“Under Massachusetts law, as elsewhere, a dismissal for failure to state a claim, under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), operates as a dismissal on the merits . . . with res judicata effect.”
How later courts described this case
- “Under Massachusetts law, as elsewhere, a dismissal for failure to state a claim, under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), operates as a dismissal on the merits . . . with res judicata effect.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
EDEN CHEVELLE JACQUES,
Plaintiff,
No. 19-cv-12083-DLC
v.
COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
THOMAS A. TURCO, III,
Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Cabell, U.S.M.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016 Eden Chevelle Jacques was indicted on state charges
of rape of a minor and ordered detained pending trial. Jacques
was initially held at a county jail but was subsequently
transferred to a state prison. Proceeding pro se, Jacques contends
in a five-count complaint that his pretrial transfer to a state
prison (and the maltreatment he received once there) violated his
civil and common law rights. The defendant, the Commissioner of
the Massachusetts Department of Correction, argues inter alia that
Jacques’ claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because
Jacques previously and unsuccessfully litigated the very same
claims in state court. See Jacques v. Commissioner, No.
1884CV02280 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk Co. filed July 24, 2018).
The defendant moves to dismiss; the plaintiff opposes. (D. 21,
33). For the reasons explained below, the court allows the motion
to dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
Because the plaintiff appears pro se, we construe his pleadings
more favorably than we would those drafted by an attorney. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, the
plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from complying with
procedural and substantive law. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d
886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
In November 2016, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted the
plaintiff on charges of rape of a minor and the superior court
ordered him detained pending trial. The plaintiff was initially
held in the Hampshire County Jail but in December was transferred
from there to the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC)1.
(D. 22-1.).
In July 2018, the plaintiff brought a pro se action in state
court against the Commissioner challenging his transfer to SBCC.
The plaintiff contended that the transfer constituted “infamous
punishment”2 where he had not been sentenced to a state
1 The plaintiff was subsequently convicted and is presently serving a term of
incarceration.
2 Massachusetts Constitution, Part I, art. 12, provides in pertinent part that
“the legislature shall not make any law, that shall subject any person to .
. . infamous punishment . . . without trial by jury.”
2
correctional facility. (D. 22-2). He contended also that SBCC
officers encouraged other inmates to assault him by revealing the
nature of the charges against him; discarded his personal property;
subjected him to humiliating strip searches before being able to
meet with his attorney; denied or allowed him only shortened face-
to-face meetings with counsel; and denied him adequate access to
the law library. (Id.).
The state court complaint advanced the following five claims:
1. “Count One - Civil Rights Violation under 42 U.S.C. §
1983”: the plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner violated
the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by transferring
him to SBCC without legal authorization;
2. “Count two - Civil Rights Violations and Article XXVI of
the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts
Constitution”: the plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner
improperly transferred him to SBCC to inflict punishment
on him rather than for purposes of security;
3. “Count three - Civil Rights violation and Article XXII
[sic]3 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts
Constitution”: the plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner
could not transfer him to a state prison where he had never
been previously indicted;
4. “Count Four - Civil Rights Violation of the United States
Constitution and Amendment XIV Section 1”: the plaintiff
alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Commissioner
deprived him of life, liberty, and property without due
process; and
5. “Count Five - Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress”: the plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him.
3 Although the plaintiff referred to Article XXII, which relates to meetings
of the legislature, he almost surely meant to refer to Article XII, which
concerns the right to due process.
3
(D. 22-2).
The Commissioner moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The
Commissioner argued inter alia that he was entitled to transfer
the plaintiff to SBCC because M.G.L. c. 276, § 52A authorizes the
Commissioner to move a detainee from a county jail to a state
facility with the approval of the county district attorney if the
detainee had previously been incarcerated in a state correctional
facility. The Commissioner noted that notwithstanding Jacques’
assertions to the contrary, Jacques had previously been
incarcerated at SBCC for a prior 2007 felony conviction for assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon. See Commonwealth v. Jacques,
No. 0601CR004972-1 (Boston Mun. Ct.-Central filed Aug. 3, 2006).
The Commissioner also argued that to the extent Jacques argued
that he was subjected to “infamous punishment” by being transferred
to a state prison without being indicted, Jacques appeared to be
relying on Brown v. Commissioner, 394 Mass. 89 (1985), which
determined that Article XII prohibits unindicted defendants from
being sentenced to the state prison. The Commissioner argued that
Brown was not applicable to Jacques’ case because Brown did not
apply to pretrial transfers and the statute in any event only
barred the transfer of a sentenced prisoner to Massachusetts’ Cedar
Junction prison facility. (D. 22-4).
4
Finally, the Commissioner argued that Jacques’ civil rights
were not violated because: he had no due process right to avoid
being transferred to SBCC; he had not alleged either deprivations
that were sufficiently serious or that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to his health or safety; and he failed to
cite any authority for his general proposition that being housed
at SBCC was sufficient in and of itself to state a valid Eighth
Amendment claim. (D. 22-4).
On May 5, 2019, the state court allowed the Commissioner’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings for the reasons stated in the
Commissioner’s memorandum. (D. 22-5). Jacques did not appeal.
(D. 22-3). Rather, on October 7, 2019 Jacques initiated the
present action. (D. 1). The federal complaint is virtually
identical to Jacques’ state court complaint in that it names the
Commissioner as the defendant, it raises the exact same claims as
those advanced in the state court complaint -using near identical
wording and format, and arises out of the same nucleus of facts,
namely the plaintiff’s pretrial transfer to SBCC and his treatment
once there. (D. 1-1).4
4 For example, the titles of the five counts in the federal complaint track
word for word the titles of the five counts in the state complaint. See D.
1-1 (“Count One - Civil Rights Violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”; “Count two
-Civil Rights Violations and Article XXVI of the Declaration of Rights of the
Massachusetts Constitution”; “Count three - Civil Rights violation and
Article XXII of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution”;
“Count Four - Civil Rights Violation of the United States Constitution and
5
On January 7, 2020, the Commissioner moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that Jacques’ federal claims are barred
by the doctrine of res judicata, and regardless fail to assert
viable claims for relief. (D. 22). Jacques in opposition argues
that the doctrine of res judicata should not apply because the
state court showed bias and favoritism toward the defendant. He
argues that this court therefore can and should consider his claims
de novo. (D. 33 at ¶¶ 2-11).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). . .
a pro se complaint must be evaluated upon less stringent standards
than those applicable to one drafted by an attorney.” Ulatowski
v. Ponte, 524 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (D. Mass. 1981). Nonetheless,
the court will “not conjure up unpleaded facts to support. . .
conclusory [allegations].” Cote v. Murphy, 152 F. App'x 6, 7 (1st
Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurney v. Carver,
602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979)).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges a party’s
complaint for failing to state claim. In deciding such a motion,
a court must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set forth in
the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
Amendment XIV Section 1”; and “Count Five - Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress”).
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pleader’s favor.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st
Cir. 2011) (quoting Artuso v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2011)).
To survive such a motion, the plaintiff must provide “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
“obligation to provide the grounds of [the plaintiff’s]
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. at 555 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Commissioner asserts that the plaintiff’s claims must
fail because they are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata,
and because they fail regardless to state claims upon which relief
can be granted. As explained below, I agree that the claims at
issue in this case were previously litigated in state court and,
accordingly, grant the motion to dismiss.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a final judgment
on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies
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from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in
that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “Federal
courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments in
accordance with state law.” SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of
Westminster, 547 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Under Massachusetts law, res judicata
includes both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Heacock v.
Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 n. 2 (1988). “Claim preclusion makes a
valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies,
and prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have
been adjudicated in the action.” Kobrin v. Board of Registration
in Medicine, 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005) (quoting O'Neill v. City
Manager of Cambridge, 428 Mass. 257, 259 (1998) (further citation
omitted)).
For claim preclusion to apply, the respective parties must be
identical or in privity with the parties in the prior action, the
causes of action must be the same or arise from the same nucleus
of operative facts, and there must have been a final judgment on
the merits in the prior action. Cavic v. America’s Servicing Co.,
806 F. Supp.2d 288, 290 (D. Mass. 2011).
All of the elements for res judicata are met in this case.
First, the parties are the same in this action as in the state
court action. Next, the claims in both cases are identical and
8
are based on the same set of facts. Finally, a final judgment on
the merits was rendered where the state court found for the reasons
set forth in the Commissioner’s memorandum that the state court
complaint failed to assert viable claims for relief. See Isaac v.
Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1983) (“Under Massachusetts
law, as elsewhere, a dismissal for failure to state a claim, under
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), operates as a dismissal on the merits
. . . with res judicata effect.”). In light of the foregoing, it
follows that the plaintiff’s federal claims are barred by res
judicata, even assuming that the state court may not have
explicitly addressed or commented on every one of the plaintiff’s
specific assertions in resolving his claims. See e.g., Lucky Brand
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 1589,
1595 (2020) (“If a later suit advances the same claim as an earlier
suit between the same parties, the earlier suit's judgment
‘prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery
that were previously available to the parties, regardless of
whether they were asserted or determined in the prior
proceeding.’”) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131
(1979)).5
5 For the same reasons, the court does not, and indeed, cannot indulge the
plaintiff’s request to consider his claims de novo on the ground that the
state court’s decision was tainted by bias or favoritism. Jacques has not in
any event proffered any evidence to suggest the state court resolved his
claims on any ground other than the merits.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (D. 21) is GRANTED.
So Ordered. /s/ Donald L. Cabell
DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.
DATED: November 13, 2020
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