Hakim Douglas v. Suffolk County District Attorney's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

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TYRON JAROME HAKIM DOUGLAS, )

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Plaintiff, )

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CIVIL ACTION

v. )

NO. 24-40002-DHH

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SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT )

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

January 5, 2024

Hennessy, M.J.

Plaintiff Tyron Jarome Hakim Douglas, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action

against the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office (DA’s Office) and the William A. Hinton

State Laboratory Institute (Hinton Drug Lab), in which he seeks (1) monetary damages for time

spent in prison on four convictions that were later vacated; and (2) the overturning of an intact

state criminal conviction. Douglas neither paid the filing fee nor filed a motion to proceed

without prepayment of the filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court will order Douglas

to resolve the filing fee and file an amended complaint.

I. Filing Fee

The fee for filing a non-habeas civil action in a federal district court is $405. This fee

consists of a $350 statutory fee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and a $55 administrative fee. The filing

fee is due at the commencement of the action. A federal court may, however, allow a person to

proceed without prepayment of the filing upon a showing that the person does not have income

or assets to pay the fee upfront. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

A plaintiff may seek leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee by filing a

completed Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs

(“Application”). When a prisoner seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee,

the Application must be accompanied by “a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or

institutional equivalent) . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the

prisoner is or was confined.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

If the court allows a prisoner plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, the

$55 administrative fee is waived, but the prisoner must pay the $350 statutory filing fee over

time, regardless of the duration and outcome of the lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Based on

the information in the plaintiff’s six-month institutional statement, the court calculates and

assesses an initial filing fee; subsequent payments are calculated by the institution’s treasurer

based on the monthly income of the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (2). For purposes of

resolution of the filing fee, a “prisoner” is defined as “any person incarcerated or detained in any

facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).

Here, it is not clear whether Douglas is a “prisoner,” as the term is defined in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(h). Douglas provides a mailing address for the Worcester Recovery Center, which is not

operated by the Department of Correction. It is not clear from his complaint whether he is still

serving a sentence for the conviction that he seeks to vacate. If Douglas is serving a criminal

sentence, he is a “prisoner” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 even though he is not confined in a

correctional institution. Compare Gibson v. City Municipality of New York, 692 F.3d 198, 202

(2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that pretrial detainee confined in a mental hospital pursuant

to a temporary order of observation was a “prisoner” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h)) and

Kalinowski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978, 979 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that civilly committed person

whose criminal proceedings were held in abeyance during treatment for mental illness was a

“prisoner”) with Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that civilly committed

person, who was not charged with a crime or serving a term of incarceration, was not a

“prisoner”).

If Douglas elects to proceed with this action, he must resolve the filing fee by (1) paying

the $405 filing fee; or (2) filing a completed Application. If Douglas is a “prisoner,” as defined

in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), he must submit a six-month institutional account statement and he must

be willing to assume the financial obligation of paying the statutory $350 filing fee over a period

of time.

II. Review of the Complaint

Federal law authorizes a federal court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua

sponte if the claims therein are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief can be

granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 Further, the Court may review the sufficiency of a complaint sua

sponte. See Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); Fitzgerald v. First

E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The Court liberally

construes Douglas’s complaint because he is proceeding pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520-21 (1972).

The present complaint is identical to the pleading Douglas filed in Douglas v. Suffolk

County District Attorney, C.A. No. 23-40019-MRG (D. Mass.). Thus, the review of the pleading

1 The Court is also required to conduct a similar preliminary review of a complaint filed by a

prisoner against a governmental entity or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

at hand will yield the same result as did the District Judge’s review of the earlier-filed

complaint.2

A. The Complaint

According to Douglas, his convictions in four Massachusetts courts were vacated with

prejudice based on the well-publicized misconduct at Hinton by former chemist Annie Dookhan.

See, e.g., Bridgeman v. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 464 (2015). Douglas seeks

damages for the time he spent serving sentences of imprisonment and probation for these

convictions. He also asks that an intact state court conviction be vacated, alleging that the “Drug

Certificate” used against him in that case suffered the same defects and lack of reliability as did

those signed by Dookhan.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Douglas’s claims against Hinton and the DA’s Office are not cognizable in this Court.

The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution generally is recognized as a bar to

suits in federal courts against a State, its departments and its agencies, unless the State has

consented to suit or Congress has overridden the State’s immunity. See Regents of the Univ. of

Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985);

Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d

102, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2007). The DA’s Office and the Massachusetts State Police (which

2 In an order dated May 8, 2023, District Judge Margaret R. Guzman conducted a preliminary

review of the complaint Douglas v. Suffolk County District Attorney, C.A. No. 23-40019-MRG

(D. Mass.) and found that it did not contain any cognizable claim. (ECF No. 5). Judge Guzman

ordered Douglas to file an amended complaint and resolve the filing fee. Douglas responded to

the order by moving to dismiss the case. (ECF No. 6). The Court construed the motion as a

notice of voluntary dismissal and terminated the action. (ECF No. 7).

operated the Hinton Drug Lab)3 are arms of the Commonwealth. The Court cannot discern any

claim for relief against either defendant for which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has

waived its immunity or Congress has overridden it. Thus, Douglas has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted in a federal court against either defendant.

Further a state is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which Douglas

may bring an action for the violation of federal rights by a “person” acting under the color of

state law. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

C. Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction to Vacate Douglas’s Intact Conviction

In addition, the Court is without jurisdiction to vacate a criminal sentence in the context

of a civil rights action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the Supreme Court of the United States is the

only federal court with jurisdiction to review a state court judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257;

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). One of the few

exceptions to this rule is when a litigant files a petition in a federal district court for a writ of

habeas corpus challenging the validity of a conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Mandel v. Town of

Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 (1st Cir. 2003). A litigant must exhaust state court remedies prior to

seeking habeas relief in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). In the absence of any suggestion

that Douglas has exhausted available state court remedies to challenge the validity of his

conviction, the Court declines to construe his complaint as a habeas petition.

D. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Douglas seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983), which provides that any “person,”

acting under the color of state law, who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

3 See Committee for Public Counsel Servs. v. Attorney General, 48 Mass. 700, 972 (2018)

(stating that “[t]he State police took over operation of the [Hinton Drug Lab] in July, 2012, and

oversaw the lab until its closure on January 18, 2013.”).

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As noted above, a state is not a “person” for purposes of this

statute.

Notwithstanding, Douglas may pursue claims under § 1983 against an individual who

was directly involved in the violation of a constitutional right. It is well-established that ‘only

those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his rights can be

held liable.’” Velez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 146, 156 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Cepero-

Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005)). In § 1983 cases, ‘supervisors are not

automatically liable for the misconduct of those under their command. A plaintiff must show an

affirmative link between the subordinate officer and the supervisor, whether through direct

participation or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization.’” Id.

(quoting Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000)).4

If Douglas wishes to pursue a claim under § 1983, he may do so by filing an amended

complaint against any individual acting under color of state law who was directly involved in the

violation of his federal rights. In the amended complaint, Douglas must identify the alleged

misconduct of each defendant, providing sufficient factual allegations which, treated as true,

reasonably imply that the defendant is liable to him.

E. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Douglas invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for his lawsuit. This statute provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right

in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give

evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the

4 The Court notes that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for claims arising out of

conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be

subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every

kind, and to no other.

42 U.S.C. § 1981. As this statute was meant to ensure racial equality, a claim under § 1981

requires an allegation of racial discrimination, see Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22,

33-34 (1st Cir. 2009). Thus, this statute does not appear to be factually applicable to Douglas’s

claims, as currently pled.

III. Order

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders:

1. If Douglas wishes to pursue this action, he must, within thirty-five (35) days of

the date of this order, pay the $405 filing fee or file a completed Application. If Douglas is a

pretrial detainee or is serving a criminal sentence (even if not confined in a correctional facility),

he must clearly state that fact in his Application and he must include a six-month institutional

account statement with his Application. Failure to comply with this order within twenty-eight

(28) days may result in dismissal of this action by a District Judge.

2. If Douglas wishes to pursue this action, he may file an amended complaint to cure

the above-identified pleading deficiencies. Failure to comply with this order within twenty-eight

(28) days of the date of this order may result in dismissal of this action by a District Judge.

So Ordered.

/s/ David H. Hennessy

David H. Hennessy

United States Magistrate Judge