The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
PRESTON W. SONNIER CASE NO. 2:20-CV-01269
VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA INC. ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the court are Motions to Dismiss [docs. 9, 13] filed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by, respectively, defendants Nissan North America Inc.
(“Nissan”) and Autoliv ASP, Inc. (“Autoliv”). Plaintiff has not responded to the motion
and his time for doing so has passed. Accordingly, the motion is regarded as unopposed.
I.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises from injuries that plaintiff sustained in a car accident on September
12, 2019. During the accident, he alleges, he was struck by another vehicle as it turned left.
Doc. 6, att. 2, p. 10. The impact caused his vehicle to run off the road and into a ditch. Id.
at 10–11. During both the first and second impacts, however, the side and steering wheel
airbags of plaintiff’s vehicle allegedly failed to deploy, causing him to sustain head and
brain injuries. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff filed suit against several individuals in the 31st Judicial District Court,
Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana. Doc. 6, att. 1, pp. 2–15. By a first supplemental and
amending complaint, he narrowed the defendants to the manufacturer of his vehicle
(Nissan), the manufacturer of the airbags (Autoliv), and the dealership where he had
purchased the vehicle (Giles Automotive, Inc.; “Giles”). There he raised claims against all
defendants in negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, and fraud, and under the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”), Louisiana Revised Statute § 51:1405,
and the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”), Louisiana Revised Statute §
9:2800.53. Doc. 6, att. 2, pp. 10–23.
Nissan and Autoliv now bring motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that the LPLA provides plaintiff’s exclusive remedies against
them and that all non-LPLA claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff has not responded to either
motion and his time for doing so has passed. Accordingly, the motions are regarded as
unopposed.
II.
LAW & APPLICATION
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of a claim when a plaintiff “fail[s] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing such a motion, the court should focus
on the complaint and its attachments. Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir.
2012). The court can also consider matters of which it may take judicial notice, including
matters of public record. Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 Fed. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished). Such motions are reviewed with the court “accepting all well-pleaded facts
as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini
Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010). However, “the plaintiff must plead enough
facts ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). Accordingly, the court’s task is not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood
of success but instead to determine whether the claim is both legally cognizable and
plausible. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th
Cir. 2010).
B. Application
The LPLA governs claims against a manufacturer accruing after September 1, 1988.
Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1995). The statute contains
an exclusive remedies provision, limiting a plaintiff’s theories of recovery against a
manufacturer for an allegedly defective product to those established by the LPLA. Stahl v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Louisiana law
bars theories of liability and claims for damages against a manufacturer that are
inconsistent with the LPLA. See, e.g., Grenier v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 99 F.Supp.2d 759, 763
(W.D. La. 2000), aff’d, 243 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff has asserted several claims against Nissan and Autoliv, as manufacturers
of the vehicle and the airbags, based on the airbags’ alleged failure to deploy in an accident
occurring in September 2019. The exclusive remedy for claims arising from such a defect
is the LPLA. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against these defendants in negligence, fraud,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and under LUTPA are barred by the LPLA’s exclusive
remedy provision and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
Il.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motions to Dismiss [docs. 9, 13] will be granted
and all claims against Nissan and Autoliv except those arising under the Louisiana Products
Liability Act will be dismissed with prejudice.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 4th day of December, 2020.
. = JAMES D. CAIN, TR C .
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE