The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
LE’KEISHA BROWN, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
AARON BUTLER, ) C.A. No. 3:17-cv-30030-MAP
Defendant. )
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Dkt. Nos. 8 and 24)
March 15, 2018
PONSOR, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Le’Keisha Brown (“Plaintiff”) has filed this
nine-count action against Defendant Springfield Police
Officer Aaron Butler (“Defendant”) alleging violations of
her civil rights. Defendant has moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 8.)
The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Katherine
A. Robertson for Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. On
December 22, 2017, Judge Robertson issued a 43-page report,
meticulously laying out the alleged facts, summarizing the
applicable law, and analyzing the merits of each of
Defendant’s arguments. She recommended that Defendant’s
motion to dismiss be allowed as to Counts II and VI, and
denied as to the remaining seven counts. (Dkt. No. 24.) On
January 11, 2018, Defendant filed a timely objection to the
R&R. (Dkt. No. 27.)
Upon de novo review, the court will adopt the R&R in
its entirety. Defendant’s motion to dismiss will therefore
be allowed as it pertains to Counts II and VI and will
otherwise be denied.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, as Judge Robertson
noted, the court must “accept as true all the well-pleaded
facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader’s favor.” (Dkt. No. 24
at 5, citations omitted.) The question at this stage is
simple: does the complaint allege “a plausible entitlement
to relief”? Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
1967 (2007).
With regard to the operative facts, it is not necessary
to recite them here; they are laid out, without significant
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objection, in the R&R. (Dkt. No. 24 at 2-5.) A copy of the
R&R is appended to this memorandum as Exhibit 1. The
central flaw in all of Defendant’s objections is that,
contrary to the law applicable at this stage of the
litigation, Defendant’s arguments do not accept the facts as
pleaded, and they suggest inferences that, while possibly
convincing at trial (or perhaps at summary judgment), are
not permissible at this stage.
Plaintiff’s legal theories can be usefully addressed in
three clusters: claims related to false arrest and
imprisonment (Counts I, III, and IV); claims related to
excessive force (Counts V and VII), and claims related to
the initiation of legal proceedings (Counts VIII and IX).
Plaintiff has not objected to the dismissal of Counts II and
VI, and they need not be addressed substantively in this
memorandum.
With regard to the first grouping, at this early stage
of the lawsuit the facts outlined in Counts I, III, and IV
are more than sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
A reasonable jury, accepting the facts as currently alleged,
could conclude that Plaintiff was falsely arrested in
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violation of her federal civil rights (Count I) and suffered
both a common law false arrest and false imprisonment
(Counts III and IV). Judge Robertson’s careful analysis
makes clear that, accepting the facts as alleged, a jury
could plausibly find that Plaintiff’s arrest could not be
justified based on conduct by her constituting disorderly
conduct, disturbing the peace, or interfering with a police
officer under Massachusetts law. (Dkt. 24 at 11-22.)
Similarly, it would be entirely justified in finding that no
argument in support of qualified immunity would protect the
officer in the circumstances alleged from liability for
civil rights and common law violations. A jury would not be
bound to accept that Defendant was responding to exigent
circumstances or providing some kind of emergency
assistance. Accepting Plaintiff’s facts, no such
circumstances existed and no assistance was needed; a
reasonable officer would have known that perfectly well.
(Id. at 22-28.) Defendant’s arguments may be raised on a
clearer record at the summary judgment stage, but they are
not sufficient to justify dismissal now.
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The objections with regard to the excessive force
claims (Counts V and VII) are similarly unpersuasive. The
question of reasonableness in the use of force can rarely be
resolved on a motion to dismiss. Accepting Plaintiff’s
facts, no reasonable officer would have believed that an
application of force was needed to confront an imminent risk
to the children or for any other reason. Defendant’s
actions in pushing Plaintiff against the porch railing,
shoving her again so that she fell down, and cocking his
fist as though he were about to hit her may be found by a
jury to have been justified based upon alternate, credible
facts, but the allegations as set forth in the complaint,
which must be accepted by the court at this stage, are
sufficient to support a contrary jury conclusion.
Finally, with regard to Counts VII and IX, the facts as
alleged are sufficient to make out a claim both for
malicious prosecution and for abuse of process. (Id. at 40-
43.) Under Massachusetts law, establishing a malicious
prosecution claim requires proving malice, among other
elements. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.
2001). Malice, defined as “any wrong or unjustifiable
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motive,” may be “inferred from a lack of probable cause,”
Campbell v. Casey, 166 F. Supp. 3d 144, 153 (D. Mass. 2016).
Accepting the facts as alleged, a jury could well find no
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed any
crime justifying her prosecution. The common law tort of
abuse of process requires establishing that a defendant used
“process” for an “ulterior or illegitimate purpose.” Eason
v. Alexis, 824 F. Supp. 2d 236, 243 (D. Mass. 2011)
(internal quotations omitted). Establishing an abuse of
process claim requires an inquiry into Defendant’s motive
which is not amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss.
See Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 388 (1st Cir. 1989).
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and
abuse of process claims survive Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
(Dkt. No. 24), upon de novo review, is hereby adopted.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 8) is hereby ALLOWED
as to Counts II and VI and DENIED as to all remaining
counts. The case is hereby referred to Magistrate Judge
Robertson for a conference pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
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It is So Ordered.
/s/ Michael A. Ponsor
MICHAEL A. PONSOR
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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