Opinion

Wallgren v. Dale Martin Offshore L L C

Court
District Court, W.D. Louisiana
Filed
Mar 11, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.5%

court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

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  • court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

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The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

JERAMEY WALLGREN CASE NO. 6:18-CV-01479

VERSUS JUDGE SUMMERHAYS

DALE MARTIN OFFSHORE L L C MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING

Presently before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs

Claim for Maintenance and Cure [doc. 15] filed by Dale Martin Offshore, L.L.C. and Intracoastal

Tug and Barge Company, L.L.C. In the motion, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for

maintenance and cure. As explained below, the motion is GRANTED.

I.

BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2017, Jeramey Wallgren applied for employment with Dale Martin

Offshore, L.L.C. and Intracoastal Tug and Barge Company, L.L.C. (collectively referred to as

“DMO”).! As part of the application process, DMO required Plaintiff to complete certain medical

questionnaires. DMO’s medical questionnaires specifically asked if Plaintiff ever had or presently

had any joint problems, limited motion in any joints, or shoulder injuries. Plaintiff indicated in

the medical questionnaires that he had never had any joint problems, limited motion in any joints,

or shoulder injuries.* Plaintiff was hired as a deckhand for DMO.° Plaintiff was assigned to the

towing vessel known as the M/V RELENTLESS.® Plaintiff alleges that on August 18, 2017, he

' Statement of Uncontested Facts at 2.

2 Statement of Uncontested Facts, 3; Declaration of Krista Carpenter.

3 Declaration of Krista Carpenter.

4 Td.; Exhibit 2 to Document 15.

> Declaration of Krista Carpenter.

6 Complaint at J V.

was severely injured while working on the M/V RELENTLESS and suffered severe and disabling

injuries to his right shoulder.’

Plaintiff filed suit against DMO on November 13, 2018, asserting three causes of action:

(1) Jones Act negligence; (2) unseaworthiness; and (3) maintenance and cure. Defendants have

filed the current motion arguing that Plaintiff is not entitled to maintenance and cure because he

intentionally concealed and misrepresented a pre-existing injury to his right shoulder.

Il.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part

of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” “The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”’ “A genuine issue of material fact exists when

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”! As

summarized by the Fifth Circuit:

When seeking summary judgment, the movant bears the initial responsibility of

demonstrating the absence of an issue of material fact with respect to those issues

on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial. However, where the

nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an

absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating

by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact

warranting trial.!!

When reviewing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, “the court

must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe,

and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence

7 Td. at VI-VIL.

8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Td.

0 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010).

Lindsey vy. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted).

supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.”!* “Credibility

determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis.”'? Rule 56 “mandates the entry of

summary judgment .. . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof.”"4

B. Maintenance and Cure.

Maintenance and cure is a contractual form of compensation afforded by general maritime

law to seamen who fall ill or are injured while in the service of a vessel.!° Maintenance is a daily

stipend for living expenses and cure is the payment of medical expenses.'® “A seaman may recover

maintenance and cure even for injuries or illnesses pre-existing the seaman’s employment unless

that seaman knowingly or fraudulently concealed his condition from the vessel owner at the time

he was employed.”!” In cases involving pre-existing conditions, as here, courts distinguish between

nondisclosure and concealment.'® “If a vessel owner does not require a pre-employment medical

examination or interview, a seaman must disclose his condition when in [the seaman’s] own

opinion the shipowner would consider it a matter of importance.”’? “If, however, the vessel owner

does require the seaman to submit to medical examination as part of its hiring process, a seaman

who misrepresents or conceals any material medical facts, disclosure of which is plainly desired,

Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir.2001); see also Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Office of

the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party).

3 Quorum Health Resources, L.L.C. v. Maverick County Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451, 458 (Sth Cir. 2002).

4 Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (Sth Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986)).

5 Jauch v. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2006).

16 Todrigue v. Delta Towing, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.03—0363, 2003 WL 22999425, at *6 n. 51 (E.D.La. Dec. 19, 2003)

(citing Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1499 (Sth Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by □□□□

Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 129 S.Ct. 2561, 174 L.Ed.2d 382 (2009)).

17 Jauch y. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing McCorpen v. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp., 396

F.2d 547, 549).

18 Id.

19 Td. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

risks forfeiture of his maintenance and cure benefits.””° Accordingly, in cases where the seaman

is required to submit to a medical examination or interview, to succeed on what has become known

as a “McCorpen defense” the defendant must prove the following: “(1) the claimant intentionally

misrepresented or concealed medical facts; (2) the non-disclosed facts were material to the

employer’s decision to hire the claimant; and (3) a connection exists between the withheld

information and the injury complained of in the lawsuit.””!

DMO has submitted evidence indicating that on July 2, 2017, just 39 days prior to the time

he sought employment with DMO, Plaintiff reported to the emergency room at Slidell Memorial

Hospital and sought treatment for a right should injury resulting from lifting or carrying a heavy

object. Plaintiff's medical records indicate that he suffered from “limited active range of motion

due to pain in the right shoulder, limited passive range of motion due to pain in the right

shoulder.””” Plaintiff underwent an X-ray of his right shoulder, was given a sling for his injured

right shoulder, and was instructed to follow-up with an orthopedic surgeon. Plaintiff was also

prescribed narcotic pain relievers, anti-inflammatories, and muscle relaxers upon discharge.”

1. Did Plaintiff Intentionally Misrepresent or Conceal his Prior Right

Shoulder Injury?

Since DMO required Plaintiff undergo a pre-employment medical examination and fill out

a medical questionnaire, the purely objective, “intentional concealment” standard applies to

DMO’s McCorpen defense.”* “McCorpen’s intentional concealment prong neither necessarily

turns on credibility nor requires a subjective determination.”*° “Failure to disclose medical

20 Td.

21 Td.

2 Exhibit 1 to Document 15.

23 Id.

24 See Soileau v. Baywater Drilling, LLC, No. 17-710, 2018 WL 3637934, at *6 (W.D. La. July 31, 2018) (applying

objective, intentional concealment standard where plaintiff submitted medical history questionnaire).

5 Td. (quoting Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also LeBlanc v. LA

Carriers, LLC, No. 15-1657, 2016 WL 1268342, at *7-9 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2016) (explaining that the subjective

intent of the plaintiff is irrelevant).

information in an interview or questionnaire that is obviously designed to elicit such information

satisfies the ‘intentional concealment’ requirement.””°

On August 10, 2017, DMO required Plaintiff to submit to a pre-employment medical

examination by Complete Occupational Health Services in Larose, Louisiana. During this

examination, Plaintiff completed an Application for Merchant Mariner Medical Certification,

which contained several questions regarding Plaintiff's current and past medical conditions and

treatment.’ Plaintiff was specifically asked

To the best of your knowledge, have you ever had, required treatment for,

or do you presently have any of the following conditions?

aR

29. Back pain, joint problems, or orthopedic surgery

eK

31. Fractures, recurrent dislocations or limitation of motion of any joint.”

Plaintiff marked “No” to those questions. The Application then instructed Plaintiff to:

Circle Y for Yes and N for No if you currently have the following symptoms or

have in the past:

Injured shoulder

Any joint problems

Plaintiff circled N to each of those issues.”?

Plaintiff first argues that he did not suffer a prior shoulder “injury” but was rather treated

for “shoulder pain.” Plaintiffs play at semantics is unpersuasive and is contradicted by the

evidence. An “injury” is defined and commonly known as “physical harm or damage.”?” Further,

26 Brown, 410 F.3d at 174.

27 Exhibit 2 to Document 15.

28 Td.

29 Id.

3° Merriam-Webster.com

the medical records from Slidell Memorial Hospital repeatedly reference a “shoulder injury” and

further note that the patient indicated “right shoulder pain, audible pop with injury” and that he

“complains of an injury, heavy lifting and pulling, right shoulder.”?! The records further note “the

problem was sustained at home, resulted from lifting or carrying a heavy object.”** In sum, Plaintiff

suffered a shoulder injury and he did not disclose this injury on the DMO Application.

Plaintiff next asserts that he actually disclosed the injury because he advised Larry Barras,

a port captain employed by DMO, that he had recently taken medication due to the shoulder injury.

DMO has submitted Barras’ declaration, which disputes that Plaintiff advised him of either a prior

injury or that he was prescribed medication.*? Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has specifically ruled:

[I]f a seaman intentionally provides false information on a pre-employment medical

questionnaire and certifies that the information therein is true and correct, that

seaman may not later argue that his concealment was not intentional based on his

statement, which the employer disputes, that he verbally disclosed medical

information that contradicted the written questionnaire.*#

Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the first element of the McCorpen

test. Plaintiff intentionally misrepresented or concealed a pre-existing shoulder injury.

2. Was the pre-existing shoulder injury material to DMO’s decision to hire

Plaintiff?

The second prong of the McCorpen defense requires a defendant to demonstrate that the

concealed or non-disclosed facts were material to the employer's decision to hire the claimant.*° If

the claimant would have been hired regardless of the disclosure, then concealment or non-

disclosure does not bar the seaman’s recovery of maintenance and cure.?° DMO has submitted the

declaration of its Human Resources Manager, Krista Carpenter who has the authority to offer and

3! Exhibit 1 to Document 15

32 Td.

33 Exhibit 1 to Document 26.

34 Meche v. Doucet, 777 F.3d 237, 247 (Sth Cir. 2015).

35 Brown y. Parker Drilling, 410 F.3d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 548-549).

36 Jauch v. Nautical Services, Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 2006)

rescind employment.*’ According to Ms. Carpenter, the deckhand position requires heavy lifting,

pulling and other strenuous labor; accordingly, it is important to DMO to know of any physical

limitations of employees as it directly affects their safety and the safety of others.** Ms. Carpenter

indicates that DMO would not have hired Plaintiff as a deckhand if they had been aware of his

prior shoulder injury.°?

Plaintiff's only evidence to rebut this showing is that he verbally advised Larry Barras of

his prior injury and was still hired by DMO. However, as previously discussed by the Court, DMO

has submitted the Declaration of Mr. Barras specifically rebutting this allegation. The Court finds

that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the second prong of the McCorpen test.

DMO has established that they would not have hired Plaintiff had they been aware of his prior

shoulder injury.

3. Was there a connection between the withheld information and the injury

complained of in the lawsuit?

The third, and final, McCorpen prong requires the shipowner to prove that “a connection

exists between the withheld information and the injury complained of in the lawsuit.’*° The Fifth

Circuit has consistently explained that there is no requirement that a present injury be identical to

a previous injury.*! Rather, the shipowner need only prove that the old injury and the new injury

affect the same body part.”

Here, both the prior injury that Plaintiff failed to disclose and the current injury involved

Plaintiffs right shoulder. Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds that he is not entitled to

37 Exhibit 3 to Document 15.

38 Td.

39 Id.

40 Jauch, 470 F.3d at 212.

41 See Thomas v. Hercules Offshore Servs., LLC, 713 F. App’x 382, 389; Brown, 410 F.3d at 176

“2 Soileau v. Baywater Drilling, LLC, 2018 WL 3637934, at *10; Carter v. Parker Towing Co., Inc., 2018 WL

2065577, at *6; LeBlanc v. LA Carriers, LLC, 2016 WL 1268342, at *5-6; Ladnier v. REC Marine Logistics, LLC,

No. 14-1278, 2015 WL 3824382, *5-6 (E.D. La. June 19, 2015); Johnson v. Cenac Towing, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 721,

728 (E.D. La. 2009).

maintenance and cure as to the shoulder injury, he also suffers from an additional injury, namely

psychological trauma resulting from his injury. DMO has conceded that their motion is limited to

the shoulder injury. The Court concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the third

prong of the McCorpen test regarding Plaintiff's alleged shoulder injury.

Il.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that DMO has established each element of the

McCorpen test and, accordingly, is entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's

claims for maintenance and cure relating to his alleged shoulder injury. A separate order in

conformity with the foregoing reasons will be ents

THUS DONE in Chambers on this \0 day of March, 2020.

United States District Judg

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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