The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
JUAN CARLOS AMALAR GONZALEZ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-0520
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
JIM TUTEN, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 15] filed by
Plaintiff Juan Carlos Amaral Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”). An Opposition [Doc. No. 17] was filed on
January 25, 2021, and a Reply [Doc. No. 18] was filed on February 4, 2021.
For the reasons set forth herein, Gonzalez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
DENIED.
A. Background
On April 23, 2019, Gonzalez filed a Complaint [Doc. No. 1] against Mike Stone
(“Stone”), in his official capacity as the former Lincoln Parish Sheriff, and against Jim Tuten
(“Tuten”), individually and in his official capacity as Operations Commander of the Lincoln
Parish Detention Center (“LPDC”), for alleged wrongful arrest and detention.
The uncontested facts are that on April 22, 2018, Gonzalez was arrested for driving while
intoxicated in Lincoln Parish and booked into the LPDC. On the morning of April 23, 2018,
Gonzalez’s employer, Albin Yakaboski (“Yakaboski”) posted bond for Gonzalez.
The facts then differ to some extent. Gonzalez maintains he was released from custody,
while Stone and Tuten maintain Gonzalez was being processed out of the LPDC and had been
allowed to leave the building, but was still in custody, as he had not left the secure perimeter and
his release had not been finalized.
Gonzalez was called back into the building to be given notice of his court date for the
pending DWI charge. Stone and Tuten maintain that while in the process of issuing Gonzalez a
court notice, LPDC employees discovered that they had received by facsimile an Immigration
Detainer and a Homeland Security Warrant for Gonzalez. Yakaboski was given a refund of the
amount he had paid for Gonzalez’s bond, and Gonzalez was again detained by the LPDC.
On April 24, 2018, Yakaboski returned to the LPDC and again posted bond on
Gonzalez’s DWI charge. On April 26, 2018, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) took custody of Gonzalez.
B. Law and Analysis
Gonzalez argues he was wrongfully re-arrested on the Immigration Detainer and
Homeland Security Warrant and illegally detained. Gonzalez further argues Stone and Tuten did
not have authority to arrest him for violation of the immigration laws of the United States
because only ICE officials have the authority to make that arrest.
Stone and Tuten maintain that they had the authority to detain Gonzalez based upon the
Immigration Detainer and Homeland Security Warrant. Stone and Tuten additionally argue that
Tuten is entitled to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claim against him and that
Gonzalez has not shown an official capacity claim against either Stone or Tuten.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before a court shows “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is
such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). “The
moving party may meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
by pointing out that the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Stahl v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is
unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate.
Id. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the
record.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, courts “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee
Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). While courts will
“resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party,” an actual controversy exists only
“when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000)
(emphasis added). “‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,’
summary judgment is appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating
Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Relatedly, there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a party fails “to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-
23. This is true “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
1. Custody and LPDC Authority
Gonzalez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied for the simple reason
that there is a material issue of fact as whether Gonzalez was “out of custody” at the time his
detention was effected. Whether Gonzalez’s release from custody was fully effective at the time
he was called back into the LPDC building is a material issue of fact that the factfinder must
determine.
Additionally, Gonzalez’s argument that the LPDC officials had no authority to arrest him
on violation of immigration laws is incorrect. The case cited by Gonzalez as authority is Arizona
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). Arizona v. United States only stands for the proposition
that state officers do not have the power to unilaterally make removability determination “absent
federal direction.” Id. at 387. See also City of El Cenizo, Texas v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 188 (5th
Cir. 2018) clarifying that Arizona v. United States dealt with removability determinations which
were absent federal direction and upholding the detention where ICE provided the relevant state
official or agency with an administrative warrant and a detainer that evidenced probable cause.
Stone, Tuten, and the LPDC employees based the continued detention of Gonzalez on
ICE’s Immigration Detainer and Homeland Security Warrant. Gonzalez’s custody was not
unlawful.
2. Official Capacity Claims
Gonzalez makes official capacity claims against both Stone and Tuten.1 To establish
liability, it is Plaintiff’s burden to identify conduct properly attributable to the government entity
itself by showing proof of (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of
constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Davis v. Tarrant County,
Texas, 565 F3d 214, 227 (5th Cir. 2005).
Defendants concede that Stone, as Sheriff, is a policymaker but argue that Gonzalez has
not shown that there was an official policy, or that such policy was the moving force behind a
violation of constitutional rights. This Court agrees.
Gonzalez has not provided specific evidence of a specific policy or custom. See Colle v.
Brazos County, Texas 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff has failed to identify any
policy, so without a policy identified, Gonzalez cannot prove a violation of constitutional rights,
whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.
3. Qualified Immunity
Tuten was also sued by Gonzalez in his individual capacity. Tuten maintains he is
entitled to qualified immunity. This Court agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials in their individual
capacities from liability for civil damages as long as the defendant’s conduct does not violate
1 An individual capacity claim is also made against Tuten.
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The qualified immunity defense has two prongs: (1) whether an official’s conduct
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at
the time of the violation such that an officer would know that what he was doing violated that
right. Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5" Cir. 2009).
For the reasons set forth previously herein, Tuten did not violate Gonzalez’s
constitutional rights since the basis of the detention was an Immigration Detainer and Homeland
Security Warrant. The law is at least unclear enough to protect Tuten from violating a clearly
established constitutional right.
C. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, Gonzalez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc.
No. 15] is DENIED.
Since it appears that both Stone and Tuten are entitled to summary judgment dismissing
Gonzalez’s claims against them, this Court gives notice of its intent to sua sponte grant
summary judgment dismissing Gonzalez’s federal claims. Any objection shall be filed within 15
days of this ruling.
Any state law claims remain pending.
MONROE, LOUISIANA this 5" day of February, 2021. mo,
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