The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
ZENYEA BEACHEM CASE NO. 3:21-CV-00299
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
LASALLE CORRECTIONS L L C ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
RULING
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 78] filed by
Defendants Kyle Erwin, Fred Fletcher, Sgt. Kimble Marshall, LaSalle Management Company,
LLC, LaSalle Corrections, LLC, WMC Enterprises, LLC, and KPL, LLC (collectively,
“Defendants”). Plaintiff Zenyea Beachem (“Plaintiff” or “Beachem”) opposes the Motion [Doc.
No. 81]. Defendants have filed a reply [Doc. No. 87].
Within the Defendants’ Reply, the Court construed that Defendants were moving to strike
certain depositions attached as exhibits to Plaintiff’s response [see Doc. No. 96]. The Court ordered
additional briefing on the motion to strike. Plaintiff responded to the Motion [Doc. No. 97].
Defendants did not reply.
For the following reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cecil Williams (“Williams”) was a twenty-year-old black male who suffered from asthma.1
At the time of his death, he was incarcerated as a convicted felon and was awaiting trial; therefore,
he was a pretrial detainee.2 Despite originally being housed in East Baton Rouge Parish awaiting
1 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 18]
2 [Doc. No. 79-1, ¶ 54]
trial, Williams was transferred to Madison Parish Correctional Center (“MPCC”) on July 2, 2020.3
Upon such arrival, Williams immediately complained that he did not have albuterol in his inhaler.4
On July 9, 2020, Williams suffered a fatal asthma attack at MPCC.5
In the early morning of July 9, 2020, Charlyn Smith (“Smith”), a correctional officer at
MPCC, was working in Building 4, Control Room 1.6 During Smith’s shift around 3:51 a.m.,
Williams knocked on the flap to the Control Room, indicated that he could not breathe, and then
immediately climbed the bars in front of the room.7 Defendants assert that at 3:59 a.m., Smith
called MPCC’s on-call nurse, Kyle Erwin (“Erwin”), and informed him of Williams’ expressions.8
Erwin responded that he was on the way to MPCC.9
Meanwhile, Smith’s supervisor, Sergeant Kimble Marshall (“Sgt. Marshall”), who was
also present in the Control Room, went to check on Williams.10 Upon entering the dorm, Sgt.
Marshall observed inmates surrounding Williams as he indicated that he was having an asthma
attack.11 Accordingly, Sgt. Marshall left the dorm and informed his supervisor of his observations,
and that Williams was responsive.12
Throughout that morning, Sgt. Marshall checked on Williams in between his duties of
serving breakfast to other inmates.13
3 [Doc. No. 79, p. 8]
4 [Id.]
5 [Doc. No. 1, pp. 3-4]
6 [Doc. No. 79-1, ¶ 1, 3]
7 [Id. at ¶ 4,7]
8 [Id. at ¶ 11]
9 [Id. at ¶ 11, 43]
10 [Id. at ¶ 15, 20-22]
11 [Id. at ¶ 23-24]
12 [Id. at ¶ 25-26]
13 [Id. at ¶ 27]
During the first check-in, Sgt. Marshall saw Williams at the door and as he began removing
him from the dorm, Williams urinated on himself and fell to the ground, where he was barely
breathing and unable to function “on his own.”14 Following this incident, Sgt. Marshall placed
Williams back into the dorm and observed another offender give him an asthma pump to breathe
better.15 When Williams began functioning on his own again, Sgt. Marshall left to tend to his
breakfast duties.16
During the second check-in, an offender informed Sgt. Marshall that Williams had stopped
breathing.17 After confirming that Williams was in distress, Sgt. Marshall executed chest
compressions.18 He avers that he cannot remember if he performed mouth-to-mouth CPR, but he
claims that he definitely performed chest compressions.
Immediately following this incident, Fred Fletcher (“Fletcher”), who, at the time, was a
shift supervisor and lieutenant, received a call that there was a medical emergency to which he
responded.19 As Fletcher entered the Control Room, he observed Sgt. Marshall performing CPR
on Williams.20 Consequently, Fletcher informed the Control Room Operator to call Erwin and 911,
but he was told that such calls were already made.21 Defendants assert that around 4:28 a.m., Smith
called Erwin for a second time with an update on Williams.22 During this phone call, Lt. Devario
14 [Doc. No. 79, p. 13]
15 [Id.]
16 [Id.]
17 [Id. at pp. 13-14]
18 [Doc. No. 79-1, ¶ 30-31]
19 [Id. at ¶ 34, 36]
20 [Id. at ¶ 37]
21 [Id. at ¶ 38]
22 [Id. at ¶ 12]
Banks (“Lt. Banks”) spoke with Erwin and was advised to call 911.23 Upon Erwin’s arrival, the
paramedics also arrived, which was at 4:49 a.m.24
Once the EMS declared that Williams had no pulse or heartbeat,25 it instructed the sheriff’s
office to notify the coroner.26 Erwin then notified the prison nurse practitioner, and Williams was
pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. by Dr. T.A. Neumann.27
Dr. Christopher Tape (“Dr. Tape”), a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on
Williams.28 The written report of Dr. Tape’s findings indicates that Williams’ cause of death was
asthma and a 5-flouro-MDMB-PICA toxicity (synthetic marijuana) with contribution of
hypertensive atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.29 Dr. Tape explained in his findings that:
Q: Can you explain … you found two causes, two separate causes
of death—is that correct?
A: There are two significant causes that one doesn’t totally
dominate, so I basically put them both in as cause of death as sort of
cofactors in this case.
Q: Is it fair to say that when you do something like that you can’t
make a determination which of those two was the specific cause of
death?
A: That’s right. They’re both significant enough and they’re both—
people do die from asthma, but it’s somewhat rare. The whole thing
with this synthetic cannabinoids or as I said synthetic marijuana,
that’s such a new thing, but it seems to be unpredictable and deadly.
So between those two, I have to sort of put them both at least on
equal footing.30
23 [Id.]
24 [Id. at ¶ 13, 46]
25 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 21]
26 [Doc. No. 79, p. 16]
27 [Id.]
28 [Id. at p. 18]
29 [Id. at p. 19]
30 [Doc. No. 79-9, p. 6]
On February 3, 2021, Zenyea Beachem (“Beachem”) filed a wrongful death action against
Defendants in this Court on behalf of her biological children, Zamiyah Beachem, William Ivery,
and Zazyria Beachem, three children she claims to have had with Williams.31
In the Second Amended Complaint,32 Karnesha Williams (“Karnesha”), the mother of
Williams (the decedent) and the Succession of Cecil Devontae Williams were added as plaintiffs.33
In the Third Amended Complaint, the claims made by the Succession of Karnesha Williams and
on behalf of Zamiyah Beachem and William Ivery were properly abandoned because they are not
within the class of people allowed to file a survival or wrongful death action if the decedent has a
child.34
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants under state and federal law claims of negligence.
Under federal law, the standard is whether the Defendants had gained actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of suicide and responded with deliberate indifference. Hare v. City of Corinth,
Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). Under state law, the standard is whether the Defendants
can be found to have acted negligently under the four-prong inquiry of Louisiana’s duty-risk
analysis. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La. 1987).
On June 23, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal
of Beachem’s wrongful death action with full prejudice.35 The primary issue in this case is whether
Defendants are legally responsible.
The issues are briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
31 [Doc. No. 1]
32 Which should have been the First Amended Complaint.
33 [Doc. No. 25]
34 [La. Civil Code Art. 2315.1(1) and 2315.2(1); Jazyria Beachem is Williams’ child]
35 [Doc. No. 1]
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before a court shows “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such
that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). “The moving party may
meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that
the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is unable to identify anything in
the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. “The court need consider
only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, courts “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas
Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). While courts will “resolve factual
controversies in favor of the nonmoving party,” an actual controversy exists only “when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing
party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). “‘If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,’ summary judgment is appropriate.”
Cutting Underwater Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Relatedly, there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a party fails “to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. This
is true “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
B. Analysis
In their Motion, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s only federal claim was brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful death; negligence in training; negligence in hiring; negligence in
supervision; negligence for not having an emergency asthma inhaler in accordance with practice
standards and governmental regulations in effect; and violation of rights otherwise guaranteed
under state and federal law. Defendants further allege that Plaintiff made state law claims asserting
that Defendants committed state law torts of assault, battery, and wrongful death.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their
deliberate indifference to Williams’ medical needs; that the Defendants did not act in good faith
and are not entitled to qualified immunity; failure to train/negligent training; supervisory liability;
individual liability; that there was no policy in place to handle Williams’ needs prior to his death;
claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; punitive
damages; and Plaintiff disputes that Zenyea Beachem improperly brought claims on behalf of her
minor child Jazyria Steward.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants are liable for wrongful death due to inadequate medical
care. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Williams’s serious medical
needs because they did not supply him with albuterol in his inhaler and because there was no policy
in place to handle this type of medical emergency.
1. Were Defendants Deliberately Indifferent to Williams’ Serious Medical
Needs?
In general, the State's incarceration of pretrial detainees and convicted state prisoners
comports with due process guarantees because of the State's recognized interests in detaining
defendants for trial and in punishing those who have been adjudged guilty of a crime. The State's
exercise of its power to hold detainees and prisoners, however, brings with it a responsibility under
the U.S. Constitution to tend to essentials of their well-being:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains
an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself,
and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—
e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to
protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from
the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (citations
omitted). Hence, since pretrial detainees and convicted state prisoners are similarly restricted in
their ability to fend for themselves, the State owes a duty to both groups that effectively confers
upon them a set of constitutional rights that fall under the Court's rubric of “basic human needs.”
This is not a typical § 1983 case against state actors whose legal obligations and liabilities
are set forth in the law. Instead, this is a case where the responsibility for housing and caring for
prisoners has been contracted out to a private corrections company that appears to be comprised
of several limited liability companies with some common ownership. This does not change the
standard of care owed to detainees.
“[M]edical care and failure-to-protect cases should be treated the same for purposes of
measuring constitutional liability.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, at 643 (5th Cir.
1996). When a claim is based on a jail official's episodic acts or omissions, the proper inquiry is
whether the official had a culpable state of mind in acting or failing to act. For episodic acts or
omissions cases, courts have adopted a standard of deliberate indifference as the measure of
culpability for such episodic acts or omissions. This is so because a proper application of Bell's
reasonable-relationship test is functionally equivalent to a deliberate indifference inquiry. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Court must then determine whether to apply an objective or
subjective definition of deliberate indifference. Specifically, Plaintiff must first prove objective
exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm. Additionally, he must show that prison officials
acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to that risk.
Based on the pleadings, Plaintiff’s claims fall under the episodic acts or omissions claims.
The episodic act or omission of a state jail official does not violate a pretrial detainee's
constitutional right to be secure in his basic human needs, such as medical care and safety, unless
the detainee demonstrates that the official acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the
detainee's needs. Hare, at 648. A state jail official's liability for episodic acts or omissions cannot
attach unless the official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial
detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that risk. Therefore, Plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the individual Defendants had a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee,
and coupled with that knowledge, that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the
detainee.
Deliberate indifference is shown where an official “refuse[s] to treat [a detainee], ignore[s]
his complaints, intentionally treat[s] him incorrectly, or engage[s] in any similar conduct that
would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” See Sama v. Hannigan,
669 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir.2012) (citation and quotations omitted). Applying that standard here,
Plaintiff must show that the Defendants either refused to provide treatment to Williams, ignored
his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any other conduct evincing
wanton disregard for a serious medical need. “[A]cts of negligence or medical malpractice do not
constitute deliberate indifference....” Id. (citation omitted). Supervisory prison officials may be
held liable for a Section 1983 violation only if there were “personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation, or ... a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir.1987)
(citation omitted). “It is facially evident that this test cannot be met if there is no underlying
constitutional violation.” Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir.2006) (citation
omitted).
a. Subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm
As stated above, Plaintiff must first show that the individual Defendants had subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Williams. Defendants assert that “Plaintiff will
be unable to show that any of the Defendants were aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to Williams existed or that anyone subjectively
drew the inference that the risk existed and then disregarded that risk.”36 Plaintiff argues that
Defendants did have subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Importantly,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants knew that Williams had a history of asthma, and that he required
albuterol in his inhaler. While this is a general statement, there are two other incidents that create
a genuine issue of material fact that Defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm.
The first is when Williams informed Smith that he could not breathe. Based on Defendants’
memorandum, it appears that Smith disregarded Williams’s comment because of the level of
energy he was showing to her, i.e., climbing on the bars in front of the control room window. Next,
Sgt. Marshall was told by Smith of Williams’s complaints about not being able to breathe. At or
around 3:50 a.m., Sgt. Marshall went to check on Williams, who was complaining again that he
was having an asthma attack. Because Williams was talking to Sgt. Marshall, he believed that this
contradicted Williams’s complaints of having an asthma attack. Sgt. Marshall allegedly checked
on Williams after each time he served food to a dorm, and during one of those checks, Sgt.
Marshall was removing Williams from one of the dorms, and Williams began to urinate himself
and fell to the floor. Williams was unable to breathe in this moment, and he was only able to
breathe and function on his own when given an asthma pump from a fellow inmate. Sgt. Marshall
left Williams after this. He did not return to check on Williams until he was informed that Williams
was not breathing again, and he allegedly performed chest compressions on Williams. Williams
never regained consciousness.
The Court finds that Defendants, therefore, did have subjective knowledge of a substantial
risk of serious harm. Williams urinating on himself, falling to the ground, and only regaining
36 [Doc. No. 79, p. 23]
consciousness after using someone else’s inhaler all created subjective knowledge that there was
some serious risk of harm. Next, the Court will determine if there is a genuine issue of material
fact that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the risk.
b. Whether the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the
substantial risk of serious harm
As stated above, Plaintiff must show that the Defendants either refused to provide treatment
to Williams, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any other
conduct evincing wanton disregard for a serious medical need. Acts of negligence cannot qualify
as deliberate indifference because the Defendants cannot accidentally be deliberate. Deliberate
indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. The question for the Court to decide in the
instant motion is whether there exist genuine disputed issues of fact that Defendants purposefully
neglected Williams’s medical needs.
This Court finds that there is a genuine disputed issue of fact that the Defendants
purposefully neglected Williams’ medical needs. There are numerous factual issues that allude to
Defendants ignoring Williams’ medical needs and/or refusing to provide treatment to Williams.
First, both Plaintiff and Defendants agree that Williams informed Smith that he was having an
asthma attack and needed albuterol in his inhaler. Instead of heeding Williams’ request, or at the
very least investigating the complaint, Smith dismissed Williams’ complaints because he was
“climbing on the bars in front of the control room,” which apparently meant that there was an
“absence of any sign of medical impairment.”37 It is uncontroverted that Smith did not act on his
request for albuterol, and she alleges that she contacted the on-call nurse to tell him what Williams
told her.
37 [Doc. No. 79, p. 26]
Then, Plaintiff had an asthma attack that Sgt. Marshall dismissed because Plaintiff was
speaking, which he evidently construed to mean that Williams was not having an asthma attack.
Following that, Plaintiff had a subsequent asthma attack that rendered him unable to breathe on
his own, requiring him to employ the use of another inmate’s inhaler that did contain albuterol in
order to function. Even this did not compel Defendants to act on Williams’ complaints of having
an asthma attack and being unable to breathe. Finally, there remains an issue between Plaintiff and
Defendants on whether Sgt. Marshall performed CPR on Williams when he discovered he was
unconscious after a second attack, which ultimately led to his death. Sgt. Marshall asserts that he
did chest compressions but cannot remember if he performed mouth-to-mouth CPR on Williams.
The Court knows that deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.
However, the facts here indicate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
or not Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Williams’ serious medical needs. Before
Williams’ death, he had two asthma attacks that Defendants clearly ignored. The seriousness of
the medical needs in this case should not be called into question when the result of the incident
was death.
Because there are genuine issues of material fact remaining on whether Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to Williams serious medical needs, the Motion for Summary Judgment
on this issue is DENIED.
2. Monell claims for inadequate medical care against LaSalle Defendants
Defendants argue that the LaSalle Defendants cannot be held responsible for the death of
Williams pursuant to § 1983. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
689 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local governmental
bodies are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, In Rosborough v. Management & Training
Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit extended municipal corporate liability
under § 1983 to include private prison-management corporations and their employees. “The test
to determine liability for a private prison-management corporation under § 1983 is more or less
identical to the test employed to determine municipal or local government liability.” Coleman v.
LaSalle Correctional Center, 2008 WL 2465989, at *4–5 (W.D. La. 2008) (citing Phillips v.
Corrections Corp. of America, 2006 WL 1308142 at *3 (W.D. La. 2006)); see also Monell, 436
U.S. at 694.
“To succeed on a Monell claim, plaintiffs ‘must show (1) an official policy (or custom), of
which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom)’.” Austin v. City of
Pasadena, Texas, 2023 WL 4569562, at *12 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Newbury v. City of Windcrest,
991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021)). “[T]he critical question is to decide who is the final
policymaker, which is an issue of state law.” See Advanced Technology Building Solutions, L.L.C.
v. City of Jackson, Miss., 817 F.3d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. den., 137 S. Ct. 297 (U.S. 2016)
(citing Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993)).
“The first element, the existence of a policy or custom, is satisfied if a practice is ‘so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law’.” Austin, 2023 WL 4569562, at
*13 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). “Allegations of an isolated incident are
not sufficient to show the existence of a custom or policy.” Austin, 2023 WL 4569562, at *13
(citing Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. den., 506 U.S. 973
(1992)). “What must be shown is ‘that the policy itself violated federal law or authorized or
directed the deprivation of federal rights.’” Austin, 2023 WL 4569562, at *12 (citing Johnson v.
Deep East Texas Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 309 (5th Cir. 2004)).
“[A] municipality may be liable for failing to adopt policies.” Austin, 2023 WL 4569562,
at *12 (citing Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992), and City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989)). “While the municipal policy-maker's failure to adopt a
precaution can be the basis for § 1983 liability, such omission must amount to an intentional
choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Id.
“[M]unicipal failure to adopt a policy does not constitute such an intentional choice unless
it can be said to have been deliberately indifferent.” Id. “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent
standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (citing Board of Commissioners of Bryan
County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). “A failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately
indifferent when it is obvious that the likely consequences of not adopting a policy will be a
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Austin, 2023 WL 4569562, at *12 (citing Rhyne, 973 F.2d at
392, and City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387).
The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is not that the Defendants’ policy is unconstitutional, but
instead that Defendants had no policy in place, that is, that there was a failure to adopt a policy.
The failure to adopt a policy is a question of deliberate indifference on behalf of the policymaker.
Because this Court has found that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as it relates to the
inadequate medical care claims against the LaSalle Defendants.
3. Failure to Train and Supervise
Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim
that they have a custom or policy of failing to adequately train LaSalle Correctional Center
employees in the face of medical emergencies.
“[A] municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to
‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into
contact.’” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citing City of Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 388). “Only then ‘can
such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under §
1983.’” Id. “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at
62 (citing Board of Commissioners of Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 410). “Thus, when city
policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training
program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed
deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.” Id. “The city's ‘policy
of inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the functional
equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.’” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62
(citing Canton, 489 U.S., at 395).
“The infringement of the plaintiff's constitutional rights must be an ‘obvious’ and ‘highly
predictable’ consequence of the failure to train.” Parker v. Blackwell, 23 F.4th 517, 525 (5th Cir.
2022) (citing Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir. 2015)). “Additionally, relief will
not typically be available absent a showing of a pattern of constitutional violations, as opposed to
a single incident.” Parker, 23 F.4th at 525 (citing Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President
Government, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002)). The existence of a constitutionally deficient
policy cannot be inferred from a single wrongful act, where the policy relied upon is not itself
unconstitutional. See Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304.
“The Supreme Court in Canton advanced two ways of proving deliberate indifference: (1)
through proof of a pattern of violations that make the need for further training obvious to
policymakers or (2) for failing to provide training when the risk of constitutional violations was or
should have been obvious or highly predictable.” Mathis, 2021 WL 5088276, at *40 (citing Littell
v. Houston Independent School District, 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018)). “For liability to attach
based on an ‘inadequate training’ claim, a plaintiff must allege with specificity how a particular
training program is defective.” Mathis, 2021 WL 5088276, at *40 (citing Benavides v. County of
Wilson, 955 F.2d 968, 973 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. den., 506 U.S. 824 (1992)).
Plaintiff has not described any specific policy or custom for training or supervision or
alleged a specific deficiency in the programs for training and supervision of inmates that
Defendants are responsible for and that is causally related to the injuries. “The description of a
policy or a custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation ... cannot be
conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th
Cir. 1997).
Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim under Monell against Defendants for a
policy of constitutionally deficient employee training or supervision. Therefore, Defendants’
Motion is GRANTED on the failure to train and supervise.
4. State Law Claims
In Louisiana, prison authorities owe a duty to provide an inmate with reasonable medical
care. Harper v. Goodwin, 41053 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 5/17/06), 930 So.2d 1160. Defendants argue
that because no claims for inadequate medical care were pled, that the claims fail. They further
argue that under these facts, Defendants did provide reasonable medical care sufficient to satisfy
any duty owed to Williams.
The Court disagrees. Based on these facts, the Court finds that there is a genuine dispute
of material fact regarding whether Defendants provided reasonable medical care to Williams.
Accordingly, Defendants Motion is DENIED on this ground.
5. Good Faith Defense
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a good faith defense because “no actions were
committed with malice. In addition, “there is no evidence that their actions were constitutionally
infirm.”38 The Court does not agree and DENIES Defendants’ Motion on this ground.
6. Claims against Patrick M. Temple
Defendants assert that because there have been no claims made against Defendant Patrick
Temple, that he should be dismissed from the suit. Plaintiffs do not oppose this. Therefore, this
portion of Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, and Temple is DISMISSED.
7. Punitive Damages
Defendants claim that in order for Plaintiff to recover punitive damages, she must prove
that the conduct of Defendants was motivated by ill-will or intent or involved reckless or callous
indifference to the constitutional rights of Williams. Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.
1992).
The Court finds that because there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the
question of deliberate indifference, then there remains an issue of whether Defendants acted with
callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Williams. Therefore, Defendants’ request to
dismiss Plaintiff’s federal punitive damages claim is DENIED.
38 [Doc. No. 79, p. 33]
8. Claims made by the Succession of Karnesha Williams, Zamiyah Beachem,
William Ivery
Defendants argue that any claims made by the Succession of Karnesah Williams, Zamiyah
Beachem, and William Ivery should be dismissed because they were dismissed in the Third
Amended Complaint. The Court agrees, and the claims made by those parties are DISMISSED.
C. Motion to Strike
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) allows the court to strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter. “Immaterial matter” is defined as
“that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or defenses being
pleaded.” Marceaux v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t., 2012 WL 5197667 at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 18, 2012).
Immateriality is established by showing that the challenged allegations can have no possible
bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not
pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question. Id. Scandalous matter is that which
improperly casts a derogatory light on someone, most typically on a party to the action. Id.
A motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible
relation to the controversy. Augustus v. Bd. Of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 306 F.2d
862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962).
After reviewing the briefing in this matter, the Court construes Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment to contain within it a Motion to Strike. Defendants are moving to strike several
exhibits from Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically,
Defendants move to strike the deposition of Richard Lichten (“Lichten”), the deposition of Dr.
Kris Sperry (“Dr. Sperry”), the cellphone video captured by an inmate. Defendants assert that these
exhibits are not authenticated, consist of or are based upon inadmissible hearsay, seek to render
opinions for which the witness is not qualified to render, seek to render opinions on the ultimate
issues of fact, are irrelevant, and/or any relevancy is outweighed by potential prejudice. The Court
ordered [Doc. No. 96] additional briefing on the Motion to Strike, and Plaintiff replied [Doc. No.
97]. Defense did not file a brief, but the Court can make a determination based on the briefing in
Defendants’ Reply memorandum.
In Defendant’s Reply brief [Doc. No. 87] to Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants assert that
“none of Lichten’s opinions, testimony or any portion of his report is relevant or admissible.”
Further, Defendants assert that Lichten is not a healthcare provider nor competent to give
testimony as to the facts at issue in this matter. In response, Plaintiffs assert that Lichten did not
give medical opinions in his deposition and that he has the education and training to testify as an
expert in jail/prison procedures.39
Defendants further argue that Dr. Sperry’s report and opinions should be stricken from the
Court’s consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of this assertion,
Defendants aver that Dr. Sperry was never deposed and that Plaintiff only provided a report of Dr.
Sperry that did not contain a declaration or affidavit.40 Accordingly, there is nothing setting out
Dr. Sperry’s qualifications as an expert. In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not been
prejudiced by her failure to include a curriculum vitae or affidavit with Dr. Sperry’s report.
Plaintiff explains that she “erroneously forgot to include Dr. Sperry’s [CV].”41
Finally, Defendants assert that to the extent that Lichten’s opinions, particularly Opinion
#3 and Opinion #4, are based on a cellphone video taken by an inmate, the opinion should be
stricken from the Court’s consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment.42 Defendants point
39 [Doc. No. 97]
40 [Doc. No. 87]
41 [Doc. No. 97, p. 1]
42 [Doc. No. 87, p. 36]
out that the video is not authenticated and that the statements made in the video are hearsay.43
Further, Defendants move to strike any of Lichten’s opinions that are based on written statements
provided by inmates after Williams’ death because they are not authenticated and are hearsay.44
To the extent that Defendants move to strike Lichten’s testimony, the Motion is
GRANTED IN PART. Lichten’s Opinions #3 and #4, any portion of his opinion that may render
a medical opinion, any portion of his testimony that discusses the cellphone video captured by an
inmate, and any portion of his testimony that highlights statements made by inmates after
Williams’ death are STRICKEN. To the extent that Defendants move to strike the remainder of
Licthen’s testimony, the Motion is DENIED. The Court finds that Lichten’s testimony as it relates
to jail/prison procedure is material to the issues on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
To the extent that Defendants move to strike Dr. Sperry’s testimony, the Motion is
DENIED. The Court finds that for purposes of considering the Motion for Summary Judgment,
Dr. Sperry’s testimony is material.
To the extent that Defendants move to strike cellphone video captured by an inmate, the
Motion is GRANTED, and the Court will not consider this video for purposes of summary
judgment. Although the video may be material to the issues here, the video has not been
authenticated, and, is therefore, inadmissible evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 78] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. To the
extent that Defendants move to dismiss the claims for failure to train and supervise, the Motion is
43 [Id.]
44 [Id.]
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims against Defendants for failure to train and supervise are
DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent Defendants move to dismiss the claims
against Patrick M. Temple, the Motion is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent Defendants move to dismiss the claims
made by the Succession of Karnesah Williams, Zamiyah Beachem, and William Ivery because
they have been abandoned, the Motion is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 87] is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART for the reasoning consistent with this opinion.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 26" day of March 2024.
| Basel ee
¥ erry A-Doug □□□
Jnited States District-Jadge
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