Opinion

Knight v. Knight

Court
District Court, W.D. Louisiana
Filed
Sep 17, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

Knight Civil Action No. 15-CV-01808

Versus Judge S. Maurice Hicks, Jr

Knight et al Magistrate Judge Carol B Whitehurst

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court are several related motions: (1) a Motion For Protective

Order And Order For Costs filed by Knight Oil Tools, LLC and HMC Leasing LLC

(collectively “KOT”) [Rec. Doc. 118], non-parties in the above captioned lawsuit,

Plaintiff, Bryan Knight’s Opposition [Rec. Doc. 122], Defendant, Mark Knight’s

Opposition [Rec. Doc. 136], and a Reply filed by KOT [Rec. Doc. 138]; (2)

Defendant, Mark Knight’s Motion To Quash And Motion For Protective Order [Rec.

Doc. 135] and Plaintiff’s Opposition [Rec. Doc. 143] (3) a Motion To Consolidate

Hearing Dates filed by KOT [Rec. Doc. 137]; and, (4) a Motion To Strike Motion

For Protective Order filed by Plaintiff, Bryan Knight [Rec. Doc. 139] and Opposition

filed by Defendant Mark Knight [Rec. Doc. 142].

1. KOT’s Motion For Protective Order

KOT contends it was served with subpoenas by Plaintiff, Bryan Knight, to

produce “personal financial and confidential commercial business records.” KOT

further contends that while it is prepared to produce hundreds of documents, it will

not do so without a Protective Order. KOT asserts that because the parties cannot

agree to such an order, it moves the Court to allow it to use the Protective Order

attached to the motion as “Exhibit C.” R. 118-4. KOT also seeks an order of

reimbursement for any costs incurred in acquiring any software licenses for

responding to the subpoenas. In the alternative, KOT seeks an in camera review of

the records it must produce to determine if they fall within the realm of being

commercial and personal confidential and financial in nature.

In his opposition, Plaintiff contends that Mark Knight and his co-defendants

extensively utilized KOT monies, resources, and employees in the execution of the

scheme that forms the basis of this lawsuit. Specifically, Plaintiff states that

KOT unwittingly paid for the magnetic boxes used to plant drugs on

Plaintiff’s vehicle, paid Defendant Russell Manual monies for his on

the clock and off the clock activities related to the scheme, paid for his

illicit monies for his role in the scheme, was a source of information

(phone records) utilized by Heath Knight Billeaud in connection with

the scheme, and even provided the “safe house” where defendants

regularly met throughout the scheme....

Plaintiff further contends that the Protective Order attached to KOT’s motion is

“onerous” in that it applies to “every single document requested” and requires that

anyone presented with the protected documents (i.e. a witness) sign the Protective

Order, making them subject to liability for any breach thereof. Plaintiff notes that

any financial information of defendant, Mark Knight, would be accessible to

Plaintiff as a shareholder outside of this litigation. He states that Mark Knight

received a similar subpoena and has not filed a motion to quash. Thus, he asserts

KOT has failed to show the need for such a Protective Order. In the alternative, KOT

requests that the Court perform an in camera review of the requested documents to

determine if any are “worthy of a protective order” and if so, determine whether or

not the Protective Order is overly burdensome on the parties, jurors, witnesses and

the Court.

In its Reply, KOT reiterates the reasons for ruling provided in its motion. It

specifically notes that Plaintiff has not opposed the request for all costs associated

with the software licenses and computer work necessary in order to respond to the

production requests by Plaintiff.

2. Defendant Mark Knights Motion For Protective Order

Defendant, Mark Knight, objects to the subpoenas issued to KOT and submits

that any documents ultimately produced in response should be protected by a

Protective Order. Specifically, Defendant moves the Court to quash the subpoenas

as to “non-relevant, privileged, sensitive and confidential information and further, to

restrict the overbroad scope of certain requests that may include requests for

documents of potential relevance to viable claims of this litigation, but exceed the

relevant time period and/or fail to describe what is sought with reasonable

particularity, and therefore, include privilege and/or non-relevant items.” Defendant

contends that any documents ultimately produced should be governed by a

protective order, as proposed by KOT, prohibiting the disclosure or dissemination

of the documents and information to anyone outside of this litigation.

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion arguing that it is “extremely untimely”

as Plaintiff served the subject subpoenas on KOT April 16, 2019 and responses

were due on April 29, 2019.

3. Motion To Consolidate

The Court will grant KOT’s motion to consolidate the hearing of all pending

motions.

4. Motion To Strike

Plaintiff, Bryan Knight, contends that the Court should strike Defendant’s

motion because it is untimely. Motions to strike are governed by Rule 12(f), which

authorizes a court to “order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

“Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted.” U.S. v. Cushman &

Wakefield, Inc., 275 F. Supp.2d 763, 767 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Augustus v. Board

of Public Instruction of Escambia County, Florida, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir.

1962)). As the Fifth Circuit has noted:

[p]artly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without

a factual record it is well established that the action of striking a

pleading should be sparingly used by the courts. * * * It is a drastic

remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purpose of justice.

* * * The motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to

be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.

Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868.

In this case, Defendant’s motion basically duplicates KOT’s motion. The

Court previously ordered the parties to confer in a Rule 37 Conference, R. 134, and

therefore has not yet ruled on KOT’s motion. As the Court will consolidate the

hearing of the pending motions, the Court will also consider Defendant’s motion.

Rule 26(c) provides that the Court “may, for good cause,” protect a party from

“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by issuing an

order “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or

discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c)(1)(D). To satisfy “good

cause,” “[t]he burden is upon the movant to show the necessity of its issuance, which

contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from

stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306

(5th Cir. 1998).

The Protective Order in this case provides for documents to be produced that

include “Confidential, Commercial Information that should be protected against

disclosure and/or use by other parties outside the confines of this case.” The Court

finds this protection is sufficient to alleviate concerns that any Confidential,

Commercial Information will not be used in any other litigation or for any purpose

other than by the parties in the above captioned action.

The Court accepts the terms of the Protective Order with the following

amended language in paragraph VIII, page 5 and paragraph IX, page 5-6. R. 118-4,

138-5:

The party proposing to file any discovery containing Confidential,

Commercial Information shall contact the party designating the

document as confidential and request permission to file the discovery

as unsealed in the public record. Said permission shall not be

unreasonably denied. In the event that such permission is denied, leave

of court must be obtained by the party who seeks to file the confidential

evidence before any document is filed under seal.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion For Protective Order And Order For Costs

filed by Knight Oil Tools, LLC and HMC Leasing LLC [Rec. Docs. 118] is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion To Quash and Motion For

Protective Order filed by Defendant Mark Knight [Rec. Doc. 135] is GRANTED

IN PART as to the Protective Order and DENIED IN PART as to the motion to

quash the subpoena.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion To Consolidate Hearing Dates

filed by Knight Oil Tools, LLC and HMC Leasing LLC [Rec. Doc. 137] is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion To Strike [Rec. Doc. 139]

filed by Plaintiff Bryan Knight is DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Lafayette, Louisiana on this 17" day of

September, 2019.

CAROL B. WHITEHURST

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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