Hunter v. Snee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CHRISTOPHER HUNTER, et al., □

Plaintiffs, :

VS. : Civil Action No. ADC-21-402

SEAN SNEE, JR., ‘

Defendant. *

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant, Sean Snee, Jr. (“Defendant”), moves this Court for summary judgment (the

“Motion”) (ECF No. 24) on the Complaint (ECF No. 4) brought by Plaintiffs Christopher Hunter

and §.H., a minor (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs responded in opposition (ECF No. 34).

After considering the Motion and response thereto, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.!

Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). In addition, having reviewed the pleadings of record and all competent

_ and admissible evidence submitted, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts I,

IV, V, and VIH and DENIED with respect to Counts IJ, III, V1, and VIL.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a police officer with the Baltimore County Police Department. ECF No. 4 □□□

2-3. On May 20, 2019,” Defendant was in pursuit of a gold Ford Explorer (license plate 2CV3508)

with suspended registration. ECF No. 24-4; ECF No. 24-2 at 2. The Ford Explorer drove off when

This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite for all proceedings

on September 13, 2021, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 301 and 302 (D.Md.

2021). ECF No. 17.

? Plaintiffs’ Complaint identified the date of the incident as on or about June 3, 2019. ECF No. 4

6. However, Plaintiff later contends that the correct date of the incident was May 20, 2019, as

identified by Defendant and the body camera footage. ECF No. 34-4 at 1.

the driver identified that Defendant approached. ECF No. 24-4. Defendant pursued the Ford

Explorer but eventually lost sight of it. Jd While in pursuit in the same area, Defendant

encountered Plaintiffs in a silver Mercury Mountaineer with a different license plate than the Ford

Explorer, and mistakenly thought it was the Ford Explorer. Jd, ECF No. 24-2 at 2, Defendant

contends that Plaintiffs’ car was being operated “like the suspect’s vehicle, without the headlights

activated,” but Plaintiffs contend that the headlights were always on as they were set in the

automatic position. ECF No. 24-2 at 2; ECF No. 34 at 6.

Defendant approached Plaintiffs’ car from a head on position, parked directly in front of

Plaintiffs’ car, and exited his car with his gun pointed toward Mr. Hunter. ECF No. 24-4. Mr.

Hunter and §.H. were in the car. ECF No. 4 § 6. Defendant instructed Plaintiffs to get out of the

car, and Mr. Hunter opened the door as Defendant approached. ECF No. 24-4. Defendant

repeatedly told Mr. Hunter to get out of the car while he pulled Mr. Hunter’s arm to remove him

from the car. Jd. Mr. Hunter was stuck in his seatbelt as Defendant pulled him out of the car. /d.

ECF No. 4 { 6. Defendant told Mr. Hunter to put his hands behind his back, while tugging his

wrists together. ECF No. 24-4, Defendant then realized that he had misidentified Plaintiffs’ car as

the Ford Explorer. As this was happening, S.H. also exited the car, was standing with his hands

over his head, and crying, stating, “I’m scared.” /d. Defendant explained the error to Plaintiffs and

told them they were free to go; he provided his name and contact information if they needed further

assistance. /d. Plaintiffs allege that they “[s]uffered serious, painful and possibly permanent bodily

injuries, great physical pain and mental anguish, severe and substantial emotional distress and loss

of the capacity for the enjoyment of life” as a result of the incident. ECF No. 4 {f 13, 18, 23, 28,

33, 38, 43, 48.

Plaintiffs brought the present action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and

Defendant removed the action to this Court on February 17, 2021. ECF No, 1-1. Plaintiffs’

Complaint raises the following counts on behalf of Mr. Hunter: violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count I); battery (Count II); false imprisonment (Count IIT); intentional infliction of emotional

distress (Count IV); and the following counts on behalf of S.H.: violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count V); assault and/or battery (Count VI); false imprisonment (Count VID); and intentional

infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII). ECF No. 4. On October 26, 2021, Defendant moved

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 24. Plaintiffs responded in opposition on

November 24, 2021. ECF No, 34.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48

(1986) (“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat

an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be

no genuine issue of material fact.” (emphasis in original)). An issue of fact is material if, under

the substantive law of the case, resolution of the factual dispute could affect the outcome.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact “if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. See Dulaney v. Packaging

Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). On the other hand, if after the Court has drawn

all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and “the evidence is merely colorable,

or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-

50 (citations omitted).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing either that no

genuine issue of material fact exists or that a material fact essential to the non-movant’s claim is

absent. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the onus is on the

non-movant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In order to meet this burden, the non-movant

“may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings,” but must instead “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football

Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and he is entitled to

judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 24 at 1. Specifically, Defendant contends that

Plaintiffs’ 1983 claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment must fail because the Fourth

Amendment provides the proper constitutional analysis and because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not

shock the conscience of the Court as required by the Fourteenth Amendment analysis. /d. at 6-11.

Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs’ 1983 claims fail because the Defendant had at least

reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiffs, and he is entitled to qualified immunity to bar any 1983

claims against him. /d. at 11-16. Defendant next asserts that he is entitled to judgment on

Plaintiffs’ claims for battery, false imprisonment, and assault and/or battery because he had legal

justification for his stop. /d. at 16-17. And finally, Defendant states that he is entitled to judgment

on Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because there is no genuine issue

of material fact that Defendant did not act intentionally or recklessly to cause Plaintiffs emotional

damage, nor was his conduct extreme and outrageous. /d at 17-18. J address each argument in □

turn?

1. Count I and V: 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Court agrees with Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ 1983 claims are properly

analyzed according to the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. A claim that “law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making

an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person” is “properly analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due

process standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). See Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d

241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (““[W]e are mindful of the Supreme Court’s injunction that the Due

Process Clause is not the proper lens through which to evaluate law enforcement’s pretrial

missteps.”). Plaintiffs’ opposition offers no response to Defendant’s argument, and frames their

argument as one of challenging the “legal justification” for Defendant’s stop and his “unreasonable

use of force” in the stop.* See ECF No. 34 at 3. Both contentions are properly analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Mapp

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), and do not invoke the substantive due process framework. See

Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. Cf Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 574 (4th Cir. 2001)

3 Defendant also contends that he is entitled to public official immunity under Maryland law for

any allegations of negligent conduct. ECF No. 24-2 at 19. In response, Plaintiffs clarify that they

are not alleging simple negligence. ECF No. 34 at 19. Accordingly, Defendant’s argument for

public official immunity is moot. See also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 117 (1995) (“Public

official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts.”).

4 Plaintiffs do state that Defendant’s actions “shock the conscious” of the Court. See ECF No. 34

at 13-14, 16. However, the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims invokes the Court’s Fourth Amendment

analysis, not the substantive due process analysis. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.

(concerning a 1983 claim brought under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment but that was

ultimately analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no “contention that the

law enforcement officers improperly took [the plaintiff] into custody or that they used excessive

force when taking him into custody”). Accordingly, Defendant’s argument that his conduct was

not the type of conduct to “shock the conscious” of this Court with respect to claims for violations

of substantive due process is moot.

Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant next asserts that he had at least reasonable suspicion to justify his stop. ECF No.

24-2 at 11. “The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion . . . will be the

events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these

historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to

reasonable suspicion.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996). See United States

v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining the same). Stopping a car and detaining

its occupant constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even if the detention was brief.

See Ogunsula v. Maryland State Police et al., No. CV ELH-20-2568, 202] WL 6105503, at *25

(D.Md. Dec. 23, 2021) (citing Kansas v. Glover, 140 §.Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020)). See United States —

v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under well-established doctrine, a police officer

may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop—known as a

‘Terry stop’—predicated on reasonable, articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be

afoot.’” Mitchell, 963 F.3d at 390 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The

reasonableness of a seizure is an objective test wherein the Court assesses the “totality of the

circumstances” to determine “whether the officer had ‘a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the. particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Walker v. Donahoe, 3 F 4th 676,

682 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009)). See Los

Angeles County y. Rettele,550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (citations omitted) (“The test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one.”); United States v. Foreman, 369

F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e examine the facts within the knowledge of [the officer] to

determine the presence or nonexistence of reasonable suspicion.”).

“Reasonable suspicion requires ‘specific and articulable facts that demonstrate at least a

minimal level of objective justification for the belief’ that a violation of the law has occurred.”

Glass v. Anne Arundel Cty., 38 F.Supp.3d 705, 717 (D.Md. 2014), aff’d, 716 F.App’x 179 (4th

Cir. 2018). The assessment weighs “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on

which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1188 (citations

omitted). Notably, “[c]ourts have typically found reasonable suspicion to stop . . . an individual

who closely resembles a description or composite sketch when that resemblance is combined

with both geographic and temporal proximity.” Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

City, 866 F.3d 546, 559-60 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 22, 2017) (emphasis in original)

(citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44 (1970)). An officer is “not required to be correct,”

but instead must only have had “an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that plaintiff was

violating” the law. McDaniel, 898 F.Supp.2d at 835-36 (citing United States v. Mubdi, 691 F.3d

334, 342 (4th Cir. 2012)).

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, I cannot conclude, based on the

totality of the circumstances, that Defendant’s actions were reasonable as a matter of law and that

no genuine dispute of material fact exists. While Plaintiffs were in the same geographic location

at the same time of Defendant’s search for a suspect with a similar car, Defendant approached

Plaintiffs’ car head on, the license plate that did not match the Ford Explorer was in his sight, as

was the appearance of the car. See ECF No, 24-4. There remains a question of whether the license

plate and car color were visible to Defendant and, if so, whether Defendant’s failure to confirm

the license plate matched that of the Ford Explorer was reasonable. Moreover, there is a dispute

about whether Plaintiffs’ headlights were on—which Defendant contends mirrored the Ford

Explorer being pursued. See ECF No. 24-2 at 2. The body cam footage does not definitively show

whether the headlights were off, a factor Defendant contends supports his belief that Plaintiffs’ car

was the Ford Explorer. With material facts in dispute, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of

law that Defendant had reasonable suspicion when he stopped Plaintiffs’ car.

Qualified Immunity □

Defendant finally contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’

1983 claim because the doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from Plaintiffs’ claims for

damages. ECF No. 24-2 at 14. Specifically, he asserts that he did not violate Plaintiffs’ clearly

established constitutional sights when he stopped them. /d “The doctrine

of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages when their

conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional . . . rights that a reasonable officer would

have known.” Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 2018). Qualified immunity balances

two interests: “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The doctrine protects government officials who make

“reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Zane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228,

243 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). See Braun v. Maynard, 652

F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011). Qualified immunity shields an officer from claims for damages

unless Plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because the test

is two-fold, if the Court determines the right is not clearly established, then the doctrine of qualified

immunity will shield Defendant from liability.

“An officer who makes an honest but objectively unreasonable mistake is not protected

by qualified immunity.” Ogunsula, 2021 WL 6105503, at *21. The doctrine applies to those

officials who “commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could

reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted). “The qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken

judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

As explained supra, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant had

reasonable suspicion for stopping Plaintiffs and thus whether his stop violated their constitutional

rights. However, the question of whether a right is clearly established is a question of law and thus

“is always capable of decision at the summary judgment phase.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 228

(4th Cir. 2020). See Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the

same). ““[The question of whether a right is clearly established is a question of law for the Court to

decide.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d

307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992)). A right is clearly established where it is “sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mays v.

Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 301 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

‘ 9

(2012)). “{E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. The Fourth Circuit has explained:

A right need not be recognized by a court in a specific factual context before such

right may be considered “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity.

However, the Supreme Court has emphasized in recent years that courts are “not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” and that “[s]pecificity

is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” Thus, although we □

often have looked to the general rules articulated in Graham and Garner to hold

that a right is clearly established, the Supreme Court has cautioned that we should

do so only in “obvious case[s]” exhibiting violations of the core of the Fourth

. Amendment.

Wilson v. Prince George’s Cty., Maryland, 893 F.3d 213, 221—22 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citations

omitted). Courts “consider whether a right is clearly established ‘in light of the specific context of

the case, .not as a broad general proposition.”” Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 227 (4th Cir.

2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).

Accordingly, the question before this Court is whether a reasonable officer would have

known that he was violating Plaintiffs’ clearly established rights when, while in pursuit of a car

with suspended registration that fled from police, he pointed a gun at the suspect in the car, directed

the suspect out of the car, pulled the suspect from the car, and pulled the suspect’s hands behind

his back. Defendant contends that “no body of law... would have informed [him] that his actions

would be a violation of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional protections.” ECF No. 24-2 at 16. The Court

agrees. While, as explained supra, there may be a question of whether Defendant violated

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights because he lacked “legal justification” for the stop, see ECF No. 34

at 3, there are no material facts in dispute with respect to Defendant’s use of force, which Plaintiffs

contend was unreasonable,

“TAJll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of

an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen, should be analyzed under the

10

Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. “[P]olice

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” /d. at 396-97. Courts then must evaluate reasonableness by

asking “whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have concluded that a threat

existed justifying the particular use of force.” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 321-22 (quoting Elliot v. Leavitt,

99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996)). To assess reasonableness, the Court considers several factors

the United States Supreme Court identified in Graham, including: “‘the severity of the crime at

issue,’ whether the ‘suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ and

whether the suspect was ‘actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” /d. at

322 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The ultimate question is “whether the totality of the

circumstances justifie[d] a particular sort of . . . seizure.” Jd. (quoting Smith, 781 F.3d at 101). An

assessment of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the use of force does not turn entirely

on whether the Defendant’s arrest was lawful. See id. at 322.

Initially, the case law supports that Defendant’s actions in effectuating the stop were

reasonable. See United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Once a

lawful Terry stop of an automobile is made, ordering suspects from the vehicle is a valid

precautionary measure designed to afford a degree of protection to the investigating officer.”);

Schultz v. Braga, 290 F.Supp.2d 637, 649 n.6 (D.Md. 2003), aff'd, 455 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that, “[w]hile approaching a suspect with drawn weapons may be an extraordinary

measure, the Fourth Circuit has justified it as a reasonable means of counteracting potential danger

to police officers confronted with a suspect believed to be dangerous”); Souder v. Toncession, No.

CIV. A. AW-07-1996, 2009 WL 4348831, at *6 (D.Md. Nov. 30, 2009) (explaining that grabbing

11

a suspect’s arm and pulling him out of the door of a house was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment).

The Court also reviews the Graham factors as assessed by a reasonable officer in the same

circumstances as Defendant. With respect to the first factor—the severity of the crime, Defendant

pursued Plaintiffs for suspended registration and fleeing a traffic stop. While suspended

registration may not be a severe offense, fleeing from law. enforcement would raise a reasonable

officer’s concern that a greater amount of force may be needed to effectuate the stop. With respect

to the second factor—whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to safety of others, it is

unclear whether a reasonable officer would believe the suspect posed a threat. Suspended

registration tags certainly would not raise a significant concern on its own, but a suspect fleeing

police may pose a greater threat. Finally, with respect to the third factor—whether the suspect was

attempting to evade by flight, a reasonable officer may believe that a greater degree of force is

warranted when the suspect he believed he approached had attempted to evade the traffic stop by

flight. The factors are either ambivalent or weigh in favor that a reasonable officer at the scene

could have thought that the amount of force Defendant exhibited was warranted under the

circumstances. Given the case law indicating that drawing a gun and pulling someone out a door

likely is not excessive force and the Graham factors, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable

officer would consider Defendant’s use of force to be unreasonable under the circumstances, even

if the arrest was not lawful. See Hupp, 931 F.3d at 322.

Moreover, the fact that Defendant was mistaken does not compei a different result. See

Lane, 573 U.S. at 243. Case law from this Circuit has established that detention due to mistaken

identity may not sustain a defense against qualified immunity. See Thompson v. Prince William

County, 753 F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “officers who

12

mistakenly arrest the wrong person are immune from § 1983 liability unless they act in an

objectively unreasonable manner in the circumstances,” even where the officer “failed to take

additional steps to verify” the plaintiff was the suspect. Brown v. Wiita, 7 F.App’x 275, 279 (4th

Cir. 2001).

As explained, the doctrine of qualified immunity bars a claim for damages against a public

official unless Plaintiffs show that Defendant violated their “clearly established” constitutional

rights. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735. Even assuming that Plaintiffs may succeed at trial at showing that

Defendant’s stop was unlawful, it is not “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

have understood that” Defendant’s actions violated Plaintiffs’ rights, especially in light of the case

law and Graham factors. See Mays, 992 F.3d at 301. Whether the right was clearly established is

a question of law for the Court. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and thus he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

that he is not liable for Plaintiffs’ 1983 claims.

4. Counts I, HI, VI, VU: Battery, False Imprisonment, and Assault and/or Battery

Defendant asserts further that Plaintiffs’ battery, false imprisonment, and assault and/or

battery claims related to his alleged excessive use of force are without merit because his actions

were legally justified.? ECF No. 24-2 at 16-17. “False imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and

battery can only occur when there is no legal authority or justification for the arresting officer’s

actions.’” Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 551 (2004) (citations omitted). Legal justification

is the equivalent of legal authority. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 655 (1970).

For instance, “[a]n officer is not liable for battery for using a reasonable amount of force when

> A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state in

which the court is located. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Therefore, the Court

will apply Maryland law to analyze this Motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ common law claims.

13

effectuating a lawful detention or arrest.” Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F.Supp.3d 366, 383 (D.Md.

2018). However, an officer “may be held liable for battery if the officer ‘uses excessive force, or

force greater than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances.’” Dobbs v. Townsend, 416

F.Supp.3d 441, 452 (D.Md. 2019) (quoting French v. Hines, 182 Md.App. 201, 266 (2008)). Such

state law excessive force claims are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the

Fourth Amendment. Wilson v. Detweiler, No. CV BPG-20-869, 2021 WL 3188329, at *9 (D.Md.

July 28, 2021) (citing Hines, 157 Md.App. at 574~75) (other citations omitted). If Defendant

lacked legal justification to stop Plaintiffs, “then the physical force used in effectuating the arrests

would give rise to a. cause of action for assault and battery.”

Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 119 n.24 (1995). “Conversely, if the arrests themselves were not

tortious, neither was the physical force used to effectuate them.”

See Sydnor v. Finish Line, Inc., No. CIV. CCB-10-3650, 2011 WL 4592400, at *3 (D.Md. Sept.

29, 2011).

As explained supra, Defendant did not act with excessive force according to the

reasonableness analysis of the Fourth Amendment that guides Plaintiffs’ common law claims.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ contention that their state law claims may be based on excessive force would

fail. However, there remains a dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant had legal

justification to stop and detain Plaintiffs. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact, the

Court cannot then conclude as a matter of law that Defendant had legal authority for his actions

that Plaintiffs claim constituted battery, assault, and false imprisonment.

5. Counts IV and VII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“ITED”)

Defendant further contends that there is no evidence he acted intentionally or recklessly to

cause Plaintiffs emotional damage, nor was his conduct extreme and outrageous. ECF No. 24-2 at

14

17-18. In a claim for IED, Plaintiffs must show that: “(1) The conduct must be intentional or

reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection

between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; [and] (4) The emotional distress must

be severe.” Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977). Generally, IIED claims succeed where there

“ts liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which

is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind. The

requirements of the rule are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.” Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat. Mgmt.

Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663, 670 (1992). See McPherson v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 494

Supp.3d 269, 286 (D.Md. 2020) (explaining the same), ITED claims are “rarely viable in a case

brought under Maryland law.” Takaes vy. Fiore, 473 F.Supp.2d 647, 652 (D.Md. 2007) (quoting

Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (D.Md. 2001)). See Lasater v. Guttmann, 194

Md.App. 431, 449-450 (2010) (detailing the “only four times” the Maryland Court of Appeals has

recognized the tort of ITED).

This Court’s decision in Takacs is of particular relevance here. In Takacs, the Court

assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff would satisfy the first three elements and instead

focused on the fourth element of severe emotional distress, 473 F.Supp.2d at 652. It explained that

“[s]evere distress is that which ‘no reasonable man could be expected to endure’” and that disrupts

the plaintiffs “ability to function on a daily basis.” Jd. (first quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560,

571 (1977)) (then quoting Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Maryland, Inc., 923 F.Supp.

720, 750 (D.Md, 1996)). Despite alleging, inter alia, severe depression and anxiety, the plaintiff

did not “allege that she ha[d] been unable to function on a daily basis, even if her functioning [was]

presumably affected by her psychological and physical distress.” /d. The plaintiff's claim that she

15

has “suffered a severely disabling emotional response [was] a legal conclusion.” /d. (citation

omitted).

Here, like in Takacs, even assuming but not deciding that the first three elements are

satisfied, Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of severe distress that would amount to an inability

to function on a daily basis and thus have failed to show Defendant’s liability for ITED. Plaintiffs’

response indicates that Mr. Hunter sought psychiatric treatment in July of 2019 related to stress

resulting from the incident and sought additional treatment for PTSD, anxiety, and depression.

ECF No. 34 at 10-11. Plaintiffs’ motion does not detail impacts on S.H.’s functioning at all. The

Complaint does not allege further details, instead the allegations under Counts IV and VIII contain

the identical phrases that they “[s]uffered serious, painful and possibly permanent bodily injuries,

great physical pain and mental anguish, severe and substantial emotional distress and loss of the

capacity for the enjoyment of life.” ECF No. 4 4 28, 48. Plaintiffs’ statements of “severe and

substantial emotional distress” are simply “a legal conclusion” and thus will not sustain the IED

claims. Takacs, 473 F.Supp.2d at 652. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact that

Plaintiffs have failed to put forth facts to support a claim for Defendant’s liability for IED, and

Defendant is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 24)

is GRANTED to the extent it seeks judgment on Counts I, IV, V, and VIII, and DENIED to the

extent it seeks judgment on Counts II, II, VI, and VII. A separate Order will follow.

Date: 2 fey 12 em

A. David Copperthite

United States Magistrate Judge

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