The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
CHARLES JOHNSON, ET AL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-00828
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
CITY OF MONROE, ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Pending before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment by Cecil Carter, Jr.
(“Carter”) [Doc. No. 16]. An Opposition [Doc. No. 23] was filed by Plaintiffs Charles Johnson
(“Johnson”) and Mallory Johnson (collectively “Plaintiffs”) on May 23, 2022. No reply is
necessary.
For the reasons set forth herein, Carter’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that on November 23, 2020, Johnson was wrongfully discharged from his
employment with the Monroe Police Department (“MPD”) for allegedly delaying the sending of
an excessive force case to the Louisiana State Police (“LSP”), prior to the City of Monroe
Mayoral election on July 11, 2020.
On November 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Damages1 in the Parish of Ouachita,
State of Louisiana, suit number C-20213502CV3. In addition to Carter, the suit named as
defendants; the City of Monroe, Mayor Friday Ellis, former Police Chief Eugene Ellis, Police
Chief Victor Zordan, Hank Smith, Sgt. Mike Fendall, the LSP, and their XYZ Insurance
Companies.
1 [Doc. No. 1-1].
In the Petition for Damages, Plaintiffs allege a violation of due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and that Johnson was retaliated
against for his refusal to engage in the unlawful and fraudulent activities of lying and saying that
the former Interim Chief Reginald Brown withheld sending the excessive force case to the LSP.
Specifically, as to Carter, Plaintiffs allege that Carter consistently threatened and
intimidated Johnson during the pre-polygraph examination,2 causing emotional stress and
anxiety, which contributed toward him failing the polygraph test. This matter was removed to
this Court on March 25, 2022.3
In his motion, Carter alleges summary judgment should be granted as the causes of action
alleged have prescribed, and because Carter was not a state actor and therefore not subject to
violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because he is a non-governmental private
person.
In Plaintiffs’ Opposition,4 they concede that claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have prescribed, and that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
has also prescribed. However, Plaintiffs argue that additional unnamed state claims against
Carter in paragraph VIII of their petition survive.
Paragraph VIII of Plaintiffs’ Petition for Damages states5:
Plaintiff CHARLES JOHNSON’S due process rights were intentionally
infringed upon by the defendants, and he suffered loss in employment,
wages, and harm to his professional and personal reputation, loss of
consortium, emotional distress/stress and anxiety, among other things.
2 [Doc. No. 1-1, para. XI].
3 [Doc. No. 1].
4 [Doc. No. 23].
5 [Doc. No. 1-1, para. VIII].
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before a court shows “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is
such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). “The
moving party may meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
by pointing out that the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Stahl v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is
unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate.
Id. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the
record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, courts “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee
Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). While courts will
“resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party,” an actual controversy exists only
“when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000)
(emphasis added). “‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,’
summary judgment is appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating
Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Relatedly, there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a party fails “to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-
23. This is true “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
B. Prescription
As correctly noted by Carter, constitutional violations alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
prescribe one year from date of the alleged constitutional violation, in accordance with Louisiana
Civil Code Article 34926. Johnson was polygraphed on October 12, 2020,7 and on October 14,
2020, he received a written pre-disciplinary letter informing him that he had failed the polygraph
test8.
The claims against Carter for constitutional violations have clearly prescribed.
Additionally, the alleged state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has also
6 Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1102 n.11 (5th Circuit 1983).
7 Affidavit of Cecil F. Carter, Jr., [Doc. No. 16-3],
8 MPD Pre-Disciplinary Hearing Letter to Sgt. Chuck Johnson, [Doc. No. 16-4].
prescribed. Plaintiffs concede these claims have prescribed and offer no reasons for suspension
of the one-year prescription. Suit was not filed until November 23, 2021, well over one year
after Johnson was aware of the results of his polygraph test.
This Court can find no other federal or state claim against Carter other than the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional claims and claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Paragraph VII only refers to a due process claim and sets forth alleged damages.
Therefore, this Court believes that all claims made against Carter by Johnson have
prescribed.
C. State Action
Carter alleges and Plaintiffs concede, that Carter is not a state actor and therefore, there is
no constitutional claim against Carter under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
D. Scientific Investigative Services of Louisiana, Inc.
Plaintiffs argue that Scientific Investigative Services of Louisiana, Inc. (“Scientific”) is
not a party to this lawsuit. This is correct, Plaintiffs’ Petition for Damages only names Carter,
not Scientific as a defendant. In order to clarify the record, any claims against Scientific are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Wl. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth therein, Carter’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 16]
is GRANTED, and all Plaintiffs’ claims against Carter are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Additionally, Scientific is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in this proceeding.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 26" day of May 2022. / \ \
TERRY A-DOUGHTY □□
UNITED STATES DISTRICT DGE