The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
CURTIS TERRELL, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-999
VERSUS JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE
JAYSON RICHARDSON, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss, filed by Defendants, DeSoto Parish Sheriff
Jayson Richardson (“Sheriff Richardson”) and DeSoto Parish Deputies Jason Allgrunn
(“Allgrunn”), Michael Banta (“Banta”), and Jeffery Henderson, Jr. (“Henderson”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). The motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons below, the motion [Record
Document 21] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. Background
Plaintiffs, Curtis and Angela Terrell, filed this civil rights action against Sheriff Richardson,
in his official capacity, and Deputies Allgrunn, Banta, and Henderson, in their individual and official
capacities. Record Documents 1 & 19. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Angela
Terrell called the police when Curtis Terrell expressed that he was contemplating suicide. Deputy
Allgrunn responded to the call and allegedly slammed Curtis Terrell against the police car,
conducted a pat-down search of him, tackled him to the ground, punched him, and handcuffed
him. Plaintiffs contend that Angela Terrell tried to record this interaction and inquired about calling
an ambulance, but Allgrunn grabbed her by her hair and threw her into his car. Later, Deputies
Henderson and Banta arrived at the scene and assisted in detaining Plaintiffs. Angela Terrell was
released, but Curtis Terrell spent five days in jail before the district attorney dismissed the charges
against him.
Plaintiffs assert a multitude of federal and state law claims surrounding their arrest and
detention. See generally Record Document 19. Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss in which
they seek to dismiss any purported excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
standard, all official capacity claims against the Deputies, and the Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim. See generally Record Document 21.
Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss is purely legal in nature. The following issues are
before the Court: (1) what standard applies to Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims; (2) whether the
Court should dismiss the official capacity claims against the Deputies; and (3) whether the Fifth
Circuit recognizes a standalone claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In order to survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court
must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint in determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a plausible claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). However, a court is “not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). A court may dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is premised upon an invalid legal
theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). If a complaint cannot meet this standard, it
may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678–79. A court does not evaluate a plaintiff’s likelihood for success, but instead determines
whether a plaintiff has pleaded a legally cognizable claim. U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004).
III. Excessive Force Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
In count 2 of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Allgrunn committed excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Record Document 19 ¶¶ 96 & 100. All parties agree that the Fourth Amendment
standard is the proper legal standard to evaluate Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims, not the
Fourteenth Amendment standard, which is applicable to pre-trial detainees. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993); Malbrough v. Stelly,
814 F. App’x 798, 801 n.7 (5th Cir. 2020) (“And when a claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment, the Fourteenth is inapplicable.”). The Court interprets Plaintiffs’ reference to the
Fourteenth Amendment as merely establishing that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to state
actors via the Fourteenth Amendment. Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 2020).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT to this extent.
IV. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against Allgrunn, Banta, and
Henderson. In suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state officials can be sued in either their
individual or official capacities. “Official capacity suits generally represent another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d
452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999); see Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290–91 (2017). An official capacity
suit against a municipal officer duplicates a suit against the officer’s municipality. Turner v. Houma
Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). The final policymaker is typically the proper defendant to name in an official
capacity suit. See Grafton v. Bailey, No. CV 13-2940, 2018 WL 2325410, at *6 (W.D. La. May 22,
2018).
Here, Plaintiffs have named Sheriff Richardson in his official capacity. It is undisputed that
Sheriff Richardson is the final policymaker of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Department. If Plaintiffs
are successful on the merits, they can obtain all the relief they seek by proceeding against Allgrunn,
Banta, and Henderson in their individual capacities and Sheriff Richardson in his official capacity.
See Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 956 F.3d 773, 778 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020).1 Therefore, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is GRANTED to this extent; the official capacity claims against Allgrunn, Banta, and
Henderson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as redundant of the official capacity claims
against Sheriff Richardson.
V. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim
In count 3 of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim for malicious prosecution
in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Record Document 19 at
22–24. Although the Fifth Circuit once recognized such a constitutional claim, the Fifth Circuit
extinguished the malicious-prosecution theory in Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 954 (5th Cir.
2003) (en banc). More recently, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its position “that malicious prosecution
and abuse of process are torts, not constitutional violations.” Morgan, 969 F.3d at 245; see Anokwuru
v. City of Houston, 990 F.3d 956, 964 (5th Cir. 2021). Nevertheless, “[t]he facts underlying these tort
allegations may constitute unconstitutional searches, seizures, or violations of due process. But that
1 Plaintiffs cite to Singleton in their brief in opposition to dismissal. The Court notes that in Singleton,
the District Attorney was the only defendant sued in his official capacity for damages and injunctive
relief; the Assistant District Attorneys were only sued in their individual capacities for damages and
injunctive relief. 956 F.3d at 778. Thus, Singleton does not support Plaintiffs’ argument against
dismissal.
does not convert the common law tort into a violation of the Constitution.” Morgan, 969 F.3d at
245.
Because “[t]here is no constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution,” “qualified
immunity bars [Plaintiffs’] § 1983 malicious prosecution claims against” Allgrunn, Henderson, and
Banta. Id. at 246. To be clear, “[i]n so far as the [Defendants’] bad actions (that happen to
correspond to the tort of malicious prosecution) result in an unreasonable search or seizure, those
claims may be asserted under § 1983 as violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 245–46. Thus,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in this regard; Plaintiffs’ standalone malicious
prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Record Document 21] is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs
are not asserting excessive force claims based upon the Fourteenth Amendment standard,
Defendants’ motion is DENIED AS MOOT to this extent. The motion is GRANTED as to
Plaintiffs’ standalone Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims and official capacity claims
against Allgrunn, Henderson, and Banta; these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This matter is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for the entry of a new scheduling order when
appropriate.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 30th day of March, 2022.
ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE