Cline v. Burke

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_______________________________________

)

TYRON CLINE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No.

v. ) 22-40115-FDS

)

PATRICK BURKE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

SAYLOR, C.J.

This is an action arising out of a dispute concerning a child-support proceeding in the

Worcester Probate and Family Court. Plaintiff Tyron Cline has sued 19 defendants: an

Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; the former Massachusetts

Attorney General (and current Governor of Massachusetts); a Probate Court judge; the Deputy

Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (“DOR”) Child Support

Enforcement (“CSE”) Division; private attorneys; and various other state and local government

officials. The complaint asserts claims for fraud (Count 1); conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s

federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count 2); violation of plaintiff’s rights

under the Fourth Amendment (Count 3); and fraud on the court (Count 4). Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se.

All 19 defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons set forth below,

the motions to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are set forth as alleged in the complaint.

1. The Parties

Tyron Cline is a resident of New Jersey. (Notice of Change of Address at 1).

The 19 defendants can be separated into two general categories.1

The first category is the Commonwealth defendants. Maura Healey is the former

Attorney General (and current Governor) of Massachusetts. (Compl. ¶ 22). Frank Gaziano is an

Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. (Id. ¶ 23). Maura Doyle is the

Clerk of the SJC. (Id. ¶ 24). Donna Wardynski is the Bar Docket Coordinator for the SJC. (Id.

¶ 25). Amy Stewart is the First Assistant Clerk of the SJC. (Id. ¶ 26). Leilah Keamy is an

Associate Justice of the Worcester Probate and Family Court. (Id. ¶ 21). Stephanie Fattman is

the Register of Probate for Worcester County. (Id. ¶ 20). Michele Cristello is the Deputy

Commissioner of the CSE Division of the Massachusetts DOR. (Id. ¶ 31). MaryKate

McDonald, Dolores O’Neill, and Geoffrey Snyder are DOR employees. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 32).

The remaining defendants are not employees of the Commonwealth. Wilson Nunez is a

constable. (Id. ¶ 33). Amy Cross and Gregory Carr are deputy sheriffs for the Worcester County

Sheriff’s Office. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30). Patrick Burke, Andrea Levy, Frederick Rushton, and James

Lukowiak are private attorneys. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18). Margaret Morang is a legal secretary for

attorney Lukowiak. (Id. ¶ 19).

1 Although the complaint does not identify all defendants by their proper names or official titles, the court

takes judicial notice of these “adjudicative facts.” Lopes v. Riendeau, 177 F. Supp. 3d 634, 666 (D. Mass. 2016)

(“[A]n ‘adjudicative fact’ is a fact ‘not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the

trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy

cannot be reasonably questioned.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)).

2. The Allegedly Unlawful State-Court Proceedings

The substance of the complaint concerns child-support proceedings in the Worcester

Probate and Family Court. Although it is unclear, it appears that the dispute involves efforts to

collect and enforce plaintiff’s child-support obligations.

It is unclear whether any of the parties, including any child, are resident in a foreign

country. In any event, the complaint alleges that the proceedings in the Probate Court were those

of a foreign tribunal pursuant to a treaty formed between Massachusetts and “the Hague Child

Support Convention.” (Id. ¶ 34). It further alleges that plaintiff “has been ignored and actions

by the foreign tribunal continued to commence despite invoking his protection under the Bill of

Rights not to enter into a treaty.” (Id. ¶ 89). The result, it alleges, has been “emotional and

psychological harm [that was] significant and affects [plaintiff’s] ability to function.” (Id. at 3).

It also alleges that he “suffered lost time that cannot be given back for time away from his

offspring.” (Id.).

B. Procedural Background

On October 17, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages and declaratory and

injunctive relief. As noted, the complaint alleges four counts: fraud (Count 1); conspiracy to

commit constitutional violations (Count 2); violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth

Amendment, which the court will construe as a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 3);

and fraud on the court (Count 4).

All defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint as to all counts.2

2 Seven motions to dismiss have been filed by various defendants or groups of defendants: the

Commonwealth Defendants; Gregory Carr and Amy Cross; Frederick Rushton; Patrick Burke and Andrea Levy;

Wilson Nunez; Margaret Morang; and James Lukowiak.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its

face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In other words, the “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555

(citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When determining whether a

complaint satisfies that standard, a court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and give

the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding

Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)).

Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual allegations, either direct or

inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable

legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Médico

del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).

B. Motions to Dismiss

For the following reasons, the complaint is insufficient to state any claim against any of

the 19 defendants. Apart from Count 1—which lists all defendants—the complaint does not

identify the defendants to which the other counts apply. Moreover, the complaint does not set

forth sufficient acts or omissions by each defendant to satisfy the elements of any of the claims.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of

the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment has been construed to

bar all suits against a state for damages in the federal courts, regardless of the citizenship of the

plaintiff. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana,

134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is considered a

suit against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23 (1991).

Congress has not abrogated, and Massachusetts has not waived, its Eleventh Amendment

immunity for civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. Will v. Michigan

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration

of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 662 (1st Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, to the extent the complaint asserts claims for damages against officials of

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (defendants Healey, Gaziano, Doyle, Wardynski, Stewart,

Keamy, Fattman, Cristello, McDonald, O’Neill, and Snyder), they will be dismissed.

2. “Persons” Subject to Suit Under Section 1983

To prove a claim for monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

establish that some “person” acting under color of law deprived him or her of any “rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” The states and their agencies are not

“persons” subject to suit under § 1983 for damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71; Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Similarly, state officials sued for damages in their

official capacity are likewise not “persons” under § 1983. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 23.

Accordingly, to the extent the complaint asserts a claim for damages under § 1983 against state

officials acting in their official capacity (defendants Healey, Gaziano, Doyle, Wardynski,

Stewart, Keamy, Fattman, Cristello, McDonald, O’Neill, and Snyder), it will be dismissed.

3. Judicial/Quasi-Judicial Immunity

The claims against the judges and court clerks are barred by judicial or quasi-judicial

immunity. “[E]very judge, whether of a higher or lower court, is exempt from liability to an

action for any judgment or decision rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in him by

law.” LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 210 (1989) (quoting Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187,

189-90 (1935)). That immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting “maliciously

and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).

In addition, under Massachusetts law, “[c]ourt clerks enjoy qualified immunity from suit

and are absolutely immune for their conduct when acting at a judge’s direction.” Temple v.

Marlborough Div. of Dist. Ct. Dep’t, 395 Mass. 117, 133 (1985). Indeed, “[c]ourts have

expanded the doctrine of judicial immunity to include certain ‘quasi-judicial’ officers who are

involved in an integral part of the judicial process and thus must be able to act freely without the

threat of a law suit.” Commonwealth v. O’Neil, 418 Mass. 760, 767 (1994); see also Nystedt v.

Nigro, 700 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2012). The doctrine applies to court clerks performing their

duties due to “the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute

immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other

judicial adjuncts.” McNeil v. State of Mass., 2014 WL 7404561, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 30, 2014)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Accordingly, to the extent the claims are asserted against judicial officers or court clerks

or employees performing their official duties (defendants Gaziano, Doyle, Wardynski, Stewart,

Keamy, and Fattman), they will be dismissed.

4. Prosecutorial Immunity

The claim against then-Attorney General Healey for failing to investigate plaintiff’s

allegations is barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. “[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute

immunity from suit based on actions taken pursuant to [her] quasi-judicial function.” Celia v.

O’Malley, 918 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S.

335, 340–43 (2009) (prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity as long as challenged conduct falls

within function as advocate for a governmental entity). The immunity extends to decisions not

to initiate charges. Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1992). Accordingly, to the

extent the claims are asserted against defendant Healey in her prosecutorial capacity, they will be

dismissed.

5. Qualified Immunity

“The general rule of qualified immunity . . . is that ‘government officials performing

discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The facts alleged in the complaint concern

discretionary functions performed by government officials, and do not make out a violation of

either a statutory or constitutional right. Accordingly, to the extent the claims asserted against

the Commonwealth defendants (defendants Healey, Gaziano, Doyle, Wardynski, Stewart,

Keamy, Fattman, Cristello, McDonald, O’Neill, and Snyder) involve discretionary functions,

they will be dismissed.

6. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

To the extent that the complaint seeks to challenge the validity of an order issued by the

Probate Court, the claims are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Tr.

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

That doctrine precludes a federal court from reviewing a final judgment entered by a state court,

or exercising jurisdiction, where the issues are “inextricably intertwined” with questions

previously adjudicated by a state court. See Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir.

1999) (stating that a federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state-court claim “if the

federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before

it.” (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring))).

7. Substantive Claims

a. Count 1—Fraud

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), in cases “alleging fraud . . . a party must state with

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” The basic purposes of that requirement are

(1) to give the defendants notice and enable them to prepare a meaningful response; (2) to

preclude the use of a groundless fraud claim as a pretext to using discovery as a fishing

expedition; and (3) to safeguard defendants from frivolous charges that might damage their

reputations. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 295 F. Supp. 2d 148, 170 (D. Mass.

2003). Under the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b), a complaint alleging fraud must

state “the who, what, where, and when” of the alleged deception. Kaufman v. CVS Caremark

Corp., 836 F.3d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 2016).

The complaint fails to allege facts with sufficient particularity within the requirements of

Rule 9(b). Instead, Count 1 merely recites the elements of fraud and asserts that all 19

defendants are liable. Accordingly, Count 1 will be dismissed as to all defendants.

b. Count 2—Conspiracy to Commit Constitutional Violations

Count 2 alleges a “conspiracy to commit fraud,” the object of which was to deprive

plaintiff “of a constitutionally protected right,” under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Id.).

To state a claim under § 1985(3) a plaintiff must allege the existence of (1) a

conspiracy, (2) a conspiratorial purpose to deprive a person or class of persons,

directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws, (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and

(4) either (a) an injury to person or property, or (b) a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected right or privilege.

Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).

The complaint falls well short of meeting those requirements. Among other things, it

does not allege which of the 19 defendants were members of the conspiracy. Accordingly,

Count 2 will be dismissed.

c. Count 3—Fourth Amendment Violation

Count 3 asserts a claim based on an alleged violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights, which the Court will construe as a claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

provides a private cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives

another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws.”

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Count 3 is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. It makes a conclusory declaration:

“Warrant without probable cause.” (Compl. at 12). The remainder of Count 3 quotes the

entirety of the Fourth Amendment, but fails to provide further allegations or identify which of

the 19 defendants violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, or how those rights were

violated. Count 3 will accordingly be dismissed.

d. Count 4—Fraud on the Court

Count 4 asserts a claim for fraud on the court, based on the court’s “authority to vacate a

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). Although such an action is recognized [by] Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(d)(3) . . . . This drastic remedy is hedged with restrictions.” Torres v. Bella Vista

Hosp., Inc., 914 F.3d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2019). “‘Fraud on the court’ is limited to fraud that

‘“seriously” affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudication,’ ‘defile[s] the court

itself,’ and prevents ‘the judicial machinery’ from performing its usual function—for example,

bribery of a judge or jury tampering.” Id. at 19 (quoting 12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §

60.21[4][a] (2018)).

Count 4 is insufficient to state a claim. It fails to allege facts sufficient to permit the

claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Moreover, as with Counts 2 and 3, Count 4

does not specify which defendants allegedly committed the fraud on the court. Furthermore, and

in any event, the alleged fraud appears to have been committed on the Probate Court, not a

federal court, and thus any such claim should be asserted, if at all, in the state courts. Count 4

will therefore be dismissed as to all defendants.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

So Ordered.

/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV

F. Dennis Saylor IV

Dated: July 12, 2023 Chief Judge, United States District Court