Corporal v. Weber

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JEFFREY CORPORAL,

Plaintiff,

v. . . Civil Action No. TDC-21-1539

WARDEN WEBER,

ASSISTANT WARDEN BUTLER,

SECURITY CHIEF LLEWELLYN,

COMMISSIONER HILL,

SECRETARY GREEN and

ATTORNEY GENERAL FROSH,

Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jeffrey Corporal, an inmate confined at the Western Correctional Institution (““WCI”) in

Cumberland, Maryland, has filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that he was denied access to reading material in violation of his rights under the First and

_ Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Pending before the Court are

Corporal’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction; a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, or

in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Warden Weber, Assistant Warden

Butler, Security Chief Llewellyn, Commissioner Hill, and Secretary Green (collectively, “the

Correctional Defendants”); and Corporal’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Service of the

Complaint on Defendant Attorney General Frosh was not accepted. Having reviewed the

submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For

the reasons set forth below, the Correctional Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED, all claims

against Defendant Attorney General Frosh will be dismissed, and Corporal’s Motions will be

DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In his Amended Complaint, Corporal alleges that in January 2021, he ordered two

paperback books and four hardcover books from the Edward Hamilton Book Company. On

February 9, 2021, these books arrived at WCI while Corporal was in administrative segregation.

Corporal was told that the hardcover books were not provided to him based on a prison policy

which prohibits inmates in segregation from possessing hardcover books for security reasons.

Although not specifically barred by prison policy, prison officials also withheld his paperback

books. Corporal learned of the fact that the books had been withheld for the first time on April 14,

2021. Corporal asserts that preventing him from receiving his books while in administrative

segregation violated his First Amendment rights. He further argues that Defendants violated his

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide a “post-censorship

remedy” for the deprivation, including a notice of the confiscation of his books and an opportunity

to challenge it. Am. Compl. at 5, ECF No. 18.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

In their Motion, the Correctional Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) or summary judgment under Rule 56 on the grounds that (1) Corporal’s claims

are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) Corporal’s claims should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) Corporal has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; and (4) they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Legal Standards

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts

to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd Legal conclusions or conclusory statements

do not suffice. Jd A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations

in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson

Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed

liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, a self-represented plaintiff must

still carry “the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be

based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

Typically, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers

only the complaint and any attached documents “integral to the complaint.” Sec’y of State for

Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir, 2007). Rule 12(d) requires courts

to treat such a motion as a motion for summary judgment where matters outside the pleadings are

considered and not excluded. Fed, R. Civ. P. 12(d). Before converting a motion to dismiss to one

for summary judgment, courts must give the nonmoving party “a reasonable opportunity to present

all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Jd “Reasonable opportunity” has two

requirements; (1) the nonmoving party must have some notice that the court is treating the Rule

12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment; and (2) the nonmoving party “must be

afforded a reasonable opportunity for discovery” to obtain information essential to oppose the

motion. Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted),

Here, the notice requirement has been satisfied by the title of the Correctional Defendants’

Motion. To show that a reasonable opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the

nonmoving party must file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), or another filing,

explaining why “for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 245 (4th

Cir. 2002). Because Corporal has not filed such a declaration and in fact responded to the

Correctional Defendants’ Motion by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court may

construe the Correctional Defendants’ Motion as seeking summary judgment as to the arguments

requiring consideration of the submitted exhibits.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the

moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, with “all justifiable inferences” drawn in its favor.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts

supported in the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football

Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is

“genuine” only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to

return a verdict for that party. Id.

Finally, in resolving the Motions, the Court may take judicial notice of the filings and court

rulings in Corporal v. Pennington, No. DKC-20-3357 (“Corporal I’), a related case filed by

Corporal in this Court on November 1, 2020, for purposes of assessing whether res judicata or

collateral estoppel precludes consideration of Corporal’s claims in the present case. Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)(1)(2); Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that a “court may

take judicial notice of facts from a prior judicial proceeding” in evaluating a res judicata claim as

long as there is no dispute as to the “factual accuracy of the record of [the] previous suit”),

B. Official Capacity Claims

Corporal’s Amended Complaint states that he is “suing all defendants in their personal and

official capacities.” Am. Compl. at 2. However, claims against state officials in their official

capacities are effectively claims against the state and are thus not proper claims against a “person,”

as required for a § 1983 claim. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989)

(“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).

Corporal’s official capacity claims against all Defendants will therefore be dismissed.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Correctional Defendants also argue that this case should be dismissed because

Corporal failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing his Complaint in this Court. Under

the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 803, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)):

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2018). Inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before they bring any

“suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter y. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532

(2002).

Exhaustion is mandatory and generally may not be excused unless the administrative

procedure is not available. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (holding that “[a]n inmate

must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”). “[A]n administrative

remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was

prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). In

Ross, the United States Supreme Court identified three circumstances when an administrative

remedy is unavailable: when officers are “unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief

to aggrieved inmates,” when the procedure is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,

incapable of use,” or when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of [filing

grievances] through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44.

In Maryland prisons, for the type of grievance asserted by Corporal, the Administrative

Remedy Procedure is the administrative process that must be exhausted. Md. Code Regs. §

12.02.28.02(B)(1), (D) (2021). First, a prisoner must file an ARP with the warden within 30 days

of the incident at issue. /d. § 12.02.28.05(D)(1) (requiring filing with the “managing official”); id.

§ 12.02.28.02(B)( 14) (defining “managing official” as “the warden or other individual responsible

for management of the correctional facility”): id. § 12.02,28.09(B) (setting the 30-day deadline).

Second, if the ARP is denied, or the inmate does not receive a timely response, a prisoner must

file an appeal with the Commissioner of Correction within 30 days. /d. § 12.02.28.14(B)(5). If

the appeal is denied, the prisoner must appeal within 30 days to the Inmate Grievance Office

(“IGO”). See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. §§ 10-206, 10-210 (LexisNexis 2017); Md. Code Regs.

§ 12.07.01.05(B). Inmates may seek judicial review of the IGO’s final determinations in a

Maryland Circuit Court. See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 10-210(a).

Here, Corporal failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The record reflects that Corporal

filed multiple ARPs relating to the withholding of the books that arrived in February 2021. For

example, he filed ARP No. WCI-0470-21 on March 31, 2021 which was dismissed by the ARP

Coordinator on April 1, 2021 for procedural reasons because more information was needed to

investigate the request. ARP No. WCI-0492-21, filed on April 5, 2021, complained that his books

had been returned to the supplier; the April 20, 2021 response stated that after investigation it was

determined that his books remained in the institution. On April 6, 2021, Corporal filed another

ARP, also assigned No. WCI-0470-21, which was dismissed by the ARP Coordinator on April 7,

2021 for procedural reasons as untimely filed. He then filed ARP No. WCI-0567-21 on April 14,

2021, which was dismissed on April 15, 2021 because it was repetitive of the prior ARPs. The

Correctional Defendants assert that Corporal failed to appeal his ARPs up to the IGO and

specifically note that Corporal’s own Amended Complaint admits that he failed to do so. In

opposing the Motion, Corporal does not dispute the fact that he failed to appeal to the IGO. Rather,

he asserts only that he was not provided a receipt for his April 14, 2021 ARP that provided the

assigned ARP number or a response from the ARP Coordinator or the Warden, so he was unable

to exhaust administrative remedies. Corporal did, however, retain a copy of that ARP, which he

submitted with his Complaint in this case.

Corporal’s claim, even if true, does not excuse his failure to exhaust administrative

remedies because it does not establish any of the grounds identified in Ross for finding that an

administrative remedy is unavailable. He has neither alleged nor demonstrated that WCI personnel

are “unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” or that the ARP

procedure at WCI is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Ross,

578 U.S. at 643-44. To the contrary, the record reflects that Corporal has filed 80 ARPs in

approximately 13 years at WCI and generally received timely responses with either procedural or

substantive grounds for the determination. Where Corporal has submitted an opinion from an

unrelated appeal to the IGO, the Court concludes that Corporal was familiar with and had the

ability to use the ARP appeal process. Though Corporal claims he was unable to appeal his April

14, 2021 ARP because he did not receive responses, the standard Appeal of Administrative

Remedy Response form includes as a possible reason for an appeal a scenario that there was “No

Response ftom Warden Managing Official/Designee.’? DOC Form 185.0002fR, Defs. Mot.

Summ. J. Ex. C-3, ECF No, 19-7. Finally, Corporal’s claim that he did not receive a receipt for

his ARP does not mean that he could not actually submit an appeal, particularly where the record

shows that his ARPs did, in fact, receive assigned numbers and were logged in the prison’s ARP

system, copies of several of the relevant ARPs and their responses were kept on file, and Corporal

had retained a copy of at least one of the ARPs. On these facts, the Court does not find that

Defendants used “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation” in order to thwart Corporal’s

use of the ARP process. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44. Under these circumstances, the Court finds

that Corporal failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that his claims therefore must be

dismissed.

D. Collateral Estoppel

The Correctional Defendants also argue that the instant action is barred by the doctrines of

res judicata and collateral estoppel because Corporal previously raised and litigated these same

claims or issues in Corporal J. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars

“successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court

determination essential to [a] prior judgment” when the party against whom the doctrine is to be

applied had “a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” even if the issue “recurs in the context of a

different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). For the doctrine to apply, (1) the

issue to be precluded must be identical te one previously litigated; (2) the issue must have been

actually determined in the prior proceeding; (3) the determination of the issue must have been a

critical and necessary part of the earlier decision; (4) the prior judgment must be final and valid;

and (5) the party against whom estoppel is to be applied must have had a “full and fair opportunity

to litigate the issue” in the prior case. Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 219, 224

(4th Cir. 1998).

Prior to filing the present action on June 21, 2021, Corporal had previously filed and

litigated Corporal I, an almost identical case filed on November 17, 2020. In his complaint in

Corporal I, as amended on March 11, 2021, Corporal alleged that in September 2020, while he

was in administrative segregation, a correctional officer informed him that three paperback books

and a hardcover book that had been ordered for him by a relative had arrived, but then told him

that he would not be permitted to keep the hardcover book because of a prison policy barring

prisoners on administrative segregation from having hardcover books in their cells. The

correctional officer also informed him that he would not receive the paperback books unless he

agreed to have the hardcover book destroyed or returned to the seller. When Corporal did not

agree, he received none of the books, In Corporal I, Corporal alleged various claims, including

that the deprivation of his books while on administrative segregation violated his rights under the

First Amendment, and that the failure to provide procedural safeguards against the “censorship of

his books” violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. No. DKC-20-3357

Compl. { 11 (ECF No. 1). The defendants in Corporal J included Butler, Weber, Hill, and Green,

all of whom are Defendants in the present case.

On July 30, 2021, the court (Chasanow, J.) granted a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary

Judgment in Corporal I. See Corporal v. Pennington, No. DKC-20-3357, 2021 WL 3269084, at

* 1 July 30, 2021). Among other grounds, the court held that the correctional officer defendant

was entitled to qualified immunity because the officer had not violated clearly established rights

under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. /d. at *6. Citing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006),

the court noted that the Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on the provision of materials such

as newspapers and magazines to inmates on administrative or disciplinary segregation, the reasons

for which included providing a means to incentivize better behavior by such inmates and the need

diminish the amount of material that could be used to start a fire. Corporal I, 2021 WL 3269084,

at *6; see Beard, 548 U.S. at 529-30. Where the policy applied in Corporal J was similarly based

in part on a need to limit the amount of material that could be used to start a fire or to clog a toilet,

the court held that the failure to deliver books to Corporal while he was on administrative

segregation did not violate a clearly established right under the First Amendment. Corporal I,

2021 WL 3269084, at *6. Similarly, the court found that the correctional officer defendant was

entitled to qualified immunity on Corporal’s due process claim because there was “no precedent

condemning the lack of procedural due process” in this context. Jd. Finally, the court concluded

that Corporal’s claim for injunctive relief failed because Corporal lacked standing to seek the

injunction requested, which would bar Defendants from withholding books from all inmates at

WCI, id. at *6, and because the claim was moot because he was no longer in administrative

segregation, such that he was seeking an improper advisory opinion. Jd. at *7.

The present case is virtually identical to Corporal I except that it is based on a different

incident of withholding books that occurred only four months after the incident underlying

Corporal I. Based on the court’s resolution of the issue of whether there was clearly established

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law on the alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment violations in Corporal J, Corporal’s claims in

the present case are barred by collateral estoppel. In the present case, Corporal claims that the

Correctional Defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by withholding

books, failing to provide a post-deprivation remedy, and failing to train or supervise staff so as to

prevent these alleged constitutional violations. The Correctional Defendants have asserted that

they are all entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate clearly established

law. Because the underlying constitutional bases for Corporal’s claims here and in Corporal I are

the same, a critical issue relevant to the resolution of the qualified immunity defense here is the

same as the issue litigated in Corporal I, namely whether there was clearly established law under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments that was violated by the refusal to allow Corporal to receive

his books while he was in administrative segregation. As discussed above, the court in Corporal

I specifically decided that no such clearly established law existed, and that determination was a

critical and necessary part of the dismissal of the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in that

case. See Corporal I, 2021 WL 3269084, at *6-7. The parties do not present, and the Court is not

aware of, any intervening law arising between the September 2020 incident in Corporal I and the

February 2021 incident in this case that would warrant a different resolution of this issue now.

The dismissal in Corporal I was final and on the merits. Finally, where Corporal was a party to

Corporal I and argued for an injunction against the prison’s policy, the defendants in Corporal I

asserted the defense of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss, and Corporal filed a

memorandum in opposition to the motion, the party against whom estoppel is to be applied had a

“full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.” See Sedlack, 134 F.3d at 224, All of the elements

of collateral estoppel are therefore satisfied.

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In the present case, the alleged constitutional violations by Defendants, whether based on

the actual withholding of his books, the failure to train or supervise prison staff not to withhold

books, or the failure to change the policy restricting books from inmates in segregation, are all

predicated on the claim that the prison’s practices violated First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

relating to the receipt of books by inmates. Because the issue of whether those rights were clearly

established at the time of the incidents in question was decided against Corporal, that issue cannot

be relitigated here. Yet absent a finding that those rights were clearly established, the Correctional

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against Corporal’s claims.

As for the availability of injunctive relief, that issue was litigated in Corporal I, Corporal

had a full opportunity to litigate that question, the Court ruled that no such relief was available

based on lack of standing and mootness, and those rulings were critical and necessary to the final

judgment on this issue. Where the record provides no basis to conclude that any of the underlying

facts have changed between Corporal J and the present case, collateral estoppel bars relitigation

of those determinations and thus bars the issuance of injunctive relief.

Accordingly, where collateral estoppel bars relitigation of dispositive issues in this case

that were decided against Corporal, his claims against the Correctional Defendants necessarily fail.

The Court will therefore grant the Correctional Defendants’ Motion.

Attorney General Frosh

Attorney General Frosh was not served with the Complaint. However, this Court is

required to dismiss any complaint filed by a prisoner if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b) (2018).

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Here, Corporal’s allegations against Frosh are that he appeared on behalf of the defendants

in Corporal I, which led him to be “aware of the irregularities” of WCI prison staff withholding

books and not providing post-deprivation remedies, that he took “no legal action whatsoever to

eliminate the foregoing irregularities,” and that he failed to train and supervise prison staff but

instead “approved, encouraged, or ignored” their acts. Am. Compl. at 8-9. Corporal’s allegations

do not support a claim against Frosh because personal liability under § 1983 requires a showing

that the “official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights” and “mere

knowledge of such a deprivation does not suffice.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th

Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Corporal has not alleged that Frosh acted, beyond “mere

knowledge,” to deprive Corporal of any rights. Because Frosh is not a prison official, he also

cannot establish or eliminate prison policy, nor can he train or supervise prison staff at WCI. For

these reasons, Corporal has fatled to state a claim against Attorney General Frosh, and the Court

will dismiss all claims against him.

IV. Corporal’s Motions

Because the Court finds that Corporal’s claims will be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and as barred by collateral estoppel, Corporal’s Motion for Summary

Judgment will necessarily be denied as moot.

As for Corporal’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, a party seeking a preliminary

injunction or temporary restraining order must establish the following elements: (1) a likelihood

of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief:

(3) that the balance of equities tips in the party’s favor; and (4) that a preliminary injunction is in

the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). All four

elements must be established. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-321 (4th Cir, 2013). Because

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the Court will dismiss Corporal’s claims, he necessarily cannot establish the first element, a

likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction will be

denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED, all claims against

Defendant Attorney General Frosh will be dismissed, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed,

Corporal’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction will be DENIED, and Corporal’s Motion for

Summary Judgment will be DENIED AS MOOT. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: January 28, 2022

THEODORE D. CHUANG

United States District Jud

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