Morency v. Uguru

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JEAN MORENCY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: PX-22-0718

EMOLE UGURU,

JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 - 10,

M. JORDAN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jean Morency, an inmate at Eastern Correctional Institution (“ECI”), has filed a verified

Complaint, alleging that defendants knowingly failed to keep him safe from his cellmate’s assaults.

ECF Nos. 1. Defendant Emole Uguru1 filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for

Summary Judgment. ECF No. 14. A hearing is not necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.

2021). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion shall be GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part.

I. Background

On February 25, 2019, Morency, an inmate at Maryland Correctional Institution-Jessup

(“MCI-J”), asked to be placed in protective custody because the nature of his criminal conviction

prompted other inmates to threaten him. ECF No. 1 at 3-4, ¶ 8. Morency’s request was granted,

and he was placed in administrative segregation “under the aegis of protective custody.” Id.

On March 22, 2019, Morency was assigned to a cell with inmate, Norman Bonds. ECF

No. 1 at 4, ¶ 9. To Morency, Bonds appeared mentally unstable as he was drinking from the toilet

1 Uguru was the only Defendant properly served. As for “M. Jordan,” the facility’s litigation

coordinator advised that he no longer works at the facility. ECF No. 21 at 2. Counsel will be directed to

disclose where M. Jordan now works so that he may be served with the Complaint.

and threatening to hurt Morency. Id. at ¶ 9-10. Within short order, Bonds was threatening to kill

Morency. Id. at ¶ 10.

Morency informed Corrections Officer Jordan about Bonds’ bizarre behavior and

requested that one or the other be moved to another cell. ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 11. Jordan replied

loudly that Morency was a “snitch” for reporting Bonds and that Morency should expect such

threats in light of his criminal conviction. Id. at ¶ 12. Jordan, in short, refused to separate the

cellmates.

Morency next alerted Officer Uguru to the same problematic threats, including that Bonds

had vowed to kill him before the end of the day. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 13. Uguru also declined to

take any action because Bonds had not yet “put his hands” on Morency. Id. at ¶ 14. Uguru made

clear that he unless Bonds assaulted Morency, Uguru need not do anything. Id.

Morency also tried to enlist the assistance of “various John and Jane Doe Correctional

Supervisors ranging in rank from Sergeant to Lieutenant.” Each claimed to be too busy and

advised Morency to contact his tier officer. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 15. One officer assured Morency

that he would be moved but it did not come to pass. Id. Rather, fifteen hours after Morency was

first placed in the cell with Bonds, Bonds punched Morency in the face, head, torso, arms, legs,

and back. Id. at 5-6, ¶ 16. Morency sustained an orbital wall fracture, traumatic head injury, lip

laceration, and an abrasion to his leg. ECF No. 26 at 1-3. Uguru, for his part, claims no memory

of speaking to Morency and surmises that Morency has mistaken him for another guard.

II. Standard of Review

Defendant Uguru has moved to dismiss the claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment to be granted in his favor. Such motions

implicate the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d). See Kensington Vol. Fire Dep’t, Inc. v.

Montgomery Cty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012).

Rule 12(d) provides that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by

the Court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule

56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court maintains “‘complete discretion to determine whether or

not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction

with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply

not consider it.’” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D. Md. Apr.

16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed.

2004, 2012 Supp.)).

Morency was placed on notice that Defendant sought summary judgment and that he

retained the right to respond. ECF No 15. Morency has filed a verified Complaint2 and after

Uguru moved for summary judgment, Morency filed relevant medical records “in support of the .

. . complaint.” ECF No. 25. Morency highlights that the records are partial, “due to lack of funds,”

and that “as exhibits are made available to Plaintiff, they will be submitted to the Court.” ECF

Nos. 25. Accordingly, the Court construes Uguru’s motion as one for summary judgment. See,

e.g., Moret v. Harvey, 381 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464 (D. Md. 2005).

Pursuant to Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant

and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the

witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.

2002). Importantly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will

2 On summary judgment, the Court considers a verified complaint the equivalent of a sworn

affidavit. Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1979).

not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that

there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-

48 (1986) (emphasis in original). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary

judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e)). A dispute of material fact is only “genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving

party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

III. Analysis

Uguru fronts three arguments: (1) that he is immune from suit for actions taken in his

official capacity; (2) that Morency has not generated sufficient evidence to pursue an

unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim; and (3) even if the claim survives challenge,

Uguru is qualifiedly immune from suit. ECF No. 14-1. The Court considers each argument in

turn.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Official Capacity Suit

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars citizen suits in federal

court against, a state or its agents absent waiver, consent or legislation. See Pennhurst State Sch.

and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-

72 (1985). No such exception to immunity applies here. Thus, to the extent that Morency raises

an official capacity claim against Defendant Uguru, the claim must be dismissed.

The Court next turns to the claims as brought against Uguru in his individual capacity.

B. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim

The Eighth Amendment protects an inmate from cruel and unusual punishment, Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)), including

“violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Sure, not every injury

suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another inmate amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation.

Id. at 834. But where the inmate has suffered an objectively serious deprivation of rights and the

official allegedly responsible for the deprivation has acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate

health or safety, an Eighth Amendment claim shall lie. Id. at 826, 834. In this context, an officer

whose acts or omissions knowingly place the prisoner at risk of significant physical or emotional

injuries can amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340,

346-47 (4th Cir. 2014). This determination includes assessing “whether society considers the risk

that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to

expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).

Uguru argues that summary judgment in his favor is proper because no evidence

demonstrates that Morency suffered a constitutionally significant injury. ECF No. 14-1 at 6-10.

Morency responds with medical records documenting the significance of his wounds. From

Bonds’ assault, Morency’s eye socket was fractured and he sustained traumatic head injury, a

busted lip, and an abrasion on his leg. On this record, Morency has generated sufficient evidence

from which a reasonable trier of fact could find in his favor on this point.

Uguru next obliquely argues that he has no memory of discussing Morency’s fear of Bonds.

This does little to advance his plea for summary judgment. Morency’s own verified complaint

establishes that he sought help from Uguru. Further, when Uguru failed to act, Bonds pummeled

him. This is enough at this juncture for the claim to proceed. The self-serving amnesia defense

does not permit Uguru to sidestep suit.

Uguru also claims that he lacked authority to move Morency to another cell. This may be,

but Uguru’s inability to unilaterally move an inmate does not mean that Uguru could not take any

action to protect Morency against a known threat of physical violence. Given that Morency has

sworn under penalties of perjury that he begged for help from multiple officers, including Uguru,

coupled with the serious nature of his injuries, a jury could conclude that a reasonable prison

official would have known that leaving Morency with Bonds would result in grievous bodily injury

to Morency. In short, sufficient evidence exists to allow the Eighth Amendment claim to proceed

against Uguru. See Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 773 (4th Cir. 2003).

C. Qualified Immunity

Last Uguru argues that even if Morency could prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim,

Uguru is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 14-1 at 4-5. “Qualified immunity balances two

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). An officer

enjoys the defense of qualified immunity when his conduct “does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” McDaniel v.

Arnold, 898 F. Supp. 2d 809, 831–32 (D. Md. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). To enjoy the protection of qualified immunity, the officer must show that either he

did not violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or that if he did, no clearly established law

existed at the time to alert him that such conduct was unlawful. See id. at 832.

Uguru summarily argues that Morency has not demonstrated a violation of “rights.” But

as already discussed, the verified complaint and medical records, viewed most favorably to

Morency, could establish that Uguru failed to protect Morency from a known impending attack

from Bonds. Morency was already housed in protective custody “due to the nature of his

convictions.” ECF No. 1 at 4. On the day that Bonds was placed in Morency’s cell, Morency told

Officer Uguru that Bonds had been acting erratically and had threatened to kill Morency “before

days end.” ECF No. 1 at 5. Uguru also knew that Morency had alerted other guards to the same

threats. Id. Finally, Uguru’s response to Morency when he asked to be separated from Bonds --

“let’s see when [Bonds] puts his hands on you, then I will move you” -- reflects that Uguru knew

the risk of assault to be high and yet chose not to take any action whatsoever until after the assault

occurred. Id. Accordingly, sufficient evidence exists for a rational juror to find that Uguru had

failed to protect Morency from a known risk of inmate assault, thus supporting an Eighth

Amendment violation.

Second, the right at issue is clearly established. As the Fourth Circuit aptly held, “being

assaulted in prison is not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society,” and officers like Uguru are responsible for “protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners.” Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while the Court concludes as a matter of law that the

constitutional right, as framed, is clearly established, it will remain a question for the trier of fact

to determine if Morency’s rights had been violated. See Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559

(4th Cir. 2005) (while the purely legal question of whether the constitutional right at issue was

clearly established is always capable of decision at the summary judgment stage, a genuine

question of material fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly violative of the right actually

occurred . . . must be reserved for trial) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion as to any official capacity

claim and otherwise denies the motion. Additionally, because Morency proceeds in forma

pauperis, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to identify the unknown defendants and

engage in discovery without the assistance of counsel. Thus, counsel shall be appointed to

represent him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (the Court may request an attorney to represent any

person proceeding in forma pauperis who is unable to afford counsel); see also Cook v. Bounds,

518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that courts appoint counsel only in exceptional

circumstances).

To ensure that the unidentified defendants are properly named and served with the

Complaint, defense counsel is directed to provide counsel for Morency with a copy of the MCIJ

duty roster for March 22, 2019, together with all reports regarding Morency’s assault, the current

place of employment for Officer “M. Jordan,” and any other documentation that would assist in

identifying the unknown defendants. Upon receipt of the described documents, counsel shall

engage in a good faith meet-and-confer regarding a mutually agreeable schedule setting deadlines

for filing an Amended Complaint, serving the additional officers, and for Uguru’s Answer to the

allegations against him.

A separate Order follows.

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Date Paula Xinis

United States District Judge