Brooks v. Vannoy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAY BROOKS

CIVIL ACTION

versus

19-846-SDD-RLB

DARREL VANNOY, ET AL.

RULING

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees filed by Plaintiff,

Ray Brooks (“Brooks” or “Plaintiff”).1 Defendants, Lt. Charles Gooden, Jr. (“Lt. Gooden”)

and Captain Thomas Sterling (“Captain Sterling”) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an

opposition.2 For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Brooks’ Motion shall be

granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 26th, 2023, after a two-day trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $10,000 in

compensatory damages, finding that Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiff in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.3 Now, Plaintiff’s attorney moves for attorneys’ fees,

as well as compensation for Plaintiff’s expert witness, having prevailed on Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims.4

1 Rec. Doc. No. 111.

2 Rec. Doc. No. 112.

3 Rec. Doc. Nos. 109, 113.

4 Rec. Doc. No. 111.

II. LAW

Brooks seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $33,650.5 Brooks also requests an

award of $598 to compensate Dr. Brian Rowan (“Dr. Rowan”) for testifying at trial.6 This

figure reflects 107.5 hours of work by Brooks’ attorney and 14 hours of work by the

attorney’s paralegal. 7Justin Glenn (“Glenn”) represented Brooks in this case. Glenn has

6 years of legal experience, 5 years of experience representing a company in similar civil

rights cases under Section 1983, and bills $300 per hour.8 Tiffany Wheatly (“Wheatly”),

Glenn’s paralegal, has over 16 years of experience as a civil litigation paralegal and bills

$100 per hour.9

Brooks provided the detailed billing records for Glenn and Wheatly for this matter,

as well as the Resolution of the En Banc Court of the Middle District of Louisiana (the

“Resolution”) which established the Civil Pro Bono Counsel Panel and sets forth the

guidelines for representing civil litigants who do not have the financial resources to hire a

lawyer.10

Section 6 of the Resolution states, “Attorneys Fees and taxable costs may be

recovered by counsel appointed from the Panel if allowed under the law applicable to the

case to the same extent and in the same manner as applicable to retained counsel in the

same kind of case.”11

42 U.S.C Section 1988(b) states that a court in its discretion may allow the

prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and compensation for experts in

5 Rec. Doc. No. 111-1, p.3.

6 Id.

7 Id. at p. 2-3.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Rec. Doc. Nos. 111-2, 111-3.

11 Rec. Doc. No. 111-2, p.3.

Section 1983 actions.12 This Court has previously allowed the recovery of attorneys’ fees

in Section 1983 actions.13 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that reasonable attorneys’

fees can include paralegal work so long as that work is legal in nature, as opposed to

clerical.14

A. The Lodestar Method

In the Fifth Circuit, the “lodestar” method is used to calculate reasonable attorneys'

fees.15 The “lodestar” analysis involves a two-step procedure.16 Initially, the district court

must determine the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation and the

reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers. Then, the court must multiply the

reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates.17 The product is the “lodestar,” which

the court either accepts or adjusts upward or downward, depending on the circumstances

of the case, assessing the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.18

A court's discretion in fashioning a reasonable attorney’s fee is broad and

reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, i.e., it will not be reversed unless there is strong

evidence that it is excessive or inadequate, or the amount chosen is clearly erroneous.19

To determine a reasonable fee, a court must provide a concise but clear explanation of

its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations regarding whether

12 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (b).

13 See Hernandez v. Theriot, No. CV 14-42-SDD-EWD, 2017 WL 8942567 (M.D. La. Jan. 19, 2017).

14 See Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that paralegal work can be

recoverable so long as the work is legal in nature as opposed to clerical); See also Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp.,

665 F.2d 689, 697 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[paralegal expenses] are [sic] recoverable only as part of a prevailing

party’s award for attorneys’ fees and expenses, and even then only to the extent that the paralegal performs

work traditionally done by an attorney”).

15 In re Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 487 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1143 (1994).

16 Louisiana Power & Light Company v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323-324 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).

17 Id. at 324.

18 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.1974).

19 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 277, n.79 (5th Cir. 2000); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37.

the requested hourly rate is reasonable, and whether the tasks reported by counsel were

duplicative, unnecessary, or unrelated to the purposes of the lawsuit.2° The Fifth Circuit

has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the findings be

complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court has used

proper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.”2'

In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the court must first determine

the “lodestar” by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended and the

reasonable hourly rate for each participating attorney.2* The party seeking the fee bears

the burden of proof on this issue.2°

B. Attorney’s Fee Limitations Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform

Act

In addition to applying the “lodestar” method, this Court must also consider 42

U.S.C. Section 1997e, also known as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), which

applies to recovering attorneys’ fees in suits brought by prisoners. Section D of this

Section states the following:

1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under

section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the

extent that—

fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual

violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which

a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and

20 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437-39; Associated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish School Board, 919

F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990).

21 Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir.1986).

22 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 661 (5th

Cir. 2002); Associated Builders & Contractors, 919 F.2d at 379; Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041,

1047 (5th Cir.1998); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324.

23 See Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir.1996); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324.

(B) (i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered

relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred

in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in

paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be

applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the

defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of

the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.24

The Supreme Court analyzed this Section in Murphy v. Smith.25 The Court found that,

while attorneys’ fees are recoverable in Section 1983 actions, before seeking recovery

from a defendant, 25 percent of the prisoner’s damage award will contribute to the

attorneys’ fee award.26 Then, a defendant will pay the remaining balance if such exists.27

The Fifth Circuit has not had the opportunity to apply Murphy. However, several other

circuits have. For example, in Thompson v. Smith, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

held that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Murphy, the prevailing party is

obliged to compensate his lawyer with 25 percent of his monetary award and the

defendant is liable for no more than 150 percent of the judgment amount to satisfy the

attorneys’ fees award. 28The Eleventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court

acknowledged that Section 1997e(D) limits a district court’s discretion to award fees

under Section 1988(b).29 All other Circuit Courts, except the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth

Circuits, have reached similar conclusions.30

24 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (D).

25 138 S. Ct. 784, 790 (2018).

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 805 F. App'x 893, 907 (11th Cir. 2020).

29 Id. at 909.

30 See Id. at 908 (holding that the Eleventh Circuit “will join all of our sister circuits that have addressed this

issue in holding that under §1997e(d)(2), a defendant’s liability for attorney’s fees is capped at 150% of the

judgment (less the amount contributed by the prisoner from his judgment).” (citing a collection of circuit

cases)).

Lacking Fifth Circuit precedent, this Court is persuaded by the interpretations of

Murphy by other Circuits. Therefore, this Court will first apply the “lodestar” method to this

Motion and then analyze where limitations may be necessary.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Reasonable Hours Expended

The Court begins by determining whether the number of hours claimed by Brooks’

attorney are reasonable.31 Local Rule 54 provides specific guidance regarding how this

burden is met, stating: “the party desiring to be awarded such fees shall submit to the

court a contemporaneous time report reflecting the date, time involved, and nature of the

services performed. The report shall be in both narrative and statistical form and provide

hours spent and justification thereof.”32 “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate,

the district court may reduce the award accordingly.”33

Here, the Court finds that 101.5 of the hours billed by Glenn and the 14 hours billed

by Wheatly are reasonable and well documented in the time sheets. The Court agrees

with Defendants that two of Glenn’s entries appear redundant and duplicative. On

February 13, 2023, Glenn billed 7 hours for “review[ing] all documents produced in

discovery, including medical records, use of force policy, and discovery to determine

which will be used at tria[l] and what witnesses can be call[ed] in advance of submitting

pre-trial order.”34 However, the next day, Glenn billed 6 hours for “review[ing] 1000+

pages of documents produced by defendant on the deadline of the pre-trial order.”35 The

31 Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047.

32 M.D. La. LR54(b).

33 Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted); see also Kellstrom, 50

F.3d at 324 (“[A] district court may reduce the number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or

incomplete.”).

34 Rec. Doc. No. 111-3.

35 Id.

Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff does not provide an explanation for the back-

to-back days of block billing. Further, the entries suggest that Glenn was reviewing

similar, if not the same set of documents on these two days. Thus, the hours will be

reduced by 6 hours, the number of hours billed on February 14, 2023.

However, the Court rejects Defendants’ assertions that the hours billed for witness

preparation and traveling for this case were excessive. As Defendants note in their

opposition, preparation of witness examination is necessary.36 And while lawyers

frequently prepare witnesses for examination, the length of each preparation may vary

depending on the complexity of the questions a witness is preparing to be asked and a

witness’s prior experience in trial. The Court finds the time spent on witness preparation

was reasonable.

Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Glenn’s billing

for travel was improperly billed and should be reduced. This Court has recently addressed

this issue in Menard v. Targa Resources, LLC.37 The Court found that the counsel’s travel

time was “necessary, and necessarily came at the expense of regular billing time that

counsel could have devoted to other clients.”38 Therefore, there was no reason to reduce

the counsel’s billing rate merely because the counsel was not completing typical legal

work.39 Accordingly, the Court finds Glenn’s hours for travel to meet with Plaintiff and

commuting to the courthouse are reasonable and compensable.

36 Rec. Doc. No. 112, p. 7.

37 No. CV 19-00050-BAJ-SDJ, 2023 WL 5628593 (M.D. La. Aug. 31, 2023).

38 Id. at *6.

39 See Id.

B. Reasonable Hourly Rates

This Court has held that reasonableness of hourly rates must be supported by the

record.40 However, Plaintiff did not provide any evidence for the Court to consider that

addresses the relevant legal market for Glenn or for Wheatly. Glenn has 6 years of legal

experience, with 5 years of experience representing a company in similar civil rights cases

under Section 1983. Glenn bills $300 per hour.41 Wheatly has more than 16 years of

experience as a civil litigation paralegal and bills $100 per hour.42 Defendants cite case

law from the Eastern District of Louisiana to deduce that $225 per hour is a reasonable

hourly rate for Glenn.43 Considering the case law, the Court agrees with Defendants that

a rate of $225/hour is reasonable and falls within the range of other rates awarded by this

Court for attorneys with similar experience in the legal community.44 Therefore, Glenn’s

hourly rate will be reduced to $225. The Court also finds the hourly rate of $100 for

Wheatly is reasonable.

40 See Bland v. Alco Collections, Inc., No. CV 16-822-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 278739 (M.D. La. Jan. 3, 2018)

(“[t]he hourly fee awarded must be supported by the record; the district court may not simply rely on its own

experience in the relevant legal market to set a reasonable hourly billing rate.”)

41 Rec. Doc. No. 111-1, p .2.

42 Id. at p.3.

43 Rec. Doc. No. 112, p. 3-4; See Bode v. Kenner City, No. CV 17-5483, 2018 WL 4701541 (E.D. La. Oct.

1, 2018) (finding an hourly rate of $275/hour for a partner with 8 years or experience and expertise in First

Amendment law was reasonable and an hourly rate of $200/hour for an attorney with 4 years of experience

and some experience in First Amendment law was reasonable); See also Faulk v. Duplantis, No. CIV.A.

12-1714, 2015 WL 3539637 (E.D. La. June 4, 2015) (finding $225/hour for attorneys with 29 and 17 years

of experience to be reasonable given their expertise and trial experience).

44 See Mealy v. Gautreaux, No. CV 16-716-JWD-RLB, 2020 WL 96897 (M.D. La. Jan. 8, 2020) (found that

a partner with 6 years of experience deserved an hourly rate of $175/per hour and Court had previously

provided this partner with this award in 2017); See also In re Marine, No. CV 20-214-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL

1823766 (M.D. La. Feb. 8, 2023) (Court found that an attorney with six years of experience with an hourly

rate of $200 was reasonable); See also Taylor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., Inc., No. CV 18-1110-SDD-EWD,

2022 WL 3219961 (M.D. La. Aug. 9, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-30635, 2022 WL 19401687 (5th Cir.

Dec. 6, 2022) (finding an hourly rate of $225 was “in line with [prevailing rates in the Middle District”); See

also Oak Harbor Inv. Properties, LLC v. Sedona Corp., No. CV 20-844-SDD-RLB, 2022 WL 709186 (M.D.

La. Mar. 9, 2022) (finding an hourly rate of $389 was reasonable for three attorneys with more than 30

years of experience).

C. Prison Litigation Reform Act

The Court finds that Brooks’ attorney is entitled to attorneys’ fees based on 101.5

hours at the hourly rate of $225 and 14 hours of paralegal work at the hourly rate of $100.

However, the Court agrees with Defendants that the award is limited to 150 percent of

the judgment. Brooks was imprisoned at the time he filed this lawsuit and is currently still

imprisoned. Thus, his claims do arise under the PLRA.45 On April 26, 2023, the jury found

in favor of Plaintiff and he received a judgment of $10,000 in compensatory damages.46

Due to this cap, the fee award will be derived from 25 percent of Plaintiff’s monetary award

and the remaining amount will be paid by Defendants. Because Plaintiff’s award is

$10,000, $2,500 of the award will go towards the attorneys’ fees and the fee award is

limited to $15,000 in total. The Court finds that the maximum amount of fees allowed

under the PRLA cap is appropriate. The PLRA is silent with respect to compensation for

experts. As such, the Court finds Defendants are liable for compensating Dr. Rowan.

Therefore, Defendants are ordered to pay Plaintiff $12,500 as a reasonable attorneys’

fees award and $598 to compensate Dr. Rowan for his expert testimony.

45 See Morales v. McCulloh, No. CV 18-808-SDD-RLB, 2019 WL 2774324 (M.D. La. July 2, 2019)

(explaining that the attorney’s fee cap pertains to an action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any

jail, prison, or correctional facility; the plaintiff here was not a prisoner at the time of suit so the PLRA did

not apply to her federal claims).

46 Rec. Doc. Nos. 109, 113.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is hereby

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is hereby awarded $12,500 in attorneys’

fees and $598 for expert costs. In accordance with Local Rule 54(a), the Court will refer

the matter of taxable costs and expenses to the Clerk of Court’s Office.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on December 11, 2023.

S

CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA