The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
CURTIS HOWELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 21-11976-PBS
MIDDLESEX COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et )
al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 20, 2022
SARIS, D.J.
Pro se plaintiff Curtis Howell brings this action in which
he alleges that the Middlesex Community College (“MCC”)
wrongfully prevented him from receiving Federal Student Aid
(“FSA”), which resulted in him withdrawing from school. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action
without prejudice.
I. Magistrate Judge’s Review of the Amended Complaint
On December 7, 2021, Howell commenced this action by filing
a complaint against Middlesex Community College (“MCC”), the
Massachusetts Commissioner Against Discrimination (“MCAD”), Bank
of America, and Verizon Wireless. On February 28, 2022, Howell
filed an amended complaint in which MCC and the MCAD are the
only defendants (Docket No. 8).
The Court granted Howell’s motions for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and, as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
proceeded to conduct a preliminary review of the amended
complaint. (Docket No. 12). This statute permits a federal
district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua
sponte if the claims therein are frivolous, malicious, fail to
state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seek monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The thrust of Howell’s amended complaint was that MCC had
violated his rights under the American with Disabilities Act by
requiring him to provide proof of his General Educational
Development (“GED”) credential before releasing federal student
aid funds for him. Howell alleged that this requirement was
improper because he had previously obtained FSA for college
without having to get a GED certificate. He further represented
that he called an FSA agency and was informed that separate
proof of a GED was not required. Howell also took the position
that MCC’s conduct was wrongful because MCC accepted him as a
student and permitted him to enroll in classes prior to
requiring proof of his GED credential. Howell further alleged
that he was not permitted to be on MCC’s campus to provide his
previous college transcript. Finally, he argued that the MCAD
did not timely address his claim of discrimination.
The Court concluded that the amended complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it did
not set forth a plausible claim of unlawful discrimination based
on disability. The Court explained Howell had not identified
his disability, and, that Howell’s assertions that MCC
discriminated against him on the basis of disability are
entirely conclusory. The judge also found that the MCAD’s
alleged delay in adjudicating his administrative claim to did
not give rise to a cause action. Judge Dein ordered Howell to
file a second amended complaint curing the pleading
deficiencies, and that failure to do so could result in
dismissal by a District Judge.
On May 5, 2022, Howell filed a second amended complaint
(Docket No. 17). On June 24 and 27, 2022, Howell filed notices
appeal two of the orders, including the order requiring him to
file a second amended complaint. (Docket Nos. 24, 27). On
September 30, 2022, the First Circuit issued a judgment
dismissing the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket No.
37). The action was then reassigned to the undersigned.
II. Review of the Second Amended Complaint
A. Allegations and Claims in the Second Amended Complaint
In the second amended complaint, Howell again alleges that
MCC discriminated against him on the basis of disability by
requiring him to provide proof of a high school diploma or GED
certification prior to the releasing federal funds to him.
Howell claims that requirement “would require [him] to go
backwards and verify something that is below the higher learning
verifications,” and that the requirement was unnecessary because
he had already attended another community college in the
Commonwealth. Second Am. Compl. at 6, ¶ 1.
Howell maintains that MCC learned that he had a mental
disability because his medical records “were disseminated by the
[L]owell police on Facebook and over 5000 people per the 99
commenters were able to see it would more than likely give rise
that these staff members at [MCC] knew that [he] had a
disability.” Id. Howell claims that, because MCC knew of his
disability, its employees “tried to manipulate [him] and deceive
[him] to believe that there was an additional step in the
process despite [him] already being ready for classes.” Id.
Howell continues:
So by [MCC] telling me additional process that only
first time college students do, and not those things
go been to college, or because [MCC] try [sic] to show
authority and declare that my knowledge of the school
process was wrong by deception and falsity thus
discriminated against me being that I am disabled and
I trust in these words that the process they were
informing me of is the right way. Which is not true
cause once you enroll in class there is no further
process.
Id. at 7, ¶ 1.
Howell further alleges:
I was denied a reasonable accommodation and ordered to
do more although the person was talking to me like I
could not comprehend nor understand the school policy
and what their actions were doing was deliberate
deceptive behaviors. This is not equal to what the
normal student has to do and because I’m disabled I
felt like I was being treated like I was dumb or could
easily be fooled and delayed. Because they felt like
I was mentally ill and did not know the law, which
denied me rehabilitation denied my right to express
and learn, deprived me of my liberty and stop my
worship of religion cause I could not continue the
school process which was delayed and treated me less
than whites. Likewise highlighting my disability post
traumatic stress, anxiety due to conflicts with
authority figures as a child and up.
Id. at 8, ¶ B (spelling standardized). Elsewhere in the second
amended complaint, he repeats the allegations that the conduct
of MCC employees denied interfered with his religious worship
because he “could not continue the school process which was
delayed” and that he was “treated less than whites.” Id. at 7,
¶ A; 9, ¶ D.
Finally, Howell claims that, when he tried to deliver a
transcript of the courses he had taken from a different college
to MCC, he “was detained illegal[ly] and denied entrance.” Id.
at 7, ¶ 1.
Howell brings claims for violations of his rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983); for unlawful
discrimination on the basis of disability, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-12134 (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act)
and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Rehabilitation Act); for unlawful
discrimination on the basis of basis of race (42 U.S.C.§ 2000d);
and U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985(3), 1986.1
B. Standard of Review
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his claim
“requires more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” to state a
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. The plausibility standard is not as
onerous as a “‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
1 Not all of these statutory citations appear in Howell’s
pleading. Where Howell has cited to a statute that is not
applicable to a claim of discrimination in public educational
institution, the Court has provided the appropriate citation.
Howell also seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, but this
statute was struck down as unconstitutional in 1997. See City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's
liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
plaintiff must “nudge[] [his] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Determining whether a pleading meets the plausibility
requirement is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
C. Discussion
1. Discrimination Based on Disability
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132.2 “The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’
means an individual with a disability who, with or without
2 Because a claim under the Rehabilitation Act against a public
entity is “materially identical” to a claim under Title II of
the ADA, see A.H. by Holzmueller v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881
F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018), the Court will cite only to Title
II of the ADA.
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . .
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided
by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(b).
Here, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Howell’s
allegations that MCC excluded him from receiving FSA because of
his disability or that MCC failed to provide a reasonable
modification of its rules or policies to allow him to receive
FSA.
A student must meet various requirements to be eligible for
FSA. One condition is that a student have a high school diploma
or the “equivalent” thereof. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1).3 The
definition of a “recognized equivalent of a high school
diploma,” includes, in relevant part, a GED Certificate (or
equivalent state certificate) or an “academic transcript of a
student who has successfully completed at least a two-year
program that is acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor’s
degree.” 34 C.F.R. § 600.2. The educational institution is
3 If a student does not have a high school diploma or its
equivalent, the student may nonetheless qualify for federal
student aid if “[t]he student is enrolled in an eligible career
pathway program” which meets a certain standard or the student
has “completed a secondary school education in a home school
setting that is treated as a home school or private school under
State law.” 20 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1)(A),(B). Howell’s factual
allegations do not support any inference that either category of
eligibility applies to him.
responsible for ensuring that a student meets this and other
qualifications for the receipt of federal student aid. See
United States Dep’t of Education, 2021-2022 Federal Student Aid
Handbook, at 1-7 through 1-20 (available at
https://fsapartners.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
07/2122FSAHbkVol1Master.pdf (last viewed Dec. 5, 2022).
Although a student may self-certify on the Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (“FAFSA”) form that he has a diploma or high
school equivalency certificate, the school cannot rely on the
self-certification alone if the school requires a high school
diploma or equivalency certificate for admission. Id. at 1-12.
In light of the aforesaid federal law concerning the
requirement that a recipient of FAS have a high school diploma
or the recognized equivalent thereof and of an educational
institution’s responsibility to ensure compliance, the Court
cannot reasonably infer from Howell’s allegations that MCC
discriminated against him because of his disability. Howell
believes that MCC was imposing an unnecessary condition on his
receipt of FSA solely because of his disability. However, as
set forth above, federal law requires educational institutions
to ensure that students receiving FSA meet all requirements for
eligibility. Contrary to Howell’s suggestion, his attendance at
some classes at a community college elsewhere did not
automatically establish his eligibility for FSA at MCC. A
transcript showing that he had “successfully completed at least
a two-year program that is acceptable for full credit toward a
bachelor’s degree,” 34 C.F.R. § 600.2, was necessary, and he
does not suggest that the transcript he sought to provide MCC
showed that he had completed such a program. In addition,
depending on its admission requirements, MCC may be required
under law to obtain a high school diploma or GED certificate
from a student, regardless of the student’s self-certification
on the FAFSA that he had a high school diploma or GED
certificate. Accordingly, Howell has not set forth a plausible
claim that MCC acted with a discriminatory motive.
2. First and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C § 1983
Howell alleges that MCC has violated his rights under the
First and Fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution. Claims for violations of federal rights by state
actors must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Arpin v.
Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir.
2001) (“[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a
constitutional right does not have a direct cause of action
under the United States Constitution but [rather] must utilize
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) This statute provides that any “person,”
acting under the color of state law, who “subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. While a § 1983 claim may be asserted against state or
local employees who were directly involved in the violation of a
plaintiff’s federal rights, a § 1983 claim cannot be asserted
against a state or its agencies. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because MCC is a state
agency see M.G.L. ch. 15A, § 5; Fantini v. Salem State College,
557 F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 2009), it cannot be liable under
§ 1983.4
3. Racial Discrimination
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
42 U.S.C.§ 2000d. Because MCC receives federal financial
assistance, it is subject to this statute.
Howell’s claim of racial discrimination is that he is
treated “less than whites.” This conclusory allegation lacks
sufficient factual specificity to permit the Court to reasonably
4 Further, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Howell’s
allegations that the alleged misconduct of any MCC employee
violated his rights under the First or Fourteenth amendments.
infer therefrom that MCC discriminated against Howell on the
basis of race.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985(3), and 1986.
Howell seeks to hold MCC liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
1982, 1985(3), and 1986. All these statutes concern the equal
rights of citizens. However, states (including their agencies)
cannot be sued under these statutes in a federal court.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
generally is recognized as a bar to suits in federal courts
against a State, its departments and its agencies, unless the
State has consented to suit or Congress has overridden the
State’s immunity. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519
U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.
14 (1985); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per
curiam); Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 105-06 (1st
Cir. 2007). In enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1982, 1985(3), or
1986, Congress did not override the Eleventh Amendment immunity
of the states. See Henry v. Florida Bar, 701 Fed. App’x 878,
881 (11th Cir. 2017); Cerrata v. San Francisco Community College
Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1994).
III. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders
that this action be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patti B. Saris
Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge