The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
__________________________________________
)
RASHARD BROWN, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No.
) 21-cv-11117-ADB
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
THOMAS A. TURCO, III, )
STEVEN SILVA, )
KEITH NANO, )
SAMUEL RAMOS and )
JOHN DOES 1 -10, )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff Rashard Brown’s (“Brown”) motion for appointment of pro bono counsel (ECF
No. 12) is hereby DENIED without prejudice, subject to refiling after the defendants respond to
the Complaint. Although pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney
to represent any person unable to afford counsel,” it is well settled that “[t]here is no absolute
constitutional right to a free lawyer in a civil case.” DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st
Cir. 1991). The First Circuit has held that a court’s denial of a motion to appoint counsel is
subject to reversal if: (1) a plaintiff is indigent; and, (2) exceptional circumstances exist such that
the denial of counsel will result in a fundamental unfairness impinging on his due process rights.
Id.; 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). “To determine whether there are exceptional circumstances sufficient
to warrant the appointment of counsel, a court must examine the total situation, focusing, inter
alia, on the merits of the case, the complexity of the legal issues, and the litigant’s ability to
represent himself.” Id. At this stage of the proceedings, the motion is premature and, on this
record, Brown has not yet demonstrated “exceptional circumstances” that warrant appointment
of counsel.
SO ORDERED.
October 27, 2021 /s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE