Sosa v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

United States District Court

District of Massachusetts

)

Che Blake Sosa, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.

) 18-12223-NMG

Massachusetts Department of )

Corrections et al., )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

Che Blake Sosa (“Sosa” or “plaintiff”) filed this suit in

October, 2018, when he was an inmate incarcerated at

Massachusetts Correctional Institute (“MCI”) Cedar Junction. He

brings constitutional and statutory claims concerning the

conditions of his confinement and the purported failure of

numerous prison and medical officials to accommodate his request

for modified handcuffing procedures due to his osteoarthritis.

After counsel was appointed at his request to assist Sosa

in this civil case, he filed several amended complaints and

conducted extensive discovery. The Department of Corrections

defendants (“DOC Defendants”) and medical provider defendants

(“Medical Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment on all

counts (Docket Nos. 205, 218, 221) and, for the reasons that

follow, those motions will be allowed.1

I. Background

Three counts, which have not previously been disposed of,

remain to be considered at summary judgment: 1) alleged

deliberate indifference to a serious medical issue in violation

of the Eighth Amendment by individual DOC and Medical Defendants

(Count I), 2) alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment for

imposition of conditions of confinement by individual DOC

Defendants (Count III) and 3) alleged violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 by the Department of

Corrections (“DOC”) and DOC Commissioner Carol Mici in her

official capacity (Count IV). Sosa seeks both monetary and

injunctive relief.

Sosa has been convicted of multiple counts of aggravated

rape and related offenses and is currently serving the

equivalent of a life sentence. He has been in the custody of

the DOC since 2001, when he was a pretrial detainee. During

1 The Department of Corrections defendants include the Department itself and

Stephanie Collins (“Collins”), Michael Rodrigues (“Rodrigues”), Joann Lynds

(“Lynds”), James O’Gara (“O’Gara”), Carol Higgins O’Brien (“Higgins O’Brien”)

and James Saba (“Saba”) in their individual capacities and Carol Mici

(“Mici”) in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of

Corrections. The Medical Defendants are Vanessa Rattigan (“Rattigan”), Dr.

Aysha Hameed (“Dr. Hameed”) and Jenny Vieira (“Vieira”).

that time, he has been found guilty of several disciplinary

infractions for which he has served extensive time in the

Department Disciplinary Unit (“DDU”). Sosa was housed in the

DDU from June, 2003 until March, 2020 and thereafter, was moved

to the Behavioral Management Unit (“BMU”). Since September,

2021, Sosa has been housed at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional

Center (“SBCC”). He asserts that he was held in what amounted

to solitary confinement for 23 or 24 hours each day from June,

2003 until April, 2022. The DOC Defendants respond that housing

in the DDU is not solitary confinement but rather, is a form of

segregation.

Sosa has suffered from degenerative bilateral joint disease

in his shoulders for over 20 years. Because his right shoulder

pain did not respond to cortisone, he underwent surgery in

January, 2005 for right shoulder impingement syndrome and

osteoarthritis of the AC joint. Based on his shoulder

condition, medical officials at MCI Cedar Junction issued a

medical restriction against behind-the-back cuffing.

In July, 2006, Sosa stabbed two guards in an attempt to

obtain their cell keys in an on-going altercation with another

inmate. The medical restriction prohibiting cuffing behind the

back was discontinued and other security precautions were

imposed, including the use of the MCI Cedar Junction tactical

response team whenever Sosa was allowed to leave his cell.

In September, 2019, after a hearing on Sosa’s pro se motion

for a preliminary injunction, this Court ordered DOC to retain

an independent doctor to examine plaintiff. After that

examination, an analysis of Sosa’s severe osteoarthritis

(detailed in the so-called “Elman Report”), subsequent hearings

and DOC participation, a modified handcuffing procedure was

implemented.

In March, 2020, plaintiff filed another motion which this

Court treated as a motion for a preliminary injunction, and

which ultimately resulted in the manufacture and use by the DOC

of double-length handcuffs for Sosa.

In September, 2020, a physician’s assistant, retained to

make an independent assessment, concluded that the custom cuffs

alleviated Sosa’s pain to a certain extent.

This Court found that the custom-designed cuffs represented

a reasonable accommodation of plaintiff’s medical condition.

Accordingly, it denied the motion for a preliminary injunction

but directed the DOC to continue using the modified restraints

indefinitely. Plaintiff appealed the order to the First Circuit

Court of Appeals (“First Circuit”) which ultimately affirmed it

in August, 2023.

In July, 2023, the Court allowed plaintiff to file a second

amended complaint. Both the DOC and Medical Defendants answered

the complaint and now move for summary judgment.

II. Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Deliberate Indifference

In Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff

alleges that individual Medical and DOC Defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by requiring him to wear behind-the-back

handcuffs.2 He contends that the maintenance of such a cuffing

procedure until 2020 constitutes deliberate indifference to his

osteoarthritis.

Plaintiff seeks both injunctive and monetary relief. This

Court and the First Circuit have, however, sufficiently

considered the propriety of Sosa’s modified restraints that have

been used since February, 2020. See Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep’t

of Corr., 494 F. Supp. 3d 37, 38-39 (D. Mass. 2020) (“Sosa II”)

aff’d, 80 F.4th 15 (1st Cir. 2023). Accordingly, insofar as

plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the modified restraint

procedure in place since February, 2020, his claim is without

merit. To the extent Sosa seeks to require defendants to

continue using the custom-designed cuffs permanently, that

motion has already been allowed.

Now, the Court is asked to decide whether Sosa is entitled

to monetary damages for the conduct of the individual defendants

in restraining Sosa in behind-the-back cuffs from October, 2015,

2 All individual defendants except for Saba and Mici are included in Count I.

the earliest date within the limitations period, until February,

2020.

The Eighth Amendment, as made applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes the “unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain...repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)

(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, states have an

obligation to provide inmates with adequate medical care. See

Wittkowski v. Levine, 382 F. Supp. 3d 107, 113 (D. Mass. 2019)

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103).

To prove a state actor has failed to comply with that

obligation, an inmate must establish both an objective and

subjective prong. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st

Cir. 2014) (en banc).

To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate

must establish that he had a serious medical need[ ]

for which the defendants provided inadequate care.

Lazarre v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 111996, *5 (D.

Mass. Jan. 9, 2024) (quoting Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474,

494-95 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration

in original)). However, “a serious medical need does not

require that an inmate receive the best possible treatment that

money can buy.” Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015)

(quotations and citations omitted).

The subjective prong requires a showing that prison

administrators were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

serious medical need. Such indifference comprises a “narrow

band of conduct...and requires evidence that the failure in

treatment was purposeful.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83. The obvious

case of deliberate indifference is denial of treatment to punish

an inmate. Id. However, wanton disregard of a medical issue may

also constitute deliberate indifference if it is “akin to

criminal recklessness, requiring consciousness of impending

harm, easily preventable.” Id. (quoting Watson v. Caton, 984

F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted)).

In addition, security interests which are fundamental to the

operation of a prison facility are accorded significant weight.

Id. (citing Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir.

2011)).

Here, the First Circuit has noted that the restraint

procedures in dispute in this case debatably “qualify as medical

care.” Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., 80 F.4th 15, 26

(1st Cir. 2023). Nonetheless, that Court determined to proceed

under the deliberate indifference standard for medical care

because it found Sosa’s claim for injunctive relief was

deficient even taking the “framing on its own terms.” Id.

This Court will do likewise. It will assume without

deciding that plaintiff’s osteoarthritis in his shoulder

constitutes a serious medical condition. Nonetheless, the Court

finds that no genuine issue of material fact remains because

defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that they did not act

with wanton disregard of plaintiff’s medical needs.

The parties only briefly discuss the second component of

the objective prong, namely, whether the care provided was

objectively inadequate. The Court recognizes that the question

is difficult to answer because restraint procedures are not, in

fact, a form of medical care at all.

1. Vanessa Rattigan

During the events at issue, Vanessa Rattigan was the

administrator in charge of running the prison’s medical unit.

One of her duties was to advocate on behalf of inmates before

medical providers but, even though she is a registered nurse by

trade, she did not provide medical care to inmates.

Plaintiff blames Rattigan for 1) the denial of his ADA

accommodation request and 2) providing insufficient

documentation to ADA Coordinator James O’Gara, who reviewed her

denial.

At some point, Sosa submitted an ADA accommodation request

to modify his cuffing procedure. He claims that “in

consultation” with a medical provider, Rattigan “opined” there

was no medical basis for his request which is contrary to her

deposition testimony that she believed, from a medical

standpoint, it was “probably not” reasonable to deny the

accommodation request.

Rattigan retorts that, as an administrator, she had no

responsibility for any medical decisions related to Sosa. He

partially concedes that point but maintains that she had “the

ability to at least influence” the accommodation decision.

The Court concludes that plaintiff’s allegation is too

attenuated to suggest that Rattigan wantonly disregarded his

medical need at the first level of ADA review. There is no

genuine issue of material fact that Rattigan was not acting in a

medical capacity and that she relied on the advice of medical

providers in denying the request.

Nor does Rattigan’s purported deficient transfer of medical

documents to O’Gara rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. Sosa appealed the denial of his ADA request to

the DOC’s ADA Coordinator, O’Gara. He contends that the appeal

was denied because Rattigan sent O’Gara only the latest medical

record from his most-recent evaluation.

Rattigan rejoins, and plaintiff does not deny, that she

advocated for plaintiff to O’Gara by suggesting that further

evaluations were warranted and that she would send along

additional information related to “x-rays, MRIs, etc.,” if

requested.

Far from constituting evidence of indifference, the

undisputed facts suggest that Rattigan appropriately carried out

her administrative role by providing O’Gara with the relevant

information concerning Sosa’s recent medical history and offered

to provide more documentation upon request. Even taking as true

his contention that Rattigan should have initially provided more

medical documentation, her actions fall far short of

demonstrating “criminal recklessness, requiring consciousness of

impending harm, easily preventable.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83.

2. Dr. Ayesha Hameed

Dr. Ayesha Hameed was the Medical Director of the facility

and was responsible for an array of patient care functions as

well as for the supervision of other providers. Sosa contends

that she was deliberately indifferent to his osteoarthritis by

not recommending a change in cuffing procedures despite her

awareness of his condition.

Dr. Hameed responds that she made a reasonable evaluation

in April, 2016 that Sosa did not need front handcuffs based upon

a “bilateral gross exam” during which Dr. Hameed observed no

muscle atrophy, erythema or tenderness on palpitation. She did

observe “normal reflexes bilaterally” and she learned that

plaintiff engaged in a number of exercises, including push-ups

and pull-ups. Nonetheless, in April, 2016, she ordered x-rays

and referred plaintiff to an orthopedist, but plaintiff refused

to keep the appointment.

Sosa contends that 1) Dr. Hameed’s medical assessments were

irrelevant to treating his osteoarthritis, 2) his push-ups and

pull-ups are not valid indicators of his pain while in behind-

the-back restraints and 3) he refused the orthopedist consult

because it would have required him to use the rear restraints

while traveling to and from the consultation.

His contentions are unavailing. The case law establishes

that

prison officials are not required to render ideal

care, let alone cater to an inmate’s preferred

healthcare regimen.

Snell, 998 F.3d at 495. The propriety of Dr. Hameed’s response

is not based on an objective analysis of medical necessity but

rather, on “what was known and understood by prison officials in

crafting their policy.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91.

There is no genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Hameed took

affirmative measures to aid Sosa in his medical condition. She

evaluated him and made observations that, in her medical

judgment, rendered a change in cuffing procedure unnecessary.

Sosa’s insistence that the Court second-guess her medical

judgment is rejected. He has produced no evidence suggesting

Dr. Hameed subjectively believed her response to plaintiff’s

condition was insufficient nor that she acted with wanton

disregard in light of her evaluation of plaintiff, her order of

x-rays and her offer to refer plaintiff to an orthopedist.

3. Jennifer Vieira

Jennifer Vieira was a nurse practitioner at the prison

facility who evaluated Sosa’s shoulder pain. The thrust of his

claim against Vieira is that she, like Dr. Hameed, did not

prescribe a change in cuffing procedure in light of Sosa’s

osteoarthritis and complaints of pain.

In moving for summary judgment, Vieira contends that she 1)

reviewed plaintiff’s most recent medical records, 2) offered an

evaluation in which Sosa refused to participate, 3) ten months

later, evaluated plaintiff beside his cell and 4) post-

evaluation, offered plaintiff an orthopedist referral and

ordered x-rays.

Sosa insists that the evaluation was insufficient because

Vieira purportedly did not review his entire medical record and

that, in any event, his subjective complaints of pain more than

established his need for a cuffing modification. Furthermore,

plaintiff contends that requiring him to wear behind-the-back

restraints while being transported to and from the evaluation

presented an unfair Hobson’s choice.

Sosa’s contentions are once again unavailing. Vieira has

adduced undisputed evidence that she took affirmative steps to

treat his medical condition appropriately. The Court will not

second-guess Vieira’s medical judgment and notes that the

parties do not dispute that the 2012 record stated that rear-

cuffing would not cause further damage to plaintiff’s shoulder

despite causing him some pain. Because any description of pain

is subjective, it was not unreasonable for Vieira to recommend

an orthopedic evaluation before recommending a cuffing

modification.

While the evaluation itself was delayed for an extended

period of time following plaintiff’s purported refusal to submit

to rear-cuffing, that delay was understandable based on

plaintiff’s history of violence against members of the facility

staff. See Battista, 645 F.3d at 454 (“security considerations

also matter at prisons...and administrators have to balance

conflicting demands.”).

Ultimately, Vieira evaluated Sosa, referred him to an

orthopedist and purportedly ordered x-rays. The Court concludes

that, far from displaying deliberate indifference toward Sosa,

Vieira afforded sufficient care to plaintiff’s medical

condition.

4. DOC Defendants

The DOC Defendants also move for summary judgment on Count

I, asserting a defense of qualified immunity. In assessing the

application of qualified immunity, a court must determine

whether 1) “the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out

a violation of a constitutional right” and if so, 2) whether

that right was clearly established at the relevant time.

Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2024).

The DOC Defendants collectively assert that they

had not been informed by any medical professional that

Sosa had a condition for which modification to cuffing

was needed

until the January, 2020, issuance of the Elman Report. They

also contend that, as a general matter, they rely on the

opinions of medical professionals in making modification

decisions. Finally, the DOC Defendants explain that there were

strong penological reasons for Sosa’s cuffing procedure prior to

2020.

Sosa asserts that each of the DOC Defendants was, at a

minimum, aware of his shoulder condition and did nothing to

alleviate his pain or modify his cuffing procedure. It is well

established, however, that prison officials “are entitled to

defer to medical personnel on medical questions.” Snell v.

Descoteaux, 2022 WL 813831, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2022)

(internal quotations omitted).

There is no genuine issue of material fact that DOC

Defendants acted reasonably in deferring to the judgment of

medical professionals that Sosa had not established a sufficient

medical need for modification of his cuffing procedure prior to

the Elman Report. Plaintiff contends that O’Gara misrepresented

Rattigan’s position as to there being no medical necessity for

the modification and erroneously relied on that

misrepresentation in denying plaintiff’s appeal. Rattigan was

not, however, a medical provider, and the record suggests that

DOC medical providers did not recommend a modification prior to

the Elman Report.

Notably, DOC Defendants acted promptly to accommodate

plaintiff following issuance of that report, which provided an

independent and objective basis for an accommodation. The

undisputed facts establish that the DOC Defendants did not act

with an intent to punish plaintiff or with a mental state akin

to criminal recklessness in denying his request for

accommodation prior to the issuance of the Elman Report.

Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83.

Furthermore, DOC Defendants were aware that plaintiff posed

a serious security risk following multiple acts of violence

against DOC personnel. Because of those security concerns, any

pain plaintiff experienced while in rear restraints was not

“easily preventable.” Id.

Accordingly, DOC Defendants did not violate plaintiff’s

constitutional rights and thus are entitled to qualified

immunity and summary judgment on Count I.

B. Conditions of Confinement

Sosa alleges § 1983 claims against the DOC Defendants as

well as Rattigan arising out of his isolation in the DDU. He

contends that, in addition to exacerbating his shoulder issues,

his isolation caused severe psychiatric symptoms, including

suicidal ideation. Accordingly, he was frequently placed on

mental health watch in the DDU’s “D Wing” adjacent to the Health

Services Unit.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement

that lack any penological justification. See Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). A condition of confinement claim

pursuant to the Eighth Amendment requires plaintiff to

demonstrate that 1) objectively he was treated in a manner that

risked excessive harm to his health or safety and 2)

subjectively defendants showed deliberate indifference to those

risks. See Feijoo v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 62 F.Supp.3d

198, 201 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

1. Injunctive Relief

It is unclear whether Sosa seeks injunctive relief as to

the conditions of his confinement. He was removed from the DDU

to the BMU, a unit specifically created to provide an

alternative placement for DDU inmates who suffer from a severe

mental illness (“SMI”). He was then moved from the BMU to SBCC

in September, 2021, where he now has “access to a window,

canteen [and] a computer tablet for reading.” Because plaintiff

suggests he is no longer under the conditions that form the

basis of Count III, injunctive relief is unwarranted and summary

judgment on Count III will be entered in favor of Commissioner

Mici who is sued only in her official capacity. As already

discussed, however, the DOC is obligated pursuant to the Court’s

October, 2020, order, to use the custom-designed cuffs on

plaintiff indefinitely in lieu of standard behind-the-back

restraints.

2. James Saba

Defendant James Saba contends that he left his position as

Superintendent of MCI Cedar Junction in October, 2015, for

medical leave and never returned. Thus, he did not participate

in any of the alleged relevant events. While Sosa does not

dispute that Saba began medical leave in October, 2015, he

asserts that Saba was still in contact with DOC administrators

during his absence and that, in any event, the statute of

limitations should be equitably tolled.

Accepting plaintiff’s version of events for the sake of

argument, merely communicating with and advising staff while on

leave is insufficient to raise a triable issue concerning

liability for Sosa’s conditions of confinement. Critically,

plaintiff does not assert that Saba specifically advised on

Sosa’s conditions of confinement while on leave.

Furthermore, there is no basis for tolling the limitations

period. Equitable tolling is only available in exceptional

circumstances. See Martin v. Somerset Cty., 86 F.4th 938, 944

(1st Cir. 2023). There is an open question of law as to whether

equitable tolling of § 1983 cases is governed by federal or

state law, see id. at 944-45, however, plaintiff’s attempt to

avail himself of that doctrine fails in either event.

Under both state and federal law, equitable tolling is a

rare exception, not the rule. On Sosa’s telling of events, he

was incapacitated and in isolation at the DDU from 2015 until at

least 2019 or 2020. He filed this suit, pro se, in 2018 under

the same conditions. This is not an extraordinary case where

tolling is warranted and accordingly, Saba is entitled to

summary judgment.

3. Stephanie Collins

During the relevant time period, Stephanie Collins was

Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Clinical Services. In that

capacity, she asserts she was only generally aware of the DDU

and did not know the specifics of Sosa’s conditions of

confinement. Rather, her role was to ensure continuity of

health services for Sosa when he was transferred to the DDU.

The undisputed evidence reveals that Collins had no role in

determining or maintaining the conditions of Sosa’s confinement

that form the basis of Count III. Accordingly, Collins has

sufficiently demonstrated that she did not wantonly disregard

excessive risks to Sosa’s health. She is entitled to summary

judgment.

4. Michael Rodrigues

Michael Rodrigues was Superintendent of the prison facility

from March, 2016 to November, 2017. He contends that 1) Sosa

was appropriately placed in the DDU during that time due to a

continued pattern of infractions and 2) Sosa was at times placed

in the “D Wing” of the DDU on the advice of medical experts.

The undisputed evidence establishes that Sosa was in the

DDU when Rodrigues became Superintendent and that during his

short stint as Superintendent, Sosa incurred 32 disciplinary

actions for which he was found guilty and faced sanctions.

While the misconducts varied in severity, at least some involved

acts or threats of violence.

Furthermore, evidence that Rodrigues had frequent

discussions with Sosa about his behavior but that Sosa self-

sabotaged his progress suggests that Rodrigues was not

deliberately indifferent to Sosa’s conditions. Finally, the

Court finds that Rodrigues appropriately deferred to medical

personnel concerning mental health issues arising from Sosa’s

placement in the “D Wing.”

5. Carol Higgins O’Brien

Former DOC Commissioner Carol Higgins O’Brien, who was

commissioner from September, 2014, to April, 2016, contends that

she was not personally aware of Sosa’s shoulder pain or his

mental health diagnoses. Furthermore, she asserts that she

never received correspondence from Prisoners’ Legal Services

concerning Sosa, and that, as is customary at DOC, any such

correspondence was processed by administrative staff.

The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to adduce

evidence demonstrating that Higgins O’Brien had any personal

involvement in the alleged events. Accordingly, summary

judgment will enter as to Higgins O’Brien on Count III.

6. Vanessa Rattigan

As discussed above, Rattigan was the administrator in

charge of the prison’s medical unit. She contends that she had

nothing to do with Sosa’s conditions of confinement and he has

proffered no evidence to the contrary.

Most of plaintiff’s allegations directed against Rattigan

have already been addressed. While Sosa alleges that Rattigan

was aware of his conditions of confinement and took no action,

there is no evidence that she had any control over those

conditions. The undisputed evidence indicates that Rattigan did

not act with wanton disregard towards any purported excessive

risk to Sosa.

C. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claim

Finally, plaintiff seeks relief under the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act to enjoin the DOC from 1) employing any

“restraint technique that requires manipulating Mr. Sosa’s

shoulder joints beyond the limitations of their mobility,” 2)

housing Sosa in isolation or 3) limiting his access to

programming, education, recreation and social opportunities.

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to recover damages, the claim

is barred by sovereign immunity. Title II of the ADA (“Title

II”) abrogates state sovereign immunity only to the extent that

state conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See United

States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006). As discussed

above, the Court finds no such violation.

With respect to injunctive relief, Title II provides that

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131.

To state a prima facie case under Title II, a plaintiff

must demonstrate he or she 1) is a qualified person with a

disability, 2) was “excluded from participation in, or denied

the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or

activities or was otherwise discriminated against” and 3) was

excluded, denied benefits or discriminated against because of

his or her disability. Snell, 998 F.3d at 499 (quoting Kiman v.

N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir. 2006)).

1. Cuffing Procedures

Sosa’s claim with respect to cuffing procedures is based on

a reasonable accommodation theory. The Court has already

determined that the double-length, custom-designed handcuffs

used on Sosa represent a reasonable accommodation of his

osteoarthritis. That determination is based on the Court’s

assessment that the double-length cuffs “avoid[] a substantial

risk of causing Mr. Sosa undue harm while still allowing the DOC

to maintain safety and security for its officers.” Sosa II, 494

F. Supp. 3d at 38-39. The order and its underlying rationale

were affirmed by the First Circuit.3 Sosa, 80 F.4th at 32-33.

While the Court’s initial determination was made with

respect to a motion for a preliminary injunction, Sosa has not

proffered any further evidence that would withstand summary

judgment. The Court notes, however, that its October, 2020,

order compels DOC to use the custom cuffs indefinitely.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment on Count IV as to

cuffing procedures will be allowed.

3 The First Circuit also noted that plaintiff’s framing of his requested

remedy within the context of ADA reasonable accommodation analysis was a

“poor fit.”

2. Isolation

Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin DOC policies concerning his

isolation and concomitant restriction from programming,

recreation and other social activities on account of his SMI.

The DOC moves for summary judgment, contending that Sosa 1)

never sought a reasonable accommodation to be moved out of DDU

placement, 2) was not identified as having an SMI until July,

2019, after which point he was removed to the BMU and 3) was

provided the same services as other inmates in the DDU.

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating

that Sosa was denied access to services by reason of his

disability.

As discussed above, Sosa is no longer housed in the DDU or

BMU but resides, instead, at SBCC. To the extent that he

chooses to pursue a claim for injunctive relief under the ADA,

there is no evidence that the SBCC provides Sosa with inadequate

services on an unequal basis from other inmates housed there.

Finally, the parties do not address in their memoranda

plaintiff’s requests that the Court enjoin defendants from 1)

discriminating against Sosa on the basis of his disabilities, 2)

interfering with the present action or 3) retaliating against

him for bringing the present action. The Court has an

obligation to assess its subject matter jurisdiction and finds

that those requested remedies are not redressable in this forum.

See In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir.

1988). Plaintiff is asking, in effect, for an order directing

defendants to comply with the law. There is no necessity to

enter such an order because the DOC is required to do so in any

event. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108-09 (1983)

(finding plaintiff lacked standing to enjoin city police

officers from illegally restraining plaintiff in the future).

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the motions of defendants

Vanessa Rattigan, Dr. Ayesha Hameed and Jennifer Vieira in their

individual capacities for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 205 and

221) and the motion of defendants the Massachusetts Department

of Corrections, Stephanie Collins, Michael Rodrigues, Joann

Lynds, James O’Gara, Carol Higgins O’Brien and James Saba in

their individual capacities and Commissioner Carol Mici in her

official capacity (Docket No. 218) are ALLOWED.

So ordered.

_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton _

Nathaniel M. Gorton

United States District Judge

Dated: March 30, 2024