Campbell v. Sims

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BRYCE CHEROY CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

PFC THOMAS SIMS, in his official and

individual capacities, Civil Action No. TDC-20-2590

OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE

TAKOMA PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT

CITY OF TAKOMA PARK,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Bryce Cheroy Campbell filed this civil action against Defendant Private First

Class (“PFC”) Thomas Sims (“Officer Sims”), sued in his official and individual capacities, Other _

Unknown Officers of the Takoma Park Police Department (“the John Doe Officers”), and the City

of Takoma Park (“Takoma Park’) in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland asserting

federal and state constitutional claims and state tort claims stemming from his seizure on April 8,

2017 for purposes of an emergency mental health examination and his subsequent involuntary

commitment. Officer Sims filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting, in part, that he had

qualified immunity to Campbell’s federal constitutional claims. The Court denied summary

judgment, in part on the grounds that that at the time of the events at issue, it was clearly

established, based on Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 740-41 (4th Cir. 2003), and related cases,

that individuals have a right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution not to

be seized for purposes of a mental health examination unless the seizing law enforcement officers

have probable cause to believe both that they have a mental health condition and that they pose a

danger to themselves or others, and that such probable cause cannot be based on a report that the

individual may pose a danger if the officers’ first-hand observations upon encountering the

individual do not support such a conclusion. Campbell v. Sims, No. TDC-20-2590, 2021 WL

2685706, at *8 (D. Md. June 30, 2021). The Court also concluded that there remained, at a

minimum, a genuine issue of material fact on whether the information available to the officers

established probable cause to seize Campbell for purposes of a mental health examination. See id.

at *9-10. Officer Sims has filed an interlocutory appeal of that denial of summary judgment based

on qualified immunity, see ECF No. 36, and has also filed a Motion to Stay All Proceedings

Pending Appeal (“Motion to Stay”), ECF No. 44. Campbell opposes the Motion. The Court has

reviewed the briefs and submitted materials and finds no hearing necessary. See D. Md. Local R.

105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Officer Sims’s Motion to Stay will be GRANTED, and

this case will be stayed pending resolution of his interlocutory appeal.

DISCUSSION

“TT]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power in every court to control the

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and

for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). In determining whether to stay a

case pending appeal, courts consider four factors: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong

showing of a likelthood of success on the merits; (2) “whether the applicant will be irreparably

injured absent a stay”; (3) “whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties

interested in the proceeding”; and (4) “where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481

U.S. 770, 776 (1987). It is not necessary that all four factors weigh in favor of a stay; rather the

court may balance the factors to determine whether a stay is warranted. See St. Agnes Hosp. of

City of Balt., Inc. v. Riddick, 751 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. Md. 1990) (noting that the four factors must

be “viewed together” and the “interests of the movant balanced against the interests of the other

parties and the public” (citation omitted)). See also Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777 (stating, where the

State filed a motion to stay the district court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus pending appeal,

that “[s]ince the traditional stay factors contemplate individualized judgments in each case, the

formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules”); Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc.,729 F.3d

370, 375 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the power of a district court to stay trial proceedings is

discretionary and calls for the balancing of “the various factors relevant to the expeditious and

comprehensive disposition” of a case (citation omitted)). The Court discusses each factor in turn.

L Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Officer Sims offers two arguments as to why he is likely to succeed on the merits of his

appeal. First, he asserts that this Court erroneously failed to apply or misapplied the collective

knowledge doctrine when assessing whether, upon consideration of the facts in the light most

favorable to Campbell, Officer Sims had probable cause to seize Campbell for a mental health

examination. In particular, Officer Sims argues that the collective knowledge doctrine shields him

from liability to the extent that he acted reasonably in relying on a fellow officer’s determination

that probable cause existed. Officer Sims also argues that the asserted right to be free from seizure

for a mental health evaluation was not clearly established at the time of the events at issue. In

opposing the Motion to Stay, Campbell asserts that Officer Sims is unlikely to succeed on the

merits of his appeal because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit lacks

jurisdiction to hear it and because, even if the appeal is heard, Officer Sims is unlikely to succeed

on the merits.

Turning first to the question whether the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal,

United States Courts of Appeals generally have jurisdiction only over “final decisions of the

district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). However, “[t]o the extent that an order of a district

court rejecting a governmental official’s qualified immunity defense turns on a question of law, it

is a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 ... and therefore is subject to immediate appeal.”

Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 528 (4th Cir. 1997); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985). This rule allows for interlocutory appellate review of a denial of qualified immunity when

the appeal is based on a “purely legal issue” such as “what law was clearly established,” but not

when the appeal is of a matter of “evidence sufficiency,” such as whether qualified immunity was

properly denied based on the conclusion that there was “a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Johnson

v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319-20 (1995). The fact that an appeal includes both types of

arguments does not necessarily deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction. Instead, it is job of the

appellate court to “parse[]” the intermingled assertions of error and consider only the legal

arguments. /ko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur first task on appeal is to

separate the district court’s legal conclusions regarding entitlement to qualified immunity, over

which we have jurisdiction, from its determinations regarding factual disputes, over which we do

not.”’).

Here, Officer Sims’s appeal, even if addressing certain factual issues, includes a challenge

to this Court’s legal determination on the contours of clearly established law at the time of

Campbell’s seizure on the circumstances under which an individual may be seized for a mental

health examination. As a result, the Court is sufficiently satisfied that the Fourth Circuit has

jurisdiction over at least some elements of Officer Sims’s appeal that it does not conclude that

Officer Sims is unlikely to succeed on that appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction.

On the likelihood of success on the merits of his appellate claims, Officer Sims advances

two primary arguments. First, Officer Sims asserts that this Court misapplied the collective

knowledge doctrine, which generally provides that a court may “substitute the knowledge of the

instructing officer or officers for the knowledge of the acting officer” when determining if there

was probable cause for a search or seizure. United States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 691 (4th Cir.

2015). Officer Sims argues that the collective knowledge doctrine also shields an arresting officer

from a civil suit if that officer conducted the arrest in reasonable reliance on another officer’s

conclusion that there was probable cause. He argues that based on this principle, he was entitled

to qualified immunity because he participated in the seizure of Campbell based on Acting Sergeant

Kristian Pederson’s determination that there was probable cause to do so.

Officer Sims points to no controlling authority in support of this principle. He instead

relies on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Zellner v.

Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344 (2d Cir. 2007), a case Officer Sims did not cite in his Motion for

Summary Judgment briefing, in which the Second Circuit described the concept of “arguable

probable cause,” which allows for qualified immunity to civil liability for an illegal seizure when

“a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well

established law.” Jd. at 369 (citation omitted). Although the doctrine ostensibly allows an officer

to be shielded from civil liability based on a reasonable belief that probable cause existed, the court

emphasized that “probable cause remains the relevant standard,” and “[i]f officers of reasonable

competence would have to agree that the information possessed by the officer at the time of the

arrest did not add up to probable cause, the fact that it came close does not immunize the officer.”

Id. at 370 (quoting Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2007)). Zellner does not

broadly hold, as Officer Sims suggests, that arresting or seizing officers are immune from civil

liability simply if they acted in reliance on a fellow officer who vouched for the existence of

probable cause. That proposition instead comes from an unpublished district court case which

extended traditional collective knowledge doctrine principles to reach this conclusion. See

Golphin v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 1015(BSJ), 2011 WL 4375679, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

19, 2011). Where Officer Sims advances a theory to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to

be used as a shield as part of an argument for qualified immunity that has not been accepted by the

Fourth Circuit, and Officer Sims has not shown that any other circuit has accepted it, the Court

finds that Officer Sims has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal based on

his collective knowledge doctrine argument.

Officer Sims’s second argument on appeal is that while it was clearly established that in

order to seize a person for purposes of a mental health evaluation, police officers need probable

cause to believe both that the individual has a mental disease or defect and that the individual poses

a danger to self or others, tt would not have been clear to reasonable officers that on the issue of

danger, they could not rely solely on the reports of others if, upon encountering the individual,

they did not see or hear anything that would indicate that the individual posed such a danger. As

discussed in the Court’s prior memorandum opinion, this proposition is clearly established by

Bailey, and the facts in that case are sufficiently similar to those present here to put a reasonable

officer on notice that, based on the facts available on summary judgment as viewed in the light

most favorable to Campbell, the seizure of Campbell violated the law. See Campbell, 2021 WL

2685706, at *8—9. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Officer Sims is likely to succeed

on the merits of his appeal on this theory. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges that in effectively

arguing that Bailey is insufficient to put officers on notice of clearly established law, Officer Sims

has presented a non-frivolous, colorable argument for appeal that raises a serious question of law

that may be sufficient to permit a stay. See Krell v. Queen Anne’s Cnty., No. JKB-18-0637, 2020

WL 416975, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2020) (granting a stay of a qualified immunity appeal based in

part on the conclusion that while the appeal was unlikely to succeed, it raised “serious questions

of law”); U.S. Home Corp. vy. Settlers Crossing, LLC, No. DKC 08-1863, 2015 WL 3973071, at

*6 (D. Md. June 29, 2015) (granting a stay pending an interlocutory appeal where the moving party

had not shown a “strong likelihood of success on appeal” but had “identified specific legal findings

that raise serious questions of law” on appeal, where the remaining factors weighed in favor of the

stay); St. Agnes Hosp., 751 F. Supp. at 76 (explaining that a stay may be warranted based on other

factors if the appeal “raises serious and difficult questions of law in an area where the law is

somewhat unclear” (citation omitted)).

Il. Irreparable Injury

Officer Sims asserts that he will be irreparably injured absent a stay because requiring him

to litigate Campbell’s claims would entirely undermine the right to be free from the burdens of

litigation that qualified immunity is meant to secure.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that qualified immunity is “an immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. See Gray-Hopkins y. Prince

George’s Cnty., 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[QJualified immunity is an immunity from

having to litigate.”). ‘This immunity is thus “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to

go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Further, “even such pretrial matters as discovery are to be

avoided if possible.” /d. In particular, government officials should not be subjected to “the costs

of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery in cases where the legal norms the officials

are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time.” Jd.

Where one basis of Officer Sims’s appeal is that the right he allegedly violated was not

clearly established at the time of the events at issue, and where, for the reasons stated above, the

Court finds that basis for appeal to be non-frivolous, the concerns about an erroneous deprivation

of qualified immunity are at their zenith. If Officer Sims were to prevail on appeal, but this Court

were to have allowed discovery to proceed while that appeal is pending, the right Officer Sims

seeks to vindicate will effectively have been lost. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.3d 309,

317 (D.C. Cir, 1982) (noting that a party seeking a stay from a denial of summary judgment on

qualified immunity should be able to establish irreparable injury).

Campbell nevertheless argues that because he has asserted in the Complaint, in addition to

the § 1983 claim, state constitutional and common law claims against Officer Sims and Takoma

Park, Officer Sims would be subject to the burdens of discovery, either as a defendant or witness

on those state law claims, regardless of the outcome of the appeal. There is, however, no guarantee

that the case will continue to proceed in this Court ifthe § 1983 claim is dismissed. Such dismissal

would deprive the Court of original jurisdiction over this case and would likely result in dismissal

of the remaining state law claims over which the Court presently has supplemental jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting, upon the dismissal of all claims over which a federal court

had original jurisdiction, dismissal of state law claims over which the court had supplemental

jurisdiction). The Court therefore finds that the absence of a stay would irreparably harm Officer

Sims.

II. Injury to the Other Parties

On the third factor, whether a stay will substantially injure the other parties, Campbell

asserts that he will suffer such harm because “[m]Jemories fade.” Opp’n at 10, ECF No. 47.

Although the risk of the loss of evidence is inherent in all stays, in this instance, the interactions

between Campbell and the responding officers were recorded multiple times on the officers’ body

cameras, so concerns about evidence degradation are mitigated. Cf Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

378 (2007) (in a case on interlocutory appeal on the issue of qualified immunity, reversing the

denial of the defendant police officer’s motion for summary judgment based on body camera

footage of the incident).

To the extent that Campbell voices a more general concern about delaying a prompt

disposition of his case, he points to no substantive remedy that he will lose as a result ofa stay. At

this point, the case has been pending for approximately one year, there have been no substantial

delays in the case, and discovery has already begun. Throughout the litigation, Officer Sims has

acted promptly, making no requests to extend any applicable deadlines. Under these circumstances

the harm that a stay would impose on Campbell is limited and does not counterbalance the injury

that a stay would cause to Officer Sims.

IV. ‘Public Interest

On the fourth factor, the public has an abiding interest in the “deterrence of unlawful

conduct” on the part of government officials and in “compensation of victims” of such unlawful

conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). It also has an interest in the prompt

resolution of civil disputes in the courts. At the same time, the public has an interest in having

government officials, when required to take action in circumstances where clearly established

rights are not implicated, proceed “with independence and without fear of consequences.”

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). The public interest therefore may,

at times, lie in avoiding the costs of subjecting government officials to the burdens of litigation,

which include “distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary

action, and deterrence of able people from public service.” /d. at 525-26 (quoting Harlow, 457

U.S. at 816). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has made clear that “there is a strong public interest

in protecting officials from the costs of damages actions” that “is best served by a defense

permitting insubstantial lawsuits to be quickly terminated.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,

590 (1998).

Officer Sims’s appeal presents the question whether certain rights were clearly established

at the time of the events at issue, and the viability of Campbell’s federal claim hinges on that

question. In this instance, a stay would prevent government officials from incurring the costs and

burdens of litigation until it is certain that the case may proceed further. It would not prevent any

favorable outcome for Campbell, and the resulting delay would not impose an excessive burden

on Campbell. Under these circumstances, the public interest slightly favors a stay.

V. Balance of the Factors

As discussed above, Officer Sims’s appeal implicates serious questions of law, and the

remaining three factors favor a stay. While a stay will delay resolution of this case for Campbell

to a certain degree, it would also preserve Officer Sims’s right not to be required to litigate a case

if he can establish on appeal that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, upon a

weighing of the four relevant factors, the Court finds that the balance tips in favor of a stay. See

Krell, 2020 WL 416975, at *3 (granting a stay pending an appeal of the denial of qualified

immunity where “the defendant has presented a plausible claim for immunity and the balance of

hardships favors a stay”).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Officer Sims’s Motion to Stay will be GRANTED, and this

case will be stay pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: September 23, 2021

THEODORE D. CHUANG

United States District Ju

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