“[S]evere anxiety or depression is not in itself sufficient to establish eligibility for benefits absent a proper showing of related functional loss.”
How later courts described this case
- “[S]evere anxiety or depression is not in itself sufficient to establish eligibility for benefits absent a proper showing of related functional loss.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
DAVID M. LINEHAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action
) No. 17-cv-10433-PBS
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, )
Acting Commissioner of the )
Social Security Administration )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________ )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
February 20, 2018
Saris, Chief U.S.D.J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security has moved,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), for reconsideration of this
Court’s December 27, 2017 Memorandum and Order (Dkt. No. 26),
which remanded this matter to the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). Defendant asserts that the Court erred in two respects:
1) Dr. Gray’s treatment notes are not “medical opinions”
entitled to “good reasons” from the ALJ for the weight that she
assigned them, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); and 2) any legal
error committed was harmless because consideration of Dr. Gray’s
records could not possibly lead the ALJ to a more favorable
decision on remand.
DISCUSSION
I. Medical Opinion
In order to qualify as a “medical opinion,” a treatment
provider’s statement must “reflect judgments about the nature
and severity of [claimant’s] impairment(s), including []
symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still
do despite impairment(s), and [claimant’s] physical or mental
restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). The Commissioner
asserts that Dr. Gray’s notes do not reflect judgments about the
nature and severity of Plaintiff’s impairments, but instead
“merely regurgitate” his reported symptoms. Dkt. No. 29 at 3
(citing Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 414 F. App’x 802, 804
(6th Cir. 2011)).
However, the Commissioner acknowledges that “Dr. Gray’s
diagnosis of ‘major depressive disorder’ qualifies as a medical
opinion in the broadest sense.” Dkt. No. 29 at 4. Other
statements by Dr. Gray also reflect her professional judgment.
See, e.g., R. at 595 (“[Plaintiff] will likely benefit from CBT-
based approaches to help improve emotion regulation skills.”);
R. at 564 (“[Plaintiff is] in a depressed mood, with flat
affect. Other aspects within normal limits given brain
injury.”). The ALJ committed a legal error when she did not give
good reasons, or indeed any reasons, for the weight assigned to
Dr. Gray’s medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
II. Empty Exercise
Notwithstanding the ALJ’s failure to comply with 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2), if remand “will amount to no more than an
empty exercise” because of “an independent ground on which
affirmance must be entered as a matter of law,” then the
Commissioner’s decision should stand. Ward v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 2000). To that end, the
Commissioner argues that Dr. Gray’s opinion merely diagnoses
Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, but fails to provide
any assessment of how he is impaired by that depression.
Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, Dr. Gray’s opinion
could not, standing alone, constitute the basis for finding that
Plaintiff is disabled. See Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19, 20-
21 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[S]evere anxiety or depression is not in
itself sufficient to establish eligibility for benefits absent a
proper showing of related functional loss.”).
Dr. Gray’s records do not exist in a vacuum, however. They
must be viewed in light of Dr. Herman’s opinion, which does
assess Plaintiff’s functional loss. As to that, Defendant argues
that Dr. Gray’s opinion could not possibly lead the ALJ to
reconsider the weight that she assigned to Dr. Herman’s opinion,
for two reasons. First, Defendant asserts that unlike Dr. Gray,
“Dr. Herman did not attribute Plaintiff’s cognitive limitations
to depression.” Dkt. No. 29 at 4. Second, Defendant points out
that the ALJ discredited Dr. Herman’s opinion due to perceived
inconsistencies within Dr. Herman’s own notes and findings.
Although Dr. Herman diagnosed Plaintiff with “post-
concussion symptoms,” R. at 559, he also opined that Plaintiff
may be depressed and prescribed him anti-depressant medication.
R. 549. Dr. Gray and Dr. Herman report many of the same physical
and cognitive symptoms, and their opinions corroborate one
another. It is plausible that the ALJ will reconsider her
assessment of the intrinsic merits of Dr. Herman’s opinion, in
light of Dr. Gray’s corroborative records.
To be sure, it is also possible that the ALJ will assign
little weight to Dr. Gray’s opinion and reach the same
conclusion on remand. As acknowledged in the Court’s original
Memorandum and Order (Dkt. No. 26 at 13), certain aspects of Dr.
Gray’s treatment records, like Plaintiff’s failure to follow
through on cognitive behavior therapy classes, actually militate
against a finding of disability. However, this is not a case
where the “mistake of the administrative body is one that
clearly had no bearing on the . . . substance of the decision
reached.” Kurzon v. U.S. Postal Serv., 539 F.2d 788, 796 (1st
Cir. 1976).
A goal of the treating source rule is to function as a
procedural safeguard. See Francis, 414 Fed. App’x at 805. Where,
as here, the Court cannot ascertain “a clear understanding of
why the ALJ rejected [the treating doctor’s] opinion,” the goal
of the treating source rule is not met. Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
ORDER
The Commissioner’s Motion to Alter Judgment (Dkt. No. 28)
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS .
Hon. Patti B. Saris
Chief U.S. District Judge