Williams v. City of Baton Rouge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ARCHIE WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CITY OF BATON ROUGE, ET AL. NO. 20-00162-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff in this civil rights case was wrongly convicted for rape in 1985 and

spent thirty-five years in prison. On March 17, 2020, he filed suit against numerous

individuals for their alleged role in his conviction. (Doc. 1). These included

Defendants Marjorie Groht, Alfred Charles Mondrick, and Steven Woodring, police

officers involved in Plaintiffs arrest and conviction, and the City of Baton Rouge; and

Defendants Sybil Guidry, a fingerprint examiner for the Louisiana Bureau of

Identification, Patrick Lane, a forensic scientist with the Louisiana State Police

Crime Lab, and Nace Jerry Miller, a serologist with the Louisiana State Police Crime

Lab (hereinafter, the “Forensic Defendants”). Now before the Court is Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 64) against Defendant Patrick Lane, and

the Forensic Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doce. 96). In both, the

Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity. Both Motions are opposed.

(Docs. 99, 118). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs Motion will be denied, and the

Forensic Defendants’ Motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Summary Judgment Evidence

The facts set forth below are drawn from the parties’ competing statements of

material fact and the competent summary judgment evidence submitted in support

of these pleadings.

On December 9, 1982, a white woman was raped and stabbed multiple times

in her Baton Rouge residence which she shared with her husband and two children.

(Doc. 64-2 { 1). The assailant, a black man who acted alone, forcibly entered the house

and took the woman to a second-story bedroom. (Id. § 2). The woman recognized him

“immediately” as someone who had come to her back door around a month earlier

saying he was lost. (Doc. 67-1 at 6). She was face-to-face with him multiple times

during the incident. (/d. at 15, 16, 20). During the assault, the woman noticed a three-

inch-long scar on the attacker’s right arm. (Jd. at 17).

While the sexual assault was in progress, the woman’s minor daughter arrived

at the house, accompanied by Stephanie Alexander, an adult, and Ms. Alexander’s

minor daughter. Ud. { 3). After Ms. Alexander entered the house, she went to the

bedroom and found the armed assailant and the woman, whose hands were visibly

bloody. Ud. { 6). In the bedroom, Ms. Stephanie was thrown against the wall, covered

her eyes, and “kept saying I can’t see you.. . I don’t know who you are .. . I can’t

identify you... [jJust get out of here.” (Doc. 67-1 at 19-20). The assailant ordered Ms.

Alexander to lie down, after which he fled and was not seen again. (Id. J 7). The whole

attack lasted between ten and fifteen minutes. (Id. 5).

Following the assault, the victim was treated at Baton Rouge General

Hospital, where a rape kit was prepared following a gynecological examination. (Doc.

99 at 19). At the hospital, police officers arrived and worked with the victim to create

a picture of the assailant. (Doc. 67-1 at 23). Separately, Ms. Alexander worked with

officers to create a composite sketch of the assailant. (Id. at 25).

While still in the hospital, officers began bringing photo lineups for the victim

to look at. Ud. at 25). Officers continued bringing lineups to the victim when she was

released from the hospital. (id. at 26). In one of those lineups, the victim identified

an individual who she thought “strongly resembled the man” who had attacked her,

but the man in the photo had different hair. (Id.). The police brought a different photo,

this time in profile, but the hair of the man in the photo was not right. (Jd. at 28).

Finally, officers brought her a lineup and she “jumped out of the chair screaming this

is the one.” (/d.). Testifying at trial, the woman related that after seeing the photo,

was the best feeling in the world to know that there wasn’t any doubt left in [her]

mind.” (/d.). She did not “hesitate in any fashion” when identifying the man. (Id. at

31). Two days later, the woman went to a physical lineup where she “saw him

instantly.” Ud. at 33). The man she identified was Plaintiff Archie Williams, and she

identified him in open court at his trial. (/d.). Following her open-court identification,

Plaintiff stood before the jury to reveal a scar on his right arm. (Id. at 35). The victim

identified the scar as the one she saw on the arm of the man who raped her. (Id.).

Defendant Patrick Lane, a forensic scientist with the Louisiana State Police

Crime Lab responded to the house following the assault, where he lifted fingerprints

and took photographs of the scene. (id. § 11). Defendant Sibyl Guidry, Lane’s

coworker, assessed the fingerprint evidence from the scene of the crime. (Doc. 96-2 {

8). No fingerprint evidence connected Plaintiff to the crime. (See Doc. 70-1 J 44).

Defendant Nace Jerry Miller examined the victim’s rape kit, determined that

it contained seminal fluid, and performed blood-type testing in an attempt to identify

the attacker. (Doc. 99 at 19). Miller’s testing was inconclusive, and he was only able

to determine that around 90% of the male population could have produced the sperm.

(Doc. 96-36 at 41). Shortly before Plaintiffs trial, Miller prepared a report, writing

that “results indicate that the seminal fluid in the vaginal washing and on the swab

could have originated from Archie Williams.” (Doc. 73-32).

Plaintiff was convicted on April 21, 1983, and sentenced to 30 years for

aggravated burglary, 50 years for attempted murder, and life in prison for aggravated

rape. (Doc. 64-1 at 3). No physical evidence connected him to the crimes. (See Doc. 99

at 14; Doc. 96-1 at 3). For 36 years, Plaintiff maintained his innocence. In 2019, he

was released from prison when latent fingerprint evidence recovered at the crime

scene was examined using a fingerprint database created in 2014 and a different

individual was identified as the attacker. (Doc. 70-3 at 4).

b. Procedural History

On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the City of Baton Rouge

and numerous officials for their alleged misconduct in the investigation and

prosecution of the criminal case for which he was convicted. Specifically relevant

here, Plaintiff alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendants Lane and Guidry for failure to disclose exculpatory crime scene

evidence, fabrication of crime scene evidence, and conducting a reckless investigation;

and against Defendant Miller for fabrication of serological evidence, failure to disclose

exculpatory serological evidence; as well as state law claims for malicious

prosecution, spoliation of evidence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

negligence against all Defendants. (Doc. 10).

Now, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his claims against Defendant

Lane, (Doc. 64), and the Forensic Defendants move for summary judgment on

Plaintiffs claims, asserting qualified immunity, (Doc. 96). Both Motions are opposed,

in part: Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant Guidry’s assertion of qualified

immunity. (Docs. 99, 118).

II. LAWAND ANALYSIS

a. Standard

The summary judgment standard is well-set: to prevail, Defendants must show

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this assessment, the

Court must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff—the non-moving party. Owens v. Circassia Pharms., Inc., 33

F.4th 814, 824 (5th Cir. 2022). Even so, under the Federal and Local Civil Rules,

Plaintiff must counter with evidence to support his claims: “A non-movant will not

avoid summary judgment by presenting speculation, improbable inferences, or

unsubstantiated assertions.” Jones v. United States, 986 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quotation marks omitted); see also M.D. La. Local Rule 56. To the point, summary

judgment is required if Plaintiff fails to “produce any summary judgment evidence on

an essential element of [his] claim.” Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 793 (5th

Cir. 1990).

b. Discussion

The Forensic Defendants invoke qualified immunity. The qualified immunity

doctrine turns the traditional summary judgment burden on its head, requiring

Plaintiff—the non-moving party—to “demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.”

Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 975 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). To

meet his burden, Plaintiff must “(1) raise a fact dispute on whether his constitutional

rights were violated by the defendants’ individual conduct, and (2) show those rights

were Clearly established at the time of the violation.” Jd. (quotation marks omitted).

The Court may address either prong of the analysis first, Winzer v. Kaufman Cnty.,

916 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2019), and Plaintiffs failure to carry his burden at one

prong is fatal, e.g., Babinski v. Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515, 522 (5th Cir. 2023). The

Court will address the arguments of each Defendant in turn.

i. Defendant Lane’s claim of qualified immunity

Plaintiff alleges that Lane suppressed a crime scene photograph of a bloody

palm print in violation of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

(Doc. 10 at 21). In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) the Supreme Court held

that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates

due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. The

prosecutor’s duty to provide favorable evidence includes impeachment evidence and

exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The

prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence includes both evidence in its own possession

and any other “favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s

behalf in the case.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 487 (1995). “[T]he duty to disclose

such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused.”

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 268, 280 (1999) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.

97, 107 (1976)).

To prevail on a Brady claim, Petitioner must show: (1) the prosecutor

suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence

is material to guilt or punishment. Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2005)

(citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The

materiality analysis “is not a sufficiency of evidence test.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.

“The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received

a different verdict with the evidence,’ or whether, ‘after discounting the inculpatory

evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left

to convict.” Mahler v. Kaylo, 587 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kyles, 514

U.S. at 484-35). To succeed on a Brady claim, a defendant must “show[] that the

favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different

light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 485. “A Brady

violation is more likely to occur when the impeaching evidence ‘would seriously

undermine the testimony of a key witness on an essential issue or there is no strong

corroboration.” LaCaze v. Warden La. Corr. Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728, 736 (5th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010)).

“[A] Brady determination is inevitably a contextual inquiry, involving

questions of both law and fact.” Sipe, 388 F.3d at 479. A Brady inquiry “is intimately

intertwined with the trial proceedings: because the court must judge the effect of the

evidence on the jury’s verdict, the Brady decision can never be divorced from the

narrative of the trial. In addition, the court must consider not simply the withheld

evidence in isolation, but also the quantity and quality of other evidence in the

record.” Id. “[W]hen the undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence

[in the record], no Brady violation occurs.” Id. at 478 (quoting Spence v. Johnson, 80

F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996)). “Similarly, when the testimony of the witness who

might have been impeached by the undisclosed evidence is strongly corroborated by

additional evidence supporting a guilty verdict, the undisclosed evidence generally is

not found to be material.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 488, 439 (5th Cir.

1994)). Conversely, if the impeaching evidence “would seriously undermine the

testimony of a key witness on an essential issue or there is no strong corroboration,

the withheld evidence has been found to be material.” Jd. (quoting United States v.

Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to establish a “reasonable probability” that the result of his

1984 trial would have been different had the allegedly suppressed crime scene

photograph been presented at trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

The photograph in question, labeled 10-5 by the parties, was one of twenty-six

taken by Lane and others at the crime scene on December 9, 1982. (Doc. 99-1 § 11).

The image captures bloody smears, measuring around eight centimeters across, on a

wall or doorframe. (Doc. 99-8). A fingerprint lifted from the blood at the left side of

the smear did not identify Plaintiff, and a black-and-white image of that fingerprint

was presented at trial as Exhibit S-12. (Doc. 67-2 at 17).1 S-12 was described by Lane

as a “bloody print” from the scene of the crime. (/d.). As confirmed by both Plaintiffs

and Defendants’ experts, at the time of trial, no additional print evidence could be

extracted from 10-5. (Doc. 96-21 at 98—94; 96-23 4 50).

Plaintiff argues that despite the presentation of S-12 at trial, the description

of S-12 as a bloody print by multiple witnesses, (Doc. 67-2 at 17; Doc. 67-12 at 6), and

1 In his opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff disputes whether print S-12 is from the

bloody smear depicted by photograph 10-5. (Doc. 99 at 4—9). This argument, which Plaintiff

does not put forward whatsoever in his own Motion, is contrary to the findings of the experts

retained by both parties, (see Docs. 96-21 at 95; 96-23 4 45-51), and Plaintiffs own

assertions, (compare Doc. 64-2 4 67 (describing S-12 as “contain[ing] obvious similarities to

the ridge patterns” visible on the left side of the bloody smear in 10-5) with Doc. 99 at 6 (“Only

a cursory analysis of 10-5 and S-12 is required to observe the obvious dissimilarities between

these two items of evidence. .. .”). Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, S-12 does appear to

display a print captured in 10-5. (See Doc. 67-9 (displaying the two images side by side)).

Moreover, the unsupported statements of counsel are not evidence, and cannot defeat

summary judgment. Wilson v. Ly Invus., L.L.C., No. 1:20CV800-HSO-RHWR, 2022 WL

493669, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 17, 2022) (“Statements by counsel in briefs are not evidence . .

..” (quoting Skyline Corp. v. N.E.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980))).

the admission that S-12 was not from Plaintiff, the failure to present 10-5 was

material for Brady purposes. (See Doc. 64-1 at 17). The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff was convicted at trial even though it was made clear to the jury that

no fingerprint evidence, including prints in blood, connected him to the crime. (See

Doc. 70-1 § 44). In opening argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that “none” of the

fingerprints taken from the scene “match[ed] the defendant” and admitted that “there

[were] two fingerprints taken from the scene that [didn’t] match anybody... .” (Doc.

96-37 at 7-8). Likewise, the defense counsel in his opening asked the jury to “[play

close attention [to] those fingerprints” because “none of those fingerprints are

[Plaintiffs], none.” (Doc. 96-37 at 12). At closing argument, defense counsel referred

repeatedly to fingerprints in blood that did not belong to Plaintiff. (Doc. 96-19 at 5—

6). Plaintiffs conviction appears to have been based entirely on the tragically

mistaken testimony of the victim herself. Because the evidence shows that the jury

knew that prints in blood from the scene of the crime were not connected to Plaintiff,

even if 10-5 had been admitted and was indeed suppressed by Lane, its effect would

have been cumulative to evidence already in the record. “[W]hen the undisclosed

evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence, no Brady violation occurs. Spence v.

Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996).

For these reasons, Defendant Lane is entitled to qualified immunity.

ii. Defendant Miller’s claim of qualified immunity

Plaintiff also argues that Miller fabricated and failed to disclose exculpatory

serological evidence in violation of Brady. The evidence does not support this claim.

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“A criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when the government

obtains a conviction with testimony that government agents know is false.” Brown v.

Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 237 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269,

79 (1959)). “A false or scientifically inaccurate report is equivalent to any other false

evidence created by investigators, such as a false police report; ... there is no reason

a government scientific expert should enjoy immunity greater than that of other

investigators.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Miller played a minor role in Plaintiffs trial. Based on his testing of physical

evidence from the victim’s rape kit, Miller produced a report stating that the evidence

“could have originated from Archie Williams.” (Doc. 73-32). Miller also testified at

trial, essentially repeating the same conclusion. (See Doc. 96-10 at 15-16).

Plaintiff argues that Miller’s report should have referenced “the fact that

approximately 90% of the population could also not be excluded as the source of the

seminal fluids extracted from [the victim’s] rape kit.” Ud. at 20). This omission,

according to Plaintiff, “was misleading to the point of being scientifically inaccurate”

because “approximately 90% of the population” could also have been potential donors.

Plaintiff also argues that Miller’s failure to perform enzyme testing of the evidence,

which could have excluded Plaintiff, was a further Brady violation. (Doc. 99 at 22—

25).

Plaintiff relies heavily on a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion

that affirmed a denial of qualified immunity to Miller at the motion-to-dismiss stage

on similar Brady claims by a different exonerated plaintiff. (Id. at 22-25 (citing

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Brown, 519 F.8d at 237). There are crucial differences, however, between that case

and the facts here. There, the plaintiff alleged that Miller “overstated the results of

the blood tests he conducted, effectively fabricating evidence by overstating his

results and putting forward misleading scientific conclusions.” Brown, 519 F.3d at

237. Miller’s report in Brown listed two possible conclusions regarding the blood test

but inexplicably left out a third, equally viable, alternative conclusion. Jd. at 234—

235. Had the third alternative been included, the results of the blood test would have

been inconclusive. Id. The report was therefore a knowingly false representation.

More egregiously, and despite the inconclusive results, Miller allegedly “gave verbal

confirmation of a positive match to an investigating officer” after which the officer

“swore out an affidavit that Brown had been positively identified by the blood test.”

Id. at 235 (quotations omitted).

Here, in contrast, Miller merely reported that the evidence “could have

originated from Archie Williams’—a true statement. (Doc. 73-32). Record evidence

suggests that the practice in place at the time was to leave percentages out of crime

lab reports. (Doc. 96-36 at 80). Moreover, Miller testified openly and honestly at trial,

agreeing that based on the blood test results, “there [was] no way that [he could] say

absolutely that” Plaintiff was the assailant. (Doc. 96-10 at 7). In Brown, Miller left

out information crucial for understanding his results from both his report and

testimony at trial. Under the specific factual circumstances present in this case,

however, the Court cannot conclude that Miller failed to disclose or fabricated

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exculpatory evidence, and therefore Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on this

claim.

Plaintiff also claims that Miller could have performed additional testing but

did not, again relying heavily on Brown. In Brown, however, plaintiffs allegations

that Miller had “[run] additional tests besides those he reported . . ., that the results

exculpated Brown, and that Miller [had] concealed, suppressed, or destroyed these

results” survived at the motion-to-dismiss-stage, where the allegations were accepted

as true. Id. Here, at summary judgment, Plaintiff only alleges that Miller could have

performed the tests but did not do so. However, the failure to perform tests does not

violate Brady. See Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.8d 338, 336 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Brady does

not obligate the State to furnish a defendant with exculpatory evidence that is fully

available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”); United

States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Brady clearly does not impose an

affirmative duty upon the government to take action to discover information which it

does not possess.”). Accordingly, Miller is also entitled to qualified immunity on this

claim.

iil. Defendant Guidry’s claim of qualified immunity

Plaintiff alleges that Guidry should have performed an exclusion analysis on

S-12, the bloody fingerprint, but he failed to contest Guidry’s assertion of qualified

immunity. A party waives an issue by failing to briefit. See United States v. Martinez,

263 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the Local Civil Rules require that parties

support their arguments with “a concise statement of reasons... and citations of

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authorities,” M.D. La. Local Rule 7(d), and this Court has repeatedly admonished

that it will not speculate on arguments that have not been advanced, or attempt to

develop arguments on a party’s behalf. See Doe v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of

Louisiana Sys., 650 F. Supp. 3d 452, 477 n.13 (M.D. La. 2023) (Jackson, J.) (citing

authorities). For this reason, Guidry is entitled to qualified immunity.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Nace Jerry Miller, Sybil Guidry, and

Patrick Lane’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 96) be and is hereby

GRANTED, and that all claims against Defendants Miller, Guidry, and Lane be and

are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 64) be and is hereby DENIED. Judgment will enter separately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the deadlines set forth in the April 15,

2024 Telephone Status Conference (Doc. 129) be and are hereby CONTINUED

WITHOUT DATE pending the Court’s ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 115) filed by Defendants City of Baton Rouge, Marjorie Groht, Alfred Charles

Mondrick, and Steven Woodring.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ok of June, 2024

Ae Q.

BRIAN A. JACKSO UDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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