Mattei v. Medeiros

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

___________________________________

)

ALEXANDER MATTEI, )

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION

) NO. 17-10869-WGY

SEAN MEDEIROS, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

YOUNG, D.J. June 13, 2018

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Alexander Mattei (“Mattei”) is a state prisoner

at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Norfolk.

Mattei was convicted of assault with intent to rape and assault

and battery in the Massachusetts County Superior Court sitting

in and for the County of Essex on September 16, 2011. Mattei

has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts two claims: (1) his rights to

confrontation were violated by restrictions on the cross-

examination of a substitute DNA analyst, and (2) the trial judge

erred in restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of a

police witness. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Pet’r’s Pet.”), ECF

No. 1. The respondent, Sean Medeiros (“Medeiros”) opposes the

petition, arguing that the Massachusetts Appeals Court decision

did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.

Resp’t’s Mem. Opp’n Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Resp’t’s Opp’n”),

ECF No. 13. For the reasons discussed infra, this Court DENIES

Mattei’s request for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254.

A. Procedural History

On May 20, 2002, Mattei was charged with home invasion,

breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, assault

with intent to rape, indecent assault and battery, two counts of

assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery.

Resp’t’s Further Supplemental Answer (“Supp. Answer”) at 179,

ECF No. 14. On April 2, 2004, Mattei was convicted of six out

of seven of the offenses. Id. at 180. Mattei appealed the

convictions, and in 2008, the Massachusetts Appeals Court

affirmed the convictions. Id. In 2010, the Supreme Judicial

Court granted further appellate review. Id. The Supreme

Judicial Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for

a new trial on two grounds: (1) that expert testimony ought not

have been admitted without accompanying statistical

explanations, and (2) that the judge improperly limited defense

counsel’s cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass.

840, 862 (2010).

After a second jury trial in 2011, Mattei was convicted of

assault with intent to rape and assault and battery, and was

acquitted of the remaining charges. Supp. Answer at 181. On

appeal from that conviction, Mattei raised three claims: (1) he

was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine a substitute DNA

analyst, (2) the trial judge improperly restricted defense

counsel’s cross-examination of a police witness and refused to

give a Bowden1 instruction, and (3) the prosecutor made several

errors in her closing argument. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 90

Mass. App. Ct. 577, 578 (2016). The Massachusetts Appeals Court

affirmed the convictions on October 27, 2016. Id. at 584. The

Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review on March

6, 2017. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 476 Mass. 1112 (2017). On May

15, 2017, Mattei filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for

writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. Pet’r’s

Pet. 1.

II. ANALYSIS

Mattei argues that (1) his confrontation rights were

violated when a substitute DNA analyst was not sufficiently

cross-examined, and (2) the trial judge erred in restricting

defense counsel’s cross-examination of a police witness.

1 Under Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980), in

appropriate circumstances a defendant is permitted to argue

inadequacies in a police investigation. In Bowden, the Supreme

Judicial Court reversed and remanded defendant Bowden’s

convictions because, among other things, “[t]he failure of the

authorities to conduct certain tests or produce certain evidence

was a permissible ground on which to build a defense.” Id. at

485-86.

Pet’r’s Pet. 6-8. This Court concludes that neither of these

arguments are meritorious and DENIES Mattei’s request for relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) governs petitions for habeas corpus seeking relief

from convictions in state court. See Hyatt v. Gelb, 142 F.

Supp. 3d 198, 202 (D. Mass. 2006). A district court may

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas relief may be granted only if the

petitioner is able to show that the state adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if “the state court

confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result

opposite to ours.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405

(2000). In addition, a state court decision may be an

unreasonable application of federal law if it identifies the

applicable governing legal rule, “but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407.

State court decisions are given substantial deference; the

incorrectness of a state court decision does not alone warrant

relief for a petitioner. Instead, relief may be granted only if

the state court decision in question features “‘some increment

of incorrectness beyond error’ that is ‘great enough to make the

decision unreasonable in the independent objective judgment of

the federal court.’” Evans v. Thompson, 465 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67

(D. Mass 2006) (quoting Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 2003)), aff’d, 518 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). Put simply, if

a state court’s decision “was reasonable, it cannot be

disturbed” on habeas review. Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 72

(2011) (per curiam).

The relevant law necessary for an analysis under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) is limited to the holdings of Supreme Court cases

existing at the time of the state court decision, and does not

include the dicta in such cases. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

B. Confrontation Clause

Mattei first argues that his “confrontation rights were

abridged” when the Commonwealth called crime lab analyst Brian

Cunningham to provide opinion testimony based on original DNA

test results from tests completed by the initial DNA analyst,

Stacey Edward. Pet’r’s Mem. Supp. Pet. Writ. Habeas Corpus

(“Pet’r’s Mem.”) 9, ECF No. 12. Medeiros explains that,

according to precedent, “the second analyst’s opinion was

admissible even if it was based on work conducted by the first

analyst.” Resp’t’s Opp’n 8. This Court agrees with Medeiros as

well as the Massachusetts Appeals Court’s holding; Mattei’s

rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the

DNA analyst’s opinion testimony.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

specifically the Confrontation Clause, provides that “the

accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the

witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme

Court noted that this right prohibits testimonial statements by

a person who does not testify at trial “unless he was

unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 54 (2004). A testimonial statement is a statement that

the declarant would reasonably expect to be used in a

prosecution. See, e.g., id. at 51-52; Davis v. Washington, 547

U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (victim statement to 911 operator was not

testimonial and not barred by Confrontation Clause, but victim’s

written affidavit to a police officer was testimonial and

therefore barred by Confrontation Clause).

The Supreme Court has expanded Confrontation Clause

jurisprudence since Crawford to apply to scientific reports.

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345 (2009);

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 669 (2011). In

Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that certificates of

analysis from a forensic laboratory that tested a substance

found in the defendant’s bag were testimonial. Melendez-Diaz,

557 U.S. at 345. The Court compared the certificates to live

testimony because they were “quite plainly affidavits,” id. at

310, and did “precisely what a witness does on direct

examination,” id. at 311 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).

Since the certificates of analysis were made to establish or

prove “that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-

Diaz . . . was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine,” the Court

held they could not be introduced unless the authors of the

certificates were subject to cross-examination. Id. at 310-11.

Similarly in Bullcoming, the Supreme Court specifically held

that the “testimonial certification” of a blood alcohol analysis

report was an out-of-court testimonial statement of the forensic

analyst who certified the report. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 657.

While it is true that the test results were generated by a

machine, “[the analyst’s] certification, however, reported more

than a machine-generated number.” Id. at 659-60. Because the

certified report was received in evidence through the in-court

testimony of a different surrogate analyst, the evidence

violated the defendant’s rights to confrontation. Id. at 652.

The Court explained in Bullcoming that “surrogate testimony . .

. could not convey what [the original analyst] knew or observed

about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the

particular test and testing process he employed.” Id. at 661.

Then came Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012)

(plurality opinion), a decision about which Justice Kagan

remarked, “I call Justice Alito’s opinion ‘the plurality,’

because that is the conventional term for it. But in all except

its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five justices

specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every

paragraph of its explication.” Williams, 567 U.S. at 120

(Kagan, J., dissenting). Despite this, the plurality opinion

appears to hold that an expert analyst could offer an opinion on

a Cellmark DNA report because such a report is “very different

from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits,”

and thus not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 58

(plurality opinion). At the very least, this ruling relaxes the

standards of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming if it does not

overrule them sub silentio, at least in the DNA context.2 See

2 Williams v. Illinois is a confusing decision. Here’s my

attempt to explain it, together with a suggestion for trial

judges having to apply it:

In Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), the

Supreme Court reviewed a “petitioner’s bench trial for

rape, [where] the prosecution called an expert who

testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside

laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile produced by

the state police lab using a sample of petitioner’s

blood. On direct examination, the expert testified

that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and that

Cellmark provided the police with a DNA profile. The

expert also explained the notations on documents

admitted as business records, stating that, according

to the records, vaginal swabs taken from the victim

were sent to and received back from Cellmark.” Id. at

56 (plurality opinion).

Justice Alito, for the plurality, wrote that even

if the Cellmark report had been introduced for its

truth, it was not testimonial because it was not

prepared for “the primary purpose of accusing a

targeted individual.” Id. at 83-85. This formulation

garnered a total of four votes, as Justice Alito was

joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy

and Breyer. Id. at 55. Under the plurality’s

definition, a statement is not testimonial unless it

was made to accuse a specific person. Id. at 83-85.

Justice Thomas rejected that definition. Id. at

114 (Thomas, J., concurring). He agreed that for a

statement to qualify as testimonial, it must be made

with a requisite primary purpose, which he described

thusly: “[F]or a statement to be testimonial within

the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the declarant

must primarily intend to establish some fact with the

understanding that his statement may be used in a

criminal prosecution.” Id. at 113-14. He criticized

the accusatory statement concept newly formulated by

the plurality because it “lacks any grounding in

constitutional text, in history, or in logic.” Id. at

114.

Justice Kagan, in a dissent joined by Justices

Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, also rejected the

plurality’s definition of the primary purpose test.

Id. at 118 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan

wrote, “Where that test comes from is anyone’s guess.

Justice Thomas rightly shows that it derives neither

from the text nor from the history of the

Confrontation Clause. And it has no basis in our

precedents. We have previously asked whether a

statement was made for the primary purpose of

establishing ‘past events potentially relevant to

later criminal prosecution’ –- in other words, for the

purpose of providing evidence. Davis, 547 U.S., at

822, 126 S. Ct. 2266; see also Bullcoming, 564 U.S.,

at ----, 131 S. Ct. at 2716-2717; Bryant, 562 U.S., at

----, ----, 131 S. Ct., at 1157, 1165; Melendez-Diaz,

557 U.S., at 310-311, 129 S. Ct. 2527; Crawford, 541

U.S., at 51-52, 124 S. Ct. 1354. None of our cases

has ever suggested that, in addition, the statement

must be meant to accuse a previously identified

individual; indeed, in Melendez-Diaz, we rejected a

related argument that laboratory ‘analysts are not

subject to confrontation because they are not

“accusatory” witnesses.’ 557 U.S., at 313, 129 S. Ct.

2527.” Id. at 135 (first citation omitted).

. . . .

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced

much the same situation in Commonwealth v. Greineder,

464 Mass. 580 (2013). In this jury trial for murder,

a DNA expert called by the prosecution testified on

direct examination to the details and results of the

nontestifying analyst’s DNA test results. Id. at 582.

Relying on Williams, a unanimous Supreme Judicial

Court held that the testifying expert’s “opinion that

the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA on items recovered

from the crime scene was properly admitted. Expert

opinion testimony, even that which relies for its

basis on the DNA test results of a nontestifying

analyst not admitted in evidence, does not violate a

criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses

against him under either the Sixth Amendment or art.

12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.” Id.

at 603. As a matter of Massachusetts evidentiary law,

however, admitting such details and results of a non-

testifying analyst’s DNA tests was error, albeit

harmless in Greineder’s case. The Supreme Judicial

Court was at pains to point out:

[W]e use the present opportunity to

emphasize to judges that the hearsay bases

of expert opinion testimony are inadmissible

on direct examination. As concerns

eliciting only the expert’s opinion, the

prosecutor, as a general matter, may first

ask the expert for an opinion, given the

expert’s background and training and after

review of the underlying data, whether the

defendant, given his or her DNA profile

authenticated by chain of custody evidence

as having originated from the defendant,

could be excluded as a possible source of

DNA recovered from the crime scene,

similarly authenticated by chain of custody

evidence. If the expert opines that the

defendant could not be excluded as a

possible contributor, a prosecutor may then

elicit an expert’s opinion on the

significance of the DNA evidence. R.C.

Michaelis, R.G. Flanders, Jr., & P.H. Wulff,

A Litigator’s Guide to DNA: From the

Laboratory to the Courtroom 297-298 (2008).

The prosecutor may ask the expert for his or

her opinion on the statistical likelihood

that the DNA profile found on the relevant

exhibit would be found in an individual

randomly selected from the population. See

note 9, supra. See also Williams, supra at

2270 n. 2 (Kagan, J., dissenting)

(assumptions, framed in hypothetical

question ‘if X is true, then Y follows,’

pass constitutional muster). See generally

P.M. Lauriat & J.F. McHugh, Massachusetts

Expert Witnesses § 6.1.2 (Mass. Cont. Legal

Educ. 2d ed. 2010). Greater detail

regarding specific allelic presence at

various loci is unnecessary and, under our

evidentiary rules, prohibited on direct

examination of a forensics expert who did

not conduct the underlying DNA testing.

Id. at 601-02 (first citation omitted).

In light of all this, while it is appropriate to

jump directly from qualifying an expert to eliciting

that expert’s opinions, see Mass. G. Evid. Ann. 703, a

careful judge may require, as well within her

discretion, that the basis for that opinion first be

admitted in evidence.

William G. Young, John R. Pollets & Christopher Poreda,

Evidence § 800.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2018), in 20 Mass. Prac.

Series 22-24 (Thomson Reuters 2016).

Colleen Clark, DNA Analysis and the Confrontation Clause:

“Special Needs” Category for DNA Testimonial Evidence, 44 Golden

Gate U. L. Rev. 195, 196 (2014).

Constrained by Williams, the First Circuit affirmed in

Barbosa v. Mitchell, 812 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2016), the denial of

habeas relief in circumstances similar to those in the case at

bar. In Barbosa, the Court held that the admission of a senior

criminalist’s expert testimonial opinion on the results of a DNA

test performed by another DNA analyst was proper. Id. at 67.

The First Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court’s plurality

decision in Williams to explain that there is no Confrontation

Clause precedent proposing that “admitting an opinion such as

that offered by [a surrogate DNA analyst] violates the right to

confrontation.” Id.

Under Confrontation Clause precedent, the expert testimony

of analyst Brian Cunningham was properly admitted. Cunningham

provided opinion testimony concerning original DNA test results

from testing completed by an initial DNA analyst. See Mattei,

90 Mass. App. Ct. at 578-79. The holding in Williams indicates

that the admission of an expert opinion based on a scientific

DNA report prepared by another does not violate the right to

confrontation. 567 U.S. at 57.3

3 Charging the jury in these cases presents special problem

as well. See generally Pooja Chaudhuri, A Right to Rational

The Appeals Court thus correctly ruled here that “[a]n

expert may testify as to his opinion, even if it is based on

work conducted by another analyst.” Mattei, 90 Mass. App. Ct.

at 579. The second analyst’s opinion testimony was admissible

even though it was based on testing done by the first analyst.

Id. at 580. Medeiros’ rights under the Confrontation Clause

were not violated by the DNA analyst’s opinion testimony. Id.

A certificate of appealability will issue on this point.4

Juries? How Jury Instructions Create the “Bionic Juror” in

Criminal Proceedings Involving DNA Match Evidence, 105 Cal. L.

Rev. 1807, 1819 (2017).

4 While the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court in

Mattei faithfully reflects Williams’ holding, its formulation of

the rule (quoted above) may well extend Williams’ narrow holding

and almost certainly goes farther than warranted by the decision

of the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Greineder.

Distortions creep into the law when courts fail to

distinguish between a higher court’s holding (which must be

obeyed under the doctrine of stare decisis) and its dicta (which

is only persuasive). See Neal Devins & David Klein, The

Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 620-21

(2017); see also Ryan D. Walters, Fragmenting the Judiciary:

Shifting Implementation of Supreme Court Doctrine from Federal

Courts to State Courts, 42 Cap. U. L. Rev. 951 (2014)

(suggesting state courts more likely than federal to push back

against Supreme Court doctrine). See generally Bryan A. Garner

et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent (Thomson Reuters 2016).

This problem is compounded today by the marginalization of the

American jury (where trial judges must necessarily closely

analyze appellate decisions to craft precise jury instructions).

See William G. Young, Juries Make a Difference, Address to 2017

Forum for State Appellate Court Judges, in Jurisdiction:

Defining State Courts’ Authority 65 (Pound Civil Justice

Institute, 2018). See also Winfield v. Town of Andover, Civil

Action No. 17-11051-WGY, 2018 WL 1627437, at *8 n.5 (D. Mass.

Apr. 4, 2018) (decrying the “over academicization” of our trial

processes). The result of all this is that our jurisprudence

tends ever more toward the “Europeanization” of American courts,

C. Cross-Examination of Police Witness

Mattei next argues that the Appeals Court erred in holding

that the trial judge did not improperly “restrict the defense’s

ability to show bias and incompetence of the officers’

investigation” when the trial judge limited his cross-

examination of multiple officers, thereby limiting his attempted

Bowden defense under state evidentiary law.5 Pet’r’s Mem. 15.

Medeiros correctly argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “no

habeas claim exists as to state criminal convictions unless the

alleged errors are violations of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” Resp’t’s Opp’n 11.

“A necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas

relief . . . is a determination by the federal court that [a

petitioner’s] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or

i.e. a vertical “code” system where identifying the correct

“rule” is all too often the extent of what passes for analysis.

See William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges,

The Federal Lawyer, July 2003, at 30.

Simply put, the role of the Confrontation Clause in this

area needs refinement and explication on a sound analytic base.

Unfortunately, AEDPA says of the “inferior” courts: “Theirs not

to reason why, theirs but” to follow the muddled (in this area,

at least) jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §

2554(d)(1); see Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light

Brigade. Thoughtful voices have raised concerns whether this

statutory restriction on the exercise of the Article III

judicial function is itself constitutional. See, e.g., Evans v.

Thompson, 524 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J.).

5 Although state evidentiary law is not subject to federal

habeas review, Mattei makes a due process argument, addressed

infra at 15, on the same state evidentiary grounds.

treaties of the United States.” Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21

(1975). The Supreme Court has held that “federal habeas corpus

relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers,

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41

(1984). In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), the Court

reemphasized “that it is not the province of a federal habeas

court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at

67-68.

Because Mattei complains about issues of state evidentiary

law which are not subject to review under 28 U.S.C § 2254, this

Court declines to review the decision of the Appeals Court

regarding the limitation of further examination into the police

investigation.

D. Due Process

Mattei argues finally that the trial judge’s limitation of

his cross-examination of a second police officer denied him his

right to due process of law. Pet’r’s Mem. 13. Mattei cites

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), to explain

“[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or

Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Crane v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). Medeiros correctly argues

that because the standard of review for a state court decision

is “reasonableness,” habeas relief is not warranted. Resp’t’s

Opp’n 13.

“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

While the violation of a rule of evidence is not, in itself, a

constitutional violation, “an evidentiary error may result in

such fundamental unfairness to the defendant as to constitute a

due process violation.” Evans v. Verdini, 466 F.3d 141, 145

(1st Cir. 2006). Of importance here, federal habeas review is

not “a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state

courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). At trial,

Mattei was permitted to advance his defense by attempting to

expose the inadequacies of the police investigation. Resp’t’s

Opp’n 10-11. Mattei then proceeded to ask another police

officer the same question. Id. at 11. The trial judge limited

this further examination, and the Appeals Court ruled that the

judge exercised proper discretion “where such testimony would

have been cumulative.” See Mattei, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 581.

The limitation of cumulative testimony, “even if it is

debatable, . . . is not unreasonable.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.

290, 303 (2010). The limitation of Mattei’s cross-examination

reasonably occurred only after Mattei attempted to ask a

subsequent police officer an identical question. The decision

by the trial judge to limit cumulative testimony was reasonable.

Mattei was provided a meaningful opportunity to present his

whole defense and the limitation of a second cross-examination

in no way resulted in fundamental unfairness creating a due

process violation.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court’s decision “was [not]

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))(1). Mattei’s

request for habeas relief is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Mattei’s

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. A

certificate of appealability will issue as to point II.B above,

but not otherwise as the remaining claims are utterly without

merit.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young

WILLIAM G. YOUNG

DISTRICT JUDGE