The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CLARENCE WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 22-12-SDD-EWD
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
AND A&M COLLEGE, THE LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, AND OFFICER
ANDREW PALERMO
RULING
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment1 filed by
Defendant Officer Andrew Palermo (“Palermo”). Plaintiff, Clarence Williams (“Williams”),
filed an Opposition,2 to which Palermo filed a Reply.3 For the reasons addressed herein,
the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Palermo.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. This suit arises out of events that began on
September 1, 2018 when Williams approached a sobriety checkpoint at the intersection
of Nicholson and South Quad Drive in Baton Rouge, LA.4 Officer Palermo was working
the checkpoint as a Louisiana State University Police Department (“LSUPD”) law
enforcement officer.5 Law enforcement placed signs at the outmost areas of the checkpoint
to notify drivers that there was a checkpoint ahead, and cones channeled all vehicles
traveling southbound on Nicholson into a single lane of travel.6 Palermo, who was tasked
with stopping motorists who entered and removed themselves from the checkpoint without
1 Rec. Doc. 48.
2 Rec. Doc. 53-1.
3 Rec. Doc. 55.
4 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 1.
5 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 1.
6 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 2.
being checked, observed a yellow and black Suzuki motorcycle (later to be determined to
be driven by Williams) traveling south on Nicholson.7 Palermo observed Williams enter the
marked checkpoint area before turning around to travel north in the southbound lane,
against the flow of traffic.8 Williams then proceeded in the northbound lane of Nicholson,
avoiding the checkpoint.9 Palermo pursued Williams.10 As he neared Williams’ motorcycle,
Palermo activated his lights and sirens to conduct a traffic stop.11 Williams accelerated his
motorcycle before veering off the road to avoid a collision with another vehicle.12 Williams’
motorcycle went “end over end,” launching Williams off the bike and onto the roadway.13
Palermo called EMS and fire to respond and render aid.14 Prior to transporting
Williams to the hospital, Palermo commenced an investigation at the scene of the
accident.15 Williams did not possess a motorcycle endorsement, and there was no
visible license plate on the motorcycle.16 Due to Williams’ medical condition, Palermo
could not conduct a field sobriety test or chemical breath test at the scene of the
accident.17
Baton Rouge Police Department Officer Kenneth Camallo (“Camallo”) was also
working the checkpoint and arrived at the scene of the accident to assist Palermo in his
7 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 3.
8 Rec. Doc. 48-2, p. 2–3; Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 39, lines 13–22; p. 135, line 24–p. 136, line 1; Rec. Doc. 48-
4, p. 1.
9 Id.; Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 39, lines 7–11; Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 3.
10 Id.
11 Id.; Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 40, lines 13–16; p. 136, lines 2–6; Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 3.
12 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 3.
13 Id.
14 Id. at p. 4.
15 Id.
16 Id. at p. 4, p. 8.
17 Id. at p. 4.
investigation.18 Both Palermo and Camallo claimed to have recognized an “extremely
strong” marijuana odor emanating from Williams.19
Camallo prepared the Uniform Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Report in connection with
Williams’ accident and, with Palermo’s assistance, prepared a warrant to draw Williams’
blood (“Search Warrant”).20 Pursuant to the signed Search Warrant, Williams’ blood was
drawn while he was in the hospital recovering from the accident.21
Although the blood results were still pending, Palermo prepared an application for
an arrest warrant (“Arrest Warrant”) on September 4, 2018.22 Palermo attested under
oath that he believed, based on the totality of circumstances, that probable cause
existed to arrest Williams on all charges, including: (1) Driving While Intoxicated; (2)
Reckless Operation; (3) Vehicle License Required; (4) Operators Endorsement
Required; (5) Failure to Obey Traffic Control Device (Sobriety Checkpoint); and (6)
Driving on Divided Roadway.23
The Arrest Warrant was approved and signed by a judge and executed by
LSUPD.24 On July 9, 2020, the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab tested Williams’ blood
sample, which was negative for ethyl alcohol and positive for Ketamine.25 On November
24, 2020, the District Attorney dismissed the charges against Williams.26
Williams filed the instant suit, alleging federal malicious prosecution claims
against Palermo in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a state law
18 Rec. Doc. 53-2, pp. 4–5.
19 Rec. Doc. 48-2, p. 4, p. 6; Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 52, lines 8–17; p. 55, lines 13–20; p. 136, lines 19–23;
Rec. Doc. 48-4, p. 1.
20 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 5.
21 Id.
22 Id. at p. 6.
23 Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 136, lines 16–19; Rec. Doc. 48-4, p. 3.
24 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 7.
25 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 7; Rec. Doc. 48-2, p. 10; Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 118, lines 17–22; Rec. Doc. 48-9, p. 1.
26 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 8.
malicious prosecution claim. When deposed, Williams claimed to have no independent
recollection of the events surrounding the September 1, 2018 incident.27 Williams stated
that there is nothing that could jog his memory.28 Accordingly, the events as recounted
by the Defendants are uncontested.29
II. CLAIMS
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action
for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.30 It
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....31
“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”32
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the
color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.33 A § 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific facts
27 Rec. Doc. 53-2, p. 8.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
32 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3,
(1979)); accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 816 (1985); Jackson v. City of Atlanta, Tex., 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 818 (1996); Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985).
33 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986);
Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984).
demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory
allegations.34
Palermo moves for summary judgment arguing that Williams cannot satisfy his
burden of proof on the malicious prosecution claims, and, alternatively, that Palermo is
entitled to qualified immunity. In response, Williams argues that there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation occurred proving malicious
prosecution because his initial arrest was not supported by probable cause.
For purposes of qualified immunity, the parties debate whether there was a
clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution at the
time of Williams’ arrest in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Thompson v. Clark,35
published in April 2022. William’s arrest occurred in 2018, before Thompson v. Clark
was published. However, the Court need not address the timing the Supreme Court’s
opinion for qualified immunity purposes, as the facts show that Williams cannot meet
the elements of his malicious prosecution claims to survive summary judgment.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”36 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we
consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility
34 See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986); Angel
v. City of Fairfield, Tex., 793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986).
35 Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022).
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
determinations or weighing the evidence.”37 A party moving for summary judgment
“must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not
negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.”38 If the moving party satisfies its burden,
“the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting
‘forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential
component of its case.’”39 However, the non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by
unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”40
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”41 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.42 However, “[t]he court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the
summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to
articulate precisely how this evidence supports his claim.”43 “Conclusory allegations
unsupported by specific facts . . . will not prevent an award of summary judgment; ‘the
plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations . . . to get to a jury without “any significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”’”44
37 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
38 Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Par. Nursing Home, 246 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003) (quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986)).
39 Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Morris v. Covan World
Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
40 Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at
1075).
41 Pylant v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
42 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
43 RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
44 Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
Williams cannot satisfy his burden on summary judgment of establishing that
Palermo violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution.
According to the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff must prove the following six elements to prevail
on a constitutionalized malicious prosecution claim: (1) the commencement or
continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present
defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona
fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for
such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.45 Additionally, a plaintiff must also prove
the “threshold element[s] of an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure.”46 “[I]f the
prosecution is supported by probable cause on at least one charge, then a malicious
prosecution claim cannot move forward.”47 The elements of a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim and the elements of a Louisiana state malicious prosecution claim are
coextensive.48 Accordingly, the Court can simultaneously analyze whether there has
been a violation of a constitutionally protected right along with the state law malicious
prosecution claim.
In doing so, the Court has determined that neither of Williams’ claims can survive
summary judgment because at least one of the charges for which he was arrested was
supported by probable cause.49 Williams testified that he did not possess a motorcycle
endorsement and that the license plate was “wedged” in the back of the motorcycle, not
45 Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023).
46 Id.
47 Id. at n.15.
48 Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023).
49 See id. at n.15 (“Importantly, because an unlawful seizure is the threshold element, see Thompson,
142 S. Ct. at 1337 n.2, if the prosecution is supported by probable cause on at least one charge, then a
malicious prosecution claim cannot move forward.”)
visible to other vehicles.50 This testimony supports probable cause for two of the six
charges: absence of a vehicle license and absence of an operator’s endorsement as
required.51 Further, Williams cannot dispute the facts supporting probable cause of the
charges of reckless operation, failure to obey traffic control device, and driving on a
divided roadway because Williams cannot recall the incident.52
The only fact in dispute relevant to the probable cause determination is whether
Williams smelled of marijuana.53 However, probable cause depends on the totality of the
circumstances, and facts exist which support probable cause for the DWI charge.54
Namely, the undisputed facts are that Williams drove recklessly, illegally turned around
within a marked DWI checkpoint, drove on a divided roadway against the flow of traffic,
did not yield to the attempted traffic stop by Palermo, and was involved in a single
vehicle accident that caused him to be launched from his motorcycle onto the
roadway.55 Accordingly, the Court finds that probable cause for the arrest existed even
without the statement that Williams smelled of marijuana. Williams cannot establish his
federal or state malicious prosecution claims.
50 Rec. Doc. 48-12, p. 46, line 11–p. 47, line 17.
51 Rec. Doc. 48-4, p. 3.
52 Rec. Doc. 48-12, p. 41, line 17–p. 43, line 13.
53 Williams contends that the lack of documentation by EMS and Emergency Room personnel that they
detected a marijuana odor supports his contention that he did not smell of marijuana. Rec. Doc. 53-1, pp.
11-12. Williams offers these facts without any evidentiary support that this is something that would
otherwise be documented. Id. Further, Williams offers an affidavit submitted by attorney Rosaline
Freeman in support of this contention that his clothes did not smell of marijuana. Id. at 13. The affidavit,
however, merely states that Freeman became custodian of the clothes “shortly after the incident” and
they did not smell of marijuana. Rec. Doc. 53-8. This contention, however, does not stand contrary to the
assertion that Williams smelled of marijuana on the night of the incident. See Forbes v. Harris Cty., 804 F.
App’x 233, 238–39.
54 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (“Because probable cause deals with
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances, it is a fluid concept that is not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. It requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. Probable cause is not a high bar.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
55 Rec. Doc. 48-3, p. 59, line 14–p. 60, line 8; Rec. Doc. 48-12, p. 41, line 17–p. 42, line 13.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment56 filed by
Defendant Officer Andrew Palermo is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff Clarence
Williams’ remaining claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on March 5, 2024.
S
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
56 Rec. Doc. 48.