Linn v. Louisiana Workforce Commission

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

MONTREAL LINN CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-547

VERSUS JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE

LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

______________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is an unopposed Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant, the Louisiana

Workforce Commission. See Record Document 9. For the reasons assigned below, the motion to

dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Montreal Linn (“Linn”), filed a “Complaint Under Section 706(f) of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964” against the Louisiana Workforce Commission. See Record Document 1. In

the complaint, Linn alleged the following:

Plaintiff Montreal Linn was discrimination, age retaliation, harassment, age, ADA,

employment Act of 1967 Title VII, negligence, breach contract, tort, remedy. All

damges injury, mental illness, pain suffering, civil rights, by Louisiana Workforce

Commission…Plaintiff Montreal was discriminated by Louisiana Workforce

Commission.

Record Document 1 at pp. 1–2 [sic]. Before filing the complaint, Linn filed these charges with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Record Document 1-2. The “Charge

of Discrimination” alleged that in September of 2021, Linn worked as a sanitation worker for the

National Dislocated Workers Program under the Ouachita Police Jury. See id. at pp. 8–9. He

further alleged that during his employment, he was discriminated against based on his “sex (sexual

orientation), age (43), disability and retaliated against. . ..” Id. at p. 9. Linn alleged he was subjected

to harassment by his City of Monroe supervisor, Frederick Coleman (“Coleman”). See id. Coleman

allegedly made jokes about Linn’s sexual preference, questioned if he knew “the difference

between a man and a woman in regard to wearing a dress [,]” and required him to complete tasks

outside his job description. Id. On December 21, 2021, Linn was discharged by the City of Monroe

but continued to participate in the National Dislocated Workers Program. See id. On May 31, 2022,

Linn resigned. See id.

Linn received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See id. at p. 1. The EEOC declined to

proceed with its investigation and made “no determination about whether further investigation

would establish violations of the statute.” Id. After receiving the notice, Linn filed this complaint,

and the Louisiana Workforce Commission filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for improper

venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Record Document 9-1 at p. 2.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The Court turns first to the issue of whether Linn’s claims are barred by Louisiana state

sovereign immunity. In his complaint, Linn alleges four different causes of action against the

Louisiana Workforce Commission: 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and

Louisiana state contract and tort law. See Record Document 1 at pp. 1–2. The Louisiana Workforce

Commission contends that all the claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Jurisdiction as to each

of Linn’s claims is discussed below, but the court begins with a general discussion of sovereign

immunity and the Court’s jurisdiction.

The Louisiana Workforce Commission framed their motion as a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Motions filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

challenge the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The

party asserting jurisdiction always has the burden of proof as to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.

See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). If the court finds that it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss without prejudice. See id. For this reason, “[w]hen a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider

the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Id. (citing Hitt

v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curium)).

Generally, the Fifth Circuit has treated a dismissal based on state sovereign immunity as

jurisdictional under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Cantu Servs., Inc. v. Roberie, 535

F. App’x 342, 346 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013).1 Therefore, this Court will follow the Fifth Circuit and treat

this issue of state sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional dismissal under Federal Rule Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1).

Federal court jurisdiction is limited by the Eleventh Amendment which bars suits in federal

court brought by a citizen against a state or its agencies. See U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Vogt v. Bd.

of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 294 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 2002). When a suit is filed against

a state agency, the Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the state agency that is deemed the

“alter ego” or the “arm” of the state. See Vogt, 294 F.3d at 689. Therefore, a citizen may not

recover monetary damages or injunctive relief from a state agency unless the state has waived its

1 The Court notes that the Fifth Circuit recognizes “the uniquely ambiguous character of Eleventh

Amendment immunity.” Cantu, 535 F. App’x at 346 n.3. State sovereign immunity is unique

because it contains traits that limit jurisdiction similar to subject matter jurisdiction but also acts

as an affirmative defense because it may be waived by the state. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Louisiana

Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 662 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2011).

immunity. See Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council--Pres. Gov’t., 279 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2002).

The Fifth Circuit considers the Louisiana Workforce Commission to be an arm of the state of

Louisiana for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Chaney v. La. Work Force

Comm’n, 560 F. App’x 417, 418 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curium).

A state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe

of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997). “By statute, Louisiana has refused any such waiver of its

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity regarding suits in federal courts.” Cozzo, 279 F.3d at

281; La. R.S. § 13:5106(A). Additionally, Congress may abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity even if the state does not consent. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 55

(1996). To abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress must “unequivocally”

express its intent and act “pursuant to a valid exercise of power.” Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.

Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999).

1. Linn’s Section 1983, ADEA, ADA, and State Law Contract and Tort Claims.

The Court now turns to the specific causes of action alleged by Linn. First, as to the claims

asserted under § 1983 and the ADEA, Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity. See

Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 281 (“We note that in enacting § 1983, Congress did ‘not explicitly and by

clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States.’”) (quoting

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)); see also Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328

(5th Cir. 2013) (“Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity under the ADEA”).

Therefore, the claims arising under § 1983 and the ADEA are barred by sovereign immunity.

The complaint does not specify which provision of the ADA was allegedly violated. Title

I of the ADA prohibits states from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of

disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Based on the facts provided in the complaint, this Court finds

that the relevant provision of the ADA is Title I. See Record Document 1-2 at p. 9. Congress did

not abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting Title I of the ADA. See Bd. of Trustees of U.

of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Therefore, the claim arising under the ADA is barred

by sovereign immunity.

Lastly, sovereign immunity also bars this Court from hearing Linn’s state law contract and

tort claims. See Raj, 714 F.3d at 329 (“[S]overeign immunity bar[s] federal courts from hearing

state law claims brought in federal court against state entities.”); see also Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984). Therefore, the claims arising under Louisiana state

contract and tort law are barred by sovereign immunity.

As a result of these claims being barred by Louisiana’s state sovereign immunity, the

claims arising under § 1983, the ADEA, the ADA, and Louisiana state contract and tort law are

dismissed without prejudice, and the Louisiana Workforce Commission’s motion to dismiss is

granted as to these claims.

2. Linn’s Title VII of the Civil Rights Act Claim.

The remaining claim is an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII

expressly authorizes suits against the states and abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity because

it was passed pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,

427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976); see also Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 n.1

(5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the Fifth Circuit has “long recognized that Congress has clearly

abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting Title VII”). Because Congress

abrogated Louisiana’s immunity from suit under Title VII, Linn’s claim against the Louisiana

Workforce Commission is not subject to dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. Although this

claim is not barred by sovereign immunity, it must be dismissed on other grounds outlined below.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue.

The Louisiana Workforce Commission also moved to dismiss Linn’s claims under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for improper venue. When a defendant objects to venue, the

burden is on the plaintiff to establish that his chosen venue is proper. See Perez v. Pan Am. Life

Ins., 70 F.3d 1268, 1995 WL 696803, *2 (5th Cir. 1995). “On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss

for improper venue, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all

conflicts in favor of the plaintiff.” Braspetro Oil Servs., Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 F. App’x

612, 615 (5th Cir. 2007).

Venue for Linn’s claims is governed by the general venue statute, under which venue is

proper in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same

state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred, or (3) if neither of the above, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject

to the court’s personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

The complaint alleged that Linn was subjected to harassment by his City of Monroe

supervisor. See Record Document 1-2 at p. 9. The specific examples of the alleged harassment

took place during his time working for the City of Monroe, and Linn was discharged by the City

of Monroe. See id. The Court finds that this case was properly brought in the Western District of

Louisiana, Monroe Division because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

Linn’s claim occurred within that District.2 Therefore, venue is proper.

2 The Louisiana Workforce Commission argued that a suit against a state agency is only proper in

the Middle District of Louisiana because state law controls the propriety of venue in this federal

suit. See Record Document 9-1 at p. 6; see La. R.S. § 13:5104(A) (in a suit filed against a state

agency, venue is proper either in “the district court of the judicial district in which the state capitol

C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.

Turning to Linn’s remaining claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Court holds

that Linn has failed to state a claim for relief in that Linn was not an employee of the Louisiana

Workforce Commission. Generally, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when

the plaintiff fails to state a legally cognizable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The moving

party has the burden under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Philips N. Am., LLC v. Image

Tech. Consulting, LLC, 22-CV-0147, 2022 WL 17168372, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2022). In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court “accept[s] all well-pleaded facts

as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577

F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]—

that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Importantly,

is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the cause of action

arises.”). Defendant’s argument is misplaced. This Court is required to follow federal civil

procedure to determine venue rather than Louisiana state law. See Spencer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.

2:16-CV-605-JRG, 2016 WL 6879598, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2016) (“However, in light

of Congress’s power to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts under Article III of the

Constitution, as recognized by Erie RR Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny, this Federal Court is

obligated to follow federal venue law rather than Texas state law.”). Even if the Court were

persuaded by Defendant’s argument that the statute was applicable, venue is proper “in the district

court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the cause of action arises.” La. R.S. § 13:5104(A).

Therefore, the Western District of Louisiana is the proper venue in which the cause of action arose.

legal conclusions without factual support are not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Young

Conservatives of Tex. Found. v. Univ. of N. Tex., 569 F. Supp. 3d 484, 489 (E.D. Tex. 2021).

“The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the

complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.

2010).

Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse

to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Additionally, the

statute prohibits retaliation if an employee opposes any practice made unlawful by Title VII. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To adequately plead a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that (1)

he participated in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) his employer took an adverse employment

action against him, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action. See McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556-557 (5th Cir.

2007). For an adverse employment action, “a plaintiff need only allege facts plausibly showing

discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or in the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of his or

her employment.” Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2023).

Linn sued the Louisiana Workforce Commission for claims arising under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act. To succeed under this claim, the Louisiana Workforce Commission must have

been Linn’s employer. Further, the complaint must plausibly allege that the Louisiana Workforce

Commission violated Linn’s rights under Title VII. However, Linn failed to plead any facts that

he was employed by the Louisiana Workforce Commission or that the Louisiana Workforce

Commission violated his rights. See Record Document 1. The complaint alleged that he “was

discriminated by [the] Louisiana Workforce Commission” and retaliated against in violation of

Title VII by his supervisor, Frederick Coleman. Id. at p. 1; see Record Document 1-2 at p. 9.

However, these are legal conclusions, not facts. In addition to failing to show that the Defendant

in this matter is his employer for purposes of Title VII, Linn failed to provide any facts to draw a

link between the alleged conduct and the Louisiana Workforce Commission. Linn must identify

facts to support his claim and survive a motion to dismiss. Legal conclusions masquerading as

facts are wholly insufficient. Here, Linn has failed to plausibly allege sufficient facts to survive

dismissal. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) regarding the

Title VII retaliation claim.

The lack of factual allegations of an employment relationship would also be fatal to Linn’s

claims arising under the ADEA and ADA if those claims were not barred by sovereign immunity,

Linn failed to plead any facts that he was employed by the Louisiana Workforce Commission. See

Brennan v. Mercedes Benz USA, 388 F.3d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of the

plaintiff’s ADA claim for failure to establish that an employment relationship existed); see also

Coleman v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge S.S. Pilots’ Ass’n, 437 F.3d 471, 481–82 (5th Cir. 2006)

(affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ ADEA claims because the plaintiffs did not establish an

employment relationship).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Louisiana Workforce Commission’s motion [Record

Document 9] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is denied as to the claim of

improper venue. It is granted in all other aspects, and all claims are dismissed. As to Linn’s claims

arising under § 1983, the ADEA, the ADA, and Louisiana state contract and tort law, those claims

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As to Linn’s claim arising under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act, that clam is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this _10th_ th day of January,

2024.

ELI OBETH EBAY E00 TE ha

ENTT E®R-SFATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10