Allen v. Royal Trucking Co

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

CORY ALLEN CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-0420

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

ROYAL TRUCKING COMPANY, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court are: (1) a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant and

Cross-Claimant Kansas City Southern Railway (“KCS”) (Record Document 142); (2) a

Motion to Strike filed by Defendant and Cross-Defendant Royal Trucking Company

(“Royal”) (Record Document 168); and (3) a Motion to Strike filed by KCS (Record

Document 179). For the following reasons, KCS’s Motion for Summary Judgement is

DENIED, Royal’s Motion to Strike is DENIED, and KCS’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about January 22, 2018, Plaintiff Cory Allen (“Plaintiff”) was working as an

engineer on a KCS train. Plaintiff became injured when Royal’s tractor-trailer, driven by

employee Emmett Battle (“Battle”), collided with the train. See Record Document 1.

Plaintiff filed claims against Royal and Battle for Battle’s negligent operation of the tractor

trailer, Royal’s negligent entrustment, and Royal’s negligent hiring of Battle. See id. at 3.

Pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51, Plaintiff also

filed a claim against his employer, KCS, for failing to provide a safe workplace. See id.

KCS, in its answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed a cross claim against Royal arguing that

Royal’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision in addition to Battle’s negligent

operation caused Plaintiff’s injuries as well as damage to KCS’s property. See Record

Document 5.1

On April 8, 2020, Royal stipulated that Battle was acting within the course and

scope of his employment when the collision occurred. In light of its stipulation, Royal filed

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document 132) to dismiss any

outstanding claims of negligent hiring, training, and supervision against Royal. This Court

granted the motion. See Record Document 195.

KCS then filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on its cross claim

asserting that Battle’s gross negligence was the sole cause of the collision. See Record

Document 142. KCS seeks either indemnification and recovery with damages to be

determined or contribution from the Cross-Defendants Royal and Battle for any and all

FELA personal injury damages sought by Plaintiff. See id. Royal opposed the motion and

Battle subsequently adopted the opposition. See Record Documents 167, 169. Cherokee

Insurance Company also filed an opposition to Royal’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

See Record Document 164.

In response, Royal moves to strike all references to Royal’s decision to fire Battle,

Battle’s required training following the collision, and the traffic citation Battle received in

connection with the collision made by KCS in its Motion for Summary Judgment. See

Record Document 168. KCS also filed a Motion to Strike the declaration by R. Major Fant

which Royal attached to its opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Record

Document 179.

1 Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (Record Document 20) realleging the initial claims

while adding Cherokee Insurance Company as a defendant.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Strike

Although the Motions to Strike filed by Royal and KCS were filed after KCS’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will address each before the Motion for

Summary Judgment because they pertain to what evidence the Court may properly

consider when evaluating summary judgment.

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike “from any

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 178

(5th Cir. 2007). Rule 12(f) motions to strike have long been disfavored by courts, and a

grant of such a motion is to be used “sparingly.” Augustus v. Bd. Of Pub. Instruction of

Escambia Cty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953) (“Motion[s] to strike

should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the

controversy.”).

B. Royal’s Motion to Strike

In its motion, Royal takes issue with KCS’s reference to Battle’s citation, additional

training, and employment termination following the collision. Royal asserts that any

mention of this information by KCS is impermissible because it is inadmissible under

Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404, 407, 701, 702, 703, and 801. Specifically, Royal

contends that any probative value in Battle’s firing is substantially outweighed by

prejudicial effect. Mention of Battle’s additional training qualifies as a subsequent

remedial measure and use of a citation is impermissible in a civil action arising out of the

same accident. See generally Fox v. NuLine Transport, LLC, 2020 WL 1536531 (W.D.

La. 2020).

After reviewing KCS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court finds it

unnecessary to strike the aforementioned information. Any mention of Battle’s termination

or subsequent training measures taken by Royal are few in number and have no bearing

on KCS’s argument in support of summary judgment. They are inconsequential and do

not necessitate striking by this Court. The Motion to Strike filed by Royal (Record

Document 168) is DENIED.

C. KCS’s Motion to Strike

KCS contends that the declaration of R. Major Fant attached to Royal’s opposition

to KCS’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be removed from the Court’s consideration

because Royal made no effort to disclose Fant’s information prior to the filing of the

opposition. See Record Document 167, Exhibit B. Absent court order stating otherwise,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires each party to disclose information such as

witness lists and expert reports in compliance with the rule’s deadlines. Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

26. While there have been numerous extensions of the discovery deadlines in the present

case, the Magistrate Judge ordered all discovery to be complete by May 29, 2020. See

Record Document 129. Royal’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary

Judgment was filed on July 8, 2020 and with it, the affidavit at issue, well past the

discovery deadline. See Record Document 167. Thus, KCS’s Motion to Strike Royal’s

attached declaration by R. Major Fant (Record Document 167, Exhibit B) is GRANTED.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Rule 56 Standard

Rule 56 of the F.R.C.P. provides that the court “shall grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.C.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material

fact exists if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party. See Geoscan, Inc. of Texas v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387,

390 (5th Cir. 2000). In a summary judgment motion, “a party seeking summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings . . . [and] affidavits, if any, which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (U.S. 1986) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . .

grant summary judgment.” F.R.C.P. 56(e)(3).

If the movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of

going beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue

of material fact exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (U.S. 1986);

see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A non-movant, however,

cannot meet the burden of proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing

only “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by

unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Little, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

(5th Cir. 1994). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it

could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should

be granted. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). In

reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view “all facts and inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C.,

755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014).

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, KCS asserts that there is no genuine issue

of material fact as to the cause of the collision. According to KCS, the collision was the

result of Battle’s gross negligence. He breached his duty as a motorist when he failed to

heed the warnings and continued onto the tracks without stopping for the train. See

Record Document 142-1. KCS further argues that it fulfilled its duty to act with reasonable

care by exceeding the regulatory requirements for signals and warnings at the track

crossing. KCS underscores that when a railroad fully complies with its duties regarding

the safety of the railway crossing as it has in this case, the motorist in breach of his duty

is solely liable for the accident. See Record Document 142-1.

In opposition, Royal and Battle argue that a train crew also has a duty to avoid a

collision when the crew, acting as reasonably prudent persons, knew or should have

known that the vehicle would not stop prior to crossing the tracks. See Record Document

167. Cherokee Insurance Company joins Royal and Battle’s argument that whether the

crew timely decided to pull the emergency brake is a fact intensive inquiry that precludes

this Court from granting KCS’s motion. See Record Document 167.2 The Court is inclined

to agree.

2 It is noted by the Court that Royal and Battle proceed to address KCS’s duties as employer to Plaintiff.

However, these arguments are the subject of Plaintiff’s FELA claim against KCS. The present summary

judgment issue is not seeking judgment on the FELA claim and will not be discussed by the Court here.

The Motion for Summary Judgment calls on the Court to address the question of

causation. As evidenced by the parties’ memoranda, the Court believes this question

remains in dispute. Furthermore, under Louisiana law, causation is a question of fact that

is “inappropriate for disposition upon summary judgment.” See Miller v. Mr. B’s Bistro,

2005 WL 2036780, at * 3 (E.D. La. 8/3/05), citing Estate of Adams v. Home Health Care

of La., 2000-2494 (La. 12/15/00), 775 So.2d 1064, 1064. For this Court to weed through

the pleadings in hopes of ultimately reaching a decision as to which party caused the

collision prematurely settles this case before reaching the jury. The analysis is further

complicated by Plaintiff's remaining claims against KCS, Royal, Battle and Cherokee, all

of which are reliant upon the answer to the causation question.

Because the Court believes the issue of causation is best left to trial on the merits,

KCS’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 142) is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, KCS’s Motion to Strike (Record Document 179) is

GRANTED. Royal’s Motion to Strike (Record Document 168) is DENIED. KCS’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Record Document 142) is DENIED.

An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue

herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this the 2nd day of

November, 2020.

Law on [pln /

S. MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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