Spears v. Louisiana College

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

CAROLYN D. SPEARS CASE NO. 1:18-CV-00387

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

LOUISIANA COLLEGE MAG. JUDGE MARK L. HORNSBY

RULING

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant

Louisiana College (“LC”) [Doc. No. 24]. LC seeks judgment as a matter of law dismissing all

claims made by Plaintiff Dr. Carolyn D. Spears (“Dr. Spears”) in her Complaint, specifically

claims of age, religion, gender, and disability discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (“Title VII”); the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (“ADEA”); and/or Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1231, et seq. (“ADA”). LC also seeks judgment as a matter of law dismissing

Dr. Spears’ state law claim of defamation.

Dr. Spears filed an opposition to LC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Cross-

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 34]. In her Cross-Motion, Dr. Spears contends

she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her claim for discrimination under the ADEA

and her claims based upon retaliation under Title VII. Dr. Spears also asserts she has made a

state law claim for breach of contract, and she seeks judgment as a matter of law on that claim.

LC filed a reply to Dr. Spears’ opposition to LC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and an

opposition to Dr. Spears’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. Nos. 39, 40]. LC

asserts in its opposition that Dr. Spears did not assert a claim for breach of contract in her

Complaint.

For the following reasons, LC’s motion is GRANTED, and Dr. Spears’ motion is

DENIED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

LC is a nonprofit corporation which operates as a private, co-educational college of

liberal arts and sciences. This Court has previously found LC to be both a “religious

organization” under § 2000e-1(a) and a “religious school” under § 2000e-2(e)(2). See Aguillard

v. Louisiana College, 341 F.Supp.3d 642 (W.D. La. 2018). Since April 2015, Dr. Richard

Brewer (“Dr. Brewer”) has served as its President.

Dr. Spears became a full-time member of the faculty, teaching in the Department of

Health and Physical Education, in 1977. She became a tenured member of the faculty in 1984.

The parties disagree as to when Dr. Spears’ tenure ended. LC contends that Dr. Spears

retired as a tenured professor effective July 31, 2007, and that she thereafter served in the role of

Senior Professor-- an adjunct, non-tenured position. According to LC, as a Senior Professor, Dr.

Spears was not tenured but instead served as an at-will employee whose year-to-year contracts

were subject to non-renewal by LC.

Dr. Spears, on the other hand, contends that she remained tenured up until her

termination, which was effective July 31, 2017.

Dr. Spears was diagnosed with adenocarcenoma in the fall of 2012. She was treated with

a complete hysterectomy, followed by radiation. The cancer re-occurred, and she was diagnosed

with Stage 4 cancer in 2014. Treatment (including both invasive and non-invasive procedures)

immediately began and continued until June of 2016.

During this period of time, LC “accommodated” Dr. Spears’ disability when she was

required to be out of town for treatment at M.D. Anderson in Houston, Texas, and on other

occasions. Her faculty colleagues agreed to take her classes when she was unavailable for

medical reasons. Her employment contract did not include mandatory summer work.

Dr. Spears contends that, on or about April 22, 2015, Dr. Cheryl D. Clark, Vice-President

of Academics, openly attacked her at a meeting of the Academic Council, calling the courses

taught by her for years a “joke.” Although Dr. Spears was not at the meeting, Dr. Carmacia

Smith-Ross (“Dr. Smith-Ross”), Dr. Spears’ immediate supervisor, and Dr. Kimberly Sharp

(“Dr. Sharp”), Dean of the School of Nursing, were both present at the meeting, and they both

reported the incident to Dr. Spears. Dr. Spears alleges Dr. Clark was also privately attacking her

with the faculty, notably with Dr. Smith-Ross and Dr. Sharp. She further alleges, that, even

before her public attack on April 22, 2015, Dr. Clark had been harassing her.

According to Dr. Spears, LC, knowing that it had no cause for terminating her

employment contract, deliberately adopted a strategy calculated to force her to resign. As a result

of the fear of the loss of her job, as well as the personal embarrassment, degradation, humiliation,

and emotional distress she was suffering, she asserts that she consulted Dr. Michael P. Shamblin,

Associate Vice-President; Dr. Smith-Ross; and Dr. Joe W. Aguillard, who at the time was

“President Emeritus” and a fully tenured member of the faculty, to assist her in preparing and

filing a “whistleblower” complaint and an EEOC complaint.

Dr. Aguillard had the “lead” in drafting the whistleblower and the EEOC complaints for

Dr. Spears. He had a draft of the “whistleblower” and EEOC complaints on his computer when it

was seized by Donald B. Connor, acting on behalf of Dr. Brewer and LC, on September 28,

2015. LC obtained a copy of the confidential draft “whistleblower” and EEOC complaints from

the computer, which it offered into evidence at a FAAC hearing in February 2016 against Dr.

Aguillard. Although she was not present and no charges were directed toward her, Dr. Spears

alleges that LC attacked her at the hearing, as if the hearing were directed at her. Dr. Aguillard

was terminated effective March 31, 2016.

During the 2015-16 academic year, in addition to her teaching duties, Dr. Spears served

as the Coordinator of the Department of Health and Physical Education and as Chair for the

Division of Teacher Education.

On May 17, 2016, Dr. Spears (who was 75 years old at the time) entered into another

“Senior Professor” contract for the 2016 –2017 school year; however, she was told she would no

longer serve as the Coordinator of the Department of Health and Physical Education or Chair for

the Division of Teacher Education. According to LC, this was the result of the reorganization of

several departments within LC prior to the 2016-17 school year, including Health and Physical

Education. Specifically, LC elected to transfer the department, beginning August 1, 2016, from

the College of Education to its College of Nursing and Allied Health in order to conform with

conventional practices, and to expand the nature of the College’s course and degree offerings.

According to Dr. Spears, however, this explanation was mere pretext for discrimination

against her.

Dr. Spears contends that the physical and mental stress of the cancer and its treatment

devastated her. Accordingly, she applied for and was granted sick leave on or about August 15,

2016. She remained on sick leave until May of 2017. Thus, even though she was under contract

and was being paid, she taught no courses during the 2016-2017 school year.

Dr. Spears filed a complaint with the EEOC and the Louisiana Commission on Human

Rights on or about January 25, 2017, alleging that LC had discriminated against her because of

her gender, religious beliefs, age, and disability, and alleging that LC had unlawfully retaliated

against her. She supplemented her EEOC charge by letter dated March 6, 2017, and again by

letter dated June 4, 2017, to claim that LC had retaliated against her by terminating her

employment and by publishing confidential information and false and defamatory allegations

about her.

LC was served by the EEOC with Dr. Spears’ charge on March 9, 2017.

Dr. Spears was terminated from her employment as a tenured professor by letter from Dr.

Brewer dated February 20, 2017, effective July 31, 2017. The letter read:

Dear Dr. Spears:

On behalf of the Louisiana College faculty, staff, administration and

trustees, please accept our collective gratitude for the many years of

service you have rendered to the students, the College, and to the

Lord.

There are many who have sung your praises to me. Chase Boyette

mentioned his deep appreciation for you during the December

commencement when he shared with the audience aspects of his

Louisiana College experience.

Though so many are your debtor for your years of service rendered,

we have decided to move to a different direction with regard to your

appointment as a Senior Professor at LC going forward, and

therefore will not be renewing your contract for the 2017-18

academic year.

We trust the Lord will continue to bless you as you serve him in the

coming days.

[Doc. No. 24-16]

Although this letter is dated February 20, 2017, Dr. Spears alleges that it was not received

by her until April 20, 2017. She implies that it was backdated to a date before LC was served by

her EEOC Complaints on March 9, 2017. She concludes, therefore, that LC was aware of her

EEOC Complaints when she was terminated, and that she was terminated in retaliation.

This lawsuit followed.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), A[a] party may move for summary judgment,

identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary

judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by

identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact.

Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (AA

party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to

particular parts of materials in the record . . . ). A fact is Amaterial@ if proof of its existence or

nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is Agenuine@ if

the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache

Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the

Court must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in

its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with

conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v.

Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248.)

B. Analysis

The Court will first consider Dr. Spears’s claims of age, religious, gender, and disability

discrimination and retaliation. The Court will thereafter consider the motions for summary

judgment pertaining to Dr. Spears’ defamation and breach of contract claims.

1. Prima Facie Case

a. Age Discrimination

Dr. Spears alleges that LC discriminated against her on the basis of her age. Both Dr.

Spears and LC seek summary judgment as to this issue.

Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her]

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”

See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

When a plaintiff alleges age discrimination, “liability depends on whether the protected

trait actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). More specifically, the individual’s age must have “actually played a

role in [the employer's decision making] process and had a determinative influence on the

outcome.” Id. at 141. Therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff must prove that

age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin.

Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).

A plaintiff may prove her case by direct or circumstantial evidence. Reeves, 530 U.S. at

141. Evidence is direct when it “proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or

presumption.” Terry v. Promise Hosp. of Ascension, Inc., CIV.A. No. 13–128–SDD, 2014 WL

4161581, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 19, 2014). Evidence is circumstantial when an inference is

required for the evidence to tend to prove discriminatory animus. Id., at * 5. In order for

comments to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, they must be “1) age related; 2)

proximate in time to the termination; 3) made by an individual with authority over the

employment decision at issue; and 4) related to the employment decision at issue.” Reed v.

Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d

651, 655 (5th Cir.1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co.,

337 Fed. App’x. 416, 419 (5th Cir. 2009).

The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell–Douglas is used by courts if the plaintiff

lacks direct evidence of discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–3. Under the McDonnell–

Douglas framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish

a prima facie case of age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show

she (1) was at least 40 years old, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) suffered an adverse

employment action, and (4) was replaced by someone younger or treated less favorably than

similarly situated younger employees. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th

Cir. 2003).

If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce

evidence that adverse action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Tyler v. Union

Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2002). If such a reason is produced, then the

employee must provide evidence to rebut the reasons given as pretext for discrimination. Id.

As the Fifth Circuit instructed in Moss v. BC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir.

2010): “The ADEA was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of employment

decisions, nor was it intended to transform the Courts into personnel managers. The ADEA

cannot protect older employees from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions, but only

from decisions which are unlawfully motivated.”

Here, Dr. Spears has produced no direct evidence of age discrimination. Therefore, the

Court must conduct the McDonnel/Douglas burden shifting analysis. LC does not dispute that

Dr. Spears can show the first three elements of a prima facie case: She was at least 40 years old;

she was qualified for the position; and she suffered an adverse employment action, as she was

terminated.

However, LC asserts that Dr. Spears’ contract was not renewed for the 2017-18 school

year because she informed LC that she would not be returning upon requesting long term leave

in 2016, and LC elected to approve her leave application and pay her in full for the 2016-17

school year, but to not renew the contract for the following year.

LC further asserts that Dr. Spears cannot show that she was replaced by someone

younger or treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees. LC asserts that Dr.

Spears was not replaced in her position as a Senior Professor by any individual; instead, her

former courses were spread among the several remaining teachers at LC, including Dr. Sonia

Tinsley, Jason Tinsley, Janet Passman, Crystal Nelson, and Penny Reeves, [Deposition of Dr.

Cheryl D. Clark, Doc. No. 24-12, pp. 15,16], which action does not constitute “replacement” for

purposes of a prima facie claim of discrimination on the basis of age (or gender.) Lilley v. BTM

Corp., 958 F.2d 746,752(6th Cir. 1992): “Spreading the former duties of a terminated employee

among the remaining employees does not constitute replacement.”; see also Hardy v. Shell Chem

Company, 693 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620, N. 25 (E.D. La. 2010) (“When a plaintiff has been

terminated and his job duties are reassigned to existing employees...the employee has not been

replaced for purposes of establishing his prima facie case.”).

Dr. Spears, on the other hand, asserts in one place in her Memorandum in Opposition that

she was replaced by Jason Tinsley, a younger male, [Doc. No. 34-1, p. 32], but she asserts in a

different place that she was replaced by both Jason Tinsley and Sonya Tinsley [Id., p. 16].

Additionally, in her Affidavit attached in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, she

states, “Louisiana College subsequently hired Dr. Sonia Tinsley and Jason Tinsley, who was the

former ‘basketball coach’ to replace Appearer.” [Doc. No. 34- 7, p.8]. She also states Jason

Tinsley was not qualified for her position and that he was hired to teach, and taught, the same

courses she taught. [Id.] Importantly, Dr. Spears points to no evidence in support of her

contentions, other than her own contradictory assertions.

LC has shown that Dr. Spear’s job duties were reassigned to existing employees. Dr.

Spears has failed to establish a prima facie case because she has not carried her burden of

showing that she was replaced by someone younger or treated less favorably than similarly

situated younger employees. LC is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing her

ADEA claim, for that reason alone.

Additionally, LC has shown that the decision to award a 2016-17 Adjunct/Senior

Professor Contract to Dr. Spears was made by Dr. Brewer, who likewise is over the age of 60

and, thus, in the same protected class as Dr. Spears. This allows LC to assert a judicial inference

that no discrimination has occurred, as the Fifth Circuit has held that “discrimination is less

likely when the supervisor is in the same protected class as the plaintiff.” McMichael v. Trans

Ocean Offshore Deep Water Drilling, Inc., 934 F.3d 447,461 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Kelly v.

Costco Wholesale Corp., 632 Fed. App’x.779, 783 (5th Cir. 2015)).

LC is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing her ADEA claim, for the

reason that Dr. Spears has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

b. Religious Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

Dr. Spears asserts religious discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII.

Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-2(a)(1) addresses discrimination claims and

provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail

or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Title 42 United States Code, Section 2000e-3(a) addresses retaliation claims and

provides, in pertinent part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed

any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

However, Title VII has certain exemptions applicable to religious organizations and

educational institutions. Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-1(a) provides:

This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the

employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious

corporation, association, educational institution, or society with

respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to

perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,

association, educational institution, or society of its activities.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)

In addition, Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-2(e)(2) provides, in pertinent

part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter ... (2) it shall

not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college,

university, or other educational institution or institution of learning

to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school,

college, university, or other educational institutional or institution of

learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported,

controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular

religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of

such school, college, university, or other educational institution or

institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a

particular religion.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2)

LC moves for summary judgment, contending these exemptions apply and bar Dr.

Spears’ Title VII religious discrimination and retaliation claims.

This Court has previously found LC to be both a “religious organization” under § 2000e-

1(a) and a “religious school” under § 2000e-2(e)(2) and therefore exempt from Title VII's

prohibitions regarding religious discrimination and retaliation. See Aguillard v. Louisiana

College, 341 F.Supp.3d 642 (W.D. La. 9/19/2018).

Accordingly, LC's Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Dr. Spears’ religious

discrimination and retaliation claims is GRANTED. Those claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

c. Gender-based Claim

Dr. Spears asserts a claim of gender-based discrimination. To establish a prima facie

case of gender-based discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was

within the protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position sought; (3) she was subject to an

adverse employment action; and (4) the position sought was filled with someone outside the

protected class. Farmer v. Mouton, No. 16-16459, 2018 WL 1123573, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 28,

2018) (citing Smith v. Woman’s Hosp., 671 Fed. App’x. 884, 888 (5th Cir. 2016)).

To show gender-based discrimination, Dr. Spears again argues that she was replaced in

her position by a younger male, Jason Tinsley. However, as indicated above, Dr. Spears points

to no evidence in support of her contentions, other than her own contradictory assertions.

Furthermore, LC has shown that Dr. Spear’s adjunct position was not filled after the 2016-17

school year, and upon her taking leave for the 2016-17 school year, her courses primarily were

re-assigned to female members of the College faculty; and after the reorganization of the

Department of Health and Physical Education within the School of Nursing, the College hired

Dr. Sonia Tinsley to serve as its Chair of the Allied Health Department.

Dr. Spears has failed to establish a prima facie case because she has not carried her

burden of showing that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class. LC is thus

entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing her gender-based discrimination claim.

d. Disability Discrimination Claim

The ADA provides, in pertinent part:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of

disability in regard to . . . discharge of employees, employee compensation, job

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) makes its unlawful for covered

employers to discriminate against a “qualified individual on the basis of a disability,” which

definition of “disability” may take the following forms:

1. A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities;

2. A record of such an impairment; or

3. Being regarded as having such an impairment.

The ADAAA prohibits employers “from discriminating against a ‘qualified individual with

a disability on the basis of that disability.’” Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 798 F.3d 222,

226-27 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773

F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014)).

In a termination action under the ADA, the employee may either present direct evidence

that he was discriminated against because of his disability or alternatively proceed under the

burden-shifting analysis first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973), a Title VII case. See Benson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2016 WL3617803 at*6 (E.D. Tex. July

6, 2016) (citing LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 694; see also EEOC v. Chevon Phillips Chem. Co., LP,

570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Direct evidence “is evidence that if believed, proves the facts of discriminatory animus

without inference or presumption.” Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310 n.6 (5th Cir.

2004).

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case of

discrimination by showing he (1) has a disability, was regarded as disabled, or has a record of a

disability; (2) was qualified for the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment decision

on account of his disability. Cannon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc., 813 F. 3d 586,

590 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 697). “If he makes that showing, a presumption

of discrimination arises, and the employer must ‘articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

for the adverse employment action.’” Id. at 590 (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co.,

LP. 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009)). “The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence

from which a jury could conclude that the employer’s articulated reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing

Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F3d. at 615.)

Dr. Spears does not point to any direct evidence of disability discrimination, but instead

relies on circumstantial evidence [Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 34-1, p. 27].

Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies.

With regard to the first and third factors, LC contends that Dr. Spears is not a qualified

individual with a disability and that its actions were justified by Dr. Spears’ own conduct in

seeking long-term leave in August 2016 for reasons unrelated to any prior chemotherapy or cancer-

related treatment, inasmuch as Dr. Spears concedes the following:

She was not disabled from working as of August 2016. Dr. Spears

concedes that she approached Shannon Tassin, Human Resource

Director for LC, in August 2016, seeking leave from her teaching

duties, even though she was not sick or disabled; “I took sick leave

because it was so upsetting to me of what had happened.”(Referring

to the College’s decision to reorganize the Department of Health and

Physical Education.) [Doc. No. 24-13, at pp.6-7, 8-9, 16]

She never indicated to anyone at Louisiana College that she needed

to take sick leave because of a purported disability or sickness–

according to Dr. Spears, she simply requested the leave because she

“needed a break.” [Id., at pp. 9-11, 20]

Dr. Spears concedes that when she requested the sick leave and

disability leave, she knew that she was not disabled or sick. [Id., at

pp. 16-17]

Dr. Spears concedes that she was never diagnosed with stress or

anxiety, such that she could not work. [Id., at p. 17]

Dr. Spears concedes that she spoke with Shannon Tassin and Dr.

Jerry Pounds in August 2016 and with regards to her seeking leave

from teaching even though she was not disabled or sick. [Id., at pp.

20-21]

Dr. Spears has no direct evidence to support her allegations of

discrimination on the basis of disability. [Id., at pp. 27, 28]

Dr. Spears concedes that at no time during the 2016-17 school year

did she request a medical-related accommodation that was not

provided to herby Louisiana College. [Id., at pp. 29, 30]

Moreover, LC asserts that the fact that Dr. Spears was extended a year-long contract for

the 2016-17 academic year demonstrates that she was not regarded as disabled from teaching by

LC.

The Court finds that Dr. Spears has not established the first factor. Although she was

treated for cancer, she does not assert that she was disabled then, and she testified that she did not

have a disability at the time she was terminated.

Additionally, the Court finds that Dr. Spears has not established the third factor, that she

was subjected to an adverse employment decision on account of her disability (or record of

disability). The record is devoid of any evidence to show that Dr. Spears’ record of disability

played any role in her termination. As indicated above, Dr. Spears concedes that she was not

disabled at the time that she requested leave, she concedes that she was able to work at the time

that she requested leave, and she concedes that at no time did she inform the College that she was

disabled or unable to work. More significantly, Dr. Spears was absent and on leave for much of

the Spring 2016 semester, yet she was extended a contract for the 2016-17 school year. Had her

record of disability served any role with regards to the decision not renew her contract for the

2017-18 school year, LC would have taken those steps earlier, but did not.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Spears has failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination on the basis of disability.

e. Retaliation

Both LC and Dr. Spears seek summary judgment on the issue of retaliation.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) she participated in a Title VII protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action

by her employer; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

action. Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Aryain v.

Walmart Stores Tex., LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008)).

Dr. Spears participated in a Title VII protected activity in that she and Dr. Aguillard drafted

an EEOC complaint and a whistleblower complaint, which was in the computer that was seized

by LC on September 28, 2015. Additionally, she filed an EEOC complaint with the EEOC on

January 25, 2017. There is no dispute that she suffered an adverse employment action, in that she

was terminated. Therefore, the first two prongs are satisfied.

LC argues that Dr. Spears cannot establish the third prong because there is no causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. LC contends that Dr. Spears

concedes that at no time relevant to these proceedings did she file any whistle blower complaint

with LC, and that, while she may have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC in or about

January 2017, the record establishes that LC did not receive a copy of the notice until March 2017,

and, thus, there is no causal connection between the protected activity in filing same with the

EEOC and the February 20, 2017 nonrenewal letter, as it was issued in advance of the College’s

notice of the filing.

Dr Spears responds that LC knew about the drafts of the EEOC charge and whistleblower

complaint in the seized computer before she was terminated because they were used against Dr.

Aguillard in the FAAC hearing on February 23, 2016.

She contends further that LC was served with the EEOC complaint on March 6, 2017, and

thus LC was fully informed about her charges with the EEOC before it terminated her, because

the letter dated February 20, 2017 was not received by her until April 22, 2017, and could have

been back-dated to before LC received her EEOC complaint.

The third element, a causal connection, may be met by

showing “[c]lose timing between an employee’s protected activity and an adverse

action against him” McCoy [v. City of Shreveport], 492 F.3d at 562 [5thCir.

2007)]. Such temporal proximity must generally be “very close.” Clark Cnty.

Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,273-74 ... (2001). This Court has found, for

example that “a time lapse of up to four months” may be sufficiently close ...

while a five-month lapse is not close enough without other evidence of retaliation

... Such evidence may include an employment record that does not support

dismissal, or an employer’s departure from typical policies and procedures. ...

Feist v. Louisiana, Dep’t. f Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454-55 (5th Cir. 2013).

The Court finds that Dr. Spears has carried her burden of establishing the elements of a

prima facie case of retaliation. Although the termination letter is dated February 20, 2017, LC has

presented no proof as to when it was actually written or as to when it was actually sent to Dr.

Spears. Therefore, her allegation that she did not receive it until after LC was notified of her EEOC

complaint, is unrebutted. This creates an issue of fact as to whether it was actually written after

March 6, 2017, but backdated to a date before then. In any event, it is clear that LC knew about

the drafts in the seized computer in February 2016, well before she was terminated.

The Court will next consider, in view of the finding that Dr. Spears has established a prima

facie case of retaliation, whether LC has produced evidence that the adverse action was taken for

a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason, and, if so, whether Dr. Spears has produced evidence to rebut

the reasons given as pretext for retaliation.

2. Legitimate, Nonretaliatory Reasons, and Pretext

If a plaintiff successfully shows a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden will then

shift to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment

actions of which the plaintiff complains. See Hiner v. McHugh, 546 Fed. App’x. 401, 409 (5th

Cir. 2013) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1996)). The burden then

shifts back to the plaintiff who has the burden of demonstrating pretext by showing that the

employer’s proffered reason or explanation is false or unworthy of credence. Id.; see also

Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003).

LC asserts that Dr. Spears’ contract was not renewed for the 2017-18 school year because

she informed the College that she would not be returning at the time she requested long term

leave in 2016, and the College elected to approve her leave application, and to pay her in full for

the 2016-17 school year, but to not renew the contract for the following year. It also distributed

her assigned courses among existing faculty, virtually all of whom were female.

LC further asserts Dr. Spears’ adjunct position was not filled after the 2016-17 school

year, and after the reorganization of the Department of Health and Physical Education within the

School of Nursing, the College hired Dr. Sonia Tinsley to serve as its Chair of the Allied Health

Department.

LC has clearly stated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Dr. Spears.

Therefore, the burden shifts back to Dr. Spears to demonstrate that LC’s articulated reasons are

actually pretexts for retaliation. In order to avoid summary judgment, Dr. Spears must show a

conflict in substantial evidence on the question of whether LC would not have taken the action

“but for” the protected activity.

Dr. Spears argues that the transfer of the Health and Physical Education Department to the

College of Nursing and Allied Health was contrived in an attempt to disguise LC’s discrimination

against her because of her disabilities, her age and her gender, and, in retaliation against Dr. Spears

for having written a complaint against Dr .Cheryl Clark that LC (and Dr. Clark) had obtained by

converting and hacking Dr. Aguillard’s computers. She argues that LC cannot identify a single

higher education institution in Louisiana or Mississippi where the Department of Health and

Physical Education is under the School of Nursing and Allied Health. [Dr. Sharp Deposition, Doc.

No. 34-59, pp. 2-11]. She questions why this decision was made without seeking any input or

communication from herself particularly in view of her experience and education.

Dr. Spears further asserts that the LC Faculty Handbook requires changes to be made in an

academic program must be approved by a majority vote of the Board of Trustees as a whole before

any faculty member can be dismissed, and that none of the Faculty Handbook’s requirements for

a “change in direction” by transferring the Health & Physical Education program were followed.

[Doc. No. 34-11].

Dr. Spears further contends that Dr. Brewer falsely represented to the Board of Trustees

that she had “retired” and “was not coming back.” She states that, in truth and reality, she had

taken a “break” and was on “sick leave” at the time. [Spears Affidavit, Doc. No. 34-7, ¶9]. She

asserts the “sick leave” policy does not require a faculty member to retire, and that LC knew she

intended to return to her employment starting in August 2017.

Dr. Spears additionally relies on the testimony of Dr. Brewer and Dr. Clark as to how the

decision to terminate Dr. Spears was made is directly contradictory and cannot be reconciled. Dr.

Clark testified that she had nothing to do with Dr. Spears’ dismissal and that she never even

discussed the issue with Dr. Brewer. [Clark Deposition, Doc. No. 34-55, p. 6]. Dr. Brewer, on

the other hand, testified that he terminated Dr. Spears on the recommendation of Dr. Clark.

[Brewer Deposition, Doc. No. 34-60, p. 3].

She states, at his deposition, Dr. Brewer had a different explanation: He claimed that he

dismissed Dr. Spears because of her “illness and poor health.” [Id., Dep., pp. 4-9]. She argues

that Dr. Brewer had no medical evidence to support this contention at the time he made the

decision to terminate Dr. Spears (letter dated February 20, 2017). She further states that her e-

mail to Shannon Tassin dated March 16, 2017, shows that she (Dr. Spears) was seeking to return

to her position:

... I will be paid my full contract for this year getting checks thru

July 31st and then start next years contract when I start back August

1. Then when I sign my next years contract, my insurance will

switch back to what it was before I went on sick leave and disability.

...”

[Doc. No. 34-28].

LC replies that Dr. Spears’ opposition memorandum is devoid of any credible evidence

which would show pretext. LC argues further that Dr. Spears’ opposition rests solely on her

admittedly subjective contentions, which cannot serve as the basis of relief. See Carr v.

Sanderson Farms, Inc., 665 Fed. App’x. 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2016). Without evidence in support of

her contentions, Dr. Spears’ opposition does nothing more than attempt to cast doubt on LC’s

legitimate and nonretaliatory reasons for the nonrenewal of her contract and/or the reorganization

of the Health and Physical Education Department. LC asserts that Dr. Spears’ speculation is

insufficient to demonstrate retaliatory intent, much less pretext. Farmer v. Mouton, 2018 W.L.

1123573 (E.D. La. 2018) (citing Smith v. Women’s Hospital, 671 Fed. App’x. 884, 888 (5th Cir.

2016)).

The Court finds that Dr. Spears has failed in her burden to prove pretext. The evidence

shows that LC took unusual steps to assist Dr. Spears when she was experiencing difficult

medical issues. When she was unable to teach during the 2015-16 school term, the faculty

members closed ranks and covered for her. LC then offered her a contract for the 2016-17

school year, which she accepted, only to turn around and take sick leave for the entire contract

period, even though she admits she was able to work. She was paid for that year despite teaching

no classes.

Although LC knew about the whistleblower and EEOC drafts in Dr. Aguillard’s

computer in February of 2016, LC nevertheless extended Dr. Spears another “Senior Professor”

contract for the 2016 –2017 school year, on May 17, 2016. This action belies Dr. Spears’

arguments of pretext.

The Court does not construe the reasons that Dr. Brewer gave for Dr. Spears’ termination

to be contradictory to the same extent that Dr. Spears urges. Nor does the Court construe the

language in the letter dated February 20, 2017, that LC wanted to “go in a different direction” to

be inconsistent with the legitimate nonretaliatory reasons LC has articulated for not renewing her

contract. It was only after LC had given Dr. Spears a new contract for the 2016-2017 school

year, and after she failed to return to teach that year even though she was physically able to do

so, that LC decided to “go in a different direction,” and not renew her contract for the 2017-2018

year.

Therefore, because LC has offered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for her termination,

and because Dr. Spears has offered little more than her own speculations as evidence of pretext,

summary judgment must be granted dismissing her claims. Accordingly, LC’s motion for

summary judgment on Dr. Spears claims of age, religion, gender, and disability discrimination,

and her claim based upon retaliation under Title VII, is GRANTED and those claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Dr. Spears’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on her claim for age discrimination and her claim based upon retaliation under Title VII is

DENIED.

F. Defamation Claim

Dr. Spears’ Complaint asserts a claim against LC for defamation based on a Facebook

posting by Dr. Brewer on or about May 2017 on a social media site in response to an online

comment made by Dr. Spears’ sister, Charlotte Dossman McIntosh, who was critical of LC’s

decision to not renew her sister’s contract. The Facebook posting stated:

Official Response from Dr. Rick Brewer

Mrs. Charlotte Dossmann McIntosh

Dear Mrs. McIntosh

I write to briefly respond to the email you sent out to many of our

Baptist and LC friends about your sister, Dr. Carolyn Spears. I write

only to make sure that the record is clear that we are thankful for the

years of God-honoring service from Dr. Spears at Louisiana College

and we wish her well in the future. She has been and remains a

beloved part of the LC family.

As you know, Dr. Spears retired from the full time faculty at LC in

2007, and since that time has served as a contract adjunct senior

professor, which under LC policy is a year-to-year engagement on

an as-needed basis.

We were all saddened by Dr. Spears’ illness in 2015 and prayed for

her recovery. Our sympathy and commitment to her extended to the

point of continuing to pay her full salary for two years without her

ever teaching a single student, although the College was not

obligated to do so. As you can understand, LC cannot sustain such

a practice, which has never been afforded any other faculty member.

I regret that your widely distributed email so grossly

mischaracterized my letter to Dr. Spears. I have included the content

of the letter in its entirety at the conclusion of this letter. Any fair

reading of the letter will not find it “cold, rude and insulting,” as you

accuse, but a thoughtful thank you for service to the Lord and the

College well-given and appreciated. I do not understand the need to

skew the spirit of its content.

The decision not to renew Dr. Spears’ annual contract for another

year was not based on personality, but on practicality, fiscal

responsibility, and a hard choice about what was best for the College

she loved and served.

Current circumstance would permit no other choice.

[Doc. No. 24-20].

The letter from Dr. Brewer to Dr. Spears [Doc. No. 24-16] referenced in the posting has

been set forth above. LC asserts that there is nothing contained within the posting that is close to

being defamatory in nature, and, therefore, this cause of action should be dismissed.

Dr. Spears, on the other hand, asserts that the letter from Dr. Brewer falsely states, among

other things, that she received her full salary for two years without her ever teaching a single

student, which conveys an element of personal disgrace or disrespect, and accuses her of being a

“gold-digger” or “free-loader,” and holds her up to contempt and ridicule.

The elements of defamation are: (1) a false and defamatory statement; (2) an unprivileged

publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4)

resulting injury. Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 2005-1418 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So.2d

669, 674 (citing Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La. 1/21/04),864 So.2d 129, 139; Trentacosta v.

Beck ̧ 96-2388 (La. 10/21/97), 703 So.2d 552, 559.). If facts sufficient to establish even one

element of the defamation tort are absent, a plaintiff’s cause of action fails. See Costello, 864

So.2d at 139; Moore v. Cabaniss, 29,834 (La.App. 2d Cir. 9/24/97), 699 So.2d 1143, 1146, writ

denied, 97-2667 (La. 1/0/ 98), 705 So.2d 1108 (“failure of any one of these elements of proof is

fatal”).

Whether a statement is defamatory is a legal question for the court. Cooksey v. Stewart,

41,336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1206, 1211, writ denied, 06-2348 (La. 12/8/06),

943 So.2d 1087 (citing Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345, 352 (La. 1993); Johnson, 889 So.2d at

332). “Defamation claims are inordinately susceptible to summary adjudication due to the

constitutional considerations involved in defamation actions.” Bell v. Rogers, 29,757 (La. App.

2d Cir. 8/20/97), 698 So.2d 749, 753.

“Speech on matters of public concern enjoys enhanced constitutional protection.”

Romero v. Thomson Newspapers (Wisconsin), Inc., 94-1105 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 866, 869.

If speech is about a matter of public concern then, as a matter of constitutional law, the burden of

proof is on the plaintiff to demonstrate falsity and malice. As stated in Spears v. McCormick &

Co., Inc:

The United States Supreme Court [has] held that the First

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that a plaintiff who is

a private figure and who seeks damages for public concern speech

claimed to be defamatory has the burden of proving falsity (and

fault) in order to recover damages.

Spears v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 520 So.2d 805, 808 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ

denied, 522 So.2d 563 (La. 1988).

Speech is a “matter of public concern” if it relates “to any matter of political, social, or

other concern to the community.” Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 677 n. 6, (quoting Connick v. Myers,

461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). The privilege to comment on matters of public concern “extends to

information concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces all issues about which

information is needed or appropriate so that individuals may cope with the exigencies of their

period.” Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980).

LC asserts that it published the nonrenewal letter and Dr. Brewer’s response to Dr.

Spears’ sister on the “Louisiana College” Facebook site to address her criticisms of LC’s

nonrenewal letter, which she claimed to be “rude and insulting.”

LC further asserts that the tenor of the post and nonrenewal letter do not express any

malice but graciously conveyed LC’s sentiments towards Dr. Spears’ retirement in the face of

undue criticism; it clearly was not designed to “harm the reputation of another, or otherwise

expose a person to contempt or ridicule.” Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d129 (La. 2004). Citing

Davis v. Borsky, 660 So.2d17, 22 (La. 1995), LC argues that a third person reading the instant

communications would not have reasonably understood the statements, taking in context, as

being intended in a defamatory sense.

The Court does not find the post to be false and defamatory. Although Dr. Spears argues

that it accuses her of being a gold digger or free loader, a plain reading of the documents reveals

that it makes no such statement, expressly or impliedly. Contrary to Dr. Spears’ representations,

the nonrenewal letter of February 20, 2017, and the corresponding response of LC to criticisms

levied against the College by Dr. Spears’ sister, are gracious in tone and did not serve to subject

Dr. Spears to “contempt and ridicule.” Dr. Spears’ only support for the assertion that the post

was made in bad faith is her personal belief and feelings, and uncorroborated assertions are

inadequate to support a defamation claim. Esiverne v. Times Picayune, LLC, 950 So.2d858 (La.

App. 4th Cir. 2006). Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that LC made the post with

malice, actual or implied, or that it violated any confidentiality owed. Accordingly, LC is

entitled to judgment dismissing this claim with prejudice.

G. Breach of Contract

Dr. Spears contends that she asserted a claim for breach of contract in her Complaint, and

that she is entitled to judgment on that claim as a matter of law. LC disputes that the Complaint

asserts such a claim, and further disputes Dr. Spears’ entitlement to summary judgment on her

purported claim.

The basis asserted by Dr. Spears for her claim is that she had tenure when she was

terminated, and, therefore, she could only be terminated for cause. Although she concedes that

her written employment contract for the term August 17, 2015, to May 7, 2016, does not

mention the term “tenure” itself, she asserts that her contract expressly provided that all policies

in the Faculty Handbook were made a part of the terms and conditions of her contract, including

the provisions in the Faculty Handbook relating to “tenure” and the provisions relating to the

confidentiality of her “personnel file.” She further contends that it is undisputed that she became

a “tenured” professor at Louisiana College in 1984, and, therefore, it is LC’s burden to show she

somehow lost or was “stripped” of her tenure at any time.

She argues that tenured professors can only be terminated for “cause,” and that LC’s

decision “to go in a different direction,” does not constitute “cause” within the meaning of

Sections 2.5.1 or 2.11.4 of the Faculty Handbook [Doc. No. 34-10]. Nor are the other vacillating

and contradictory “explanations” offered by Dr. Brewer “cause” for termination. Thus, she

concludes that LC clearly breached her employment contract; there are no genuine issues of

material fact with respect to these issues; and, therefore, she is entitled to judgment on the breach

of contract issue as a matter of law.

LC responds, first, that Dr. Spears failed to procedurally assert a state law claim of breach

of contract in her Complaint. LC argues that Paragraph III of the Complaint makes expressly

clear that Dr. Spears’ claims arise under (1) Title VII, (2) the ADEA, and/or (3) Title II of the

ADA. LC asserts that there is no identification of a claim of a state law breach of contract

anywhere in the Complaint. As such, her claims therein expressly and solely relate to what she

alleged to be discrimination on the basis of her age, gender, disability and/or retaliation, and the

purported breach of contract claim is an improper new claim. A claim raised only in response to

a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the Court. Cutrera v. Board of

Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Riggens v.

City of Indianola, Mississippi, 2015 WL 5568932 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (“A Complaint cannot be

modified by a party’s affidavit or by papers filed in response to a dispositive motion to dismiss

or for summary judgment.”) (citing Streit v Bushnell, 424F. Supp.2d 633, 639 (S.D. N.Y.2006)).

The Court has carefully examined Dr. Spears’ Complaint, and it, too, is unable to discern

a cause of action for breach of contract. To state a breach of contract claim, Louisiana law

requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) the parties consented to be bound through offer and

acceptance; (2) the obligor failed to perform a conventional obligation; and (3) the failure to

perform resulted in damages to the obligee.” Crescent City Surgical Centre v. Cigna Health and

Life Ins. Co, No. 18-11385, 2020 WL 1503534 (E.D. La. March 30, 2020) (citing LA. CIV.

CODE arts 1927 & 1944 and Favrot v. Favrot, 2010-0986 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/9/2011), 68 So.3d

1099, 1108-09). The plaintiff must also “allege a breach of a specific provision of the contract.”

Id.; Loque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782(5th Cir. 2003). Here, Dr. Spears failed to allege

the elements of a breach of contract claim with sufficient particularity. Moreover, she failed to

identify in her Complaint any specific contract provision LC allegedly breached. Therefore, for

that reason alone, D. Spears’ motion for summary judgment must be denied.

LC additionally asserts that the facts are clear that (1) Dr. Spears was not a tenured

employee of LC entitled to contract renewal, (2) the 2016-17 Senior Professor Contract extended

to Dr. Spears was not terminated, but completed, and (3) no breach occurred with regards to

other provisions of the contract, which was paid in full.

LC contends that Dr. Spears elected to retire from her position as a tenured Professor

with Louisiana College on or about February 28, 2007, in order to take advantage of the then-

existing retirement plan options [Spears Deposition, Doc. No. 24-13, p. 11-13; Doc. No. 39-4].

She acknowledged in executing her June 7, 2007 Employment Separation form that she retired

from her full-time position but would continue “as Senior Professor teaching as adjunct.” [Doc.

No. 39-4, p. 2]. The Adjunct Professor Contracts which Dr. Spears generally executed from the

Fall 2007 semester to the Fall 2016 semester expressly provided that she would serve as a Senior

Professor at Louisiana College, an adjunct position which does not bestow benefits of tenure.

[Doc. Nos. 24-9, 24-10; Doc. No. 39-6]. The Adjunct Contract executed by Dr. Spears,

generally, from the Fall 2007 semester to the Fall 2016 semester clearly stated that the contract

(1) was subject to nonrenewal, (2) limited to the period of time specified on the contact, and (3)

offered no expectation of any future contracts. [Id.]

In comparison, LC points to the Tenured Faculty Contract executed by Dr. Spears for the

Fall 2006/Spring 2007 semester [Doc. No. 39-5]. Absent from the Tenured Faculty Contract is

any language stating that the Tenured Faculty Contract is (1) subject to nonrenewal, (2) limited

to the period of time specified on the contract, and/or (3) offers no expectation of any future

contracts. However, this language is clearly contained in the adjunct contracts. LC argues that, if

tenure was extended, these contracts would have reflected same, or deleted such language.

Additionally, Dr. Spears herself conceded/testified on more than one occasion that she

was not a tenured employee of LC after June 2007. [Spears Deposition, Doc. No. 24-13, pp. 12-

13]; and excerpts from the deposition of Carolyn Spears taken in the matter of Ross v. Louisiana

College, No. 16-cv-0870, (W.D. La.), taken on December 19, 2016 [Doc. No. 39-7, pp. 4-6].

Furthermore, LC has attached the Declaration of Randall Hargis, Chief Financial Officer

of Louisiana College since 2001, and an Officer of the College’s Board of Trustees, which attests

that defendant has researched its records and cannot find any action on the part of the Louisiana

College Board that bestowed tenure upon Dr. Spears and subsequent to her retirement on or

about June 10, 2007, or with regards to her service as a Senior Professor. [Doc. No. 39-8].

The Court finds that Dr. Spears has failed to establish that she was a tenured employee of

LC, and, therefore, DENIES Dr. Spears Motion for Summary Judgment on her purported claim

for breach of contract.

I. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Defendant Louisiana College’s

Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 24] should be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff Dr.

Carolyn D. Spears’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 34] should be

DENIED. All claims of Dr. Spears are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Monroe, Louisiana, this 24 day of July, 2020.

UNIT S)ATES DISTRICT JUDGE

30