The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-12601-RGS
MARSHA GRANT
v.
KELSEY ROSS, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 19, 2018
STEARNS, D.J.
INTRODUCTION
For the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) grants the plaintiff’s
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (2) denies plaintiff’s
emergency motion; and (3) directs plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marsha Grant (“Grant”), a residential tenant of Highland
House Apartments in Randolph, Massachusetts, filed a complaint against
two Highland House property managers. See Complaint (“Compl.”), Docket
No. 1. The complaint is accompanied by 48 pages of exhibits. Id. With her
complaint, Grant filed a one-page emergency motion seeking to have this
federal court review the submitted documents and decide whether she must
vacate her apartment by the end of December 2018. See Plaintiff’s Motion
(“Pl.’s Mot.”), Docket No. 3. Grant also filed an Application to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit. See Docket No. 2.
Grant seeks to have this federal court “review a housing case that was
brought against [plaintiff by Highland House]. Compl. at ¶ III (statement of
claim). Grant alleges that she was “taken to court” despite the fact that her
lease was due for renewal and the assistant manager accepted Grant’s
payments. Id. She states that she must leave her apartment by the end of
December. Id. She alleges violation of several federal statutes including the
Fair Credit Act of 1970. Id.
Grant seeks relief “due to the stress this has caused” and for defamation
of character and false claims. Compl. at ¶ IV (relief). Grant states that she
“was publicly embarrassed in state court to due to the false claim” and that
this affected her credit score. Id. Although not clearly pled, it appears that
Grant sought “a stay of execution from the Quincy District Court” and that
she has filed a complaint with the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Id. at p. 6. Grant seeks to have the defendants held
accountable. Id.
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Based upon review of plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, the court concludes that plaintiff has demonstrated a lack of funds
to prepay the filing fee. The court therefore will grant the motion.
SCREENING
Where a plaintiff is allowed to proceed without prepayment of the filing
fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court “shall dismiss the case . . . if the
court determines that - . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted[] or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915(e). In conducting this review,
the court liberally construes the complaint because plaintiff is proceeding
pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Quincy District Court if the matter
is concluded. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts
lack jurisdiction over “federal complaints … [that] essentially invite[] federal
courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court
judgments.” Federacion de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del
Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2005). The doctrine applies to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., Inc., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Here, Grant’s request for this court to review the state court proceedings
improperly seeks, “in effect, an end-run around” state court proceedings that
did not go her way. Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 907 F.3d
61, 66 (1st Cir. 2018).
Similarly, to the extent that a proceeding before the Quincy District
Court is on-going, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). A federal court must abstain from
reaching the merits of a case over which it has jurisdiction “when the
requested relief would interfere (1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding;
(2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3) that provides an
adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal
constitutional challenge.” Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 39
(1st Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Grant’s request to interfere with pending
state court proceedings implicates all the requirements for Younger
abstention. Because there are no applicable exceptions, abstention is
mandatory.
To the extent Grant brings this action pursuant to the “Fair Credit Act,”
the complaint fails to comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must, in
compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), include “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). At a minimum, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice
of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Calvi v.
Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Educadores
Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2004)).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Here, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted because the statement of he claim does not meet the requirements
of Rule 8(2)(a). Although there is a Fair Credit Reporting Act, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2(b), and there is a Fair Credit Billing Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1666-1666j,
there is no “Fair Credit Act.” Next, the complaint fails to specifically identify
the alleged acts of misconduct by each of the defendants, and the Court will
not consider the documents that are submitted as attachments to the
complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993) (ordinarily a court
may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not
expressly incorporated).
If Grant wishes to pursue this action, she must file an amended
complaint in which she sets forth, with clarity, the alleged misconduct of each
defendant. As an amended complaint completely replaces the original
complaint, see Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008),
the plaintiff should repeat in the amended complaint any allegations in the
original complaint that she wishes to be part of the operative complaint.
PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION
The Court will not construe Grant’s emergency motion as a request for
a preliminary injunction because preliminary injunctions may not be issued
without notice to the adverse party, and the complaint has not been served
on the defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). To the extent she seeks an
ex parte temporary restraining order, such relief may be sought pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is an order issued without
notice to the party to be enjoined that may last no more than 14 days. Fed R.
Civ. P. 65(b)(2). A TRO may issue without notice only if "specific facts in an
affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can
be heard in opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Even where a plaintiff
makes a showing of "immediate and irreparable" injury, the Court cannot
issue a TRO without notice to the adverse parties unless the plaintiff
"certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it
should not be required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). The Court notes that
there is no certification in writing of any effort Grant has made to provide at
least informal notice to the defendants. See Fed. R. Civ P. 65(a)(1).
In addition to notice to the adverse parties, motions for injunctive relief
must be accompanied by a memorandum in support addressing the four
requirements for injunctive relief: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits, (2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is
withheld, (3) a favorable balance of hardships, and (4) a fit (or lack of
friction) between the injunction and the public interest.” Nieves-Marquez v.
Puerto Rico, 353 F. 3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003). In order to secure injunctive
relief, Grant must establish that she is likely to succeed on her claim.
Because the Court finds that the Younger abstention and Rooker-
Feldman doctrines bar this Court’s jurisdiction, Grant has not shown a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The Court does not need to
reach the other factors in determining whether to issue a temporary
restraining order. Sindicato Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno,
699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012).
ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED
that:
(1) The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED;
(2) The emergency motion is DENIED: and
(3) The plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint. Failure
to comply with this directive within thirty-five (35) days of the date of this
Memorandum and Order will result in dismissal of this action.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE