The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KEITH A. EVANS CIVIL ACTION NO.
VERSUS 19-542-SDD-RLB
EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
SCHOOL BOARD
RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative
Motion for New Trial1 filed by Plaintiff, Keith A. Evans (“Evans”). Defendant, East Baton
Rouge Parish School Board (the “School Board”) filed an Opposition.2 For the reasons
set forth below, Evans’ Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Following a three-day jury trial in this employment discrimination matter, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the School Board, concluding that former teacher Evans
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his treatment and termination
were unlawful.3 Within 28 days of the entry of the Judgment,4 Evans filed the pending
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial, and the
School Board filed its response.5
Evans argues that an amendment to the judgment or, in the alternative, a new trial
is warranted because the great weight of the evidence presented at trial is so
1 Rec. Doc. 106.
2 Rec. Doc. 107.
3 Rec. Doc. 103.
4 Rec. Doc. 104.
5 Rec. Doc. 106; Rec. Doc. 107.
overwhelmingly in his favor that no jury could have rationally concluded that (1) Evans
did not give the defendant proper notice of the need for time off from work in the 2017-
2018 school year and (2) Evans’ mental impairment did not substantially limit a major life
activity in the 2017-2018 school year. Notably, despite challenging the weight of the
evidence presented at trial, Evans does not cite to a transcript of the proceedings or
otherwise present tangible evidence for the Court’s review. In opposition to the Motion,
the School Board argues that the jury’s verdict was supported by the great weight of the
testimony and evidence presented at trial and cites to various exhibits presented to the
jury.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
“A Rule 59(e) motion ‘calls into question the correctness of a judgment.’”6 A
Rule 59(e) motion “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must
present newly discovered evidence”7 and “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing
evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the
entry of judgment.”8 “‘Manifest error’ is one that ‘is plain and indisputable, and that
amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.’”9 The Fifth Circuit has explained
that reconsideration of a judgment after it has been entered under Rule 59(e) “is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”10 As this Court has explained,
6 Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303
F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002)).
7 Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
8 Templet, 367 F.3d at 478–9 (citing Simon, 891 F.2d at 1159).
9 Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Venegas–Hernandez v. Sonolux
Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004)).
10 Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citing Clancy v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465 (E.D.
La. 2000)).
“[w]hile the district courts do have ‘considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant or
deny a motion to alter a judgment,’ denial of Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend is
favored.”11
Although he submits a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,” Evans fails to argue
or allege any of the above-mentioned grounds.12 Accordingly, the Court shall deny Evans’
Motion to the extent he seeks to alter or amend the judgment.
B. Motion for New Trial
Rule 59(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a district court
“may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any
reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal
court.” It is left to the district court’s “sound discretion” as to whether it will grant or deny
a motion for new trial.13 Although Rule 59(a) does not list specific grounds for a new trial,
the Fifth Circuit has held that a new trial may be granted if “the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or
prejudicial error was committed in its course.”14 When a party moves for a new trial on
evidentiary grounds, the court will not grant a new trial unless “the verdict is against the
great weight of the evidence.”15 Ultimately, the court must view the evidence in “a light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and that the verdict must be affirmed unless the
evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court
11 Brown v. Louisiana State Senate, No. CIV.A. 11-620-SDD, 2013 WL 5603232, at *1 (M.D. La. Oct. 11,
2013) (quoting Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir. 1995)); Schilling v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp.
& Dev., CIV.A. 12-00661-SDD, 2014 WL 5500402, at *1 (M.D. La. Oct. 30, 2014).
12 See Rec. Doc. 106.
13 Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998).
14 Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). See also Kohler
v. Englade, 365 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761 (M.D. La. 2005).
15 Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026.
believes that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary conclusion.”16 “Where the
jury could have reached a number of different conclusions, all of which would have
sufficient support based on the evidence, the jury’s findings will be upheld.”17
Evans contends he is entitled to a new trial because the great weight of the
evidence presented at trial was so overwhelmingly in his favor that it could not support
the jury’s verdict. Specifically, Evans argues that the evidence established that (1) the
School Board was given proper notice of Evans’ need for time off work during the 2017-
2018 school year, and (2) Evans’ disability substantially limited a major life activity in the
2017-2018 school year. For the following reasons, however, the Court finds otherwise.
1. Notice to the School Board of Evans’ Need for Time Off Work
Evans’ first argument ultimately turns on a credibility determination. He relies on
his own testimony to counter the testimony of the School Board’s four witnesses. At trial,
Evans testified that he met with Principal Karen Triche during the summer of 2017 to
inform her that he would continue to need leave in the upcoming 2017-2018 school year
for his mental health condition.18 He testified to having a similar telephone conversation
over the summer with the Supervisor of Personnel Management, Certification, and
Staffing for High Schools at the time, Ms. Daphne Donaldson.19 Evans also argues that if
the jury had determined that notice was provided, the jury would have also found in his
16 Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1989)).
17 Id.
18 Rec. Doc. 106-1, p. 4. The Court notes that arguments contained in briefs and made by counsel are not
evidence. D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2010).
Nevertheless, for the sake of this Ruling, the Court will rely on the assertions of the parties and on the
Court’s own recollection of the events that took place at trial.
19 Id.
favor regarding the School Board’s liability for terminating his employment in violation of
the FMLA.20
The School Board’s four witnesses, including former Principal Triche and
Ms. Donaldson, testified to exchanging emails, holding telephone conversations, and
attending meetings with Evans during the summer of 2017 through the beginning of the
2017-2018 school year. However, the witnesses testified that Evans never mentioned
FMLA leave or a disability accommodation. Instead, they claimed that Evans merely
expressed his unhappiness about his reassignment from a Special Education Inclusion
teacher to a Social Studies teacher.21
Evans contends that his own conflicting testimony should be given greater weight
than that of the witnesses. He is essentially dissatisfied with the jury’s weighing of
evidence and determination of witness credibility. However, the Fifth Circuit has stated
that these are not valid grounds upon which to grant a new trial or alter a judgment.22
Evans also provided evidence of a computer printout from August 3, 2017 showing
approval of his sick leave for August 9 to August 16, 2017.23 However, this was merely
an internal record of sick leave taken, and it fails to support Evans’ statement that he
informed anyone of his need for FMLA leave.
For these reasons, Evans has failed to meet his burden of showing that the verdict
regarding his failure to notify the School Board was against the great weight of the
evidence at trial. Based on the evidence presented, the jury could have reached a number
of different conclusions about whether Evans provided sufficient notice to the School
20 Rec. Doc. 106-1, p. 6.
21 Id.
22 Bovie-Clark v. Sentry Select Ins. Co., 568 F. App’x 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished).
23 Rec. Doc. 101, Pla-6.
Board. Accordingly, Evans has failed to prove that the overwhelming weight of the
evidence would support a finding in his favor or that a new trial is warranted.
2. Disability Substantially Limiting a Major Life Activity
As for Evans’ second argument, the evidence presented at trial supported the
jury’s verdict finding that Evans’ disability did not substantially limit a major life activity in
the 2017-2018 school year. Evans’ claim that, “had the jury properly rendered a finding
that plaintiff suffered from a mental impairment that substantially affected a major life
activity . . . the jury also would have more likely than not rendered findings that the
defendant failed to accommodate his disability,” is also unsubstantiated.
The jury was instructed to consider whether Evans’s “impairment substantially
limits his ability to care for himself, sleep, learn, read, concentrate, think, communicate,
or work” and to “compare [his] ability to perform these activities with that of the average
person.”24 While Evans claims the testimony of his physician established that his mental
impairment had a negative effect on his ability to sleep, concentrate, and work at school,
Evans is essentially hinging his argument on another credibility determination. Although
the testimony of Evans’ physician addresses negative effects of his condition, given the
evidence, the jury could have concluded either way regarding whether those effects were
substantial compared to an average person. Evans cites to no further evidence to prove
that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
Additionally, Evans’ testimony at trial conflicted with that of the School Board’s four
witnesses regarding whether Evans told administrators that that he needed a transfer or
24 Rec. Doc. 106-1, p. 7.
reassignment as an accommodation for disability or due to stress and anxiety.25 Evans
failed to prove that the overwhelming weight of the evidence would support a finding in
his favor for a new trial. Accordingly, Evans’ motion for new trial shall be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Keith Evans’ Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial26 is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on October 25, 2023.
S
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
25 Rec. Doc. 101, Joint-5, 6-23-2017 correspondence regarding reassignment; Def-15, June 28, 2017-July
10, 2017 emails regarding reassignment; Joint-8, letter of confirmation re 8-18-17 meeting.
26 Rec. Doc. 106.