law Article to state a claim that he is a

vulnerable adult within the meaning of the statute. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 14-101, 14-

302). Plaintiff has no private right of action against Defendants based on this statute; and, in

any event, states no facts on which the court might reasonably find that he satisfies the statutory

definition of “vulnerable.” See id. at § 14-101(q), which defines “vulnerable adult” as “an adult

who lacks the physical or mental capacity to provide for the adult’s daily needs.” Further, as

with Plaintiff’s civil rights claims, the College is immune from suit. Finally, even if these

barriers did not prevent Plaintiff’s recovery based on Maryland family law, the court declines to

extend supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106,

110 (4th Cir. 2004).

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion at ECF No. 28 is GRANTED; the

Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED; and the Motions at ECF Nos. 4 and 36 are DENIED

AS MOOT. Madam Clerk shall close this case and transmit a copy of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order to all parties.

March 7, 2024

/S/

________________________

Julie R. Rubin

United States District Judge