“A claim which is not raised in the complaint, but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.”
How later courts described this case
- “A claim which is not raised in the complaint, but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.”
- finding 13 months an insufficient amount of time to create a causal link
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
VANESSA ADAMS CASE NO. 3:19-CV-00585
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
FRANKLIN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
RULING
Plaintiff Vanessa Adams (“Adams”), an African-American female, filed this lawsuit
against Defendant Franklin Parish School Board (the “School Board”) alleging claims of
retaliation, harassment, and racial discrimination. Pending here is the School Board’s Motion for
Summary Judgment dismissing Adams’s claims [Doc. No. 27]. Adams has filed an opposition
[Doc. No. 50]. The School Board has filed a reply to the opposition [Doc. No. 51].
For the following reasons, the School Board’s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Adams has worked for the School Board for approximately thirty (30) years as a teacher,
administrative assistant, assistant principal, and principal. She currently works as a curriculum
facilitator in the School Board’s central office.
In 2011, Adams was working as a curriculum facilitator when she was appointed by the
School Board to the position of principal at Gilbert Junior High School. Adams was the second
choice of Superintendent Lanny Johnson (“Johnson”) for the position. On October 31, 2011,
Johnson issued a written reprimand to Adams regarding improper use of leave, after Adams left
the school and went on a cruise without informing Johnson, and improperly entered her time away
as sick leave. On June 28, 2012, Johnson notified Adams of concerns with maintenance of the
Gilbert campus and advised her that the campus grounds should be mowed throughout the school
year.
When it was time to determine whether Adams’s contract as principal of Gilbert Junior
High School should be renewed, Johnson determined it was in the best interest of the School Board
not to renew it. His reasons included improper absences/dishonesty, failure to maintain her
campus, and decline in student scores. In not renewing Adams’s contract, the School Board’s only
remaining obligation to Adams would have been to place her back into her last tenured position as
a teacher. Johnson offered Adams the opportunity to resign in lieu of not having her contract
renewed, with the agreement to place her back into her prior position as curriculum facilitator in
the central office, instead of a lower paying position as a teacher. Adams accepted Johnson’s offer
and resigned her position as principal of Gilbert Junior High School on July 1, 2013.
In May 2018, Adams applied for the position of Director of Franklin Parish Head Start.
The top two candidates for the position were Adams and Holly Sartin (“Sartin”), a Caucasian
female. Adams had 15 years more teaching experience than Sartin; Adams had transitioned to
administrative roles, whereas Sartin’s experience was only in teaching; and Adams had a higher
certification as an Education Leader.
Adams and Sartin participated in interviews with the School Board’s diverse, five-person
Interview Committee. Adams scored 184 following her interview; Sartin scored 190. Following
the interview process, the applications and the results of the interviews were presented to Johnson.
Johnson elected to hire Sartin, stating that he was relying on the interview process as well as his
personal knowledge of each candidate’s comparative work performance, including how they
2
handled themselves. He further stated he ultimately declined to offer Adams the position based
on the 2011 and 2012 incidents [Johnson deposition, Doc. No. 27-6, pp. 33, 35, 36, 45, 47.]
In August 2018, the Student Services position at Franklin High School became open.
Although Adams did not formally apply for the position, she did contact Principal Brian Gunter
(“Gunter”) to express her interest in the position. Gunter provided two (2) names to Johnson for
consideration as potential candidates for the student services position: Charlie Amos, a Caucasian
male, who was not employed with the school system at the time, and Adams, without indicating
any preference between the two. Johnson offered the position to Amos, who turned the position
down. Johnson then offered the position to another candidate, an African-American female, who
was not employed with the school system at the time, and who initially accepted the position but
then resigned from employment with the School Board. Johnson next offered the position to Brian
Rogers (“Rogers”), a Caucasian male, who was not employed with the school system at the time,
and who accepted.
Around the same time, the principal of Horace G. White retired, effective the 2018-2019
school year. Adams contends that, before she could apply, Johnson decided to transfer Tara
Robbins, a Caucasian female, to the position, and further opted to modify the position from that of
principal to that of administrative assistant. The School Board, on the other hand, contends that
when the principal of Horace G. White was originally appointed, the school operated as any other
school, with the principal having the same responsibilities as any other principal. However, Horace
G. White had morphed from an alternative “school” to an alternative “program.” As an alternative
program, students and teachers were no longer at the school full time, and students with
disciplinary issues would cycle in and out. Based on the changes to the program, the School Board
3
determined that a principal at Horace G. White was no longer necessary, and the position that was
open was changed from principal to administrative assistant, and Tara Robbins was offered and
accepted a transfer to the position. Adams did not apply for the position.
Adams filed an intake questionnaire with the EEOC [Doc. No. 5-2] on August 25, 2018,
and her official charge of discrimination based on race and retaliation was signed and sent back to
the EEOC on October 12, 2018 [Doc. No. 5-3]. She further alleges she received the EEOC’s right
to sue notice in February 2019.
On May 6, 2019, Adams initiated this lawsuit against the School Board alleging that she
was subjected to harassment, retaliation, and racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 United States Code § 2000e, et seq; 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), Louisiana
Revised Statute 23:301 et seq., when she was not selected for positions to which she applied or
that were otherwise available.
Pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by the School Board, this Court dismissed Adams’s
Title VII and LEDL claims arising from any incidents alleged to have occurred in 2013, or prior
thereto. Adams’s Section 1981 claims were dismissed with prejudice absent amendment to
pleadings, and no amendment has been filed. [Doc. Nos. 6, 7]. Adams’s Title VII and LEDL
claims remain with respect to selections and appointments in 2018 for the positions of Director of
Head Start, Student Services Coordinator at Franklin High School, as well as the alleged
principalship at Horace G. White alternative program.
On February 15, 2021, the School Board filed the pending motion seeking the dismissal of
Adams’s remaining claims of harassment, retaliation, and racial discrimination [Doc. No. 27].
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Adams has filed an opposition with regard to her claims of retaliation and racial discrimination;
however, she states that she does not oppose summary judgment as to her harassment claim. [Doc.
No. 50, p. 1]. The School Board has filed a reply [Doc. No. 51].
The issues are fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before a court shows “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). “The moving party may
meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that
the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is unable to identify anything in
the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. “The court need consider
only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
5
However, Rule 56 does not require a court to “sift through the record in search of evidence to
support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoted source omitted).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, courts “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas
Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). While courts will “resolve factual
controversies in favor of the nonmoving party,” an actual controversy exists only “when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that a genuine issue of material
fact exists. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
“‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,’ summary judgment is
appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517
(5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Relatedly, there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a party fails “to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. This is
true “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
When a movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, it must establish “beyond
peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim . . . to warrant judgment in [its] favor.”
6
Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). In other words, the movant must
affirmatively establish its right to prevail as a matter of law. Universal Sav. Ass'n v. McConnell,
1993 WL 560271 (5th Cir. Dec. 29, 1993) (unpubl.).
B. Analysis
The Court will consider Adams’s claims of harassment, retaliation, and racial
discrimination, in that order.
1. Harassment
As noted above, Adams does not oppose the granting of the School Board’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law dismissing her claims of harassment. Accordingly, the School Board’s
motion as to Adams’s claims of harassment is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
2. Retaliation
Under Title VII, employers may not retaliate against an employee because the employee
opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII, registered a complaint under Title VII, or
participated in an investigation under the law. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 969 F.3d 571,
576–77. Where a retaliation case is based on circumstantial evidence, the Court applies the burden-
shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). That
framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating “(1)
that [s]he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that [s]he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000).
7
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse action. Brown, 969 F.3d at 577. If the
employer satisfies that burden, then the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the employer's
stated reason is pretextual. Id.
In its motion, the School Board asserts that it is unclear from Adams’s Complaint, and even
less clear at the conclusion of the discovery process, what “protected activity” purportedly led to
any alleged retaliatory conduct. Other than to make a blanket allegation that the School Board
failed to prevent and address any acts of retaliation, the Complaint points to no alleged protected
activity.
When asked to specify the protected activity, Adams testified that Johnson retaliated
against her for her having been appointed by the School Board in 2011 to be principal at Gilbert
Junior High School “against his will,” referencing that she was Johnson’s second choice for the
position [Adams deposition, Doc. No. 27-5, p. 8]. If that is the case, according to the School
Board, Adams was not the individual that engaged in the alleged protected activity, but, rather, it
was the action of the School Board. In a situation of third-party retaliation, it must be determined
whether the plaintiff falls within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory
provision that forms the basis of the complaint. Thompson v. N. American Stainless, L.P., 562 US.
170 (2011). In other words, the question is whether the alleged retaliatory conduct would dissuade
an employee from engaging in protected activity, thus rendering the third party the aggrieved party.
The School Board argues here that the School Board is not an employee of itself, and the inquiry
should end there. But, going further, any purported retaliatory action against Adams would not
have acted to dissuade the School Board, as a collective body, from performing its obligatory
8
statutory functions. Therefore, Adams has failed to establish the first prong of her prima facie
case, according to the School Board.
As to the second and third prongs, the School Board acknowledges that a failure to promote
with respect to the Head Start position could constitute an adverse action. The School Board
asserts, however, that there is no causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the
alleged adverse action. The School Board asserts that the seven (7) year period from 2011 to 2018
does not constitute temporal proximity, and that Adams has not demonstrated that the employer
knew about the employee’s alleged protected activity. As the final decision maker, Johnson would
have had to have known, or at least believed, that Adams had engaged in protected activity. The
School Board asserts, however, that it is implausible that Johnson would have attributed the School
Board’s decision to Adams, particularly as Adams was Johnson’s second choice recommendation.
Thus, according to the School Board, Adams has failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.
In her opposition, Adams does not refute the School Board’s arguments. Rather, Adams
asserts that the School Board was aware that she filed a race-based claim of discrimination with
the EEOC in 2016, and that her filing of that claim is the protected activity upon which she bases
her retaliation claim.
In its reply, the School Board contends that this is the first time that Adams has made the
assertion that she engaged in protected activity when she filed an EEOC complaint in 2016; that
there is no allegation in Adams’s Complaint related to the 2016 EEOC matter; that no questions
were posed to Johnson, as the former Superintendent and Rule30(b)(6) deponent, regarding his
knowledge of an EEOC complaint filed by Plaintiff in 2016 (or at any other time); and that even
9
Adams, when specifically asked for the reasons she believed Johnson took retaliatory actions
against her, made no mention of the 2016 EEOC complaint. Instead, Adams testified that Johnson
retaliated against her for her having been appointed by the School Board in 2011 to the Gilbert
principalship “against his will.” [Adams deposition, Doc. No. 27-5, pp. 57].
The School Board further asserts that Adams has failed to point to any competent evidence
in the record that would support the contention that Johnson was even aware of a complaint to the
EEOC in 2016. Where, as here, temporal proximity cannot be inferred, an employee must
demonstrate that the employer knew about the employee’s protected activity. See Cox v. DeSoto
County, Miss., 407 F. App’x 848 851-852 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding 13 months an insufficient
amount of time to create a causal link).
The School Board concludes that Adams has presented no evidence that would support a
causal connection between the 2016 EEOC complaint and the alleged retaliation two (2) years
later. Thus, Adams has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and this claim should
be dismissed.
The Court agrees with the School Board that Adams has not previously asserted that her
cause of action for retaliation was predicated on the alleged protected activity of making an EEOC
complaint in 2016. The law is well-settled that a plaintiff may not rely on new claims raised for
the first time in response to a motion for summary judgment. Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A claim which is not raised in the complaint, but,
rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the
court.”). The Court will not consider any facts, offered exhibits, or argument related to Adams’s
10
retaliation claim that is raised for the first time in her opposition to the School Board’s motion for
summary judgment.
Further, even if the Court did consider this new claim, Adams has failed to present any
evidence that Johnson knew of her alleged 2006 EEOC complaint.
Therefore, the School Board’s motion seeking the dismissal of Adams’s retaliation claim
is GRANTED, and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. Racial Discrimination
To analyze whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination
under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas
framework. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see
also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, (1973). Under that framework, a
plaintiff must show that she “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position
at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4)
was ... treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected
group.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to provide
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action. Id. at 557. If the employer does so, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must establish either that the employer's reason was
pretext for discrimination or that the plaintiff's protected status was a motivating factor for the
action. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007).
11
a. Director of Head Start Position
Adams bases her racial discrimination claim on circumstantial evidence. As an African-
American female, Adams is a member of a protected class. She applied for the Director of Head
Start position and was qualified for the position, but she was rejected for that position. The
applicant selected for the position, Sartin, is a Caucasian female. As such, Adams states a prima
facie case for race-based discrimination.
In providing nondiscriminatory reasons for choosing Sartin over Adams, the School Board
cites Johnson’s personal knowledge of each employee’s work history, the employees’
certifications, the results of the interview process, and the employees’ experience.
Adams argues these reasons are pretextual. She asserts that she had 15 years more
experience than Sartin; she had transitioned to administrative assistant roles, whereas the entirety
of Sartin’s experience was in teaching; and she had a higher certification than Sartin.
Further, Adams shows that, during the interview process, Adams scored 184, and Sartin
scored 190. Thus, according to Adams, the applicants were separated by “a mere six points.” [Doc.
No. 50, p. 2].
The School Board replies that Johnson relied upon his personal knowledge of each
candidate’s comparative work performance and Johnson declined to offer Adams the position
based on the two incidents which occurred in 2011 and 2012, where Adams left the school and
went on a cruise without informing the Superintendent and improperly entered her time away as
sick-leave, and where Adams had to be reminded that the campus grounds should be mowed
throughout the school year.
12
Adams asserts that Johnson apparently considered these two “minor” infractions to be more
significant than her considerable breadth of experience as a teacher and administrator and her
higher certification levels. However, Johnson testified that the first incident was a severe concern
for him:
Q. So why did something in 2012, which was six years prior, affect
her position in 2018?
A. Just -- just the severity of it, to me.
Q. Of not --
A. She was absent without leave and that affected my judgment of
her, leaving 450 kids, 50 employees, and going on a cruise and being
absent for a week without letting me know.
[Johnson deposition, Doc. No. 27-6, p. 7]. Johnson also testified that he considered the second
incident to be significant because:
A. . . . I had some complaints made to the board member. The board
member called me about her not keeping the campus up. And that
was very important to me because we were trying to pass taxes,
renovate some schools, and I tried to get the principals to keep their
schools clean and manicured on the outside because I thought that
made a difference with voters on tax issues.
[Id., p. 5].
The School Board further takes issue with Adams’s attempt to discount the difference in
interview scores as being “a mere 6 points.” The School Board states that what cannot be
discounted is that a diverse group of reasonable individuals agreed Sartin was the top selection,
even after considering education and experience, along with the other desired attributes for the
position. The School Board concludes that Johnson gave due weight to the interview scores when
13
making the final selection, and that there is no evidence in the record to support a racial animus
toward Plaintiff in making the final selection.
Because the School Board provided nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action, the
burden shifted back to Adams to show that the reasons were pretextual or that her protected status
was a motivating factor in her not being promoted. See Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. Adams has
failed to make such a showing.
Adams argues that it is well-settled that where the employer’s proffered reason for refusing
to hire or promote an employee is that it selected the “best qualified” candidate, pretext may be
inferred by evidence of the plaintiff's superior qualifications: “[Q]ualifications evidence may
suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 US 454,
456-457 (2006); Farver v. McCarthy (8th Cir. 2019) 931 F3d 808, 812].
However, Adams has failed to show that she clearly possessed superior qualifications.
Although she may have had more years of teaching experience than Sartin, Johnson could have
been justified in concluding that Sartin possessed superior qualifications, after considering his
personal knowledge of each employee’s work history, the employees’ certifications, the results of
the interview process, and the employees’ experience.
As indicated above, the interview process itself took into account each candidate’s
experience, and even after considering that Adams had more years of teaching experience, the
diverse interview committee nevertheless scored Sartin higher than Adams. [Doc. No. 27-7]
A plaintiff's subjective belief that she was the victim of racial discrimination is insufficient
to create an inference of discriminatory intent. Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 654
(5th Cir. 2004).
14
Accordingly, the School Board’s motion seeking the dismissal of Adams’s claim of racial
discrimination with regard to the Director of Head Start position is GRANTED, and that claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
b. Student Services Position
Adams contends she expressed her interest in the Student Services position at Franklin
High School to Dr. Gunter, who proffered her name as a potential candidate for the position to
Johnson. Adams was rejected for that position. The applicant selected for the Student Services
position was outside of Adams’s protected class, as Brian Rogers is a Caucasian male. As such,
Adams asserts that she has stated a prima facie case for race-based discrimination.
The School Board, on the other hand, asserts that there was no adverse action, in that
Adams never formally applied for the position, and, further, that the position would have been a
demotion from her position as curriculum facilitator in the central office, with possibly a reduction
in pay.
The School Board further asserts that Adams has failed to show that she was treated less
favorably than similarly situated individuals outside the protected group. As an initial matter, she
was not similarly situated to the those considered for the position, all of whom were not employed
with the district. The School Board argues that it is apparent that Johnson sought individuals who
were not currently employed to fill that unfilled opening, and, ultimately, a former employee was
placed in that position. Secondly, if others employed by the school district had been interested in
a transfer, regardless of race, they too would not have had that opportunity. Additionally, Johnson
actually hired an African-American female who later resigned before starting the position, further
15
evidencing that Adams was not treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals outside
of the protected group, according to the School Board.
Adams responds that the School Board is attempting to mask its discriminatory hiring
practices by demonstrating that the position was offered at least once to another candidate in her
protected class [Doc. No. 50, p. 11].
The Court finds that Adams has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, in that she has failed to establish disparate treatment. The evidence that the School
Board offered the position to someone in the same protected group as Adams is uncontroverted.
Johnson testified:
A. Well, let me go back and tell you what happened on the position.
We had the opening and we advertised it and we went through an
interview process and we actually named a young lady that worked
in Monroe that was from Winnsboro, a black, for the position. She
went through payroll, she registered, did everything she was
supposed to do to come to work for us, but a day before school
opened, she called and resigned. So we were scrambling for
somebody to fill that position. So the principal and I started talking
about who could we get, who could we find on such short notice to
help, because that position was crucial to the front office and the
high school. And that's what happened with that.
We had hired -- I think she was a counselor and she was working at
Swanson Correctional Institute. And she actually accepted the job. I
appointed her, and then the day before school started, she called and
told us she would not come. And that's when we started scrambling
to find someone.
[Johnson deposition, Doc. No. 27-6, p. 8]. Adams has failed to produce any evidence to support
her contention that the School Board was attempting to mask its alleged discriminatory practices.
Adams, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that she received unfavorable treatment because she
was a black female.
16
Accordingly, the School Board’s motion seeking the dismissal of Adams’s racial
discrimination claim with regard to the Student Services position is GRANTED, and that claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
c. Position at Horace G. White
Adams alleges that the School Board advertised a Principal position with Horace G. White
Alternative school, but before she could apply, Johnson decided to transfer Tara Robbins
(“Robbins”), Caucasian female, to the position. Johnson further opted to modify the position from
that of Principal to that of Administrative Assistant.
The School Board responds that Adams’s credentials for this position were not considered
as she did not apply for the position, nor did she express an interest in the position. As indicated
above, the position at Horace G. White had been that of a principal, but upon retirement of the
former principal, the Superintendent (Johnson) changed the position to that of an Administrative
Assistant, reasoning that based on changes in programming, there was to be less administrative
work required at the site, and a principal – with a principal’s salary – was no longer necessary for
the position. The School Board asserts that saving money is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the action. With respect to Robbins, the School Board asserts that this this was essentially a
transfer, which is well within the Superintendent’s authority. Robbins, a valued employee, had
expressed that she would be resigning her position to take a job in another district. In an effort to
persuade her not to resign, Johnson suggested she apply for the position. Robbins agreed, and she
was ultimately selected. Here, too, the School Board asserts it has articulated a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the selection. There is no evidence in the record, according to the School
Board, that would show or tend to show that decisions made with respect to the position at Horace
17
G. White were pretext for discrimination – particularly where Johnson was unaware of Adams’s
interest in the position
Adams replies that, while an employee normally must prove he or she applied for and was
denied a promotion, this prong is not required where the employer does not notify employees of
available promotions or provide a formal mechanism for promotion applications.
The Court finds that Adams has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination as to this position. It is undisputed that she did not submit an application or express
any interest in the position. Further, contrary to her contentions that the School Board failed to
notify its employees of available positions, the School Board has provided a copy of an
advertisement for the position of “Administrator of Horace G. White Learning Center” published
August 1, 2018, in the Franklin Sun newspaper. [Doc. No. 27-13].
Further, assuming arguendo that Adams had established a prima facie case, the School
Board has given legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for filling that position, and Adams has
failed to produce any evidence of pretext.
Accordingly, the School Board’s motion seeking judgment as a matter of law dismissing
Adams’s claim of racial discrimination with regard to the position at Horace G. White is
GRANTED, and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the School Board’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 27]. Plaintiff Vanessa Adams’s claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. All pending motions [Doc. Nos. 29, 39] are DENIED AS MOOT.
18
Monroe, Louisiana, this 6" day of April, 2021.
t, . DOUGHTY
UNITE TES DISTRI U
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