Coster v. The State of Maryland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RODNEY COSTER, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. GLR-21-65

THE STATE OF MARYLAND, et al., *

Defendants. *

***

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant the State of Maryland’s (the

“State”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43) and Defendants Harford

County Sheriff’s Office, Harford County Detention Center, Warden Michael Capasso,

Deputy First Class (“DFC”) Donald Licato, DFC Christopher Majewski, DFC Mark Jeric,

DFC Kevin Bliss, DFC Matthew Norton, DFC Derek Seman, DFC Stavros Kalambihis,

DFC Joe DiBartolo, DFC Nicholas Robinson, Sgt. Andrew Meador, Cpl. Nickolas Goins,

and Does 1 to 20’s (collectively, “County Defendants”)1 Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 46). The Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary.

See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant

the Motions in part and deny the Motions in part.2

1 The Court will hereinafter refer to Defendants Harford County Sheriff’s Office

and Harford County Detention Center as “Harford County Defendants.” The Court will

refer to Defendants Capasso, Licato, Majewski, Jeric, Bliss, Norton, Seman, Kalambihis,

DiBartolo, Robinson, Meador, Goins, and Does 1 to 20 collectively as “Individual

Defendants.”

2 Also pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the original

Complaint (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36); a Motion for Leave to File Audio

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations3

Plaintiff Rodney Coster (“Coster”) was diagnosed with Bipolar I Disorder decades

ago. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 37). On January 10, 2018, Coster went to visit his mother,

Sharon Coster (“Ms. Coster”) for her birthday. (Id.). Coster is just over five feet tall and,

at the time of the visit, was unarmed, over fifty years old, and weighed approximately 145

pounds. (Id. ¶ 3). Coster was not making sense upon his arrival and Ms. Coster immediately

determined that he was having a mental health crisis. (Id. ¶ 1). Ms. Coster persuaded her

son to drive her to the Harford County Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff’s Office”), located at

the Harford County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”), so that she could get him

help. (Id.).

Coster and his mother arrived at the Detention Center around 8:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 52).

After arriving, they waited in the car until Defendants Licato and Majewski pulled up in

front of them in a police cruiser. (Id. ¶ 2). Ms. Coster approached Licato and explained that

Recording as Exhibit (ECF No. 58); and a Motion for Leave to File Surreply (ECF No. 64).

The original Motions to Dismiss were rendered moot by Coster’s Amended Complaint

(ECF No. 37). See Venable v. Pritzker, No. GLR-13-1867, 2014 WL 2452705, at *5

(D.Md. May 30, 2014) (“When a plaintiff files an amended complaint, it generally moots

any pending motions to dismiss because the original complaint is superseded.”), aff’d, 610

F.App’x 341 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motions to Dismiss the

original Complaint (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36) without prejudice as moot.

For reasons set forth in more detail below, the Court will grant the Motion for Leave to

File Audio Recording as Exhibit and the Motion for Leave to File Surreply.

3 Unless otherwise noted, the Court takes the following facts from the Amended

Complaint and accepts them as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Coster “was bipolar and was not taking his medicine,” and asked them to assist in

“connecting him with trained mental health professionals.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 54). She tried to

provide Licato additional details, but he left and approached the driver’s side of the car,

where Coster was seated. (Id. ¶¶ 54–55).

Licato was joined by Majewski and the two of them began questioning Coster. (Id.

¶¶ 4, 56). Coster “responded in the manner of a person in the midst of an acute mental

health crisis by saying that no one could help him and repeating over and over, largely to

himself, that ‘everything’s going to be [okay].’” (Id.). Majewski and Licato then “briefly

tried to pull Mr. Coster out of the car,” but Coster “resisted passively, shrinking away from

the officers and seeking to avoid being pulled out of the vehicle.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 58). Seconds

after this initial attempt, Majewski “drew his Taser, aimed it at Mr. Coster, and repeatedly

tased him.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 59). After the Taser barbs “impaled” Coster, Majewski “delivered

four Taser cycles (lasting 5 seconds, 2 seconds, 3 seconds and 5 seconds) over the

following 20 seconds.” (Id. ¶ 60). Majewski then hit Coster with a Taser “stun drive,”

“appl[ying] the Taser directly to Mr. Coster’s leg, point blank, for 3 seconds.” (Id. ¶ 61).

Majewski and Licato then removed Coster from the car and pulled his sweatshirt

over his head. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 77–78). While Coster was “doubled over and at times lying on the

asphalt next to the car,” “one of the deputies repeatedly punched and kneed Mr. Coster,

including delivering several overhand ‘hammer-fist’ punches to the back of Mr. Coster’s

head.” (Id. ¶ 6). Majewski and Licato then moved Coster onto an adjacent lawn and, in

doing so, “caused his pants to fall down—exposing him in front of his mother.” (Id. ¶ 7).

Within seconds of moving Coster onto the lawn, “a total of at least seven Individual

Defendants piled on top of Mr. Coster, including, but not limited to, Warden Capasso,

Deputies Majewski and Licato, and on information and belief, Defendants Jeric, Bliss,

Norton, Robinson, Seman, and Kalambihis.” (Id. ¶ 8). Coster was unable to move under

the weight. (Id.). Despite this, “Majewski continued to punch Mr. Coster while kneeling

on his head and neck, while other Individual Defendants in the dogpile were striking Mr.

Coster with their fists and knees.” (Id.).

After several minutes, unspecified Individual Defendants put Coster in handcuffs

and leg irons. (Id. ¶ 9). Despite this restraint, “several of the Individual Defendants

continued to stand on Mr. Coster and to kneel on his back, neck and head,” while other

Individual Defendants milled around and watched. (Id.). After about five minutes, medical

personnel arrived on the scene and walked toward Coster, but rather than allowing them

access to Coster, Individual Defendants turned the medical personnel away. (Id. ¶ 10).

Approximately five minutes after the medical personnel left, Individual Defendants

stood Coster up and left him standing for an additional fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶ 11). At this

time, two Individual Defendants “lifted Mr. Coster off the ground by his elbows while his

arms were still cuffed behind his back” and “marched him toward the Harford County

Detention Center.” (Id. ¶ 12). Coster describes this as a “stress position” that is “highly

painful and very likely to result in injuries.” (Id.). The manner in which they were carrying

Coster caused him to flip over, so the two Individual Defendants “carried him across the

parking lot into the Harford County Detention Center upside down with his face just a few

inches above the pavement.” (Id. ¶ 13).

Coster sustained a number of injuries during the altercation: “his left shoulder was

dislocated, he had extensive lacerations and bruising, including a bruised and/or fractured

rib, his clothes were bloodied, and his glasses were broken.” (Id. ¶ 96). Coster believes the

dislocation of his shoulder occurred during the “frog march[]” he endured while

handcuffed. (Id. ¶ 12, 91). According to Coster, at no time during the course of these events

did he fight or otherwise actively resist the Individual Defendants. (Id. ¶ 14).

On January 11, 2018, Goins, Meador, and DiBartolo transported Coster to the

hospital to treat the injuries he sustained the previous day. (Id. ¶ 16). During the procedure

to repair his dislocated shoulder, hospital staff asked that Coster change positions. (Id.

¶ 108). When he did so, hospital staff began to tighten a weighted medical device used to

relocate the shoulder. (Id.). This caused Coster to become “extremely agitated,” and he

“yelled and tried to pull away from the hospital staff.” (Id.). Meador asserted that Coster

kicked him during this incident, but Coster states that if he did so, it was inadvertent and

caused by him reacting to the painful medical procedure. (Id. ¶ 109).

Coster believes that in response, one of the Individual Defendants instructed

hospital staff to exit the room. After they left, “Goins began striking Mr. Coster in the face

while the other two other Individual Defendants pinned him to the bed. By the end of the

incident, Mr. Coster’s face and chest were bloody, and his clothing had to be cut away and

discarded.” (Id. ¶ 111).

2. Criminal Proceedings

In their Motions to Dismiss and Replies, Defendants provide the Court copies of

records detailing criminal charges that were brought against Coster. (See Docket Entries

for State v. Coster, Dist. Ct. for Harford County, Case No. 2R00113766 [“Jan. 10 Crim.

Docket”], ECF No. 43-2; Docket Entries for State v. Coster, Dist. Ct. for Harford County,

Case No. 2R00113778 [“Jan. 11 Crim. Docket”], ECF No. 43-3; Incident Report for Jan.

10, 2018 Arrest [“Incident Report”], ECF No. 46-2; Transcript of May 14, 2018 Hr’g, State

v. Coster, Dist. Ct. for Harford County, Case Nos. 2R00113766, 2R00113778 [“Hr’g Tr.”],

ECF No. 57-3). The Court will take judicial notice of the existence of these documents and

the underlying proceedings for the purpose of reviewing Defendants’ Motions.4 Because

the Court will take judicial notice of these documents, it will also grant County Defendants’

Motion for Leave to File Audio Recording as Exhibit (ECF No. 58), which merely presents

4 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court may take judicial notice of a fact

only if it is “one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

Evidence or testimony from another litigation can reasonably be questioned. See Int’l Star

Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1998).

Thus, “courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts, . . . not for

the truth of the matters asserted . . . , but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and

related filings.” Sher v. Luxury Mortg. Corp., No. ELH-11-3656, 2012 WL 5869303, at *7

(D.Md. Nov. 19, 2012) (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.

1991)). In other words, “[t]here is an important distinction between taking judicial notice

of documents filed in other courts and using judicial notice to bind a party to the truth of

the matters asserted in the court filings. The latter is not typically permitted.” See Veteran

Constructors, Inc. v. Beeler Barney & Assocs. Masonry Contractors, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-

64-F, 2014 WL 4199238, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2014). In the context of a criminal

proceeding, this Court has held that it may take judicial notice of the plea, but not its

contents. See Sher, 2012 WL 5869303, at *6–8.

Here, the Court will take judicial notice of the fact of the underlying state

proceedings but need not accept as true any statements or conclusions reached in those

proceedings. Thus, the Court will take notice of the fact that the State read its version of

events into the record in Coster’s criminal proceeding, but will not treat the State’s version

of events as true.

the Court with an alternate format through which to review Coster’s May 14, 2018 hearing

at the District Court for Harford County.

The documents provided by Defendants reflect that criminal charges were filed

against Coster for the incidents on January 10 and 11, 2018. With respect to the January

10, 2018 incident outside the Detention Center, Coster was charged with two counts of

second-degree assault, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of assault on a law

enforcement officer. (See Jan. 10 Crim. Docket at 3–4). Of these, one of the counts for

second-degree assault count and the resisting arrest count were placed on the “stet docket,”

and the remaining count for assault on a law enforcement officer was nolle prosequi. (Id.).

With respect to the January 11, 2018 incident at the hospital, Coster was charged with one

count of second-degree assault, one count of assault on a Detention Center employee, and

one count of resisting arrest. (See Jan. 11 Crim. Docket at 3). Of these charges, the second-

degree assault count was placed on the stet docket, and the remaining counts for assault on

a detention center employee and resisting arrest were nolle prosequi. (Id.).

With respect to the remaining count for second-degree assault arising from the

January 10, 2018 incident, Coster pleaded not guilty with an agreed statement of facts.

(Hr’g Tr. at 13). The prosecutor read the following statement of facts into the record:

On January 10, 2018, deputies responded to the detention

center located on Rock Spring Road in Harford County,

Maryland in reference to a domestic disturbance.

While en route, the deputies were advised that the

subjects were seated in a white passenger vehicle near the

flagpole towards the public entrance of the detention center.

Upon arrival, deputies located that vehicle and the two subjects

near the public entrance. They made contact with the male

seated in the driver’s seat of the vehicle, who they identified as

the defendant seated to my left at trial table with counsel. The

female subject was outside of the vehicle.

Deputy Licato was attempting to interview the

defendant, who wouldn’t answer any questions and kept

repeating that everything was okay. While Deputy Licato was

interviewing the defendant, the defendant dropped his left hand

out of sight, as if reaching for something. At this time, Deputy

Licato repeatedly ordered the defendant to show his hands, but

the defendant was noncompliant.

After repeating the order several times to no avail, the

deputy, along with Deputy Majewski opened the driver’s door

and ordered the defendant to exit the vehicle. The defendant

refused to exit and began to try to kick and punch at Deputy

Licato and Deputy Majewski. Both deputies tried to grab the

defendant to remove him from the vehicle, but he kept kicking

at the deputies.

At this point and after numerous warnings that he would

be tased if he continued to resist, Deputy Majewski deployed

his taser, the probes struck the defendant in the abdomen area

and were close in proximity to each other so they had minimal

effect on the defendant. Both deputies continued to try and

restrain the defendant. And after the deputies arrived with --

and at that time, other deputies arrived to assist in placing the

defendant in handcuffs. As a result of the incident, Deputy

Licato sustained a significant injury to his upper body area

including his arm, which required transportation by EMS for

medical treatment. He also received scratches around his eye

area.

The State would be entering into evidence photos of the

defendant and the vehicle – You’ve seen those. – and then

pictures of Deputy Licato.

And while he’s looking through the photos, I would

state for the record that all events did occur in Harford County,

Maryland and all witnesses called would identify the defendant

as the person who assaulted Deputy Licato on that day.

(Id. at 22–24). After the prosecutor finished reading the statement of facts, counsel for

Coster responded, “we agree that the State’s witnesses would have testified consistently

with the facts that the prosecutor just read into the record.” (Id. at 24). Based on the

statement of facts, the court found Coster guilty of one count of second-degree assault. (Id.

at 25). The court sentenced Coster to three years’ confinement, with two years and 240

days of the sentence suspended. (Id. at 39; Jan. 10 Crim. Docket at 3).

B. Procedural History

Coster filed this action on January 8, 2021. (ECF No. 1). Defendants filed Motions

to Dismiss the original Complaint on April 16, 2021. (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,

36). Coster responded to the Motions by filing an Amended Complaint on May 7, 2021.

(ECF No. 37).

In his ten-count Amended Complaint, Coster alleges: Failure to Provide Reasonable

Accommodations in Violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), against the State and Harford County Defendants (Count I);

Failure to Train in Violation of Title II of ADA against the State and Harford County

Defendants (Count II); Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29

U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (the “Rehabilitation Act”), against the State and Harford County

Defendants (Count III); Unreasonable Seizure in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

against the Individual Defendants (Count IV); Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth

Amendment against the Individual Defendants (Count V); Excessive Force in Violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment against Meador, Goins, and DiBartolo (Count VI); False Arrest

in violation of Maryland Common Law against the Individual Defendants (Count VII);

Battery in violation of Maryland Common Law against the Individual Defendants (Count

VIII); Battery in Violation of Maryland Common Law against Meador, Goins, and

DiBartolo (Count IX); and Bystander Liability in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments against the Individual Defendants (Count X). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 115–90).

Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, statutory and actual damages,

attorneys’ fees and costs, and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. ¶¶ 191–204).

On May 25, 2021, Board Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 43). On May 28, 2021, County Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 46). Coster filed Oppositions to both Motions on June 18,

2021. (ECF Nos. 51, 52). The State and County Defendants filed Replies on July 9, 2021.

(ECF Nos. 57, 59). County Defendants accompanied their Reply with a Motion for Leave

to File Audio Recording as Exhibit (ECF No. 58). Coster filed an Opposition to the Motion

on July 23, 2021, (ECF No. 60), and County Defendants filed a Reply on August 6, 2021,

(ECF No. 63). Coster also filed Motion for Leave to File Surreply to the State’s Reply on

August 6, 2021, along with a proposed Surreply. (ECF Nos. 64, 64-1). The State filed an

Opposition on August 20, 2021. (ECF No. 65).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint,”

not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of

defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v.

City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if

it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Though the plaintiff is

not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of the claim, the complaint must

allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d

445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.

2012)), aff’d, 546 F.App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a

whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268

(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). But the court need not accept unsupported or

conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United

Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979), or legal conclusions couched

as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. Analysis

1. Arguments Raised in Defendants’ Replies

Coster argues that this Court should decline to consider certain arguments raised for

the first time in Defendants’ Replies. Specifically, Coster objects to the Court considering

Defendants’ arguments that his claims are barred under the doctrines of judicial notice or

judicial estoppel, or under the Supreme Court holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994). (See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. Leave File Audio Recording as Ex.

[“Opp’n Mot. Leave”] at 7, ECF No. 60; Pl.’s Surreply Mem. Opp’n State Md.’s Mot.

Dismiss Am. Compl. [“Surreply to State”] at 2, ECF No. 64-1).

This Court has held that “[b]y failing to raise and argue [a] point in their initial

Motion, Defendants waived it.” Rose v. Harloe Mgmt. Corp., No. GLR-16-761, 2017 WL

193295, at *6 n.3 (D.Md. Jan. 17, 2017); see also Clawson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,

Inc., 451 F.Supp.2d 731, 734 (D.Md. 2006) (“The ordinary rule in federal courts is that an

argument raised for the first time in a reply brief or memorandum will not be considered.”);

Sher v. Luxury Mortg. Corp., No. ELH-11-3656, 2012 WL 5869303, at *9 n.11 (D.Md.

Nov. 19, 2012) (concluding defendant’s argument was waived because defendant did not

raise it until reply brief). But as Defendants correctly counter, “the power to decline

consideration of such arguments is discretionary, and courts are not precluded from

considering such issues in appropriate circumstances.” Clawson, 451 F.Supp.2d at 734.

“The concern that the ordinary rule addresses is ‘that [an] opposing party would be

prejudiced by an advocate arguing an issue without an opportunity for the opponent to

respond.’” Id. at 735 (quoting United States v. Head, 340 F.3d 628, 630 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003)).

Defendants argue that considering the arguments advanced in Defendants’ Replies

will not prejudice Plaintiff. According to Defendants, Coster was on notice “since as early

as April 2021” that Defendants were seeking to obtain materials related to the underlying

criminal proceeding and, indeed, made several arguments relating to that proceeding in

their original Motions. (Cnty. Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Leave File Audio Recording

as Ex. [“Reply Mot. Leave”] at 9, ECF No. 63). County Defendants further note that their

arguments relating to judicial estoppel were “closely related” to the Heck arguments

County Defendants made in their original Motion. (Id.). Finally, Defendants note that

through Coster’s Surreply and his Opposition to County Defendants’ Motion for Leave,

Coster had the opportunity to contest any arguments raised for the first time in Defendants’

Replies.

The Court agrees with Defendants. While the ordinary rule is that the Court will not

consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply, this situation warrants departure

from that rule. First, Defendants previewed their intent to rely on materials relating to

Coster’s criminal proceeding and seek to exclude Coster’s claims on that basis in both of

their Motions to Dismiss. (See State Md.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl.

[“State Mot.”] at 10 n.5, ECF No. 43-1; Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl.

[“Cnty. Defs.’ Mot.”] at 6–12, ECF No. 46-1). Indeed, Coster’s argument is particularly

unpersuasive in the context of County Defendants, whose Motion contains detailed Heck

arguments relating to Coster’s conviction. Second, the Court will grant Coster’s Motion

for Leave to File Surreply (ECF No. 64) regarding the State’s Motion and, as County

Defendants argue, “[t]he instant Motion for Leave gave Plaintiff opportunity to file what

is, in essence, a surreply to the Motion to Dismiss.” (Reply Mot. Leave at 9). Perhaps most

critically, the Court will not dismiss Coster’s claims on the basis of arguments raised for

the first time in either of Defendants’ Replies. Accordingly, Coster has not been prejudiced

by the Court’s consideration of those arguments.5

2. Judicial Estoppel

According to Defendants, “[w]ell-settled principles of judicial estoppel bar Coster

from relying on any allegations in his amended complaint that are inconsistent with his

judicial admissions in his criminal case.” (State Md.’s Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss

Am. Compl. [“State Reply”] at 6, ECF No. 59; see also Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Cnty. Defs.’

Mot. Dismiss [“Cnty. Reply”] at 5 (“Judicial Estoppel and Heck Foreclose Plaintiff’s

Ability To Proceed[.]”), ECF No. 57). At bottom, the Court disagrees and will not bar

Coster’s claims under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

“The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from adopting a position

inconsistent with a position taken in prior litigation.” Tyree v. Baltimore Cnty., No. RDB-

10-1084, 2011 WL 836427, at *2 (D.Md. Mar. 4, 2011) (citing Zinkand v. Brown, 478

F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 2007)). “The purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent litigants

from ‘playing fast and loose with the courts, and to protect the essential integrity of the

judicial process.’” Id. (quoting Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1996)). A

5 For similar reasons, the Court will grant County Defendant’s Motion for Leave to

File Audio Recording as Exhibit (ECF No. 58). The audio recording in question is merely

an audio version of the transcript attached to the State’s Reply. As set forth in Section I.A.2,

supra, the Court will take judicial notice of these documents but will not accept their

contents as true.

court should find that judicial estoppel bars a plaintiff’s claims if the defendant establishes

that: “(1) [plaintiff’s] positions are inconsistent, (2) [plaintiff’s] prior inconsistent position

must have been accepted by the tribunal in the prior proceeding, and (3) [plaintiff] must

have acted in bad faith, intentionally misleading either court to gain an unfair advantage.”

Id. (citing Zinkand, 478 F.3d at 638).

Defendants argue that, insofar as Coster’s claims are premised on allegations that

are inconsistent with the statement of facts read into the record in his criminal proceeding,

those claims should be judicially estopped. As Section I.A, supra, makes plain, certain of

Coster’s allegations in this case do clearly conflict with the statement of facts read into the

record in his criminal proceeding. This Court has held that plaintiffs who previously

pleaded not guilty with an agreed statement of facts are judicially estopped from later

advancing a civil claim premised on allegations inconsistent with those facts. See, e.g.,

Tyree, 2011 WL 836427, at *3.

Some context will demonstrate how the facts in this case are materially

distinguishable from those presented in the Court’s opinion in Tyree. “Amidst the spectrum

between not guilty pleas and guilty pleas, there exists the hybrid plea,” through which a

party proceeds “[b]y pleading not guilty and agreeing to the proffer of stipulated evidence

or an agreed statement of facts.” Bishop v. State, 7 A.3d 1074, 1085 (Md. 2010). But as

the Court of Special Appeals explained and the Court of Appeals adopted:

There is a distinction between an agreed statement of facts and

evidence offered by way of stipulation. Under an agreed

statement of facts both [the] State and the defense agree as to

the ultimate facts. Then the facts are not in dispute, and there

can be, by definition, no factual conflict. The trier of fact is not

called upon to determine the facts as the agreement is to the

truth of the ultimate facts themselves. There is no fact-finding

function left to perform. To render judgment, the court simply

applies the law to the facts agreed upon. . . .

On the other hand, when evidence is offered by way of

stipulation, there is no agreement as to the facts which the

evidence seeks to establish. Such a stipulation only goes to the

content of the testimony of a particular witness if he were to

appear and testify. The agreement is to what the evidence will

be, not to what the facts are. Thus, the evidence adduced by

such a stipulation may well be in conflict with other evidence

received.

Id. at 1085–86 (quoting Barnes v. State, 354 A.2d 499, 505–06 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1976)).

But the Court of Appeals cautioned that “a determination of whether a proffer is stipulated

evidence or an agreed statement of facts is a matter of substance over form.” Id. at 1086.

The court further noted that on multiple prior occasions, it had held that a “case that

proceeded on what the court, prosecutor, and defense counsel referred to as a ‘not guilty

statement of facts’” was nevertheless a stipulation of evidence where “the parties were

merely stipulating as to what the testimony would be at trial.” Id. at 1086–87 (citing Bruno

v. State, 632 A.2d 1192, 1194, 1201 (Md. 1993); Taylor v. State, 879 A.2d 1074, 1079–80

(2005)).

Defendants argue that this case involves an agreed statement of facts rather than

stipulated evidence and, in support thereof, point to the numerous times at the hearing

where counsel for Coster asserted that Coster was pleading “not guilty, agreed statement

of facts.” But this is precisely the argument rejected by the Court of Appeals in Bishop. In

Bishop, rather than agreeing to the statement of facts recounted by the prosecutor, the

defense counsel responded “that the ‘defense would agree that the young ladies would

testify as such,’ and the State’s characterization of [a witness’s] statement as how she

‘would have testified had this gone to trial.’” Id. at 1089. Similarly, here, after the

prosecutor concluded reading the statement of facts into the record, counsel for Coster

responded, “we agree that the State’s witnesses would have testified consistently with the

facts that the prosecutor just read into the record.” (Hr’g Tr. at 24). Apart from pleading

“not guilty agreed statement of facts,” neither Coster nor his counsel ever expressly

conceded that the statement of facts the prosecution read into the record was true. In

Bishop, the Court of Appeals found that this language, “despite the label affixed to this

plea,” made “clear that the parties had no agreement as to the ultimate facts of the case and,

at best, were stipulating to the evidence that the State would have presented at trial.”

Bishop, 7 A.3d at 1089.

The Court similarly finds here that Coster merely stipulated as to the evidence the

State would present against him in his criminal proceeding. Because Coster did not agree

to the truth or accuracy of the statement of facts entered into the record by the prosecutor

in the criminal proceeding, those statements cannot constitute a “prior inconsistent

position” that conflicts with Coster’s allegations in this case. Accordingly, Coster’s claims

are not subject to judicial estoppel.

3. Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages

for . . . harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal” or otherwise invalidated. 512 U.S. at 486–87.6 Some claims, however, do

not necessarily imply the validity of a conviction or sentence, and therefore Heck does not

bar them. See Marcantoni v. Bealefeld, 734 F.App’x 198, 199 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that

Heck did not bar the plaintiff’s § 1983 suit for damages for an unreasonable search under

the Fourth Amendment, even though evidence from the search was introduced at a criminal

trial that resulted in the plaintiff’s unreversed conviction (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 &

n.7)).

The State argues that the Heck doctrine bars Counts I, II, and III of the Amended

Complaint, and County Defendants argue that Heck bars Counts IV, VII, and VIII. At

bottom, the Court finds that Counts IV and VII are barred by Heck, but will permit the

balance of the Amended Complaint to survive a Heck challenge at the motion to dismiss

stage.

As an initial matter, it does not matter in the Heck context that Coster pleaded not

guilty, i.e., that he did not concede the truth of the allegations against him in the criminal

proceeding. “[T]he Heck doctrine derives from the existence of a valid conviction, not the

mechanism by which the conviction was obtained . . . .” Havens v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 776,

784 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting distinction between a guilty plea and an Alford plea). Thus,

“the dispositive question in determining whether Heck applies” is whether a finding that

defendants are civilly liable under the claims advanced by Coster would “necessarily call

6 Neither party argues that Coster’s criminal conviction for second-degree assault

was reversed on appeal or otherwise invalidated.

into question the validity of [Coster’s] conviction.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 398

(5th Cir. 2006).

Here, the statement of facts on which Judge Cooper of the District Court for Harford

County, Maryland found Coster guilty did not describe any events that took place on

January 11, 2018; indeed, Judge Cooper did not find Coster guilty of an assault that

occurred on that day. Thus, Heck clearly does not foreclose claims arising from actions

that occurred on January 11, 2018. Heck also clearly does not foreclose a finding in

Coster’s favor regarding events that occurred on January 10, 2018, after the fact narrative

described in the underlying proceeding, i.e., after Coster was placed in handcuffs. This

includes the dislocation of Coster’s shoulder.

At the motion to dismiss stage, rather than parsing out specific factual allegations

in each count of the Amended Complaint that may require a finding inconsistent with

Coster’s guilty verdict, the Court will decline to dismiss on the basis of Heck those counts

that are premised, in whole or in part, on allegations that Coster could prove without

invalidating his conviction. See Tolley v. Rockbridge Reg’l Drug Task Force, No. 7:19-

CV-00863, 2020 WL 2499705, at *5 (W.D.Va. May 14, 2020) (finding that plaintiff “does

not plead facts in his complaint here that are inconsistent with guilt, at least as to most of

his claims. . . . Upon further factual development, though, the result under Heck might be

different.”); see also Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cnty., 777 F.3d 186, 198 (4th Cir. 2015)

(“Because we cannot make this determination on the record, we hold that Heck does not

bar any of [plaintiff’s] claims for purposes of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. We leave

it to the district court on remand to decide at summary judgment whether Heck bars any of

[plaintiff’s] claims.”). Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Counts I, II, III, V, VI,

VIII, IX, and X—all of which are premised, in part or in whole, on allegations that Coster

could prove without invalidating his conviction—on the basis of Heck. At the summary

judgment stage, with the factual record more fully developed, Defendants may again move

for judgment in their favor on Coster’s surviving claims on the basis that a finding in his

favor on those claims would necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction.

Certain of Coster’s claims, however, clearly cannot survive a Heck challenge even

at this early stage of the litigation. Specifically, Coster’s claims for unreasonable seizure

and false arrest (Counts IV and VII) are barred by Heck. This is so because those claims

rest on, inter alia, allegations that Defendants did not “have a warrant or probable cause to

arrest or detain Mr. Coster,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 153), and “effect[ed] an initial detention of

Mr. Coster without cause,” (id. ¶ 175). Critically, these are not superfluous allegations, but

rather, are elemental to those claims. See Smith v. Aita, No. CCB-14-3487, 2016 WL

3693713, at *3 (D.Md. July 12, 2016) (“To demonstrate false arrest, a plaintiff must show

that he was arrested without probable cause.”), aff’d, 711 F.App’x 163 (4th Cir. 2018);

Osborne v. Georgiades, No. RDB-14-182, 2015 WL 6447503, at *4 (D.Md. Oct. 23, 2015)

(“If a plaintiff alleges that police officers seized him ‘pursuant to legal process that was not

supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor,’

then he has sufficiently stated a claim for unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

Amendment.” (quoting Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir.

1996))), aff’d, 679 F.App’x 234 (4th Cir. 2017).

Coster argues that these claims may survive and directs the Court’s attention to

multiple Fourth Circuit cases finding that “[a] claim for false arrest . . . does not by its

nature call into question the validity of a conviction.” Dizzley v. Garrett, 836 F.App’x 157,

158 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 767 (7th Cir. 2007)); see

also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A] charge that

probable cause for a warrantless arrest was lacking, and thus that the seizure was

unconstitutional, would not necessarily implicate the validity of a subsequently obtained

conviction—at least in the usual case.”). The Court does not dispute the continued vitality

of these precedents. But the fact a claim for false arrest does not necessarily implicate the

validity of a conviction does not mean that a claim for false arrest cannot implicate the

validity of a conviction.

In this case, a finding in Coster’s favor as to Counts IV and VII would, in fact,

necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction. Indeed, in Heck, the Supreme Court

provides a specific example of “a § 1983 action that does not seek damages directly

attributable to conviction or confinement but whose successful prosecution would

necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s criminal conviction was wrongful.” Heck, 512 U.S. at

487 n.6. The Heck Court’s example of such an unviable claim is as follows:

A state defendant is convicted of and sentenced for the crime

of resisting arrest, defined as intentionally preventing a peace

officer from effecting a lawful arrest. (This is a common

definition of that offense.) He then brings a § 1983 action

against the arresting officer, seeking damages for violation of

his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

seizures. In order to prevail in this § 1983 action, he would

have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been

convicted. Regardless of the state law concerning res judicata,

the § 1983 action will not lie.

Id. (citations omitted). Counts IV and VII in this action closely resemble the example

provided by the Supreme Court in Heck.

The state court found Coster guilty of assault in the second degree. (Hr’g Tr. at 25).

Coster argues that Defendants lacked probable cause for the arrest following the assault. In

Maryland, probable cause exists if the evidence before the law enforcement officer is

“sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the

circumstances shown, that the suspect [has] committed . . . an offense.” Gray v. State, No.

CCB-02-0385, 2004 WL 2191705, at *6 (D.Md. Sept. 24, 2004) (quoting Porterfield v.

Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998)). Whether there is probable cause depends on the

totality of the circumstances. Gilliam v. Sealey, 932 F.3d 216, 234 (4th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017)). “While probable cause

requires more than bare suspicion, it requires less than that evidence necessary to

convict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998)). “It is an

objective standard of probability that reasonable and prudent persons apply in everyday

life.” Id. (quoting Gray, 137 F.3d at 769). Whether probable cause to arrest exists is based

only on the information the officers had at the time of the arrest. Id. (first citing Munday,

848 F.3d at 253; then citing Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016)). The

court does not consider “the subjective beliefs of the arresting officers to determine whether

they thought that the facts constituted probable cause.” Id. (quoting Munday, 848 F.3d at

253).

Here, the state court found Coster guilty of second-degree assault on the basis of

certain actions that occurred prior to his arrest. Specifically, the state court made its

judgment based on stipulated evidence that, inter alia: Coster “dropped his left hand out of

sight, as if reaching for something,” and after Licato “repeatedly ordered [Coster] to show

his hands,” Coster “was noncompliant,” (Hr’g Tr. at 23); Coster “refused to exit [the

vehicle] and began to try to kick and punch at Deputy Licato and Deputy Majewski,” and

after they tried to remove him “kept kicking at the deputies,” (id.); and that Coster was

only tased “after numerous warnings that he would be tased if he continued to resist,” (id.).

Those actions, which the state court determined were witnessed by and, indeed, inflicted

on, the arresting officers, provided probable cause for the arrest.7 Accordingly, the Court

cannot find that Defendants lacked probable cause without necessarily calling into question

the validity of Coster’s conviction. As a result, Counts IV and VII, which require a finding

that Defendants lacked probable cause, are barred by Heck.

4. Claims Against Harford County Sheriff’s Office and Detention Center

As Defendants correctly argue, Maryland courts have long recognized that a county

sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued. See, e.g., Kronk v. Carroll Cnty.,

No. L-11-0277, 2012 WL 245059, at *6 (D.Md. Jan. 25, 2012) (“In Maryland, it is well

established that the office of a county sheriff is not an agency susceptible of being sued.”);

Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121, 128 n.9 (Md. 1991) (“Neither the Constitution nor any other

7 Coster’s argument that he “does not challenge his seizure and arrest for the

misdemeanor assault conviction,” but rather some undefined and apparently separate event

that happened beforehand, (see Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss [“Opp’n to

Cnty.”] at 30, 31, ECF No. 51), is mystifying and ultimately unpersuasive.

provision of law of which we are aware creates a governmental agency known as the

‘Sheriff’s Department.’ Consequently, . . . [it] is not an entity capable of being sued.”);

Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1071 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2004) (holding that “the Harford

County Sheriff’s Office is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued and,

consequently it was properly dismissed as a defendant”). Likewise, a county detention

center operated by a sheriff is also not subject to suit. See McMahon v. Cnty. Comm’rs of

Kent Cnty., No. JFM-13-490, 2013 WL 2285378, at *3 (D.Md. May 21, 2013). Coster does

not appear to contest this point in his Opposition. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss

Coster’s claims against the Harford County Sheriff’s Office and Detention Center.

5. Claims Against the State

In its Motion, the State argues that it is not a proper defendant for a claim under the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In its Reply, however, the State agrees to “concede to the

status as the ‘proper nominal defendant’ for purposes of Counts I through III only.” (State

Reply at 18–19).8 Indeed, as courts in this state have regularly held, “for purposes of civil

liability, Maryland courts ordinarily treat sheriffs as state officials.” Ensor v. Jenkins, No.

ELH-20-1266, 2021 WL 1139760, at *22 (D.Md. Mar. 25, 2021) (citing cases). And “this

Court has often taken the view that Maryland sheriffs are State, not county, actors.” Id.

(citing cases). Moreover, “public entities are liable under principles of respondeat

superior for their employees’ violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.” Paulone v.

City of Frederick, 787 F.Supp.2d 360, 377 (D.Md. 2011). Thus, this Court has held that

8 Counts I through III are the only counts in the Amended Complaint listing the

State as a Defendant.

“the State is the proper defendant for plaintiff’s [ADA and Rehabilitation Act] claims.” Id.

The State’s arguments urging the Court to reverse this position are unavailing.

Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the State on the basis that is it not a proper

defendant in this action.

The State nevertheless urges the Court to hold that “in the event of any payment of

a settlement or judgment by the State in this case,” the Court direct that payment of such

settlement or judgment be made “from any tax which has been appropriated in the State

budget to Harford County, or direct payment from Harford County’s share of any income

tax collected by the State Comptroller.” (State Reply at 19). That question is not ripe before

the Court and the Court declines to issue an advisory opinion. See Maryland v. United

States, 360 F.Supp.3d 288, 316 (D.Md. 2019) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96

(1968)). Accordingly, the Court will not rule at this time on the source of any payments the

State may make upon the resolution of this dispute.

6. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

The State argues that Coster has failed to state a claim under the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act because “in circumstances such as those described in the [Amended

Complaint], law enforcement officers are not required to stop, reflect upon, and

accommodate a person’s disability. They are permitted, instead, to quickly gain control of

what is confronting them.” (State Mot. at 15). Coster counters that courts in this circuit

“have repeatedly held that where, as here, officers fail, in the context of making an arrest,

to reasonably accommodate a disabled citizen’s needs, the officers violate the ADA.” (Pl.’s

Mem. Opp’n Def. State Md.’s Mot. Dismiss [“Opp’n to State”] at 12, ECF No. 52). At

bottom, the Court agrees with Coster and will decline to dismiss his claims under the ADA

and the Rehabilitation Act.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides

that no qualified individual with a disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,

be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he scope of liability under the

ADA is generally the same as that under the Rehabilitation Act.” Wood v. Md. Dep’t of

Transp., 732 F.App’x 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2018).

To state a claim under these statutes, a plaintiff must allege plausible facts to

establish that “(1) she has a disability, (2) she is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits

of a public service, program, or activity, and (3) she was excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated

against, on the basis of her disability.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason

Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005). The State does not contest that Coster’s bipolar

disorder qualifies as a disability or that he is otherwise qualified to receive law enforcement

services. Rather, the State asserts that Coster has failed to state a claim as to the third prong.

The Fourth Circuit has recognized two legal theories supporting Title II disability

discrimination claims in the context of police investigations and arrests: “(1) wrongful

arrest, where police arrest a suspect based on his disability, not for any criminal activity;

and (2) reasonable accommodation, where police properly arrest a suspect but fail to

reasonably accommodate his disability during the investigation or arrest, causing him to

suffer greater injury or indignity than other arrestees.” Waller ex rel. Est. of Hunt v.

Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 2009). “The requirement of ‘reasonable

accommodation’ in the Title II context derives from the statute’s reference to ‘reasonable

modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication,

or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services.’” Paulone, 787

F.Supp.2d at 371 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)). Applicable regulations require, inter alia,

that public entities “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures

when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,

unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would

fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.130(b)(7). But “[a] reasonable modification does not require the public entity to

employ any and all means to make services available to persons with disabilities.” Miller

v. Hinton, 288 F.App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008). Rather, the reasonableness of a requested

accommodation is determined by the totality of the circumstances; “whether the service,

program, or activity operated or owned by the public entity, ‘when viewed in its entirety,’

is readily accessible.” Levy v. Mote, 104 F.Supp.2d 538, 543–544 (D.Md. 2000) (quoting

Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 87 F.Supp.2d 221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).

The State relies on Waller in urging this Court to find that Defendants lacked a duty

to accommodate Coster’s disability given the dangerous nature of the situation. Waller

involved a mentally ill individual who was shot and killed by police after barricading

himself in an apartment with a hostage. 556 F.3d at 173. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument

that the officers should have approached the situation in a more conciliatory manner, the

Fourth Circuit held that “it was unreasonable to expect the sorts of accommodations that

plaintiff proposes,” including “summoning mental health professionals and family

members and administering medication.” Waller, 556 F.3d at 175–76. Appearing to adopt

an “exigent circumstances” exception to the Title II duty to accommodate—albeit without

expressly doing so—the Fourth Circuit noted that “‘exigency’ is not confined to split-

second circumstances.” Id. at 175.9

Notwithstanding the State’s reliance on the case, the facts of Waller are so readily

distinguishable from those present in this case as to almost lend support to Coster. As the

Fourth Circuit described, in Waller, “[a]lthough the officers did not face an immediate

crisis, the situation was nonetheless unstable: the officers could not see or speak to [the

hostage], [the decedent] implied that he had weapons, and [the decedent] was growing

more and more agitated.” 556 F.3d at 175 (citation omitted). Indeed, prior to the officers

escalating the situation, the decedent yelled to an officer, “I’m going to blow your

goddamned head off.” Id. at 173. These facts bear little resemblance to the facts alleged by

9 The Fourth Circuit later clarified that “while there is no separate exigent-

circumstances inquiry, the consideration of exigent circumstances is included in the

determination of the reasonableness of the accommodation.” Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs Frederick Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit added

that it was “reluctant to question the snap judgments of law enforcement officials in

situations in which a reasonable officer would fear for his safety and for the safety of those

he is charged to protect.” Id. at 340.

Coster in this case, in which he was seated in a car, plainly visible to officers, and where

officers had no indication that he was in possession of a weapon or otherwise posed a threat.

(See Am. Compl. ¶ 54).

The Court views as instructive its opinion in Estate of Robert Ethan Saylor v. Regal

Cinemas, Inc., No. WMN-13-3089, 2016 WL 4721254 (D.Md. Sept. 9, 2016), aff’d sub

nom. Est. of Saylor v. Rochford, 698 F.App’x 72 (4th Cir. 2017). Saylor involved a twenty-

six-year-old man with Down syndrome who unlawfully attempted to watch a movie

without a ticket. Id. at *1. After a sheriff’s deputy asked Saylor to leave, Saylor cursed at

the deputy, became agitated, and said that he was “done talking” with the deputy. Id. at *3.

Saylor’s caretaker asked the Sheriff’s deputies to “wait him out”; instead, the deputies

forcibly removed Saylor from the theater. Id. at *2. Saylor died during the ensuing struggle.

Id. at *1. The Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that there

was “more than enough evidence” that deputies had failed to accommodate Saylor’s

disability by, inter alia, simply waiting. Id. at *18–19. The Court rejected defendant’s

argument based on the inherent dangerousness of the plaintiff as a mentally ill individual,

finding that in the absence of a concrete reason to believe that the plaintiff posed an

immediate threat of harm, there existed a dispute of fact as to whether the officers were

justified in removing him from the theater without further delay. Id. at *19.

Earlier in the Saylor case, the Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on the

basis that “simply waiting would have been the most logical accommodation.” Est. of

Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F.Supp.3d 409, 427 (D.Md. 2014). Similarly, here, on

the facts as alleged by Coster, the deputies could and arguably should have simply waited

for Coster to calm down. Moreover, the types of judgments the State calls on the Court to

make—specifically, that exigent circumstances existed compelling the officers to act

without delay—are not at all obvious on the face of the Amended Complaint and appear

far better suited to evaluation at summary judgment, and perhaps even left for the judgment

of a jury. As this Court has previously noted, “[a]ccording to the Fourth Circuit, ‘a

reasonable accommodation is one that is feasible or plausible,’ and ascertaining the

reasonableness of a proposed accommodation is a factual question” that is “certainly not

capable of resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” O’Reilly v. Bd. of Child Care of

United Methodist Church, Inc., No. JKB-20-0570, 2020 WL 5913242, at *4 (D.Md. Oct.

6, 2020) (quoting Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407, 414, 416 (4th Cir.

2013)); see also Sacchetti v. Gallaudet Univ., 181 F.Supp.3d 107, 130 (D.D.C. 2016)

(finding that whether “officers’ alleged conduct amounted to a denial of reasonable

accommodations for [plaintiff’s] disabilities is a question properly reserved for resolution

until a meaningful opportunity for discovery is provided”). Accordingly, the Court finds

that Coster has adequately alleged that the State, via its agents, had a duty to accommodate

Coster’s disability and failed to do so. As a result, the Court declines to dismiss Coster’s

claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

The State next argues that the Court should dismiss Coster’s claims under the ADA

and the Rehabilitation Act on the basis of the “direct threat” defense. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(3) (providing that the ADA does not require entities to “permit an individual

to participate in or benefit from the goods, services . . . and accommodations of such entity

where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others”). The Supreme

Court and Fourth Circuit have recognized 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) as establishing an

affirmative “direct threat” defense to an ADA claim. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002); Thomas v. The Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d

632, 640 (4th Cir. 2016).

District courts, however, do not resolve affirmative defenses on a motion to dismiss

unless all facts necessary to the defense “clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.”

Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). The State argues that the fact

of the direct threat posed by Coster is established by judicial estoppel as a result of the

statement of facts read into the record in Coster’s criminal proceeding. But as set forth in

Section II.B.2, supra, judicial estoppel does not apply to Coster’s claims in this case.

Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Coster’s claims at the motion to dismiss stage

on the basis of the State’s “direct threat” defense.10

7. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts IV, V, VI, and

X. Count IV has already been dismissed on Heck grounds. At bottom, the Court finds that

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the remaining counts.

10 The Court also notes that the State’s overheated rhetoric that Coster seeks to

“persuad[e] this Court to be the first to recognize victim-blaming suits under the ADA,”

(see, e.g., State Reply at 13), a characterization apparently designed to scandalize or shame

the Court into siding with the State, is tawdry and unavailing. The Court is applying the

law to the facts before it.

a. Standard

“Qualified immunity shields police officers who commit constitutional violations

from liability when, based on ‘clearly established law,’ they ‘could reasonably believe that

their actions were lawful.’” Est. of Jones by Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661,

667 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 537–38 (4th Cir.

2017)), as amended (June 10, 2020). Qualified immunity analysis requires courts to

conduct a two-step inquiry, asking, in either order: “(1) whether a constitutional violation

occurred; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id.

When determining whether a right is clearly established, “a court does not need to find ‘a

case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.’” Crouse v. Town of Moncks Corner, 848 F.3d 576,

583 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “The burden

of establishing a qualified immunity defense rests on the official asserting the defense.”

Wingate v. Fulford, 987 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 2021), as amended (Feb. 5, 2021) (citing

Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013)).

As to Counts V, VI, and X, Defendants argue that no constitutional violation

occurred and, even if a constitutional violation did occur, the law was not clearly

established at the time of the violation.

b. Count V (Excessive Force on January 10, 2018)

The Fourth Amendment prohibits officers from using excessive force in making an

arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989); Betton v. Belue, 942 F.3d 184,

191 (4th Cir. 2019); E.W. by and through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir.

2018); Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527–28 (4th Cir. 2003). A court analyzes whether

the amount of force used was reasonable by assessing the totality of the circumstances,

including “the severity of the underlying offense,” “whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others,” and “whether the suspect is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” E.W., 884 F.3d at 180–82. As the

Supreme Court has explained:

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . The calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police

officers are often required to make split second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—

about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

County Defendants argue that their use of force was reasonable. With respect to the

January 10, 2018 incident, however, County Defendants base their argument not on the

facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint, but rather, the facts as described in the January

10, 2018 Incident Report and the stipulated evidence read into the record in Coster’s

criminal proceeding. But those recitations of fact do not control the Court’s review of this

Motion. The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, on the other hand, clearly state a

claim for excessive force. Defendants encountered Coster not because of an underlying

offense, but because Coster’s mother prophylactically sought police intervention with

Coster’s mental health crisis. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54–55). Moreover, Coster did not pose

a significant threat to Defendants. He was unarmed, outnumbered, seated, middle-aged,

and diminutive. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5). Finally, Coster alleges that he neither actively resisted nor

sought to evade arrest. (Id. ¶ 58).

Thus, under the facts as set forth in the Amended Complaint, there is no question

that Defendants would have known that the level of force they used was unconstitutionally

excessive. See Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 745 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that officers

“violated clearly established law,” and thus were not entitled qualified immunity, where

the officers “lifted [plaintiff] up by his arms while they were bound behind his back,

thereby wrenching his shoulder”); Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of

Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 901–02 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that use of taser could constitute

excessive force where plaintiff “was stationary, non-violent, and surrounded by people

willing to help,” notwithstanding that plaintiff “was not allowing his arms to be pulled from

the post and was refusing to comply with shouted orders to let go”); Jones v. Chapman,

No. ELH-14-2627, 2017 WL 2472220, at *29 (D.Md. June 7, 2017) (finding that “any use

of force by Officers . . . after [plaintiff] ceased resisting arrest would not have been

objectively reasonable” and denying motion for summary judgment on qualified

immunity). County Defendants’ arguments to the contrary—virtually all of which rely on

facts derived from Coster’s criminal proceedings, rather than the Amended Complaint—

are unpersuasive.11 Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Count V on qualified

immunity grounds.

11 The scant arguments County Defendants advance that attempt to confront the

allegations in the Amended Complaint are similarly unavailing. Indeed, County

Defendants’ argument that Coster fails to make out an allegation for excessive force

c. Count VI (Excessive Force on January 11, 2018)

With respect to the January 11, 2018 incident, County Defendants first argue that

Coster fails to state a claim against Meador or DiBartolo because they “are accused of

nothing more than (i) assisting in the transport detail and providing security during

Plaintiff’s treatment (ii) and pinning Plaintiff to the bed during Cpl. Goins’ purported

assault.” (Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. at 17). But these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for

excessive force. See, e.g., McKelvey v. W. Reg’l Jail, No. 3:13-CV-22206, 2016 WL

11483647, at *21 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 6, 2016) (“The unreasonableness of holding down an

injured, compliant detainee so that another officer may strike him is

indisputable. . . . Furthermore, it was clearly established . . . that the striking of a restrained

detainee who poses no threat to officer safety violates the detainee’s right to be free from

excessive force.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:13-22206, 2016 WL

1090619 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 21, 2016). This argument therefore fails to persuade the Court.

County Defendants next argue that Coster cannot state a claim for excessive force

with respect to the January 11, 2018 incident because Coster concedes in the Amended

Complaint that he was “extremely agitated” when hospital staff began tightening the device

around his shoulder, (Am. Compl. ¶ 108), and because Coster acknowledges a possibility

that he may have kicked Meador, (id. ¶ 109). As Coster correctly notes, however, “[t]hose

facts are wholly irrelevant to the defendants’ conduct once Mr. Coster was pinned, helpless,

because of some ambiguity about whether officers lifted him by his elbows or wrists after

handcuffing him is particularly far from the mark.

to the bed, and they nevertheless began beating him.” (Opp’n to Cnty. at 20). The Court

agrees and declines to dismiss on this basis.

County Defendants finally argue that the Court must dismiss Coster’s claim because

the allegation that Goins “instructed the hospital staff to leave the room” before beating

Coster bloody, (Am. Compl. ¶ 111), is “too extreme to credit.” (Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. at 18).

County Defendants cite no case in support of the radical proposition that the Court should

dismiss Coster’s claim because it simply does not believe him, and the Court declines to

do so. To the extent County Defendants submit to the Court that it is simply implausible

that police officers would engage in such brazenly unlawful conduct, the Court—which is

located, as County Defendants know, in the same city that employed the lawless Gun Trace

Task Force12—is unpersuaded. The Court therefore finds that County Defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity on Count VI.

d. Count X (Bystander Liability)

County Defendants allege that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Coster’s

claim of bystander liability. An officer may be liable under § 1983 on a theory of bystander

liability, if he “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional

12 See generally United States v. Jenkins, No. CR 17-638, 2021 WL 2805948, at

*1–2 (D.Md. July 6, 2021) (describing the actions of the former officer-in-charge of the

Baltimore Police Department’s Gun Trace Task Force, including “us[ing] his position of

authority to rob citizens in the course of his duties,” “routinely st[ealing] drugs and money

from individuals whom he temporarily detained and/or arrested,” “breaking into a

residential home or a vehicle,” “[giving] drugs he stole to another individual to sell on his

behalf,” and “arrang[ing] to have heroin planted in a vehicle driven by two individuals,

after . . . a high-speed pursuit which ended in a collision that resulted in the death of one

man”).

rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”

Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted);

see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who subjects, or causes to be subjected . . . any citizen

of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . .”). In order for

an officer to be liable, there must be a “realistic opportunity to intervene and end the

unlawful” activity. Randall, 302 F.3d at 204. Determinations of whether an officer “had

sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the harm being caused by another

officer is an issue of fact for the jury unless . . . a reasonable jury could not possibly

conclude otherwise.” Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). Of course, “if

no excessive force is applied by the fellow officer, the officer witnessing the conduct

‘cannot be held liable under bystander liability for a failure to intervene.’” Dodson v.

Prince George’s Cnty., No. JKS-13-2916, 2016 WL 67255, at *3 (D.Md. Jan. 6, 2016)

(quoting Howie v. Prince George’s Cnty., No. DKC-2006-3465, 2009 WL 2426018, at *6

(D.Md. Aug. 5, 2009)).

County Defendants offer two arguments for why Coster fails to state a claim for

bystander liability. First, they argue that the Court should dismiss the claim because Coster

“fails to allege with particularly which officers knew what and chose not to act.” (Cnty.

Defs.’ Mot. at 19). Second, they argue that “based on the Agreed Statement of Facts,

Plaintiff cannot establish the first element of the claim – that the officers knew that a fellow

officer was violating an individual’s constitutional rights.” (Cnty. Reply at 17). Both

arguments fail.

As to the first argument, it is true that “a complaint cannot rely on ‘indeterminate

assertions against all defendants.’” Jien v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. SAG-19-2521, 2020

WL 5544183, at *4 (D.Md. Sept. 16, 2020) (quoting SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.)

Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 423 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is also true that “if the officers participate[d] in

the fray . . . , as plaintiffs claim, then they were not acting as bystanders.” Jones, 2017 WL

2472220, at *35 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Weeden v. Prince George’s

Cnty., No. GJH-17-2013, 2018 WL 2694441, at *5 (D.Md. June 4, 2018) (“Defendant

Police Officers cannot be held liable for both participating in the injury and failing to

prevent the injury.”). But the incidents described in the Amended Complaint were

undoubtedly intense, frenetic, and bewildering. Coster understandably cannot describe

with particularity each Individual Defendants’ actions at all stages of the alleged beatings.

At the motion to dismiss stage, Coster should be afforded the opportunity to essentially

plead in the alternative—either the Individual Defendants participated in the beatings or

they failed to intervene in the unlawful conduct. See RaceRedi Motorsports, LLC v. Dart

Mach., Ltd., 640 F.Supp.2d 660, 666 (D.Md. 2009) (“Rule 8[d] . . . permits a party

to plead multiple, and when necessary, inconsistent claims.”); see also J.A. v. Miranda, No.

PX-16-3953, 2017 WL 3840026, at *3 (D.Md. Sept. 1, 2017) (“Rule 8(a) is not so rigid

that it requires a plaintiff, without the benefit of discovery, to connect every single alleged

instance of misconduct in the complaint to every single specific officer. The key is to

generally identify those persons responsible for the problem.” (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)). The Court will afford Coster the opportunity to engage in discovery

before dismissing his bystander liability claim on the basis that it lacks particularity.

County Defendants’ second argument requires the Court to accept as true the

stipulated evidence entered into the record in Coster’s criminal proceeding. Thus, the Court

rejects the argument for the reasons set forth in Sections I.A.2 and II.B.2, supra. For these

reasons, the Court finds that County Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on

Coster’s bystander liability claim.

8. Failure to State a Claim (Counts IV, V, VII, VIII, X)

County Defendants argue that Coster’s “arrest-related claims,” in which category

they place Counts IV, V, VII, VIII, and X, are “too vague and generalized to support any

plausible claims against DFCs Jeric, Bliss, Norton, Robinson, Seman, and Kalambihis, and

Does 1 to 20.” (Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. at 20). County Defendants essentially argue that Coster

is engaged in group pleading, generally alleging that large groups of Defendants

participated in unlawful actions. As set forth in Section II.B.7.d, supra, “a complaint cannot

rely on ‘indeterminate assertions against all defendants.’” Jien, 2020 WL 5544183, at *4

(quoting SD3, 801 F.3d at 423).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Counts IV and VII are barred by Heck and

will not include those counts in its analysis. With respect to the remaining counts, Coster’s

allegations contain sufficient specificity to survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading

stage. Among other things, Coster alleges that Jeric, Bliss, Norton, Robinson, Seman, and

Kalambihis, and Does 1 to 20 “joined DFC Licato and DFC Majewski in a dogpile on top

of Mr. Coster, bringing the total number of Sheriff’s Department employees bearing down

on Mr. Coster to at least seven,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 84); “hit Mr. Coster and pressed their

knees, elbows and bodies down into him,” (id. ¶ 85); turned away a medical provider after

Coster was beaten and lying on the ground,” (id. ¶ 88); and “lifted Mr. Coster by his wrists

when his hands were cuffed behind his back,” (id. ¶¶ 95, 102). These allegations—

combined with Coster’s more specific allegations as to particular Defendants in those cases

where he knew which Defendants were responsible—are sufficiently specific to survive a

motion to dismiss. As this Court has held, “[a]t this early stage in the litigation . . . use of

[the phrase] ‘Officer Defendants’ . . . does not amount to insufficient group pleading under

Iqbal and Twombly,” because where the plaintiff “alleges direct knowledge of the specific

officers involved, he uses only those names” and “[w]hen he does not have this knowledge,

he alleges that a definite subgroup of Defendants—the Officer Defendants—committed the

alleged acts.” Burgess v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. RDB-15-0834, 2016 WL 795975, at *10

(D.Md. Mar. 1, 2016).

In cases where the plaintiff is unable to specify which individuals were responsible

for every instance of wrongdoing at the pleading stage, “[t]he key is to generally identify

those ‘persons responsible for the problem.’” J.A., 2017 WL 3840026, at *3 (quoting Burks

v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009)). “This is especially so where the injured

party was the alleged victim of a group beat down which, no doubt, severely disadvantaged

him and any onlookers in identifying precisely which officers committed which bad acts.”

Id. “To put it bluntly, when a plaintiff claims that multiple officers used excessive force,

‘it is not reasonable to expect [the] Plaintiff[] to be able to provide a detailed, blow-by-

blow recitation of who did what and when.’” Robinson v. Farley, 264 F.Supp.3d 154, 161

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Clark v. City of Chicago, No. 10-C-1803, 2010 WL 4781467, at

*3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 17, 2010)).

The cases County Defendants cite to contest this point are inapposite. See, e.g.,

Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 349 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing respondeat superior,

not pleading standards); Jones, 2017 WL 2472220, at *30 (granting summary judgment on

the basis that plaintiff failed to produce evidence of an officer’s liability, as opposed to

evaluating the sufficiency of a pleading at the motion to dismiss stage). The Court finds

that the Amended Complaint provides more than enough information to place Defendants

on notice of the allegations against them and that Counts V, VIII, and X state a claim for

which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss on this basis.

9. Battery Claims (Counts VIII, IX)

County Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Count IX for essentially the

same reasons it argued the Court should dismiss Count VI: (1) that Meador and DiBartolo

are accused only of “assisting in the transport detail and pinning Plaintiff to the bed”; (2)

that the Defendants had “legal justification for their actions,” presumably referring to

Coster becoming “agitated”; and (3) that Coster’s allegations “are simply too extreme to

be ‘plausible.’” (Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. at 20). For the same reasons the Court denied the Motion

as to Count VI, see Section II.B.7.c, supra, it denies the Motion as to Count IX.

County Defendants do not make a specific argument as to Count VIII. Rather, their

sole argument on Count VIII appears to be wrapped up in their general argument that

Coster’s allegations were too vague to state a claim. (Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. at 20–22). Thus,

for the reasons set forth above, see Section II.B.8, supra, County Defendants’ argument

fails, and the Court declines to dismiss Count VIII.

10. Injunctive Relief

Among the remedies Coster seeks through this lawsuit is injunctive relief. (See Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 198–99). County Defendants argue that Coster is without standing to seek such

relief. As County Defendants explain, standing to seek an equitable remedy hinges on

whether the plaintiff is “likely to suffer future injury” from the alleged misconduct. City of

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). The “threat of injury must be both real and

immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, only where a plaintiff is “realistically threatened by a repetition of” the events giving

rise to the action can he meet the necessary requirements for seeking an injunction in

federal court. Id. at 109.

County Defendants argue that Coster is not entitled to injunctive relief because

Coster “indicates that the alleged misconduct in this case, if taken as true, was an isolated

episode.” (Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. at 22). County Defendants cite to the Amended Complaint, in

which Coster states that he “needed emergency medical treatment related to his Bipolar I

Disorder approximately four times in the past 20 years,” and “[n]one of these incidents

involved violent or unlawful conduct by Mr. Coster.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 48). Coster further

notes that he is a resident of Baltimore County, (id. ¶ 38), further reducing his likelihood

of interacting with the Defendants in this action.

Coster responds by noting that he is likely to be in Harford County in the future

because his wife and his mother, whom he visits regularly, reside there. (Am. Compl. ¶ 47).

Coster further argues that if he “is not afforded standing, he will be chilled from engaging

in lawful conduct: approaching the police for assistance when he his struggling with mental

health issues.” (Opp’n to Cnty. at 30). As an initial matter, the Court disagrees; injunctive

relief is not the only means of deterring unlawful conduct. Moreover, Coster’s subjective

fear of future mistreatment is not sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See Lyons, 461

U.S. at 107 n.8 (“The emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient

basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the

defendant.”).

Coster further asserts that “courts routinely recognize that a plaintiff has standing to

contest law enforcement misconduct where the conduct to be enjoined arises from

circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control, particularly with respect to the defendant’s

mental health.” (Opp’n to Cnty. at 31). But Coster cites just three cases in support of this

apparently “routine” finding, and nearly three decades have passed since the most recent

of those decisions. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994); Lynch

v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984); Grant v. Johnson, No. CIV. 89-269-FR, 1989

WL 97886 (D.Or. Aug. 10, 1989). To the extent this is a routine finding, Coster has not

succeeded in demonstrating that fact to the Court.

Finally, Coster argues that “future encounters with the deputies are likely to result

in the same problem, because Harford County has embraced the view that individual

defendants with mental health issues should be profiled as ‘dangerous,’ regardless of their

actual behavior.” (Opp’n to Cnty. at 31). This conclusion is based on Coster’s interpretation

of arguments made in Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (See, e.g., State Mot. at 18

(“Disabilities involving psychotic and violent behavior such as Coster’s pose a serious

danger to law enforcement officers.”); Cnty. Mot. at 14 (noting that the fact that Coster

“was off his medication and not directly answering questions, posed a potentially

dangerous situation for officers”)). But this Court is unpersuaded by the position that

Coster is “realistically threatened by a repetition of his experience,” see Lyons, 461 U.S.

at 109, because of an immoderate argument presented in a brief to the Court.

Coster has conceded that acute episodes of mental illness like the one that led to the

incidents underlying this lawsuit have occurred four times in twenty years. (Am. Compl.

¶ 48). In light of this admission, Coster cannot credibly argue that the threat of an injury

arising under similar circumstances is “real and immediate.” See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102;

see also Medina v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-9412 (AJN), 2020 WL 7028688, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (“The mere fact that such conduct brought the Plaintiff into

contact with [Defendants] in a way that resulted in the use of excessive force does not

compel the conclusion that the Plaintiff faces a real and imminent threat of reoccurrence.”);

Falls v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., No. DKC-97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550, at *6 (D.Md.

Mar. 16, 1999) (“Because there is no ‘actual and imminent’ threat to [the plaintiff’s] rights,

she does not have standing to seek injunctive relief.”). As the Supreme Court cautioned in

Lyons, it is “no more than conjecture to suggest that in every instance of [an] . . . encounter

between the police and a citizen, the police will act unconstitutionally and inflict injury

without provocation or legal excuse.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. Coster seeks relief against

precisely the sort of “conjectural threat of injury” the Fourth Circuit has held is

“insufficient to justify injunctive relief.” Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1382 (4th Cir.

1995). None of the cases Coster cites in support of his request for injunctive relief counter

this simple fact. Accordingly, the Court will grant County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

to the extent it seeks to dismiss Coster’s request for injunctive relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the State’s

Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43) and grant in part and deny in

part County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (ECF No. 46).

Specifically, the Court will grant the State’s Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of

Coster’s claims against the Harford County Sheriff’s Office and Detention Center, and will

otherwise deny the State’s Motion. Further, the Court will grant County Defendants’

Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts IV and VII and dismissal of Coster’s

claim of injunctive relief, and will otherwise deny County Defendants’ Motion. A separate

Order follows.

Entered this 30th day of November, 2021.

/s/

George L. Russell, III

United States District Judge