Williams v. Town Of Clinton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MAURICE WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 23-00119-BAJ-RLB

TOWN OF CLINTON, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff Maurice Williams pursues constitutional claims of excessive force and

false arrest—and related state law claims—against The Town Of Clinton, Louisiana,

and one of the Town’s Police Officers, Charles Brown, arising from his arrest on

March 2, 2022. Now, the Town and Officer Brown each move to dismiss Plaintiff’s

action. Defendants’ motions will be granted in part.

I. ALLEGED FACTS

For present purposes, the following allegations are accepted as true1:

Plaintiff is 70 years old. (Doc. 1 ¶ 6). He is a dog owner, a professional chef, and

“a pillar of the Clinton community.” (Id. ¶ 9).

On December 7, 2021, the Twentieth Judicial District Court for the Parish of

East Feliciana, Louisiana (“Twentieth JDC”) issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff’s

1 At this stage, the Court accepts Defendants’ invitation to consider the December 7, 2021

bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, issued by the Twentieth Judicial District Court for the

Parish of East Feliciana, Louisiana. (Doc. 10-3, Doc. 14-3). Though not referenced in

Plaintiff’s Complaint, this document is a public judicial record subject to judicial notice

without converting Defendants’ Rule 12 motions to motions for summary judgment. E.g.,

Buchicchio v. LeBlanc, 656 F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (M.D. La. 2023) (taking judicial notice of

certain state court records when considering defendants’ Rule 12 motions, pursuant to Fed.

R. Evid. 201).

arrest, citing Plaintiff’s failure to appear at his arraignment for the misdemeanor

offense of allowing his dog to roam free, in violation of La. R.S. § 3:2771. (Doc. 10-3,

Doc. 14-3).

On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff was at his home when, at an unspecified time,

Officer Brown arrived to execute the December 7 bench warrant, telling Plaintiff that

he was being arrested “for failure to appear in Court and allowing his dog to roam

free.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). Plaintiff did not resist, or otherwise pose any threat, and was even

wearing “a cast on his wrist” during the encounter. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 14). Still, when arresting

Plaintiff, Officer Brown “needlessly pepper sprayed [him], beat [him], and caused

serious bodily harm to [his] neck.” (Id.).

At some point after his arrest, Officer Brown allegedly falsified a police report

to state that he “handcuffed [Plaintiff] and checked the tightness of the handcuffs.

This was impossible as [Plaintiff] had a cast on his wrist at the time of the attack[.]”

(Id. ¶ 14). Ultimately, “all charges [against Plaintiff] were dismissed by the District

Court judge” for lack of probable cause. (Id. ¶ 7).

In addition to his neck injuries—which required surgery in March 2023—

Plaintiff suffered reputational damage and mental anguish as a result of his March

2 encounter with Officer Brown. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action on February 17, 2023. (Doc. 1). Against Officer

Brown, Plaintiff pursues individual capacity constitutional claims of excessive force

and false arrest, and state law claims of battery, defamation, and malicious

prosecution. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3, 10-14). Against the Town, Plaintiff pursues only vicarious

(employer) liability claims for Officer Brown’s “state law delicts.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 18).

Now, Officer Brown and the Town each move to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. (Doc.

10, Doc. 14). Officer Brown argues that qualified immunity shields him against

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, that any claim for punitive damages fails because

Plaintiff has not shown that his “actions were due to reckless or intentional disregard

for his constitutional rights,” and that Plaintiff’s state law claims fail because

Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing multiple essential elements. (See Doc. 14-

1). The Town largely parrots Officer Brown’s arguments, adding that it is entitled to

a “conditional privilege” against Plaintiff’s defamation claim.2 (See Doc. 10-1).

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motions. (Doc. 20, Doc. 21).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against

the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

2 Bizarrely, the Town dedicates the majority of its argument to seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s

federal constitutional claims, even invoking qualified immunity on Officer Brown’s behalf.

(Doc. 10-1 at 2-6). But again, Plaintiff pursues only state law employer liability claims against

the Town. (Doc. ¶¶ 3, 18). As such, the Court does not consider the Town’s additional

arguments for dismissal of non-existent federal claims.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). When conducting its inquiry, the Court must “accept[] all

well-pleaded facts as true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal

citations omitted).

B. Discussion

The Court addresses Defendants’ arguments in the order they are presented.

Constitutional Claims

Officer Brown invokes qualified immunity. The qualified immunity doctrine

turns the traditional Rule 12 analysis on its head, requiring Plaintiff—the non-

moving party—to establish “the inapplicability of the defense.” Babinski v.

Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). To meet his

burden, Plaintiff must “allege both (1) the violation of a federal constitutional or

statutory right; and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). The Court may address either prong of the analysis first,

id., and Plaintiff’s failure to carry his burden at one prong is fatal, e.g., id. at 522.

a. False Arrest

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “false” arrests. Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton,

568 F.3d 181, 206 (5th Cir. 2009). Whether an arrest is “false”—i.e.,

unconstitutional—depends on whether it was supported by probable cause. Put

differently, “[t]he ‘constitutional torts’ of false arrest, unreasonable seizure, and false

imprisonment … require a showing of no probable cause.” Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d

185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing authorities).

Here, Plaintiff’s arrest arose from a bench warrant issued by the Twentieth

JDC due to Plaintiff’s failure to appear at his arraignment date. The Complaint sets

forth no allegations undermining the bench warrant’s validity. As such, the warrant

establishes probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, and Plaintiff fails to state a valid

Fourth Amendment “false” arrest claim. E.g., Nalls v. LaSalle, 568 F. App'x 303, 307

(5th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment “illegal seizure”

claim where plaintiff's failure to appear in court provided probable cause to support

a bench warrant); accord Peairs v. Jackson Cnty., Miss., No. 13-402, 2015 WL

5666906, at *18 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2015) (Ozerden, J.) (“Because the record

supports the conclusion that Thornton held an objectively reasonable belief that

probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff based upon the bench warrant, Thornton is

entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for unlawful seizure,

false arrest, and false imprisonment arising out of his June 1, 2011, arrest”). This

claim will be dismissed at the first stage of the qualified immunity analysis, subject

to Plaintiff’s right to amend.3

3 Plaintiff argues that the December 7 bench warrant was invalid—and did not establish

probable cause for his arrest—because he only failed to appear at his arraignment due to a

citation that incorrectly directed him to “Mayor’s Court,” not the Twentieth JDC. Plaintiff

further contends that Officer Brown knew the December 7 bench warrant was invalid,

because Officer Brown himself issued the citation directing Plaintiff to the wrong court. (See

b. Excessive Force

“An excessive force claim is separate and distinct from a claim for unlawful

arrest and must therefore be analyzed without regard to whether the arrest was

justified, although the evidence may overlap.” Massey v. Wharton, 477 F. App'x 256,

262 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted; citing authorities). In other words, even

if Plaintiff’s false arrest claim fails on the present showing, the same is not

necessarily true of his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, id., provided that

Officer Brown’s force was excessive or unreasonable in the context of Plaintiff’s

arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).

To establish an excessive force violation, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an

injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly

excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively

unreasonable.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 2021)

(quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 564 (2021).

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight. Factors to consider include the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

Doc. 21 at 5-6). The problem for present purposes is that this argument relies on multiple

“facts” that do not appear in Plaintiff’s Complaint; instead, these “facts” are set forth for the

first time in Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum, based on selective citations to transcripts

and other documents produced in Plaintiff’s underlying state court proceedings. (See Doc. 21-

1). But unlike the December 7 bench warrant—the fact of which speaks for itself—Plaintiff’s

additional “facts” require an interpretive gloss that is inconsistent with the rules governing

judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. As such, the Court does not take judicial notice of

Plaintiff’s additional “facts,” determining instead that the better course is to allow Plaintiff

to amend his complaint to supplement his allegations in support of his false arrest claim.

E.g., Stubblefield v. Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health Sys., Inc., No. 20-cv-00748,

2022 WL 554649, at *2 n.2 (M.D. La. Feb. 23, 2022) (Jackson, J.) (declining to consider

exhibits appended to Plaintiff's opposition memorandum because they were not referenced in

the plaintiff's Amended Complaint and were not public records subject to judicial notice).

safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. The calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers

are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force

that is necessary in a particular situation.

Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

Here, curiously, Officer Brown expressly acknowledges Plaintiff’s allegations

that he “beat” and “pepper-sprayed” him despite Plaintiff offering no resistance to his

arrest, and posing no threat. (Doc. 14-1 at 9). Still, Officer Brown contends that

Plaintiff’s allegations of a “beating” are too conclusory to support an actionable

excessive force claim, and that Plaintiff’s allegations of being maced establish, at best,

a constitutionally insignificant (de minimus) injury. (Id. at 9-10).

The Court cannot agree. At the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, the law was clearly

established that “although the right to make an arrest necessarily carries with it the

right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it, the

permissible degree of force depends on the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect posed a threat to the officer's safety, and whether the suspect was resisting

arrest or attempting to flee.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008)

(quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Here, under Plaintiff’s version of the events,

he was arrested for failing to respond to a summons for a minor dog-walking offense,

posed no threat, and was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee when Officer

Brown “beat” and “pepper-sprayed” him, causing “serious” neck injuries that

ultimately required surgery. Under these circumstances (as alleged), no reasonable

officer would believe that physical battery and the application of pepper spray were

necessary to effect the arrest of a non-resisting septuagenarian with evident physical

limitations (a broken wrist).

And merely because Plaintiff has failed to expressly allege a discrete injury

resulting from Officer Brown’s alleged use of pepper spray does not remove this aspect

of Plaintiff’s claim from the analysis. To the contrary, the law is also clear that

“[i]njury and force … are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that

ultimately counts.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010). Taken as a whole,

Plaintiff’s allegations of an unprovoked beating (causing “serious” injuries to

Plaintiff’s neck), accompanied by pepper spray, are sufficient to overcome Officer

Brown’s qualified immunity defense. E.g., Bush, 513 F.3d at 501–02 (finding it

objectively unreasonable to employ force after plaintiff was “restrained and

subdued”); Gauglitz v. City of Dallas, No. 95-cv-3123, 1997 WL 786246, at *6 (N.D.

Tex. Dec. 15, 1997) (Fish, J.) (rejecting defendant officers’ qualified immunity defense

to non-resisting arrestee’s excessive force claim: “the repeated use of pepper spray

against a bound, prone, and compliant citizen could easily be considered excessive”).

c. Punitive Damages

A claim for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a showing that

the defendant’s conduct is the result of “evil motive or intent, or … involves reckless

or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461

U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Officer Brown argues that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts

to establish that his actions resulted from reckless or intentional disregard for his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 14-1 at 12). Plaintiff offers no response.

A party waives an issue by failing to brief it. See United States v. Martinez, 263

F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the Local Civil Rules require that parties

support their arguments with “a concise statement of reasons ... and citations of

authorities,” M.D. La. LR 7(d), and this Court has repeatedly admonished that it will

not speculate on arguments that have not been advanced, or attempt to develop

arguments on a party's behalf. See Doe v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of Louisiana

Sys., 650 F. Supp. 3d 452, 477 n.13 (M.D. La. 2023) (Jackson, J.) (citing authorities).

Pursuant to the Court's Local Rules, and consistent with the general rule that a

party's failure to brief an issue acts as a waiver, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages

will also be dismissed. E.g., Clark v. LeBlanc, No. 19-cv-00512, 2023 WL 2655725, at

*7 n.4 (M.D. La. Mar. 27, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (ruling that plaintiff abandoned claims

not addressed in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment).

State law claims

a. Battery

“Under Louisiana law, the torts of assault and battery, when raised against a

law enforcement officer acting in the course of employment, require a showing that

the law enforcement officer acted with unreasonable or excessive force.” Elphage v.

Gautreaux, 969 F. Supp. 2d 493, 515 (M.D. La. 2013) (Dick, J.). To the point,

“Louisiana's excessive force tort mirrors its federal constitutional counterpart.”

Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 172 (5th Cir. 2009). The same allegations

establishing a viable constitutional claim of excessive force against Officer Brown—

detailed above—also establish a viable claim for state law battery. E.g., id.

b. Defamation

“Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show four elements to prove defamation:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged

communication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the

publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 464 (5th Cir.

2012) (citing Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129, 139 (La. 2004)). “If even one of the

required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of action fails.” Costello, 864 So. 2d

at 140.

Officer Brown challenges the first element of Plaintiff’s defamation claim,

contending that “Plaintiff does not identify a statement which he alleges to be false

and defamatory.” (Doc. 14-1 at 13). The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s Complaint describes

only one alleged “statement” with any particularity—specifically, that upon arriving

at Plaintiff’s house on March 2, Officer Brown “told plaintiff he was arresting [him]

for failure to appear in Court and allowing his dog to roam free.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 5). Plainly,

however, this statement was not false in light of the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s

arrest. Nor, for that matter, was it published to a third party. Plaintiff’s defamation

claim fails.

Plaintiff responds that his defamation claim passes muster because, under

Louisiana law, “false accusation of a crime” is “[d]efamation per se.” (Doc. 21 at 7).

Certainly, the caselaw supports this view. See Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant

Super Markets, 390 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. 1980) (“[W]ords which impute a crime to

another are defamatory per se[.]”). The problem for present purposes, however, is that

the Complaint does not set forth any specific instances when Officer Brown falsely

accused Plaintiff of a crime. Instead, again, Plaintiff bases his argument on

allegations appearing for the first time in his opposition memorandum. See supra n.3.

This is not how it works. E.g., Stubblefield, 2022 WL 554649, at *2 n.2 (“[T]he Court

does not consider the exhibits appended to Plaintiff's [Rule 12] opposition

memorandum because they are not referenced in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and

are not public records subject to judicial notice. Rather, as it must, the Court limits

its review to Plaintiff's allegations set forth in the [Amended Complaint].” (citation

omitted)); accord Verdiner v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 15-cv-2612,

2016 WL 2736185, at *1 n.3 (D. Md. May 11, 2016) (Chasanow, J.) (“Plaintiff may not

amend the pleading by attaching documents to her opposition brief, and the court will

not consider the exhibits at this stage.”). Plaintiff’s defamation claim will be

dismissed, subject to Plaintiff’s right to amend.4

c. Malicious Prosecution

Under Louisiana law, a claim of malicious prosecution requires Plaintiff to

establish six elements:

(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil

judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant in

the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the

present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding;

(5) the presence of malice therein; and (6) damage conforming to legal

standards resulting to plaintiff.

4 Having determined that Plaintiff’s defamation claim fails because Plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged any defamatory statement made by Officer Brown, the Court does not

consider the Town’s alternative argument that it is entitled to “a privilege against defamation

actions.” (See Doc. 10-1 at 6-8).

Lemoine v. Wolfe, 2014-1546 (La. 3/17/15), 168 So. 3d 362, 367. “Although the plaintiff

ordinarily bears the burden of proof on all the elements of a malicious prosecution

claim, there is a presumption of malice and a lack of probable cause in cases where

the prosecuting officer has dismissed the charges. In those cases, the burden shifts to

the defendant to show that she acted on probable cause and without malice.” Mills v.

City of Bogalusa, No. 13-cv-5477, 2016 WL 2992502, at *11 (E.D. La. May 24, 2016)

(Brown, J.).

Officer Brown challenges the fourth and fifth elements of Plaintiff’s claim,

arguing that the bench warrant established probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, that

“[n]othing in Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that the bench warrant was facially

invalid,” and that Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of establishing that Officer Brown

acted maliciously. (Doc. 14-1 at 15). The Court agrees on the present showing. For

essentially the same reasons requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim—i.e.,

the bench warrant established probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest absent any

allegations undermining its validity—the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claim, subject to Plaintiff’s right to amend. See supra n.3.

d. Employer liability

Under Louisiana law, an employer is vicariously liable for the intentional acts

of its employees. La. C.C. art. 2320. Having stated an actionable claim for battery

against Officer Brown, Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against the Town arising

from Officer Brown’s alleged battery may also proceed. See Mitchell v. Louisiana, No.

20-cv-00470, 2021 WL 1972274, at *3 (M.D. La. May 17, 2021) (Jackson, J.). In turn,

having now dismissed Plaintiff’s claims of defamation and malicious prosecution,

Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims relating to these underlying torts will also be

dismissed.

C. Amendment

When a complaint fails to state a claim, the plaintiff generally should be

allowed an opportunity to amend before dismissing with prejudice, unless it is clear

that amendment would be futile. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). Here, as set forth above, Plaintiff has

appended additional documents to his opposition papers, suggesting that he may yet

supplement his allegations to state actionable claims of false arrest, defamation, and

malicious prosecution. It follows that any supplemental allegations may also support

an award of punitive damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be allowed to submit an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies set forth herein, within 21 days of the date

of this Order.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Officer Brown’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss

(Doc. 14) be and is hereby GRANTED IN PART, consistent with the relief set forth

herein. Officer Brown’s Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force

and battery.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Town of Clinton’s Motion To Dismiss

Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 10) be and is hereby GRANTED IN PART,

consistent with the relief set forth herein. The Town’s Motion is DENIED as to

Plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability for Officer Brown’s alleged battery.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest,

defamation, and malicious prosecution, and Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, be

and are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, subject to Plaintiff’s right

to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies outlined herein within 21 days

of the date of this Order.

Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an amended complaint will be construed as a

waiver, and will result in dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest,

defamation, and malicious prosecution (and related vicarious liability claims against

the Town), and Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 5th day of January, 2024

______________________________________

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA