Opinion

Joyner v. Kansas City Southern Railroad Co

Court
District Court, W.D. Louisiana
Filed
May 16, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

JAMES MATTHEW JOYNER CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-180

VERSUS JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD CO., MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

ET AL.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss, filed by Defendant Kansas City Southern Railway

Company (“KCSR”). The motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons below, KCSR’s motion

[Record Document 19] is GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff James Joyner (“Joyner”), who is self-represented, filed this civil action against

KCSR pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) on January 19, 2022. Record

Document 1. Based on attachments to the complaint, it appears Joyner is complaining about events

surrounding his termination from KCSR. According to these attachments, Joyner was removed

from service on May 8, 2019, pending a formal investigation. After the investigation, it was

determined that Joyner was scheduled to attend mandatory training that was bulletined and posted

several days earlier, but he did not attend. It was determined that by failing to attend mandatory

training, he violated the railroad’s General Code of Operating Rules 1.6 regarding conduct, and he

was dismissed on June 20, 2019.

Joyner appealed to the public law board to be reinstated and argued that he was medically

unable to report for training on the dates in question. The railroad responded that Joyner was aware

of the scheduled training and had originally said he forgot about the training and was seeking legal

advice about a foreclosure on that day. Joyner belatedly produced to the railroad an illegible

doctor’s note that purportedly indicated he was unable to attend the training. However, he failed to

notify the railroad in advance of his intended absence.

After review, the board found no procedural errors or violations of Joyner’s due process

rights, and the board noted that Joyner was apparently unhappy regarding being scheduled for

training on one of his off days. The board concluded that Joyner improperly resorted to a self-help

solution that was impermissible based on company policy. Thus, the board denied his appeal.

In addition to attaching the above-referenced documents to his complaint, Joyner alleges in

his amended complaint that “the company shouted at me and snatched a cooler from my hand” on

June 20, 2017, and that he “filled [out] a speak up report” the same day. Record Document 8. He

also claims that he was approved for FMLA leave on October 24, 2018, and that he was harassed

in a job briefing on March 4, 2019. Id.

Joyner filed suit against KCSR and six individuals. Record Document 1. The Court has

since terminated the six individuals as named defendants. Record Document 11. KCSR now has

filed a motion to dismiss in which it seeks dismissal of the claims against it pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Record Document 19.

II. Law & Analysis

A. Legal Standard

KCSR invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in support of its motion to dismiss.

In order to survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must “state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must

accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint in determining whether a plaintiff has

stated a plausible claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); In re

Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). However, a court is “not bound

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986). A court may dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is premised upon an

invalid legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). If a complaint cannot meet this

standard, it may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678–79. A court does not evaluate a plaintiff’s likelihood for success, but instead

determines whether a plaintiff has pleaded a legally cognizable claim. U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s

Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004).

B. Analysis

In the motion, KCSR argues that dismissal is appropriate because Joyner’s claims are

untimely and that he fails to plead a claim for relief. The Court agrees that Joyner has failed in his

burden of establishing the timeliness of his claims and dismissal is warranted solely on this ground.

A cause of action under the FMLA must be filed within two years of the alleged violation,

unless a plaintiff pleads a willful violation, which extends the limitation period to three years. See

29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1) & (2). “To show willfulness, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer

‘knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the

statute.’” Steele v. Leasing Enters., Ltd., 826 F.3d 237, 248 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting McLaughlin v.

Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1988)) (discussing FLSA violations); see Williams v.

Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 717 F. App’x 440, 449–50 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Steele, 826 F.3d at

248); Mozingo v. Oil States Energy, Inc., 661 F. App’x 828, 830 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Steele,

826 F.3d at 248). “A negligent violation is not a willful violation, and an unreasonable violation

does not necessarily constitute a willful violation.” Steele, 826 F.3d at 248 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Here, the face of the complaint and attachments show that all acts giving rise to Joyner’s

purported FMLA claims happened over two years before he filed suit. As such, Joyner must show

a willful violation to avoid dismissal. Quite simply, he failed to plead any facts upon which a willful

violation could be found and failed to make any argument to show that his claims were otherwise

timely. See Record Documents 23, 34, & 36. Thus, Joyner failed in his burden of showing the

timeliness of his claims, and his complaint is subject to dismissal solely for this reason.

I. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, KCSR’s motion to dismiss [Record Document 19] is

GRANTED. All claims asserted by Joyner against KCSR in the above-captioned matter are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS TIME-BARRED. A separate judgment will be issued

herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 16th day of May, 2022.

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UNITED S Cr bse P JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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