Satterfield v. Robinson Helicopter Co Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

JERRY ALLEN SATTERFIELD CASE NO. 6:22-CV-06055

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

ROBINSON HELICOPTER CO., ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 25] filed by Defendant

Starr Indemnity & Liability Company (“Starr”). No opposition has been filed. For the reasons set

forth herein, Starr’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 27, 2021, Plaintiff Jerry Allen Satterfield (“Satterfield”) was operating a

helicopter described as a Model R22 Beta, serial number 3780 F.A.A. certification number

N827SH (“the helicopter”). Satterfield alleged that while he was making an approach to land, there

was a loss of tail rotor function, caused by the fractioning of the tail rotor output shaft. Satterfield

alleged that the fracture resulted in Satterfield having to land the helicopter in a field, which caused

property damage to the helicopter and personal injuries to Satterfield.

In response to the Petition1 and First Amended Complaint2 Starr filed the pending Motion

for Summary Judgment,3 which argues that the Starr Policy of insurance does not provide coverage

to Satterfield for medical expenses, property damages, or personal injuries.

1 [Doc. No. 1-1]

2 [Doc. No. 21]

3 [Doc. No. 25]

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall [be] grant[ed]…if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(A). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the

outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in this case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable

fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

If the moving party can meet their initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache

Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must show more than some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court

must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its

favor.

In deciding unopposed summary judgment motions, the Fifth Circuit has noted that a

motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there was no opposition. Hetzel

v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). The movant has the burden to

establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and, unless it has done so, the court may

not grant the motion, irrespective of whether any response was filed. Powell v. Delaney, 2001 WL

1910556, at *5–6 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2001). Nevertheless, if no response to the motion for

summary judgment has been filed, the court may find as undisputed the statement of facts in the

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1, n.2; see also Thompson v. Eason, 258 F. Supp. 2d 508,

515 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (stating that where no opposition is filed, the nonmovant’s unsworn

pleadings are not competent summary judgment evidence and movant’s evidence may be accepted

as undisputed); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Long, 227 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Tex. 2002)

(“Although the court may not enter a ‘default’ summary judgment, it may accept evidence

submitted by [movant] as undisputed.”); Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex.)

(“A summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to his unsworn

pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment evidence.”). The court has no obligation to

“sift through the record in search of evidence” to support the nonmovant’s opposition to the motion

for summary judgment. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994).

B. Starr Policy

Starr attached a copy of its policy of insurance to its motion.4 First, the Starr Policy

excludes bodily injury coverage for “Passengers” in the helicopter. The policy defines

“Passengers” as follows:

Passenger means any person in, on, or boarding the aircraft for the

purpose of riding or flying therein or alighting therefrom after a

flight or attempted flight therein, including crew member(s).5

The word “crew” includes the pilot in-command or co-pilot.6 Therefore, according to the

language of the policy and the allegations of the Petition for Damages,7 Satterfield was a

“Passenger” operating the helicopter at the time of the accident and thus is excluded under the

Starr policy for personal injury damages.8

4 [Doc. No. 25-3]

5 [Id. at 17]

6 [Id. at 16]

7 [Doc. No. 1-1 ¶ 3]

8 The policy additionally excludes coverage for bodily injury while the aircraft is being used for “aerial application.”

[Doc. No. 25-3 at 10–11]

Second, the Starr policy excludes coverage for property damage to the helicopter.” The

policy specifically describes the helicopter as “NOT COVERED” under the property damage

portion of the policy. Therefore, there is no possibility for coverage for property damage to the

helicopter under the Starr policy.

Third, the Starr policy does not provide coverage for medical expenses as the declarations

page of the Starr policy clearly states that medical expenses are “NOT APPLICABLE.”!®

An insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted using

ordinary contract principles. Smith v. Matthews, 611 So.2d. 1377, 1379 (La. 1993). If the language

in an insurance contract is clear and explicit, no further interpretation may be made in search of

the parties’ intent. La. Civil Code Art. 2046. This Court finds that the language in the Starr policy

is clear and explicit. Therefore, by its clear terms, the Starr policy does not provide coverage to

Satterfield for personal injury, property damage, or medical expenses. Thus, Starr is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 25] filed by

Starr is GRANTED. All claims filed herein by Satterfield against Starr are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

A judgment consistent with the terms of this ruling shall issue herewith.

MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 27th day of June, 2023. oo

(reac: Dott Keee/

10 [Id. at 2]