The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
VERA BROWN-MORRISON, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.
) 17-12192-FDS
v. )
)
KATIE JACOBS, SUSAN ABBOTT, and )
VINFEN CORPORATION, )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________________)
ORDER ON DEFENDANT SUSAN ABBOTT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
SAYLOR, J.
This is an action for workplace discrimination. Plaintiff Vera Brown-Morrison, a black
woman who practices Pentecostalism, alleges that defendants Vinfen Corporation, her former
employer; Katherine Sharby,1 her team leader; and Susan Abbott, the Vice President of Vinfen,
violated federal labor law and discriminated against her on the basis of her race and religion.
She further alleges that she was retaliated against when she reported those violations to Abbott.
Defendant Susan Abbott has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the
following reasons, that motion will be granted.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are set forth as alleged in the complaint.
Plaintiff Vera Brown-Morrison is a black woman who practices Pentecostalism. (Compl.
1 Katherine Sharby is identified in the complaint as Katie Jacobs.
Ex. B ¶ 1). She began working for Vinfen on February 14, 2011, as a Community Integration
Coordinator. (Id.). In November 2013, Sharby was hired as Brown-Morrison’s team leader. (Id.
Ex. B ¶ 2).
The complaint alleges that Sharby “continuously targeted members of [Brown-
Morrison’s] team who[] [were] not white by constantly switching their work assignments and
clients around as well as delegating licensed caseloads to unlicensed practitioners.” (Id.).
The complaint further alleges that from December 2013 to May 2014 Sharby organized
mandatory trainings that occurred during lunch and required employees to eat during the
training. (Id. Ex. B ¶ 4). Brown-Morrison “felt very uncomfortable” with that because, in
accordance with Pentecostalism, she and three other co-workers on her team were fasting for 30-
40 days around the Easter holiday. (Id.).
On October 6, 2014, Brown-Morrison sent an email to Abbott, expressing her concerns
that Sharby was giving her, an unlicensed practitioner, work assignments that required a license.
(Id. Ex. B ¶ 5). She told Abbott in the email that she “felt uncomfortable doing these duties as
[she was] not qualified and spoke about [Sharby’s] unprofessional behavior towards [her]
because of [her] race.” (Id.). According to the complaint, she never heard back from Abbott.
(Id.).
The complaint alleges that Sharby reprimanded Brown-Morrison and other employees,
who were again fasting for religious reasons, in November 2014 for not attending a potluck prior
to another training. (Id. Ex. B ¶ 6). It further alleges that Brown-Morrison unsuccessfully
attempted to transfer to other positions or another team. (Id. Ex. B ¶ 7).
The complaint alleges that on February 12, 2015, Brown-Morrison received a Corrective
Action form, and that Sharby fabricated all five clients mentioned on the form in order to accuse
Brown-Morrison of failing 25% of the time. (Id. Ex. B ¶ 8). Furthermore, it alleges that she was
issued the Corrective Action form in retaliation for complaining to Abbott. (Id.).
B. Procedural Background
Brown-Morrison filed this action on November 7, 2017. The complaint alleges violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; and violation of Massachusetts labor laws, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4.
Defendant Susan Abbott filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on May 14, 2018. Defendants Vinfen and Katherine Sharby filed a
motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) on June
4, 2018.
Brown-Morrison did not oppose those motions. On July 13, 2018, the Court ordered
Brown-Morrison to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. She filed a response to
that order on August 31, 2018.
On September 7, 2018, the Court granted the motion of Vinfen and Sharby and dismissed
all claims as to them.
II. Standard of Review
On a motion to dismiss, the Court “must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and
give . . . plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.
1999)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its
face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). That is, “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations and footnote
omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Dismissal is appropriate if the facts as
alleged do not “possess enough heft to sho[w] that [plaintiff is] entitled to relief.” Ruiz Rivera v.
Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Clark v.
Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not provide for individual liability for
claims of discrimination or retaliation. Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 28-31 (1st
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e find that ‘Title VII addresses the conduct of employers only and does not
impose liability on co-workers.’ . . . Consequently, we find that there is no individual employee
liability under Title VII.” (quoting Powell v. Yellow Book U.S.A., Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th
Cir. 2006))). Therefore any Title VII claim against Abbott will be dismissed.
B. Labor Laws
As to any claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) or Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151B, the complaint fails to allege any activity taken by Abbott that would amount to a violation.
It was Sharby who allegedly required Brown-Morrison to work through her lunch break and
discriminated against her on the basis of her race and religion. See 29 U.S.C. § 207; Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 151B § 4 ¶ 1. At most, the complaint alleges that Abbott was aware of Sharby’s
actions and did nothing. That is not enough to state a plausible claim for relief under federal or
state law. Brown-Morrison’s response to the Court’s order to show cause does not contain any
additional allegations as to Abbott. (See Pl.’s Response to Ct. Order at 6 (referring to an email
that is not attached)). Therefore, any claims under FLSA or Chapter 151B will be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Susan Abbott’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV
F. Dennis Saylor, IV
Dated: September 10, 2018 United States District Judge