The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHARON LEWIS, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff
VERSUS NO. 21-198-SM-RLB
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL
AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE,
Defendant
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Emotional Distress
Damages, Punitive Damages, and Damages in Excess of Statutory Caps1 filed by
Defendant, Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College (the “Board”). The motion is unopposed. For the reasons that follow,
the motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The history of this case is set forth extensively in prior Orders and Reasons.2 The
Court recounts only the procedural history relevant to this motion.
On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint, in which she
alleges she was terminated from her employment at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)
in retaliation after she reported allegations of sexual misconduct by certain LSU
employees.3 Plaintiff brought claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
1 R. Doc. 425.
2 See, e.g., R. Doc. 254.
3 See generally R. Doc. 219.
(“Title IX”)4 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),5 and she sought, in
connection with those claims, damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and
compensatory damages.6 She sought “an amount of no less than $50,000,000,” to include
“legal interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”7
The Board filed this motion on October 11, 2023.8 Plaintiff’s response in opposition
was due on or before November 1, 2023,9 but no response was filed by that time. In an
email to the Court, Plaintiff’s counsel advised Plaintiff “will not oppose” this motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a district court may dismiss
a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
if the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support her his claim that would
entitle her to relief.10 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”11
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”12 However, the court does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere
conclusory statements,13 and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading
as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”14 “[T]hreadbare
4 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
6 See, e.g., R. Doc. 219 at ¶¶ 16, 93, 302, 306, 313, 308, and at p. 70 (Plaintiff’s Plea for Damages and
Remedies).
7 Id. at pp. 71–72.
8 See R. Doc. 425.
9 See M.D. La. Local Civ. Rule 7(f).
10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Court of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or
“naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.15
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Board makes three arguments in its motion. First, Plaintiff’s claims for
emotional distress damages and punitive damages under Title IX are barred by case law;
second, her claims for punitive damages under Title VII are barred by statute; and third,
her claims for compensatory damages under Title VII are in excess of that law’s statutory
limits. Each of these arguments is correct.
I. Plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress damages and punitive
damages under Title IX are barred by Supreme Court case law.
Title IX is a so-called “Spending Clause” statute, enacted by Congress “[p]ursuant
to its authority” under the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution16 to ‘fix the terms on
which it shall disburse federal money.’”17 Receipts of “federal financial assistance” under
Title IX and other Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes18 are prohibited “from
discriminating based on certain protected grounds.”19 By “conditioning an offer of federal
funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate,” a Spending Clause statute like
Title IX is “essentially . . . a contract between the Government and the recipient of
funds.”20
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted).
16 U.S. Const. art. I § 8 cl. 1.
17 Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 217 (2022) (quoting Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
18 See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids race, color, and national
origin discrimination in federally funded programs or activities); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act,
which forbids funding recipients from discriminating because of disability); 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (the
Affordable Care Act, which forbids healthcare entities that receive federal funds from discriminating on the
same grounds as Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as age).
19 Cummings, 596 U.S. at 217–18.
20 Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998).
Under these Spending Clause statutes, a federal funding recipient is only liable to
a plaintiff for those remedies for which the recipient has “clear notice regarding the
liability.”21 The Supreme Court previously explained that a “recipient may be considered
on notice that it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant
legislation,” that is, by the terms of the legislative contract, “but also to those remedies
traditionally available in suits for breach of contract.”22
Title IX, like certain other Spending Clause statues, is “silent as to available
remedies,” so instead, any remedy must be that “traditionally available in suits for breach
of contract.”23 Accordingly, in last year’s Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,24
the Supreme Court ruled that because “[i]t is hornbook law that “emotional distress is
generally not compensable in contract,” such “damages are not recoverable under”
Spending Clause statutes like Title IX.25
The Board correctly argues that Plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress and related
damages “are not recoverable as a matter of law under Title IX.”26 Accordingly, the Court
dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress damages under Title IX.
Similarly, by the same analogy to contract, the Supreme Court long ago held that
punitive damages, “generally not available for breach of contract,” are not available under
Spending Clause nondiscrimination statutes.27 Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under Title IX.
21 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
22 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002).
23 Id.
24 596 U.S. 212 (2022).
25 Id. at 230.
26 R. Doc. 425-1 at p. 6.
27 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187–88.
II. Plaintiff cannot recover for punitive damages under Title VII
against the Board, a governmental unit, because Title VII bars
claims for punitive damages against governmental units.
Defendant, the Board, is “an instrumentality of the State of Louisiana.”28 Though
“[t]he [Civil Rights] Act allows plaintiffs asserting a Title VII claim to recover
compensatory and punitive damages” in certain circumstances,29 “[t]he Act precludes
plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages against governments, government agencies,
and political subdivisions.”30 Because the Board is a governmental unit, Plaintiff cannot
recover Title VII punitive damages against it.31 The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
for such damages.
III. Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages under Title VII are
subject to the statutory cap on such damages.
Unlike her claims for emotional distress damages under Title IX,32 Plaintiff may
recover for emotional distress damages under Title VII,33 and the Board concedes as
much.34 However, the Board correctly argues that Plaintiff’s “claims for compensatory
damages, including emotional distress damages, are subject” to the limits provided by
statute. Those limits correlate to a Title VII defendant’s number of employees. In this case,
28 Pegues v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., CV 18-2407, 2018 WL
4076385, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2018); see also Pastorek v. Trail, 248 F.3d 1140 (5th Cir. 2001)
(unpublished table decision) (“[T]he LSU Board is an ‘arm of the state.’” (quotation omitted)); La. Const.
art. VIII, § 7.1; see also R. Doc. 107 at pp. 10–12 (again noting that the Louisiana constitution creates the
Board and state law provides that in actions against the university, which are actions against a state
instrumentality, the Board is the proper party to be sued).
29 Oden v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 246 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
30 Id. at 465-466 (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), which provides that a plaintiff may not
recover punitive damages against “a government, government agency or political subdivision”).
31 See, e.g. Wallace v. Bd. of Supervisors for the Univ. of La. Sys., 2016 WL 7116107, at *8 (M.D. La. Dec. 6,
2016) (plaintiff conceded Title VII punitive damages unavailable against a political subdivision); Tureaud
v. Grambling State Univ., 2005 WL 81167346, at *5 (W.D. La. Aug. 26, 2005) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims
for punitive damages under Title VII against a university, a governmental entity not subject to punitive
damages under Title VII).
32 See Part I, supra.
33 42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (permitting compensatory damages like emotional distress damages).
34 See R. Doc. 425-1 at p. 7.
the limit is the highest available amount of compensatory damages, $300,000.35
Plaintiffs claim for emotional distress damages under Title VII in excess of the statutory
cap will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the controlling case law and statutory provisions, as provided
above;
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for emotional distress damages under Title
IX is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under
Title [x is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under
Title VII is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for emotional distress
damages under Title VII in excess of the statutory maximum is dismissed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of November, 2023.
Sse Seah _
SUSIE MOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
35 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (setting the cap for compensatory damages at $300,000 “in the case of a
respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year). The Court takes judicial notice that Louisiana State University meets this
description. The Board also concedes the same. R. Doc. 425-1 at p. 8.