Murphy v. University Health Shreveport L L C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

SHELIA MURPHY CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-614

VERSUS JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE

UNIVERSITY HEALTH SHREVEPORT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

LLC, ET AL.

MEMORANDUM RULING

In this discrimination case, defendant University Health Shreveport, LLC

(“UHS”) alleges that it fired plaintiff Shelia Murphy (“Murphy”), a healthcare

professional, because she never obtained her Louisiana registered nurse (“RN”)

license. Murphy, however, disputes this claim and instead argues that UHS’s decision

was discriminatory, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).1

UHS now moves for summary judgment on all of Murphy’s claims.2 For the

following reasons, UHS’s motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

In 2017, UHS created a Vice President (“VP”) position for perioperative services

at its main campus in Shreveport, Louisiana.3 UHS wanted the individual in this new

role to manage day-to-day clinical and business operations in the perioperative

1 Record Document 20 (Amended Complaint). Murphy also brought a claim of age

discrimination under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act in her Complaint.

However, Murphy does not wish to pursue this claim. It is therefore DISMISSED.

2 Record Document 34.

3 Record Document 38-1, p. 2 ¶ 3.

department.4 To fill the position, UHS enlisted a recruiting company to advertise the

opening and field prospective candidates.5 To that end, the recruiting company and

UHS created an application brochure to promote the position to potential applicants.6

Early in the brochure drafting process, UHS provided the recruiting company a

preliminary “Needs Assessment” that outlined UHS’s preferences for a successful

applicant.7 Among its other specifications, it noted that a RN license was not an

“absolute” requirement for the VP position.8 But later in the process, while creating

the required qualifications in the job description, Mark Randolph (“Randolph”),

President of UHS, decided that the position would actually require an “experienced

nurse.”9 Essentially, Randolph wanted someone in the position to monitor

“instrument processing” and provide clinical oversight in the perioperative department. 10

As a result, on the official job description used by UHS and the recruiting firm, a

Louisiana RN license was listed as a “Minimum Qualification.”11

At the time the recruiting company and UHS posted the VP job listing, Murphy

worked in California as a nurse.12 Interested in the position in Shreveport, though,

Murphy applied, and through the recruiting agency, secured a phone interview with

4 Id. at pp. 2−4 ¶ 4.

5 Id. at p. 3 ¶ 5.

6 Record Document 34-3, pp. 93−99.

7 Record Document 34-4, pp. 16−19.

8 Id. at p. 19.

9 Id. at pp. 7−8.

10 Id.

11 Id. at p. 28 & 34-3, p. 103.

12 Record Document 38-1, p. 14 ¶ 30.

Randolph shortly afterward.13 This phone call led to an in-person meeting, and

eventually the job offer in April 2018.14 But soon after UHS offered the position to

Murphy, UHS’s HR director raised red flags about Murphy’s credentials.15

The HR director, in particular, was concerned about the status of Murphy’s

nursing licenses in two states where she worked as a nurse—Virginia and California.16

With this in mind, the director reached out to the recruiting firm and asked about

their vetting procedures for professional licenses.17 In response, the recruiting firm

said Murphy characterized the Virginia license issue as a “minor” technical problem.18

The issue was that Murphy failed to complete paperwork before leaving a Virginia

medical center.19 When the medical center filed a complaint against Murphy, she took

no steps to expunge her record.20 As a result, the nursing board suspended her multi-

state Virginia license.21

The California license issue related to the same problem Murphy faced in

Virginia.22 Because she had a reprimand on her multi-state license, upon her

relocation to California, the nursing board mandated that Murphy undergo a

probation period.23 The probation required Murphy to reside in state for six months

13 Id. at p. 8 ¶ 14.

14 Id. at pp. 8−9 ¶ 15.

15 Id. at p. 10 ¶ 22.

16 Record Document 34-6, p. 12.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Record Document 38-1, pp. 13−14 ¶¶ 26–28.

20 Id. at pp. 13−14 ¶ 28.

21 Id. at p. 14 ¶ 28.

22 Id. at pp. 14−15 ¶ 32.

23 Id. at p. 15 ¶ 33.

before the board approved her California license.24 Murphy never completed this

probation, though, because she relocated to Shreveport before the period ended.25

Nevertheless, at the time Murphy started at UHS, its administration was

aware of these issues and the fact that Murphy did not have a RN license in

Louisiana.26 UHS alleges that Murphy assured it that she would clear the licensing

problems in other states and apply for a Louisiana license by endorsement.27 Pending

her certification, UHS contends it amended Murphy’s job description to allot her six

months—and then nine—to get the license.28 Murphy, though, disputes UHS’s claims.

She instead asserts that a Louisiana RN license was never an absolute requirement

for her position.29 To support her claim, she points to internal emails and documents

that she believes cast doubt over UHS’s allegations. She also points to conversations

she had with Randolph about her hospital responsibilities.30 In these conversations,

Murphy alleges that Randolph assured her that UHS planned to change her position

to “VP of Perioperative Operations,” a role that did not require a RN license.31

Despite Murphy’s beliefs and Randolph’s alleged assurances, however,

Murphy’s role never changed. UHS also emailed Murphy multiple times throughout

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Record Document 34-6, p. 12.

27 Record Document 34-5, p. 8. A license by endorsement is a way for out-of-state

nurses to become licensed in Louisiana. Record Document 34-3, pp. 146−47.

28 Record Document 34-5, pp. 4, 10.

29 Record Document 38-1, p. 15 ¶ 34.

30 Record Document 38-5, p. 20.

31 Id.

her tenure referencing the status of her Louisiana license.32 Murphy says she does

not remember receiving or acknowledging these emails.33 Even so, Murphy traveled

to Baton Rouge to apply for a Louisiana license at the nursing board.34 She claims

she made this trip because she planned to seek employment elsewhere, yet Murphy

billed the cost of her trip to UHS.35 Otherwise, during the first few months of her

employment, UHS seemed satisfied with Murphy’s performance. Notably, UHS

awarded Murphy an “outstanding” on her first annual review, and Randolph sent her

praise-filled messages indicating he approved of her work.36

Unfortunately, however, in December 2018, Murphy received concerning news;

her young son required serious surgery.37 To manage his care, Murphy needed time

away from her professional responsibilities.38 Because she had yet to accrue enough

time for medical leave, she offered to resign her VP position at UHS.39 But Randolph

rejected her offer and instead allowed Murphy to take paid leave.40 During Murphy’s

absence in December, though, UHS received an anonymous email raising concerns

about her nursing credentials.41 Escalating the situation further, Louisiana State

32 See, e.g., Record Document 34-3, pp. 145−46, 148.

33 Record Document 38-1, pp. 17−18 ¶ 38.

34 Id. at pp. 22−24 ¶¶ 46−49.

35 Id. at pp. 25−26 ¶¶ 55−56.

36 Record Document 38-6, pp. 1−8.

37 Record Document 38-1, p. 26 ¶ 57.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id. at p. 26 ¶ 58.

41 Record Document 34-5, p. 18.

University’s hospital compliance office also called UHS regarding the status of

Murphy’s Louisiana RN license.42

A few weeks later, in January 2019, a letter signed by Murphy’s operating room

(“OR”) staff surfaced in UHS’s HR Department.43 The letter contained twenty-four

signatures and expressed complaints about Murphy’s staff management.44 The

signees—more than half of whom were black—were all OR staff working under

Murphy’s supervision.45 Murphy claims the letter was ripe with racial animus and

further alleges that she reported this fact to UHS.46 A few days after the letter,

Murphy’s son underwent another surgery and UHS allowed Murphy more time

away.47

Meanwhile, during Murphy’s second absence, Randolph claims he received a

phone call from the Director of the Louisiana State Board of Nurses.48 He and a

witness allege that the Director told him that Murphy would never receive a license

in Louisiana.49 Considering this fact, the next month, in February, Randolph claims

that he decided to terminate Murphy’s employment.50 As a result, UHS informed

Murphy that she was fired because she never obtained a Louisiana RN license.51

42 Id. at pp. 12−13.

43 Record Document 38-3, pp. 7−8.

44 Id.

45 Id. & 39-1, pp. 1−2.

46 Record Document 38-5, p. 11.

47 Record Document 38-1, p. 27 ¶ 59.

48 Record Documents 34-4, p. 18 & 34-7, p. 8.

49 Id.

50 Record Document 34-4, pp. 21−22.

51 Id. at p. 22.

Murphy claims, however, that UHS’s decision was racially motivated and

related to her disabled son. 52 She further argues that UHS had a larger struggle with

racial discrimination.53 Murphy alleges, for instance, that UHS kept her from

important meetings, subjected her to secondhand racist slights, and assigned her a

larger workload than other non-minorities in similar positions.54 UHS, on the other

hand, refutes this and contends that Murphy cannot carry her burden to present a

prima facie case of discrimination.55 And even if Murphy can make an adequate prima

facie case, UHS argues that she has no evidence that its decision to fire her was

discriminatory.56 For this reason, UHS claims it is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.57

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment is

appropriate when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions,

and affidavits on file indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

52 Record Document 38-2, p. 1.

53 Id. at pp. 7−8.

54 Id.

55 Record Document 34-2, at 15−16.

56 Id. at pp.16−17.

57 Id. at p. 25.

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the burden at trial will rest on the non-moving party,

the moving party need not produce evidence to negate the elements of the non-moving

party’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of supporting evidence. See id.

at 322–23.

If the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine

dispute of material fact, the nonmovant must demonstrate that there is, in fact, a

genuine issue for trial by going “beyond the pleadings” and “designat[ing] specific

facts” for support. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325)). “This burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts,” by conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere

“scintilla of evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However,

“[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to

be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1985) (citing

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). While not weighing the

evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, courts should grant summary

judgment where the critical evidence in support of the nonmovant is so “weak or

tenuous” that it could not support a judgment in the nonmovant’s favor. Armstrong v.

City of Dall., 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993).

Additionally, Local Rule 56.1 requires the movant to file a statement of material

facts as to which it “contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” The opposing party

must then set forth a “short and concise statement of the material facts as to which

there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” W.D. La. R. 56.2. All material facts set forth

in the movant’s statement “will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless

controverted as required by this rule.” Id.

B. Race Discrimination Claim

Under Title VII, an employer may not “discharge any individual . . . because of

such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When, as in this case, a plaintiff

offers only circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the three-step McDonnell

Douglas framework applies. Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th

Cir. 2001); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under

this framework, a plaintiff must first assert a prima facie case of discrimination,

which, if established, raises a presumption of discrimination. Methodist Hosp. Sys.,

271 F.3d at 219. Next, “[t]he employer must [] produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for the adverse employment decision.” Id. When the employer provides a

legitimate reason, the presumption of discrimination dissipates. The plaintiff must

then prove that the employer’s given reason for the termination was pretextual and

that she was discriminated against because of her protected status. Id. at 219–20.

The first step in this framework, therefore, requires Murphy to present a prima

facie case of race discrimination. To do so, she must show that she (1) is a member of

a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or

suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by

someone outside her protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly

situated employees outside the protected group. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d

551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).

Murphy, as an African American female, is a member of a protected class who

was fired by UHS, and thus suffered an adverse employment action. UHS also

replaced Murphy with a white woman.58 As a result, Murphy meets the first, third,

and fourth requirements of a prima facie case, leaving only the second requirement—

whether she was qualified for her position—in dispute. UHS claims that Murphy was

not qualified because she never registered as a nurse in Louisiana.59 Murphy, on the

other hand, claims that she was not aware of the license requirement and does not

recall conversations with UHS staff about obtaining a RN license. 60 Rather, Murphy

alleges that she had discussions with Randolph—her direct supervisor—who

communicated that UHS eventually planned to remove clinical oversight from her

duties.61 She also points to UHS’s “Needs Assessment” sent to the employee recruiting

firm, which indicated a Louisiana RN license “was not absolute.”62 Murphy finally

cites the “outstanding” performance review she received just a few months before UHS

fired her.63 The review did not include anything about obtaining a license. These facts

coupled with UHS’s decision to interview and hire her, she argues, suggest that she is

at least minimally qualified for her position.64

The Court will not automatically assume that Murphy was qualified because

UHS hired her. See Lewis v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 956 F. Supp. 2d

58 Record Document 38-4, at 9.

59 Record Document 34-4, p. 22.

60 Record Document 38-1, pp. 17−18 ¶ 38.

61 Id.

62 Record Document 34-4, p. 19.

63 Record Document 38-3, p. 19.

64 Record Document 38-2, p. 6.

722, 734 (E.D. La. 2013), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 209 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Bienkowski v.

Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1988)) (holding that a plaintiff was

unqualified even after she was hired because she did not possess the necessary

credentials for the possession). The evidence shows that UHS expected Murphy would

obtain a license during her first few months of employment.65 And while there may

be a fact dispute about whether Randolph downplayed the urgency of securing a

Louisiana license, there is no dispute that a Louisiana RN license was a minimum

qualification on the official job description for Murphy’s position.66 Unlike the job

description, the “Needs Assessment” Murphy cites was not the final document that

governed the required qualifications for her position.67 Murphy provides no evidence

that proves otherwise.

Without a Louisiana RN license, Murphy could not legally engage in clinical

oversight, although this was always a component of her job duties. The evidence

provided by UHS shows that it anticipated Murphy to perform this oversight once she

obtained her license.68 UHS claims it allowed Murphy a six, then nine-month period

to obtain a license, which Murphy was unable to do. While Murphy disputes such a

period existed, UHS’s evidence includes multiple emails to Murphy that stressed the

need for her to apply for a Louisiana license. One email from the Chief Nursing Officer

65 Record Document 34-5, p. 4. For example, the HR Director testified the job

description was amended to allow Murphy time to obtain a license within the first six

months of hire. Id. Once the six months passed, UHS allowed an additional three

months. Record Documents 34-10, p. 2−3 & 34-4, p. 9.

66 Record Document 34-3, p. 103.

67 Record Document 34-4, p. 7.

68 Id. at p. 9 & 34-6, pp. 6−7.

stated, for instance, “I really need you to get licensed for this state ASAP.”69 Another

from an HR director said, “we need to decide on [the] expected date of completion for

you to receive your Louisiana RN license.”70 These emails were sent within the first

few months of Murphy’s employment. More than six months into her tenure, she even

booked a one-day trip to Baton Rouge to register as a nurse at the nursing board.71

Even though the board never approved her application, she nevertheless billed the

costs of this trip directly to UHS.72 Ultimately, the evidence demonstrates that one of

the requirements for Murphy’s position was a Louisiana nursing license. Without this

license, Murphy cannot point to any evidence that she was qualified for her role.

Drawing on the analysis applied in Bienkowski v. American Airlines, the Fifth

Circuit considers professional licenses “necessary qualifications” when required by an

employer; they may, therefore, be used to analyze whether an employee can establish

a prima facie case of discrimination. See Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 n. 3 (explaining

that the “loss of a necessary professional license” may render an employee “unfit for

the position for which [s]he was hired”). Here, at the time of her firing, Murphy had

a suspended multi-state license in Virginia and a revoked California license she lost

during her tenure at UHS.73 The undisputed facts also show that Murphy never

obtained a Louisiana RN license. As a result, she did not meet the objective

qualifications outlined in the official job posting.

69 Record Document 34-3, pp. 145−46.

70 Id. at p. 148.

71 Id. at pp.112−115.

72 Id. at p. 88.

73 Record Document 38-1, p. 30 ¶ 65.

Regarding the praise Murphy received during her tenure, the Court finds that

it is not relevant in this specific analysis. Praise, like experience, is no substitute for

the minimum licensing requirement. See, e.g., Lewis, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 735

(determining that experience could not “compensate for a plaintiff's failure to hold the

‘minimum educational requirement’”) (quoting Merwine v. Bd. of Trustees for State

Institutions of Higher Learning, 754 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1985)). The issue here is

not whether Murphy was successful in her role, but whether she met the objective

qualifications for the position. See Lewis, 562 F. App'x at 211. In other words, even if

Murphy has the training, experience, and capacity to excel as a nurse, she cannot

engage in the clinical duties only registered nurses may carry out under Louisiana

law.74

In short, Murphy has not submitted evidence to “contradict or diminish in any

way the simple, uncontested and stipulated fact” that she “did not possess the

published minimum [qualification] requirement” for the position of VP of

Perioperative Services. Merwine, 754 F.2d at 637. For this reason, she cannot present

a prima facie case of discrimination. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674,

681 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[E]mployee must demonstrate that [s]he meets objective hiring

criteria at the prima facie case stage[.]”). But even assuming she could, Murphy’s

discrimination claim is foreclosed because she cannot satisfy her burden on the final

step of her Title VII action, which the Court will address below.

74 Id. at p. 102 & 34-4, pp. 7−8. For state laws regarding nursing practices in

Louisiana, see generally La. Stat. §§ 37:913 to :1020.

If Murphy had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court would

next proceed with the second step in the McDonnell Douglas framework. At this stage,

UHS needs to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Murphy’s termination.

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 142 (2000). To do so, it “must

provide both ‘clear and reasonably specific reasons’ for its actions.” Okoye v. Univ. of

Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tex. Dep’t. of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). This is a burden of production,

not persuasion, and “can involve no credibility assessment.” St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). As discussed above, UHS claims that it fired Murphy

because she did not have a Louisiana RN license. This reason, if “taken as true, would

permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

action.” Id. UHS has therefore satisfied its burden.

Because UHS has produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

decision, the third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis requires Murphy to show

that UHS’s stated reason for her discharge is false or unworthy of credence. Vaughn

v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333

F.3d 572, 538 (5th Cir. 2003)). She must also substantiate her claim of race

discrimination through evidence capable of proving that discriminatory animus lay at

the heart of UHS’s decision to fire her. Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720

(5th Cir. 2002). Murphy therefore cannot prove that UHS’s decision is “‘a pretext for

discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that

discrimination was the real reason” for UHS’s decision. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515

(emphasis in original).

Arguing that UHS’s proffered reason for her firing is untrue, Murphy alleges

she did not need a license for her role. To support her argument, she cites alleged

conversations with Randolph who she says downplayed the necessity of a RN license.75

Pointing to these conversations and some internal UHS emails, she claims that UHS

planned to develop her position into a role where a license was unneeded; it wanted to

remove all clinical oversight and have Murphy work as a “service line executive”

without a RN license.76

While the evidence shows UHS considered making this change,77 the change

was never realized. Instead, when UHS fired Murphy, she occupied the same role

UHS hired her for; a role that required a Louisiana RN license per the job posting.

Here, it is not the Court’s role to second-guess UHS’s business decision not to alter

Murphy’s role at the hospital. Though Murphy may disagree with UHS’s decision,

“[m]anagement does not have to make proper decisions, only non-discriminatory

ones.” Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005). Even if

UHS did not sufficiently stress the need for Murphy to obtain a RN license during her

tenure, or bungled communications with Murphy altogether, absent evidence of

discrimination, these facts alone do not show pretext. See Little v. Republic Ref. Co.,

924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991). (“The existence of competing evidence about the

75 Record Document 38-1, pp. 17−18 ¶ 38.

76 Record Document 38-3, p. 20.

77 Id.

objective correctness of a fact underlying a defendant's proffered explanation does not

in itself make reasonable an inference that the defendant was not truly motivated by

its proffered justification.”). Here, Murphy cannot refute the evidence that shows that

UHS had an internal pattern of concern regarding her credentials throughout her

nine-month career at UHS.

Murphy nevertheless contends that UHS is masking its unlawful action behind

a deceptive pretense. She claims that UHS instead fired her in response to racially

motivated staff complaints.78 Murphy, for instance, points to a letter the OR staff

submitted to UHS.79 In the letter, the staff voiced their complaints about Murphy’s

OR schedule management.80 Among other grievances, the staff cited their extensive

work hours and their lack of breaks. They mentioned nothing related to Murphy’s

race.81 Even so, once UHS informed Murphy of this letter, she claims that she

requested an investigation.82 Murphy believes she generated the staffs’ discontent

after she suspended a white nurse.83 As a result, for Murphy, the letter was infused

with racial undertones.84 A few weeks after UHS informed Murphy about the letter,

she was fired.85 For this reason, Murphy argues that UHS, influenced by the staffs’

alleged racially motivated letter and Murphy’s ensuing reaction, fired her.

78 Record Document 38-2, p. 10.

79 Record Document 38-3, pp. 7−8.

80 Id.

81 See id.

82 Record Document 38-5, p. 113.

83 Id. at p. 241.

84 Id.

85 Record Document 38-1, p. 36 ¶ 76.

Unhelpful to Murphy’s theory, however, is the fact that more than half of the

twenty-four employees who signed the letter were black.86 Notably, the individual

who submitted the letter to UHS was a black woman.87 Murphy cannot point the

Court to any evidence that shows the letter is racially fueled, and her speculation

alone is insufficient to carry her burden. It is also undisputed that multiple employees

from the UHS organization emailed Murphy on different occasions, stressing the need

for her to register with the Louisiana nursing board.88 These emails were sent, in

some cases, months before the OR letter ever surfaced.89 UHS also received warnings

and notices before the OR letter that raised alarms about Murphy’s ability to remain

in her position without a RN license.90 Importantly, days before her discharge,

Randolph and another witness also claim that UHS received a call from the nursing

board itself, which indicated that Murphy would never be licensed in Louisiana.91

Murphy does not provide any evidence that disputes these facts.

Also unhelpful to Murphy’s theory is the fact that Randolph was the final

decision maker when it came to Murphy’s employment. Because Randolph both hired

and fired Murphy in a short time frame, the “same-actor inference” applies and creates

a strong inference that discrimination was not the determining factor in Murphy’s

firing. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229 n.16 (5th Cir. 2000).

86 Record Document 39-1, pp. 1−2.

87 Id.

88 See, e.g., Record Document 34-3, pp. 145−46, 148.

89 Id.

90 Id.

91 Record Documents 34-4, p. 18 & 34-7, p. 8.

This inference is based on the idea that an employer is unlikely to hire someone from

a group he dislikes, and then turn around and fire her a short time later. See Brown

v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133 (quoting Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)). To

be sure, Murphy does not claim that Randolph directed any discriminatory animus

towards her.92 She only points to an alleged incident where Randolph relayed that he

was questioned by staff as to why he would hire a black individual for the position. In

response, Randolph said he hired Murphy because she was the “best person” for the

job.93 In fact, the evidence shows that Randolph praised Murphy throughout her

tenure at UHS.94

Claiming broader racial discrimination at UHS, Murphy also argues that UHS

excluded her from meetings and required her to carry a larger workload than other

Vice Presidents at the hospital.95 She also points to racially charged text messages

sent to other staff by outside vendors who did business with UHS.96 Murphy claims

these texts crudely referenced her race, though she does not provide copies of the texts

or describe the texts in detail.97 Nevertheless, Murphy does not argue that the

individuals who sent the messages had any role in Randolph’s decision to fire her. See

Vasquez-Duran v. Driscoll Children's Hosp., No. 20-40837, 2021 WL 3775350, at *5

92 Record Document 34-3, at pp. 41−42.

93 Id. at p. 27.

94 Record Documents 38-6, p. 8 & 38-4, p. 7.

95 Record Document 38-2, pp. 7−8.

96 Id. at p. 7.

97 Id.

(5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2021) (reasoning that comments are not evidence of discrimination

when not attributed to individuals with decision making authority). Additionally,

Murphy does not identify a specific comparator who she alleges UHS treated better

than her, nor does she offer firsthand knowledge of other VP roles or provide any

evidence that would tend to support her claims.

To defeat summary judgment at this pretext stage, Murphy must provide

something more than speculation and conclusory statements. Turner v. Baylor

Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007). Instead, there must be a

legally sufficient reason to infer racial discrimination, and it is that link which is

absent in this case. In sum, Murphy cannot carry her burden of showing that UHS’s

reason for her firing was discriminatory in nature. For these reasons, the Court must

dismiss her Title VII racial discrimination claim.

C. Associational Disability Claim

Murphy also brings an associational disability claim under the ADA, arguing

that UHS was at least in part motivated to fire her because of her son’s disability.

Under the ADA, it is unlawful to exclude or otherwise deny “equal jobs or benefits to

a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the

qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(4). Though the Fifth Circuit does not explicitly recognize associational

disability claims, it does acknowledge that other courts in this Circuit recognize this

cause of action. Grimes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Tex., L.L.C., 505 F. App’x 376, 380 n.1

(5th Cir. 2013). It noted that if such a claim were to exist, a plaintiff would need to

show that (1) she is qualified for the job; (2) suffered an adverse employment action;

(3) the employer had knowledge of the employee’s disabled relative; and (4) that the

adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable

inference that the relative’s disability was a determining factor in the employer’s

adverse action. Id. at 379. After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework then applies. See id.

It is undisputed that Murphy meets the second and third elements of a prima

facie case; she was fired, and Randolph was aware her son was disabled. Nevertheless,

even if the Court were to assume she was qualified for her position, and thus meets

the first element, Murphy’s ADA claim is foreclosed because she cannot establish the

fourth element of a prima facie case. Murphy, in particular, is unable to present

evidence that raises a reasonable inference that her son’s disability was a determining

factor in Randolph’s decision to fire her.

In December 2018, Murphy discovered that her son would need significant

medical care. In response, she offered to resign her position at UHS because she was

not yet eligible for time away under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

Rejecting her offer, Randolph instead allowed Murphy to take time off so that she

could care for her son. Murphy’s hiatus extended through the month of December

until January, when, upon her discovery that her son required additional surgeries,

Murphy asked for more time away. Randolph again granted her request. The next

month, in February, UHS placed Murphy on administrative leave; she was fired soon

after. As a result, roughly two months passed between the time Randolph discovered

Murphy had a disabled son and the time when UHS terminated her employment.

Murphy does not allege that Randolph—the decision maker—made any

negative comments about her disabled son before or during this period. Nor does she

allege that he ever denied her requests for leave so that she could tend to her son’s

medical needs. In fact, in the face of Murphy’s proposed resignation, Randolph

rejected her offer and allowed Murphy to take paid leave even when Murphy was not

eligible for time away under the FMLA. Considering these circumstances, Murphy

cannot establish a prima facie claim for associational disability. See Spinks v.

Trugreen Landcare, L.L.C., 322 F. Supp. 2d 784, 796 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that a

plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie associational disability claim when the

employer granted the requested time off and made no comments regarding the

disabled family member). Even if she did, her associational disability theory would

fail at the pretext stage because UHS provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

for its decision, which Murphy is unable to rebut. For these reasons, Murphy’s

associational disability claim is likewise dismissed.

III. Conclusion

The Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate for both Murphy’s race

discrimination and associational disability claims. Therefore, UHS’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED, and all of Murphy’s claims against UHS are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A judgment consistent with the Memorandum Ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 27th day of January, 2022.

□□ od

ELIZABKTH ERAFO OTE

NITED BTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22