Akinola v. Corizon Health Service

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RILWAN AKINOLA,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. DKC-22-657

OFFICER LAVIN, CO II, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Rilwan Akinola’s complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was received by

the Clerk on March 17, 2022.1 (ECF No. 1-1). His complaint centers on an incident in which he

slipped and fell, and his subsequent medical treatment for resulting injuries. Id. As defendants,

Mr. Akinola named Officer Lavin, CO II, Nurse Amy Stafford-Shroyer, and Corizon Health, Inc.2

Now pending before the court is a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by Officer

Lavin (ECF No. 10), which Mr. Akinola opposed (ECF No. 22).3

No hearing is deemed necessary as the issues have been fully briefed. See Local Rule

105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below, Officer Lavin’s motion, construed as motion

to dismiss, will be granted.

1 Mr. Akinola’s complaint (ECF No. 1-1) included an attachment (ECF No 1-2) which

appears to be a duplicate copy of the complaint. This memorandum will only cite to the original

complaint (ECF No. 1-1).

2 Mr. Akinola’s complaint initially named “Corizon Health Sources” and “Nurse Amy.”

(ECF No. 1-1). These defendants were later identified by counsel as Corizon Health, Inc. (ECF

No. 15) and Amy Stafford-Shroyer (ECF No. 17).

3 Also pending is Corizon Health, Inc. and Nurse Stafford-Shroyer’s motion to dismiss. (ECF

No. 23). In part because of the bankruptcy filing of Corizon Health, resolution of that motion is

deferred.

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations

On the morning of September 23, 2021, while confined at Western Correctional Institution

(“WCI”), Mr. Akinola and his cell mate were escorted to use the showers by Officer Lavin. (ECF

No. 1-1 at 1-2).4 Following the shower, both inmates were escorted by Officer Lavin back to their

cell. Id. at 2. Both inmates were handcuffed, but Officer Lavin was only physically supporting

Mr. Akinola’s cell mate. Id. Mr. Akinola states that Officer “Lavin told me to go, telling me to

proceed, even though no other officer was there.” Id. Mr. Akinola then slipped and fell “while

restrained in a fashion that prevented him from bracing for the fall” or “protecting himself.” Id.

He sustained injuries to his lower back, left arm, left hip, left leg, and left ankle. Id. He “remained

in constant excruciating pain for hours.” Id. Mr. Akinola states that he should have been escorted

by an officer to support him and prevent him from falling. Id. He maintains that Officer Lavin’s

conduct violated prison “rules, policies, and regulations” and amounted to “gross- negligence” that

placed Mr. Akinola’s “health and safety in imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. at 5.

Mr. Akinola purports to raise several claims stemming from this incident, including gross

negligence; a violation of his First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights; and a violation

of his right to procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 4-5. He states that Officer Lavin

“acted with callous disregard” for his safety, and his “actions amounted to the wanton and truly

unnecessary infliction of pain.” Id. at 5. He also alleges that Officer Lavin exhibited “deliberate

medical indifference” because he did not take action to secure treatment for Mr. Akinola even

though he “knew the extent of the injuries sustained by seeing it occur.” Id. at 6.

4 Citations refer to the pagination assigned by the court’s Case Management and Electronic

Case File (CM/ECF) system.

II. Officer Lavin’s Motion

Officer Lavin included material with his motion: copies of the Administrative Remedy

Procedure (“ARP”) grievances that Mr. Akinola filed with respect to this incident, (ECF Nos. 10-

2, 10-3), and portions of Mr. Akinola’s medical records, (ECF No. 11). In his initial ARP dated

September 29, 2021, Mr. Akinola states that-at about 8:50 am- Officer Lavin handcuffed him, then

he “stepped out of the shower and proceeded to walk towards the steps with no officer to escort

[him].” (ECF No. 10-2 at 3). He further notes that as he was “walking down the steps” he “slipped

and fell really hard.” Id. at 4. Officer Lavin “did not call for assistance, nor did he tell [Mr.

Akinola] to wait.” Id. After Mr. Akinola fell, he “asked Officer Lavin to call medical for [him].”

Id. at 4. However, he was not seen by medical for four hours. Id. The ARP was procedurally

dismissed because Mr. Akinola did not “separate [the] medical issue and [the] custody issue.” Id.

at 3.

Mr. Akinola resubmitted his ARP on October 12, 2021. Id. at 1. His claims were

functionally identical to his original ARP, again maintaining that Officer Lavin failed to support

and escort him after his shower, and that he slipped while handcuffed and was injured as a result.

Id. at 1-2. This ARP was also procedurally dismissed for failing to “resubmit the request in

accordance with the coordinator’s instructions.” Id. at 2.

As is relevant to Mr. Akinola’s claims in the complaint, the medical records include the

notes from the day of Mr. Akinola’s fall. Those notes detail that Housing Unit 4 called the medical

unit and requested an evaluation of Mr. Akinola. (ECF No. 11 at 2). The notes of an examination

at 2:20 p.m. reflect that Mr. Akinola fell while “cuffed behind his back,” and that his “feet were

wet and he had shower sandals on.” Id. Mr. Akinola complained of left foot, ankle, and hip pain,

but no bruising or swelling was noted at the time. Id. Defendant Amy Stafford-Shroyer, who

examined Mr. Akinola, prescribed muscle rub and Tylenol. Id.

In his motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgement, Officer Lavin argues

that Mr. Akinola has failed to state a valid Eighth Amendment claim against him. (ECF No. 10-1

at 7). Further, he argues that due process protections are not triggered by his alleged lack of due

care. Id. at 10. Finally, he asserts that any suit against him in his official capacity is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 13.

III. Mr. Akinola’s Response in Opposition

Mr. Akinola filed a response opposing Officer Lavin’s motion to dismiss, or alternatively,

for summary judgment. (ECF No. 22). He reiterates that Officer Lavin failed to follow procedure

when he did not support Mr. Akinola while walking after his shower. Id. at 1. He emphasizes that

he slipped and fell “down metal steel steps, and because his hands were cuffed behind his back, he

could not break his fall and was badly injured. Id. at 2-3. He concludes that “through negligence”

Officer Lavin “deviated from… policy, a duty of care was owed to [Mr. Akinola].” Id. at 6.

Officer Lavin “breached that duty, and injury resulted – due to failure to follow their own policy.”

Id. at 6-7.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of the claims pled in

a complaint.” Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317

(4th Cir. 2019). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to

state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible

when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims, “a court ‘must accept as true all of

the factual allegations contained in the complaint,’ and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from

those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.’” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019)

(alteration in original) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d

435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)). However, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions,

elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[.]” Nemet

Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, in

ruling on a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “separat[es] the legal conclusions from

the factual allegations, assum[es] the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determin[es]

whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that ‘the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011),

cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1949-50).

Pro se complaints must be construed liberally and must be “held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a valid claim is therefore only appropriate

when, after applying this liberal construction, it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Spencer v. Earley, 278

F. App’x 254, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 521 (1972)). However, despite this liberal construction requirement, “[p]rinciples requiring

generous construction of pro se complaints are not … without limits.” Beaudett v. City of

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Courts are not required to “conjure up questions

never squarely presented to them” nor “construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.” Id.

Upon review, the assertions in the complaint fail to state a claim against Officer Lavin and

the federal claims against him will be dismissed. Furthermore, once all the federal claims are

resolved, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law

claims and those will be dismissed without prejudice.

ANALYSIS

Many of Mr. Akinonla’s claims, including a violation of his First, Fourth, and Sixth

Amendment rights; and a violation of his rights to procedural and substantive due process, do not

match the substance of Mr. Akinola’s complaint. The court is not obligated to accept Mr.

Akinola’s labels. Even if it were, it would be required to dismiss any claims inadequately stated

because Mr. Akinola proceeds in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).

Based on the factual background set forth in the complaint and fully outlined above, the

court finds that Mr. Akinola has not proffered facts alleging a violation of his rights to procedural

or substantive due process, or his First, Fourth, or Sixth Amendment rights. Construing the

complaint liberally, Mr. Akinola has, at best, put forth a claim that the Officer Lavin was negligent

and violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth

Amendment. His complaint is therefore analyzed accordingly.

I. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment proscribes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue

of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const, Amend. VIII; Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); King v.

Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016). Notably, it “proscribes more than physically

barbarous punishments.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. It also “embodies” the “‘concepts of dignity,

civilized standards, humanity, and decency …’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Eighth

Amendment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.”

Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).

The Fourth Circuit has observed that “not all Eighth Amendment violations are the same:

some constitute ‘deliberate indifference,’ while others constitute ‘excessive force.’” Thompson v.

Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1986)).

In general, the deliberate indifference standard applies to cases alleging failure to safeguard the

inmate’s health and safety, including failing to protect inmates from attack, maintaining inhumane

conditions of confinement, and failure to render medical assistance. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Thompson, 878 F.3d at 97.

Because there is no suggestion in the record that Officer Lavin pushed, shoved, or otherwise used

force to cause Mr. Akinola’s injuries, and because he is raising claims of failure to safeguard him

and render medical assistance, only the deliberate indifference standard is applicable here.

To establish liability, a two-part inquiry that includes both an objective and a subjective

component must be satisfied. See Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016). Objectively,

the prisoner “must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a serious or significant

physical or emotional injury” or substantial risk of either injury. Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d

340, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2014). The objective inquiry requires this court to “assess whether society

considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary

standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.

25, 36 (1993).

Subjectively, a plaintiff must establish that the prison official involved had “a sufficiently

culpable state of mind” amounting to “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834. Evidence establishing a culpable state of mind requires actual knowledge of an

excessive risk to the prisoner’s safety or proof that prison officials were aware of facts from which

an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and that the inference

was drawn. Id. at 837. However, actual knowledge of a substantial risk does not alone impose

liability. Where prison officials responded reasonably to a risk, they may be found free of liability.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

Further, “[a]n accidental or inadvertent response to a known risk is insufficient to create

Eighth Amendment liability.” Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 2017).

“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it

… [T]he Constitution is designed to deal with deprivations of rights, not errors in judgment, even

though such errors may have unfortunate consequences.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695-96

(4th Cir. 1999); see also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing the

applicable standard as an “exacting” one).

II. Officer Lavin

Mr. Akinola alleges that Officer Lavin exhibited deliberate indifference when he failed

physically to support him after a shower, allowing him to slip and fall, and when he failed to secure

medical assistance for Mr. Akinola after the fall. (ECF No. 1-1). Officer Lavin argues that Mr.

Akinola has failed to state a valid Eighth Amendment claim against him. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7).

Further, he asserts that any suit against him in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 13.

Most slip and fall cases, particularly in shower areas, present claims of simple negligence

that are not cognizable under § 1983, even when the prisoner is handcuffed, or the prison’s

procedures require escort. See, for example, Stevens v. Jividen, Civil Action No. 1:18cv140, 2021

WL 1539154, *6-8 (N.D.W.Va. January 5, 2021), citing, inter alia, Martinez v. Cornell, No. 5:12-

CT-3183-FL, 2014 WL 3955073 (E.D.N.C. August 13, 2014), where an inmate, handcuffed

behind his back, broke his arm when he stepped into a shower and sued the escorting officer who

failed to keep a steadying hand on him. Accord, Cadle v. Rubenstein, Civil Action No. 1:17cv218,

2018 WL 6628961, at *5-6 (N.D.W.Va. October 24, 2018) (finding no cause of action against an

officer who failed to protect prisoner from serious injury by physically assisting him to descend

stairs while cuffed and shackled, even if the officer violated policy by not maintaining physical

contact as he went down the stairs.) The few cases that find the allegations sufficient to sustain a

claim contain facts that are more egregious. In Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir.

2016), the court noted that:

Prisons are not required to provide a ‘maximally safe environment,’ Carroll v.

DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001), but they must address easily

preventable, observed hazards that pose a significant risk of severe harm to inmates.

Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 710 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2013); Smith

v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2011); Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th

Cir. 2004).

That court found that “forcing someone to walk handcuffed and unaided down stairs needlessly

strewn with easily removable milk, food, and garbage,” as alleged by the prisoner, “poses an

unreasonable peril.” Anderson, 835 F. 3d at 683. The court distinguished cases dealing with

slippery, wet floors that were unavoidably wet, such as in showers. Id.

Mr. Akinola does not state a claim against Officer Lavin for a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights. Mr. Akinola slipped and fell, causing injury. Officer Lavin’s failure to follow

a purported policy that may have avoided the injury, at best, would support a finding of

negligence.5 Officer Lavin’s decision to escort Mr. Akinola’s cell mate, and not to call for another

5 Negligence is a state law tort claim. See Stracke v. Est. of Butler, 465 Md. 407, 420-21

(2019) (“simple negligence is ‘any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest

of others, which falls below the standard established by law for protection of others against

unreasonable risk of harm.’ On the other hand, this court has explained that ‘gross negligence is

officer to assist in escorting Mr. Akinola, at best amounts to an error in judgment, albeit one that

had an unfortunate consequence for Mr. Akinola. See Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695-96. Mr. Akinola’s

allegation that he slipped after showering while unsupported by Officer Lavin, without more, fails

to state a plausible violation of Mr. Akinola’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Mr. Akinola’s allegation that Officer Lavin exhibited “deliberate medical indifference”

because he did not act to secure treatment for Mr. Akinola (ECF No. 1-1 at 6) similarly fails.

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner

plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the prison staff were

aware of the need for medical attention but failed either to provide it or to ensure the needed care

was available. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

Mr. Akinola proffers no facts upon which this claim could be substantiated. In his complaint, he

concedes that he was seen by Nurse Stafford-Shroyer the day of his fall. Further, he does not put

forth any facts from which the court could find that Officer Lavin deliberately delayed, impeded,

or otherwise failed to provide medical care to Mr. Akinola. Accordingly, this claim cannot

proceed.

III. Qualified Immunity

Furthermore, Officer Lavin is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity

balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability

when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “In

particular, . . . qualified immunity protects law officers from ‘bad guesses in gray areas’ and it

an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as

affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the

consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.’”) (internal citations omitted).

ensures that they may be held personally liable only ‘for transgressing bright lines.’” Gomez v.

Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th

Cir. 1992)). The defense provides protection for public officials for mistakes of law, mistakes of

fact, or a combination of the two. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting). Qualified immunity is a defense from suit, not simply liability, which is lost if a matter

is improperly permitted to go to trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

Resolution of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity must be determined “at the

earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).

In order to determine if a public official is entitled to the protections afforded by qualified

immunity, two inquiries must be addressed by this court. Although the Supreme Court’s decision

in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) directed a rigid approach to the inquiries involved, the

requirement that the two-prong analysis must be “considered in proper sequence” has since been

revised. Katz, 533 U.S. at 200. Courts are now “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 818.

The first prong is whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, . . . the facts alleged show [that] the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right[.]”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the evidence establishes a violation of a constitutional right, the second

prong is to assess whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. Id.

If the right was not clearly established, the qualified immunity doctrine shields a defendant officer

from liability. The “answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for a

plaintiff to defeat a . . . motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.” Henry v.

Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, 293-94 (4th

Cir. 2003)). “‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was

‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ is

unlawful. Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, _ U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) citing Ashcroft v. al–

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

Here, the facts alleged in the complaint do not show that Officer Lavin’s conduct violated

Mr. Akinola’s constitutional rights. However, even if it did, any alleged right was not clearly

established. Officer Lavin could not have understood that his failure to physically support Mr.

Akinola after his shower violated Mr. Akinola’s constitutional rights. He is entitled to qualified

immunity on these claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Akinola’s complaint is dismissed with respect to all claims

against Officer Lavin. A separate Order follows.

February 22, 2023 /s/

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge