In Re: Chester J Marine, LLC, as Owner and Operator of the M/V Cecile A. Fitch, Official No. 297854

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN THE MATTER OF YAZOO RIVER CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-214-JWD-SDJ

TOWING, INC., AS OWNER AND c/w 20-252-JWD-SDJ

OPERATOR OF THE TWO BOAT

MELVINL. KING, AND ITS ENGINES, JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

MACHINERY, GEAR, TACKLE,

APPAREL AND ITS SKIFF AND ALL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SCOTT D.

OTHER APPURENANCES, PETITIONING JOHNSON

FOR EXONERATION FROM AND/OR

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. On February 10, 2020, the skiff of the M/V MELVIN L. KING (the “KING”) sank

in the Port Allen Route between the Bayou Sorrel and the Port Allen Locks as four crew members

of the KING traveled in the skiff from a bar to the KING.1 During this tragic incident, Lloyd “Ray”

Standridge (“Standridge”) and another crew member, Norsalus Jackson (“Jackson”), drowned.2

2. The KING is an inland towboat owned and operated by Yazoo River Towing, Inc.

(“YRT”).3 The surviving members of Standridge’s family (“Standridge Claimants” or

“Claimants”) allege that the skiff sank when it was struck by barges being pushed by the inland

push tug M/V CECILE A. FITCH (“CECILE”).4

1 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 3–7, Established Facts 1, 21, 45–48. Unless indicated otherwise, all references to

docket numbers are in Case No. 3:20-cv-214.

2 Id. at 6, Established Fact 49.

3 Id. at 4, Established Fact 20.

4 Id. at 1.

3. The CECILE is owned by Limitation Complainant, Chester J. Marine, LLC

(“CJM”).5

4. YRT not only owned the KING and its skiff6 but also employed the KING’s six-

person crew, which consisted of: Captain Billy Evans (“Evans”), Captain (or Pilot) 7 Standridge,

engineer Shannon Lashbrook (“Lashbrook”), mate Jamie May (“May”), and deckhands Jackson

and Austin Winemiller (“Winemiller”).8

5. The facts and circumstances leading up to and surrounding this tragedy, and who

is to blame, are hotly contested issues.

6. Claimants filed suit against CJM, YRT, and LeBeouf Bros. Towing, LLC in the

18th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Iberville, State of Louisiana⎯in the matter entitled

Charlotte Standridge, individually and as personal representative for the Estate of Lloyd

Standridge, Ashley Standridge and Aaron Standridge v. Yazoo River Towing, Inc., Chester J

Marine, LLC and LeBeouf Bros. Towing, LLC, Proceeding No. 79717-A.

7. Thereafter, on April 8, 2020 and April 29, 2020, CJM and YRT respectively

initiated separate limitation proceedings before this Court.9 On July 17, 2020, the cases were

5 Id. at 3, Established Fact 2.

6 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 149, 171 (YRT’s corporate representative Patrick Smith). See also Doc.

320, Pretrial Order, at 4, Established Facts 20–21.

7 At trial, the parties disputed the hierarchy of the crew aboard the KING and whether Evans or Standridge

was the vessel’s captain. Claimants argue that Evans was the captain and Standridge was the pilot. (See, e.g.,

Doc. 360, Claimant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereafter “CPFFCOL”), at 7, ¶ 14.)

CJM argues that they were both Captains. (See, e.g., Doc. 367, CJM’s Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (hereafter “CJM’s PFFCOL”), at 6, ¶ 2.) The Court finds that it need not resolve this

factual dispute since, in either event, the Court’s ruling is the same.

8 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 5, Established Facts 26, 27.

9 See generally Case No. 3:20-cv-214, Doc. 1, CJM’s complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability;

Case No. 3:20-cv-252, Doc. 1, YRT’s verified complaint.

consolidated.10 Claimants, Charlotte Standridge, individually and as the personal representative

for the Estate of Lloyd Standridge, Ashley Standridge, and Aaron Standridge, asserted claims in

both CJM’s and YRT’s limitation actions.11 So did Catina McCloud-Smith, suing for the wrongful

death decedent Jackson,12⎯who was later substituted by Shayla Wright.13

8. On June 29, 2021, the Court bifurcated the issues to be tried to the bench in the

limitation trial.14 Specifically, the Court held that “[t]he issue of liability, limitation and

apportionment of fault will be tried to this Court in connection with the limitation proceeding.”15

9. The case was tried to the bench January 9, 2023, through January 12, 2023.16

II. PARTIES TO THE LIMITATION TRIAL

A. Limitation Petitioner

10. CJM is the only remaining limitation petitioner in this case.

11. CJM is a limited liability company established under the laws of the State of

Louisiana.17

12. CJM is the owner and operator of the CECILE.

10 Case No. 3:20-cv-214, Doc. 21, minute entry containing the Court’s order consolidating cases.

11 Case No. 3:20-cv-214, Doc. 13, the Standridge Claimants’ claims in CJM’s limitation case; Case No. 3:20-

cv-252, Doc. 13, the Standridge Claimants’ claims in Yazoo’s limitation case.

12 Case No. 20-cv-214, Doc. 12, Ms. McCloud-Smith’s claims in CJM’s limitation case; Case No. 3:20-cv-252,

Doc. 11, Ms. McCloud-Smith’s claims in YRT’s limitation case.

13 Case No. 3:20-cv-214, Doc. 49, minute entry substituting Catina McCloud-Smith with Shayla Wright in both

limitation actions.

14 Id., Doc. 101, minute entry reflecting the Court’s bifurcation ruling.

15 Id.

16 Docs. 351–54, Trial Transcripts, Vols. 1–4.

17 Doc. 1, at 1, ¶ 1.

13. The sole owner of CJM is Captain Larry Fitch.18

B. Limitation Claimants

14. The Standridge Claimants are the only remaining limitation claimants in this action.

C. Non-Parties to Limitation Trial

15. On September 6, 2022, the limitation claimant Shayla Wright, as personal

representative of decedent Jackson, notified the Court that she settled all of her claims against CJM

and YRT.19 On December 12, 2022, the Standridge Claimants notified the Court that they settled

all of their claims against YRT.20 In light of these settlements, the only remaining parties in this

limitation trial are the Standridge Claimants and CJM.

16. The Court must determine whether CJM is at fault in causing the accident and, if

so, whether it is entitled to limit its liability. If at fault, the Court must apportion fault among the

various parties and non-parties who may have been involved in causing this accident including

CJM, Standridge, and YRT (independently or vicariously through its employees Evans and May).

D. General Facts Leading Up to the Accident

17. As stated above, this matter involves the loss of two lives in a maritime accident,

which occurred on February 10, 2020, on the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway Morgan City—Port

Allen Route between the Bayou Sorrel locks and the Port Allen locks. While the exact location is

unknown,21 it is stipulated that the incident “occurred somewhere between the KING’s location

18 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 12–13 (Captain Fitch).

19 Doc. 230, the Jackson claimants’ Notice of Settlement. See also Doc. 231, minute entry reflecting the Court’s

conditional dismissal in light of the settlement.

20 Doc. 317, the Standridge Claimants’ Notice of Settlement.

21 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 6, Established Fact 51.

and Jack Miller’s” Landing, a convenience store and bar “located about 1.6 miles north of where

the KING was tied off . . . .”22

18. At the time of the accident, the KING was pushed up against the right-descending

bank of the Port Allen Route at approximately Mile Marker 41.4, facing southbound.23 As stated

above, the KING was manned by a crew of six: Captains Standridge and Evans, mate May,

engineer Lashbrook, and deckhands Winemiller and Jackson. Captains Standridge and Evans were

both U.S. Coast Guard-licensed captains. May was a licensed tankerman.

19. The KING was equipped with an auxiliary vessel, referred to as a “skiff.” The skiff

was an appurtenance of the KING.24 The skiff was “a small, flat-hulled open boat with an outboard

kill-switch motor[,]”25 which had a 500-pound weight limit for passengers.26

20. It is undisputed that at approximately 5:35 p.m. or 5:40 p.m., Standridge, May,

Winemiller, and Jackson took the skiff and travelled to Jack Miller’s Landing, a grocery store and

bar.27

21. Both sides agree that Standridge, Jackson, May, and Winemiller spent slightly more

than two hours drinking at Jack Miller’s Landing.28 Both sides agree that at some point after 8:20

p.m. when they left the bar, the KING’s skiff, with May at the controls, began its return voyage to

22 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 5, Established Fact 30. See also id., Established Fact 29.

23 Id. at 4, Established Fact 19.

24 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 171, Testimony of Patrick Smith.

25 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 4, Established Fact 21.

26 Id., Established Fact 24.

27 Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 7, ¶ 15; Doc. 367, CJM’s PFFCOL, at 8, ¶ 13.

28 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 6, Established Fact 42.

the KING traveling south and that the occupants of the skiff, including Standridge and May, were

drunk.29

22. Both sides agree that at this time, the CECILE was headed north in the direction of

Jack Miller’s Landing and that its captain, Larry Fitch, was at the helm.30

23. Both sides agree that, before reaching the KING, the skiff sank, and Standridge and

Jackson drowned.31 The parties agree that, again, while “[t]he exact location of the incident . . . is

unknown . . ., it is established that it occurred somewhere between the KING’s location and Jack

Miller’s.”32

24. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the CECILE collided with the skiff

and, even if it did, whether the CECILE was at fault.

E. Allegations of the Parties

25. The Standridge Claimants allege that, as the CECILE was proceeding north on the

Port Allen Route between the Bayou Sorrel Locks and the Port Allen Locks, its tow struck the

skiff, which was heading south.33 According to Claimants, the occupants were thrown into the

water resulting in the deaths of Standridge and Jackson. Originally, Claimants alleged that the

29 See, e.g., Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 6–7, Established Facts 42, 58, 59. See also Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 8,

¶ 14 (“It is undisputed that the skiff crew got intoxicated while at Jack Miller’s landing.”); Doc. 367, CJM’s

PFFCOL at 8–9, ¶¶ 14–17; 15–17, ¶¶ 37–41.

30 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 3–4, Established Facts 5, 8, 10, 16, 17.

31 Id. at 6, Established Facts 48–49.

32 Id., Established Fact 51.

33 Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 11, ¶ 24.

negligence of CJM and YRT caused Standridge’s death.34 Following their settlement with YRT,

Claimants contend that CJM is solely at fault.35

26. Claimants argue that CJM and its owner Captain Larry Fitch were negligent

because Fitch failed to see and avoid the skiff when, had he been acting with due care, he could

and should have been able to do so. Specifically, Claimants argue that Fitch was negligent in a)

being responsible for too many tasks simultaneously causing him to be overworked, fatigued,

distracted, and inattentive;36 b) failing to post an additional lookout at the head of the tow or

elsewhere;37 and c) failing to have the requisite number of radar devices and/or failing to properly

calibrate and/or monitor the radar that was on board the CECILE.38

27. CJM, on the other hand, submits that it should be completely exonerated from

fault.39 CJM does not concede that the CECILE collided the KING’s skiff,40 but, even if it did, it

argues it was not negligent in doing so because the CECILE’s captain (and owner) Fitch piloted

the vessel with due care and could not reasonably have seen or avoided the unlit skiff.41

Furthermore, whether an additional lookout should have been posted is left to the sound discretion

of the captain, and in this case there was no abuse of that discretion because there was no need for

34 Case No. 3:20-cv-252, Doc. 13, the Standridge Claimants’ answer and claim in the YTR Limitation.

35 See generally Doc. 360, CPFFCOL.

36 Id. at 15–8, ¶¶ 36–40.

37 Id. at 19–31, ¶¶ 46–66.

38 Id. at 32–37, ¶¶ 67–75. The Court notes that while Claimants also suggested in prior briefing that there may

have been “an issue” with the CECILE’s lights (Doc. 355 at 10), the Court finds that this suggestion is totally

without merit.

39 See generally Doc. 367, CJM’s PFFCOL.

40 Id. at 15, ¶ 32.

41 See, e.g., id. at 18–21, ¶¶ 44–54.

an additional lookout.42 As to the CECILE’s radar, CJM maintains it was calibrated properly and

was used reasonably and in a manner consistent with the Rules of the Road and CJM’s Towing

Safety Management System (“TSMS”).43 Furthermore, it argues there was no requirement or need

for a second radar.44

28. CJM insists that Standridge should bear the majority of fault for his role in

organizing the fatal trip to Jack Miller’s Landing, permitting and encouraging his subordinates to

drink to the point of intoxication while on the job, breaching his duties to adhere to United States

Coast Guard Inland Navigation Rules (the “Rules of the Road”), and failing to act as a prudent,

licensed mariner. CJM also submits that YRT should bear all remaining liability for the conduct

of its other employees that night (primarily Captain Evans and mate Jamie May) because its skiff

was operating in the center of a navigable waterway, had no lights, was overloaded, all in violation

of numerous Rules of the Road,45 and finally, because the incident was the direct and predictable

result of YRT’s pervasive culture of allowing its employees to use drugs and alcohol while on the

job.46

III. ISSUES

29. Five main issues were raised at trial:

1) Did the CECILE collide with the KING’s skiff?

42 Doc. 367, CJM’s PFFCOL, at 20–21, ¶¶ 51–54.

43 Exhibit 39, CJM’s Safety Management Manual, at 888. The Court notes that, unless otherwise indicated,

references to Exhibits are meant to refer to Joint Exhibits, which were submitted jointly by both parties. A

list of those exhibits is found at Doc. 313.

44 Doc. 367, CJM’s PFFCOL, at 21–24, ¶¶ 55–63.

45 Id. at 24–27, ¶¶ 65–71.

46 Id. at 28–32, ¶¶ 78–87; id. at 44–46, ¶¶ 130–33.

2) If so, was CJM at fault in causing the collision?

3) If CJM was at fault, is it entitled to limit its liability?

4) If CJM was at fault in causing the collision, were others also at fault in a way that

proximately caused the Standridge’s death including Standridge himself and YRT,

either independently or vicariously through the actions of its employees May and

Evans?

5) If CJM and others were at fault, what is the appropriate apportionment of fault

among the remaining parties and non-parties?

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

30. The Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. For any

finding of fact that is more appropriately considered a conclusion of law, it will be deemed as such.

For any conclusion of law more appropriately considered a finding of fact, it will be deemed as

such.

31. Because the Court finds that CJM was not at fault, it need not consider issues 3–5.

A. Did the CECILE collide with the KING’s skiff?

32. The overwhelming evidence shows that the CECILE’s tow collided with the skiff.

33. On February 10, 2020, the CECILE was proceeding north pushing empty barges on

the Port Allen Route towards Baton Rouge.47 At about 8:27 p.m., the CECILE passed the KING

heading in the direction of Jack Miller’s Landing.48 At 8:30 p.m., as he was required to do by

47 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 3, Established Fact 5.

48 Exhibit 241, Demonstrative Timeline. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 211–12, 254–55 (Captain

Rivera).

CJM’s TSMS,49 Fitch recorded in the CECILE’s rough handwritten log that an incident occurred

at 8:30 p.m.50 The Coast Guard determined that the incident happened around 8:30 p.m.51

34. The evidence at trial showed that, besides the CECILE, there were only two other

vessels that transited the Port Allen Route between the location of the KING and Jack Miller’s

Landing during the relevant timeframe:52 the CROCKETT and the AMERICAN FREEDOM.53

35. However, the evidence also showed that neither of these two vessels could have

possibly collided with the skiff. Surveillance videos obtained from Jack Miller’s Landing and

Verret Shipyard54—located about 0.1 mile south of Jack Miller’s Landing55—show that the

CROCKETT could not have struck the skiff because the skiff crew was still at Jack Miller’s

Landing at 7:50 p.m. when the CROCKETT passed the area at 7:47 p.m.56 And the AMERICAN

FREEDOM could not have been involved in the collision because it was trailing 40 minutes behind

49 Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS (entitled “Safety Management Manual”), section 5.1, at TBS000707.

See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 215–17 (Captain Rivera). According to the testimony of CJM’s

expert Captain Schropp, Coast Guard regulations require that “[t]owing vessels with a Towing SMS must be

operated in accordance with the TSMS applicable to the vessel.” (Doc. 354, Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 38).

50 Exhibit 31, the CECILE’s rough log. See also Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 7, Established Fact 54; Doc. 351,

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 214–15 (Captain Rivera); id. at 86 (Captain Fitch). For whatever reason, the

8:30 p.m. entry in the rough log reporting an incident was not transferred to the CECILE’s final digital log.

Although Fitch offered different explanations as to why this was not done, the Court found these

unsatisfactory.

51 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 217 (Captain Rivera); id. at 81 (Captain Fitch).

52 Id. at 207–08 (Captain Rivera).

53 Id. See also Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 4, Established Fact 18.

54 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 5, Established Facts 34–35.

55 Id., Established Fact 34.

56 Exhibit 241, Demonstrative Timeline. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 207–12 (Captain

Rivera); Exhibit 19, the video from Jack Miller’s Landing (cam 5); Exhibit 17, the video from Verret

Shipyard.

the CECILE and did not pass the KING until after 8:44 p.m.57—at which time the collision had

already occurred (as confirmed by the fact that the crew’s life jackets were found in the CECILE’s

tow).

36. In addition, the skiff and its crew left Jack Miller’s Landing at approximately 7:52–

8:00 p.m. They boarded the skiff and proceeded south towards the KING. At the same time, the

CECILE was heading north towards Jack Miller’s Landing58 and, as noted above, passed the KING

around 8:27–8:35 p.m. This then put the CECILE at the time and place where this incident

occurred.

37. The Court’s conclusion is also supported by damage to the skiff.59 In addition, it is

supported by the surviving witnesses to this incident: mate May and deckhand Winemiller who

both testified that they were struck by a barge or saw a “black wall” coming towards them.60 This

is consistent with what they reported to the investigator when interviewed shortly after it occurred

(i.e., they were hit by a boat or tow).61

38. Furthermore, the call log for 911 dispatch shows that it was repeatedly reported that

the crew members in the skiff were “ran over by a barge” and “hit by a barge.”62

57 Exhibit 241, Demonstrative Timeline. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 217–19 (testimony of

Captain Jay Rivera); Exhibit 17, the video from Verret Shipyard.

58 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 211–12 (Captain Rivera). See also Exhibit 241, demonstrative timeline.

59 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 186–87 (YRT’s corporate representative Patrick Smith), 219–20

(Captain Rivera); Exhibit 24, photos of the skiff.

60 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 83–84 (Captain Rivera); Exhibit 131, Winemiller’s drawing of the

collision; Doc. 354, Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 29, 48–49 (Captain Schropp).

61 See, e.g., Exhibit 8, Iberville Parish Sheriff’s Office report, at CJM 1077. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript,

Vol. 1, at 124–26 (deputy Mascaro).

62 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 124–26 (deputy Mascaro). See also Exhibit 8, Command Logs of

Iberville Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness, at CJM 36 (“Hit by a barge”; “He remembers a barge

coming over on top of them and then he popped out of the water.”).

39. Compelling evidence that the CECILE’s tow struck the skiff came by way of

testimony that two life jackets being worn by the skiff’s crew at the time of the incident and bearing

the KING’s insignia were found stuck between the barges in the CECILE’s tow.63

40. The Court’s conclusion is also supported by the expert testimony of Captain Jay

Rivera which, on this point, the Court found credible and persuasive.64

41. CJM has suggested that something other than its vessel and tow caused the skiff to

sink. The Court is not persuaded. CJM’s expert Captain Samuel Schropp testified that the skiff

may have collided with sheet-piling bulkheads in the area.65 Given the lack of corroborating

evidence, 66 and in light of the mountain of evidence to the contrary outlined above, the Court finds

this testimony speculative and rejects it.

42. In conclusion, the Court finds that the great weight of the evidence shows that the

CECILE’s tow collided with YRT’s skiff on February 10, 2020, at around 8:30 p.m.

B. Was CJM negligent in colliding with the KING’s skiff?

43. As mentioned above, Claimants posit three main reasons why CJM is alone

responsible for the collision: a) undertaking to perform too many tasks simultaneously causing him

to be overworked, fatigued, distracted, and inattentive;67 b) failing to post an additional lookout at

the head of the tow or elsewhere;68 c) failing to have the requisite number of radar devices and/or

63 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 7, Established Fact 55. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 138 (deputy

Mascaro) where May and Winemiller told Deputy Mancuso that they had been wearing their life jackets

before the accident; id. at 218–19 (Captain Rivera).

64 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 218–20

65 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 202–05.

66 Doc. 354, Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 48–49 (Schropp concedes he has no evidence to support his theory).

67 Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 15–18, ¶¶ 36–40.

68 Id. at 19–31, ¶¶ 46–66.

failing to properly calibrate and/or monitor the radar that was on board the CECILE.69 These three

allegations will be considered in turn, but, in conclusion, the Court finds that CJM was not

negligent in causing the collision.

1. Was Fitch distracted and inattentive because he was overworked and

fatigued by undertaking too many jobs?

44. In sum, Claimants argue that Fitch, in violation of CJM’s TSMS, was acting in

multiple capacities and performing multiple duties which should have been performed by multiple

persons with the result that he was fatigued, distracted, or inattentive, resulting in his failure to see

and avoid the skiff.70

45. Fitch is the sole owner of CJM.71 At the time of the incident, Fitch was

simultaneously acting as vessel owner, vessel captain, and the shoreside management office for

CJM.72 In addition, he was acting as the wheelman on watch and “the sole lookout.”73 Claimants

argue that this violated, inter alia, 46 C.F.R, § 15.705(d), which prohibits a captain from working

more than 12 hours a day absent an emergency.74 Claimants contend that operating a vessel in this

manner created an unsafe condition, which rendered Fitch unable to keep a proper lookout as

required by federal regulations.75

69 Id. at 32–37, ¶¶ 67–75.

70 Id. at 15–18, ¶¶ 36–40.

71 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 24 (Captain Fitch).

72 Id. at 24–25. See also Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 3–4, Established Facts 3–4, 13–14, 16.

73 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 135 (Captain Fitch).

74 46 C.F.R. § 15.705(d). See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 222–26 (Captain Rivera).

75 Exhibit 239, Captain Rivera’s expert report, at 14.

46. Claimants acknowledge they offered no evidence as to the number of hours Fitch

or other crew members worked aboard the CECILE or whether CJM complied with federal

limitations regarding those hours.76 However, Claimants contend that CJM violated 46 C.F.R.

§ 138.205(b)(3) by failing to conduct performance evaluations on the crew to ensure compliance

with the company’s TSMS.77

47. Claimants maintain further that Fitch was required to designate a person ashore

(“DPA”) who had the responsibility to “continuously” perform certain functions, such as ensuring

that the TSMS was being enforced, monitoring the safety and maintenance aspects of operating

the CECILE, providing adequate resources and “shore-based” support, etc.78 At the time of the

incident and despite the fact that Fitch was aboard the CECILE and acting as its captain, wheelman,

and lookout, he was simultaneously acting as the CECILE’s DPA.79

48. The Court finds that Fitch was not in violation of 46 C.F.R. § 15.705(d) for working

more than 12 hours straight. Indeed, Claimant’s expert Jay Rivera conceded that Fitch had been

on duty for only two and a half hours when the CECILE was between the KING and Jack Miller’s

Landing.80 Rivera also admitted he had seen no medical evidence that Fitch was fatigued.81

76 Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 16–17, ¶ 38.

77 Id. See also Exhibit 28, the CECILE’s audit, at CJM000544. See also Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at

147–50 (Captain Fitch); Doc. 354, Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 57–59 (Captain Schropp).

78 Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS, section 4.1, at TBS000701-2; section 4.3, at TBS000703.

79 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 24–25 (Captain Fitch); id. at 222 (Captain Rivera).

80 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 48 (Captain Rivera).

81 Id.

49. Although Claimants made much of phone records showing that Fitch had used his

cell phone during this period of time,82 Rivera acknowledged that the evidence only showed that

Fitch made a “butt dial” some 15 minutes before the earliest estimate of the time of the accident.83

This could not have played a role in the accident.

50. The Court concludes that even if Claimants are correct that Fitch was violating

CJM’s TSMS in acting as the company’s DPA and performing multiple duties aboard the vessel

(including acting as lookout),84 Claimants failed to prove that this caused him to be unduly

fatigued, distracted, or inattentive at the time of the collision with the skiff or that this otherwise

caused or contributed to the collision.

2. Should Fitch Have Posted an Additional Lookout?

51. In sum, Claimants argue that, given the prevailing conditions, Fitch was negligent

for failing to post an additional lookout at the head of the tow or elsewhere.85 Claimants argue that

Fitch’s failure to so was a violation of CJM’s TSMS86 as well as Inland Navigation Rule 5, 33

C.F.R. § 83.05.87

82 Claimants argue that CJM’s TSMS prohibited the use of cell phones while navigating a vessel and

specifically prohibited the use of cell phones while transiting narrow waterways. It also states that “[a] look-

out shall never have a cell phone while on duty.” Claimants maintain that, while transiting a narrow waterway

and serving as (the only) lookout, Captain Fitch used his cell phone—within minutes from this incident—in

violation of the TSMS policy designed to ensure that the person acting as a lookout pays full and undivided

attention to safe navigation of the vessel. Claimant points the Court to the trial testimony of CJM’s expert

Captain Samuel Schropp who conceded that Captain Fitch did not act as a prudent lookout while on watch

on February 10, 2020, because of his cell phone use. (Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 24–25, ¶ 56, citing Doc. 354,

Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 41–43).

83 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 38–39. (Captain Rivera).

84 Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS, at TBS 001018 (“Lookouts should be well rested, have no other duties,

and receive periodic training on proper lookout procedures.” (emphasis added)).

85 See generally Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 19–31, ¶¶ 46–66.

86 See, e.g., id. at 28–29, ¶¶ 62–63.

87 See, e.g., id. at 31, ¶ 65.

52. CJM counters that under the prevailing conditions, Fitch’s decision to act as his

only lookout was reasonable, ordinary, and consistent with CJM’s TSMS and Rule 5.88

53. Both the Inland Navigation Rule 5 and Chester Marine’s own TSMS required Fitch,

while at the helm of the CECILE, to see what was around him at all times and to keep a proper

lookout.89 Captain Fitch conceded this, although he insisted that, under the prevailing

circumstances, an additional lookout was not needed.90

54. Keeping a “proper” lookout by sight and hearing while navigating a vessel is

obviously important in order to avoid colliding with other vessels and objects in the vicinity.91

While a captain of the vessel always serves as a lookout, there are circumstances and conditions

when that is insufficient and where additional means of lookout are needed.92 These additional

lookout means may include the proper use of a radar and/or placing another crew member at the

bow of the vessel to perform lookout duties.93

55. To determine whether an additional lookout is necessary, the industry practice as

well as CJM’s TSMS required Captain Fitch to consider⎯among other things⎯the following

factors: (1) visibility, (2) traffic density, (3) the attention necessary when navigating in areas of

increased vessel traffic, and (4) proximity of dangers to navigation.94

88 See, e.g., Doc. 367, CJM’s PFFCOL, at 19–21, ¶¶ 47–54.

89 Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS, section 7.23.4, at TBS001002. See also 33 C.F.R. § 83.05 (Rule 5).

90 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 30–31 (Captain Fitch).

91 Id. at 20–22 (Captain Fitch).

92 E.g., Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS, sections 7.23.5, 7.23.5.1, at TBS001002–03.

93 Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS. See also id. at section 7.28, at TBS001016–17; id. at TBS001019.

94 Id. at section 7.23.5.1, at TBS001003; Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 25 (Captain Fitch).

56. Claimants argue that one of the variables favoring the need for an additional lookout

was how Fitch’s visibility was impacted by the blind spot created by the barges in front of the

CECILE.95

57. While on the Port Allen Route, the CECILE was pushing six empty barges arranged

in a 3 long by 2 wide configuration,96 which were light and floating almost entirely out of the

water.97

58. Each barge was about 200 feet long and 35 feet wide98⎯making the size of the

vessel together with its tow a total of 700 feet in length and 70 feet in width.99 The CECILE’s

wheelhouse was located approximately 615 feet from the front of its tow.100

59. While Fitch testified that the size of his blind spot was approximately 150 to 200

feet,101 Claimants disagreed, offering their expert Rivera’s calculations that the CECILE’s blind

spot was at least twice the size estimated by Fitch⎯i.e., approximately 417 feet.102

60. CJM argues that Rivera’s calculation was based on an inspection made while the

CECILE was on blocks in a shipyard and was using an estimate as to the height of the CECILE’s

95 Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 18–19, ¶¶ 41–45.

96 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 3, Established Fact 5.

97 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 226–27 (Captain Rivera). See also id. at 17–18 (Captain Fitch).

98 Id. at 15–16 (Captain Fitch).

99 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 3, Established Fact 6 (addressing only the size of the tow without the vessel

itself); Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 16–22 (Captain Fitch).

100 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 16–17 (Captain Fitch).

101 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 42–43, 93 (Captain Fitch). See also Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2,

at 23 (Captain Rivera).

102 Exhibit 239, Captain Rivera’s report, at 6. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 227–30 (Captain

Rivera); Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 23 (Captain Rivera).

wheelhouse at the time of the accident, meaning that his calculations could be off.103 Furthermore,

according to CJM’s expert Captain Schropp, it is not customary to place a lookout on the head of

the tow purely to mitigate the blind spot.104

61. The Court has carefully considered the conflicting evidence on this issue and

concludes that, regardless of whether Fitch’s estimate or Rivera’s calculation is correct, Fitch was

reasonable under the existing circumstances not to place an additional lookout at the head of the

tow. While both experts are qualified to provide expert testimony on this issue, the Court finds that

of Captain Schropp more persuasive. Schropp has more actual experience than Rivera in

performing duties identical to those being performed by Fitch. Indeed, Schropp testified that only

16 days after the accident in question, he was at the controls of a tug and tow transiting the exact

waterway where the accident occurred. Like Fitch, he used an additional lookout as he went

through the Bayou Sorrel swing bridge, but “when we cleared the bridge, I called them back to the

boat and they went about their normal duties.”105

62. With respect to the blind spot created by the empty barges, the Court accepts the

testimony of Captain Schropp that, while there may be circumstances when a blind spot will dictate

that an additional lookout be placed at the head of the tow (e.g., entering a lock or going through

a bridge),106 this was not such an occasion. Indeed, Captain Schropp indicated that under ordinary

circumstances like those existing on the night of the accident, he has not used a supplemental

103 Doc. 358, at 16, ¶ 31.

104 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 228–29.

105 Id. at 228. By contrast, Rivera has not operated or been on any boat of any size in the Port Allen Route. Doc.

351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 198.

106 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 228–29.

lookout while pushing tows with a much longer blind spot of 800 to 1000 feet.107 In addition,

Rivera testified that it is possible that the radar might have been able to see into the blind spot

depending on the height of the radar (which is unknown).108

63. As stated above, CJM’s TSMS requires consideration of several factors in

determining whether to use an additional lookout including visibility and anything that may

“affect[ ] or restrict[ ] it.”109

64. Although at the time of the accident it was “pitch-dark”,110 the Court agrees with

CJM111 that darkness is not “restricted visibility” as defined and intended in the Rules of the

Road.112 Even Claimants’ expert Rivera agreed. 113

65. CJM’s TSMS also required Fitch to consider traffic density114 and the attention

necessary when navigating in areas of increased vessel traffic.115 Here, the only vessels the

CECILE met in this stretch of waterway other than the skiff were pushed in and tied up on the

107 Id.

108 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 95 (Captain Rivera).

109 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 22–23, 25–26, 74 (Captain Fitch). See also Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s

TSMS, section 7.23.5.1, at TBS001003.

110 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 74 (Captain Rivera).

111 Doc. 358, CJM’s Reply Memorandum, at 13–15, ¶¶ 25–30.

112 Rule of the Road 3(L), 33 C.F.R. § 83.03(l). That definition includes “any condition in which visibility is

restricted by fog, mist, falling snow, heavy rainstorms, sandstorms, or any other similar causes.” Id.

113 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 44.

114 Exhibit 39, CJM’s TSMS, section 7.23.5.1, at TBS001003; Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 25 (Captain

Fitch).

115 Exhibit 39, CJM’s TSMS, section 7.23.5.1, at TBS001003; Doc. 351, Trial transcript, Vol. 1, at 25–26

(Captain Fitch).

banks.116 Despite Claimants argument that the Port Allen Route is known to be an area frequented

by small personal vessels, their support for this is Fitch’s statement that there could be small

vessels in the area.117 Captain Schropp testified logically that, given that it was a February night

and cold, “[t]here’s not likely to be recreational boats and pleasure craft out.”118 The Court

concludes that this factor of traffic density did not militate in favor of a supplemental lookout.

66. Claimants argue there is another reason Fitch should have posted an additional

lookout at the head of his tow. CJM’s TSMS states that “[a] look-out shall be added . . . at any

waterway intersection . . . [, but] the lookout may remain in the wheelhouse if visibility, weather[,]

and traffic conditions permit.” 119 Prior to the collision, the CECILE had passed an intersection

where a starboard-side waterway cuts into the Port Allen Route.120

67. But, as stated in the TSMS, the additional lookout is not required “if visibility,

weather[,] and traffic conditions permit.”121 The Court finds that visibility, weather, and traffic

were not such that Rule 5, CJM’s TSMS, or reasonable care required the use of a supplemental

lookout at that time.

116 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 44 (Captain Fitch). See also id. at 227 (Captain Schropp); Exhibit 13-

a, Rose Point data from CECILE through the entire video.

117 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 73 (Captain Fitch).

118 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 220 (Captain Schropp).

119 Exhibit 39, CJM’s TSMS, section 7.23.5, at TBS 1002.

120 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 255–57 (Captain Rivera); Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 6

(Captain Rivera).

121 Exhibit 39, CJM’s TSMS, section 7.23.5, at TBS 1002.

68. In conclusion, the Court is persuaded by and accepts the opinion of Captain

Schropp that Fitch kept a proper lookout and was in compliance with Rule 5 of the Rules of the

Road, CJM’s TSMS, and reasonable care.122

3. Did Fitch Fail to Properly Have or Use Radar Equipment?

69. Radar is a federal law-required aid in navigation that can, by providing instant

readings, prevent incidents and loss of life and assist with safely navigating a vessel.123

70. To serve its purpose, a radar must be (1) fully functioning, (2) properly scaled to

the parameters of the waterway that is being navigated, and (3) continuously monitored by the

wheelman on watch.124

71. From the time it was purchased by Chester Marine until after this incident, the

CECILE was equipped with only one radar.125

72. Claimants argue that CJM’s TSMS required that the CECILE be equipped with two

radars.126 Even if not required, Claimants maintain that the benefit of having two radars is that they

can, respectively, be set for short- and long-range scanning and—by being able to issue different

kinds of warnings—provide for a better situational awareness and a safer navigation.127 Claimants

122 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 206.

123 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 48–49, 54 (Captain Fitch). See also id. at 234–35 (Captain Rivera).

124 Id. at 49–53 (Captain Fitch). See also id. at 237–38, 246–47 (Captain Rivera).

125 Id. at 44–45 (Captain Fitch). See also id. at 235 (Captain Rivera).

126 Id. at 53–56 (Captain Fitch); Exhibit 40, CJM’s TSMS, at TBS 000209–10 (“Short and long-range scanning

by radar should be used to identify targets before they get too close.”); Exhibit 39, CJM’s TSMS, section

7.28, at TBS 001017–18; Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 92–93 (Captain Rivera).

127 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 232–34 (Captain Rivera).

insist that Captain Fitch’s failure to equip the CECILE with two radars was not only a violation of

the company’s TSMS but was also not a prudent practice.128

73. Claimants contend that federal regulations required Fitch to comply with CJM’s

TSMS129 and that by failing to comply with the TSMS’s radar policy, Fitch failed to comply with

the Code of Federal Regulations. Claimants note that Fitch testified at trial that he thought that

federal regulations required his vessel to use both short- and long-range radar.130

74. Claimants also point the Court to Rule 6 as well as CJM’s TSMS, which, they

argue, required Fitch to know and consider the settings and limitations of his radar during

navigation.131

75. CJM counters that there is no federal regulation requiring a vessel like the CECILE

to have two radars132 and that its TSMS on this issue only applies in areas of restricted visibility,

which this was not.133

76. CJM points the Court to the testimony of Claimants’ expert Rivera to the effect that

federal regulations did not require the CECILE to have a second radar.134 In addition, it notes that

128 Id. at 233–34 (Captain Rivera).

129 46 C.F.R. § 140.205(b) (“Towing vessels with a Towing Safety Management System (TSMS) must be

operated in accordance with the TSMS applicable to the vessel.”); Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 110–

111 (Captain Fitch); Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 90 (Captain Rivera).

130 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 56–58, 76 (Captain Fitch).

131 Exhibit 39, CJM’s TSMS, at TBS 000891 (“Recognize the importance of the correct use of navigational aids

and knowledge of their limitations.”). See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 201 (Captain Rivera).

See also Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 98–99 (Captain Rivera); 33 C.F.R. § 83.06(b) (Rule 6).

132 Doc. 358, at 16, ¶ 33.

133 Id. at 16–17, ¶ 34.

134 Id. at 17–18, ¶ 37.

its own expert Schropp opined that CJM’s TSMS did not require two radars135 nor did federal

regulations.136

77. Though probably a basic model,137 the radar aboard the CECILE was new and fully

functioning at the time of this incident.138

78. The Court concludes that, while Rivera testified persuasively that two radars would

have been preferable to having only one,139 federal regulations did not require the CECILE to have

two radars despite Claimants’ argument to the contrary.140 Claimants’ expert Captain Rivera

agreed that federal regulations did not require a second radar on the CECILE at the time of the

accident141 and so did Captain Schropp.142 This is also confirmed by a Subchapter M Compliance

Survey on the CECILE conducted on September 17, 2019, which found that her navigation

equipment was “satisfactory” and in compliance with 33 C.F.R. § 164.143

79. While Rivera conceded the CECILE’s one radar was compliant with Coast Guard

regulations,144 he opined that it violated CJM’s TSMS.145 Captain Schropp disagreed. While

135 Id. at 18, ¶¶ 38–39.

136 Id. at 19, ¶ 40.

137 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 91–92, 96–97 (Captain Rivera).

138 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 57 (Captain Fitch). See also id. at 246–47, 248–49 (Captain Rivera).

139 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 232–34.

140 See, e.g., Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 32, ¶ 68.

141 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 92–93, 105.

142 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 241.

143 Exhibit 7, Vessel Survey Summary for 46 CFR 137 Vessel Compliance, at Bates stamp CJM0057.

144 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 241. See also Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 93.

145 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 92–93, 105.

conceding that the language of the TSMS was ambiguous, Schropp opined that it did not require

two radars.146 Regarding this disagreement between the experts, the Court is persuaded by and

accepts that of Captain Schropp.

80. In conclusion, while two radars may have been preferable to having only one, the

Court finds that having one properly functioning radar was acceptable, met the requirements of the

Rules of the Road and CJM’s TSMS, and was within the standard of care.

81. Claimants separately fault Fitch and CJM for not setting the CECILE’s radar at a

longer range rather than a quarter of a mile.147 Rivera testified that setting the radar at “a quarter

of a mile range . . . gives you a couple of hundred feet of scanning in front of you . . . [which]

defeats the purpose of the radar.” 148 According to Rivera, this one-quarter mile range would have

dramatically shortened the ability of the radar to pick up vessels outside the blind spot and

consequently the ability to avert a collision.149

82. Schropp concluded on the other hand that “a quarter mile is a good range to be

working in this kind of close work”150 and that setting the radar at a one-mile to two-mile range

would provide no advantage and might carry downsides.151

83. Here, the Court again agrees with Schropp. Particularly given Schropp’s greater

experience in performing this kind of work generally and specifically in doing this work in this

146 Doc. 354, Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 69–70 (Captain Schropp).

147 See, e.g., Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 33–34, ¶ 70.

148 Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 246 (Captain Rivera).

149 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 94–97 (Captain Rivera).

150 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 219–20 (Captain Schropp).

151 Id. at 220 (Captain Schropp).

specific location, the Court accepts his opinion that Fitch was not negligent in setting his radar at

one-quarter mile.

84. Claimants next argue that Fitch was negligent and in violation of both Rule 6 and

CJM’s TSMS for not “continuously” monitoring the radar.152 The Court has carefully considered

Fitch’s testimony on this point and concludes that while in the wheelhouse, he met the

requirements of both Rule 6 and CJM’s TSMS by regularly checking the radar (along with his

other equipment and looking ahead), although he admitted he “didn’t constantly keep my eyes on

the radar every second.”153

85. Claimants point to Fitch’s deposition testimony that he did not “consistently”

monitor the radar, which he changed on his errata sheet to the effect that he did consistently check

it, and which he changed again at trial to the effect that he didn’t.154 The Court listened carefully

to his testimony and accepts what Fitch said in open court, that although he didn’t “didn’t

constantly keep my eyes on the radar every second,” he did in fact regularly monitor the radar

consistent with Rule 6 and CJM’s TSMS while performing his other duties in the wheelhouse.155

The Court does not interpret Rule 6 or CJM’s TSMS to require that the person at the wheel of the

vessel constantly look at the radar to the exclusion of looking ahead and checking his other

equipment.

152 Doc. 360, CPFFCOL, at 35, ¶ 72.

153 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 60–64 (Captain Fitch).

154 Id. (Captain Fitch).

155 Id. at 60 (Captain Fitch).

86. For these reasons, the Court finds that the CECILE was adequately equipped with

radar and that the radar was set and monitored in a reasonable way given the prevailing

circumstances.

87. In conclusion, the Court finds that CJM was not at fault in causing this tragic

accident but that, instead, the accident was caused exclusively by the combined fault of Standridge,

May, and YRT.

C. Those at Fault in Causing Accident

88. As mentioned above, the KING was manned by a crew of six: Captains Standridge

and Evans, mate May, engineer Lashbrook, and deckhands Winemiller and Jackson.

89. On the date of the accident, crew members began drinking that afternoon. At

approximately 2:30 p.m., at Standridge’s direction, May and Lashbrook took the KING’s skiff to

Jack Miller’s to purchase cigarettes and alcohol.156 While at Jack Miller’s, they consumed shots of

liquor and beer.157 They also purchased bottles of liquor, which they brought back to the KING.158

156 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 120 (Testimony of Jamie May).

157 Id. at 121 (Testimony of Jamie May).

158 Id. See also Doc. 314-2, Testimony of Shannon Lashbrook, at 47 (46:11–13 on transcript) (discussing another

incident in which they used the skiff to purchase liquor from a store). See also Exhibit 19, Video from Jack

Miller’s, Camera 5 showing May and Lashbrook purchasing liquor drinks from the bar, timestamped 2:22:30

p.m. to 2:23:30 p.m. Approximate times are from timestamp shown on video. The parties previously

stipulated that the time stamp is actually 30 minutes slow, i.e., if the video shows 2:22 pm., the actual time

was 2:52 pm. See also Exhibit 19, Video from Jack Miller’s Camera 11 (Video 1) at timestamp 2:06:40 p.m.

to 2:08:05 p.m., showing May and Lashbrook purchasing beer and bottles of liquor.

90. Upon returning to the KING, they proceeded to drink the alcohol in the vessel’s

galley.159 At one point after May and Lashbrook returned, May was drinking a beer on the outside

deck of the boat.160 Standridge was also in the galley drinking alcohol.161

91. Later that afternoon, Standridge and May organized a return trip to Jack Miller’s.162

Lashbrook decided not to go back to Jack Miller’s because he believed it would “lead to

problems.”163 Specifically, he believed the group was going back to consume more alcohol.164

92. According to May, Standridge informed him that Evans knew the group was going

to Jack Miller’s.165 Standridge informed Winemiller that Evans had authorized the trip to Jack

Miller’s.166

93. Evans began his wheelhouse watch at approximately 5:30 p.m. When the skiff is in

its davit (a cradle and crane apparatus used to launch and retrieve the skiff), it is visible from the

KING’s wheelhouse.167 To get to the KING’s wheelhouse, one must climb stairs on the outside of

159 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 5, Established Fact 33.

160 Doc. 311-1, Testimony of Austin Winemiller, at 154–55 (153:10–154:18 on transcript). The Court notes that,

in advance of trial, the parties were ordered to file into the record the deposition testimony to be considered

by the Court. Doc. 300. See also Doc. 351, Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 4 (where the Court indicated it had

read all depositions except Brandon Thornton). Therefore, when citing to deposition testimony, the Court

will be referring to the record document numbers of the depositions instead of exhibit numbers).

161 Doc. 314-2, Testimony of Shannon Lashbrook, at 157 (156:3-8 on transcript).

162 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 140 (Testimony of Jamie May). See also Doc. 311-2, Testimony of

Austin Winemiller, at 305 (655:2-4 on transcript).

163 Doc. 314-2, Testimony of Shannon Lashbrook, at 73 (72:1–8 on transcript).

164 Id. at 164 (163:10-19 on transcript). Note: Claimant’s objection is overruled.

165 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 140 (Testimony of Jamie May).

166 Doc. 311-1, Testimony of Austin Winemiller, at 313–14 (312:3-313:16 on transcript). The Court overrules

the objection by Claimants.

167 Exhibit 130, photograph from KING’s wheelhouse showing the location of the skiff davit. See also Doc. 314-

3, Testimony of Captain Evans, at 68–69 (68:25-69:6 on transcript).

the wheelhouse upon which the skiff and its davit are visible to anyone looking in that direction.168

Before the group departed, Evans saw May retrieve the controller for the skiff davit while in the

wheelhouse and did not question him on where he was going.169

94. Standridge, May, Winemiller, and Jackson travelled in the skiff back to Jack

Miller’s at approximately 5:35 p.m. or 5:40 p.m. on February 10, 2023.170

95. While at Jack Miller’s, all four YRT employees consumed numerous alcoholic

beverages:

Standridge consumed “about three, four shots,” three Long Island ice teas, and a

beer.

Winemiller consumed two shots, six Jager Bombs, a beer or two, and about five

Long Island iced teas.

May consumed the same number of shots as Standridge, beer, and a Long Island

ice tea.

Jackson had a shot of Patron tequila and partially drank a Long Island iced tea.171

96. Extensive video from Jack Miller’s shows all four crewmembers in the barroom

consuming alcohol throughout the evening.172 The alcohol consumption reported by Winemiller

was consistent with Jack Miller’s surveillance footage,173 and with the post-accident BAC records

168 Doc. 314-3, Testimony of Captain Evans, at 70–71 (70:13–71:14 on transcript).

169 Id. at 338 (337:24–338:13 on transcript).

170 Doc. 311-1, Testimony of Austin Winemiller, at 33 (32:9–11 on transcript).

171 Id. at 60 (57:6-60:2 on transcript). The Court overrules Claimants’ objection.

172 See generally Exhibit 19, the video from Jack Miller’s Landing.

173 Id.

of May and Winemiller, according to Dr. Douglas Swift, CJM’s expert in occupational and

environmental medicine and medical review officer.'

97. Dr. Swift was accepted by the Court as an expert, without objection, in the fields

of occupational and environmental medicine and as a medical review officer.!”°

98. YRT’s internal documents show that Captains Standridge and Evans were not

simply employees, but rather, were considered a “vital element of [YRT’s] management team.”!”°

2.0 SCOPE:

2.1 This job description applies to all Captains employed at YAZOO RIVER

TOWING.

2.2 Captains have the authority to carry out the responsibilities identified in

this procedure.

3.0 JOB SUMMARY:

3.1 The Captain is the highest authority on board a YAZOO RIVER TOWING

motor vessel and is a vital element of YAZOO RIVER TOWING's

management team. The Captain will be relied upon to use necessary

independent judgment and discretion to assure the efficient and safe

operation of both the vessel and all crew members.

Excerpt from Exhibit 59, YRT Procedure Manual at Bates stamp YRT1392.

99. Evans agreed that the captain on wheelhouse watch is responsible for the safety and

well-being of his crew.!7”

100. YRT’s job description for its captains shows that Captains Standridge and Evans

were “responsible for the safety, behavior, performance[,] and welfare of crewmembers at all

times.”!78 Moreover, the KING’s captains were responsible to “supervise, reprimand, remove, and

See Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 196-97 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

15 Id. at 165-66 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

176 Exhibit 59, YRT Vessel Captain Job Description, at Bates stamp YRT1392-93.

1 Doc. 314-3, Testimony of Captain Evans, at 150 (150:3—6 on transcript).

V8 Exhibit 59, YRT Vessel Captain Job Description, at Bates stamp YRT1392-1393 (emphasis added).

29

discipline all crew members assigned to the motor vessel in [their] charge” and was “accountable

for all crew members . . . on [YRT’s] vessels” according to YRT’s documents.179

101. Evans testified that at some point he became aware that four of his crewmembers

were missing and attempted to radio his crew: “Well, I made the radio check, and they never

answered. So I don’t know where they’re at.”180 He then asked Lashbrook to locate the crew.181

Lashbrook confirmed that he called May at 6:46 p.m. that evening to tell those at Jack Miller’s

that “Bill [Evans] was getting antsy and they needed to get back.”182

102. Despite claiming that he had no idea where his crew or the KING’s skiff was and

receiving no information from Lashbrook, Evans made no attempt to investigate or locate his crew

and made no attempt to alert YRT’s shoreside management of the situation.183

103. Not only did Evans fail to take any action to locate his crew or alert YRT’s

shoreside management that four of its six employees on the KING were missing with the skiff, he

made no attempt to ensure their safety prior to, or after, ordering them back to the vessel. It is

undisputed that there were no lights on the skiff at the time of the incident. By the time Evans

realized his crew was not on the KING, it was getting dark. Despite this, he made no inquiry into

whether the crew had brought the lights of the skiff with them. 184

179 Id. at Bates stamp YRT1397.

180 Doc. 314-3, Testimony of Captain Evans, at 141 (141:21–23 on transcript).

181 Id. at 151 (151:1–16 on transcript).

182 Doc. 314-2, Testimony of Shannon Lashbrook, at 77 (77:2–24 on transcript).

183 Doc. 314-3, Testimony of Captain Evans, at 154 (154:11–23 on transcript).

184 Id. at 328 (328:13–23 on transcript).

104. To determine whether his crew had taken the skiff’s navigation lights, Evans would

have simply needed to look in a drawer in the KING’s wheelhouse where they were stored.185

105. In fact, Evans made no inquiry into the ability of the crew to return to the KING

safely, despite his impression that the crewmembers were drunk. When the crewmembers in the

skiff did not return following Lashbrook’s call, Evans testified that he “had that gut feeling that

they was up to no good.”186 He admitted that he believed the crewmembers under his authority

were getting drunk. 187

106. Even though it was dark and he believed his crewmembers may have been drinking

at a bar, Evans did not ask Lashbrook to call May again to determine if the skiff had lights or if

anyone in the group was in a safe condition to operate the skiff.188 Also, despite his order for the

crew to return, Evans did nothing to alert area vessels that a skiff would be out on a dark waterway

returning to the KING.189

107. At some point while the KING’s crew was at Jack Miller’s, May and Winemiller

were ready to leave. However, Standridge did not want to go back; rather, he wanted to patronize

another bar.190 Winemiller did not argue with Standridge because he felt like Standridge was “in

charge” of him.191

185 Id. at 82 (82:3–15 on transcript).

186 Id. at 383 (383:23–24 on transcript).

187 Id. at 352–53 (352:8–353:8 on transcript).

188 Id. at 356 (356:1–8 on transcript).

189 Id. at 357 (357:4–7 on transcript).

190 Doc. 311-1, Testimony of Austin Winemiller, at 61–62 (60:9–25 on transcript).

191 Id. at 62 (61:1–13 on transcript). Claimant’s objection is overruled.

108. By this time, Winemiller considered himself “drunk.”192 When the group departed

Jack Miller’s, Winemiller described Standridge as “drunk,” “stumbling,” and requiring assistance

to walk.193 Winemiller similarly described May as “drunk” as the group left the bar.194

109. May agreed that all of the crewmembers at Jack Miller’s were returning to the

KING to either go back on watch or rest up for their next watch.195 May then asked for clarification

and testified unequivocally that “yes, we were going back to work” when the skiff was returning

to the KING that evening.196 Winemiller provided similar testimony, stating that he was going to

go back on watch once the skiff made it back to the KING.197

110. According to YRT’s U.S. Coast Guard 2692 Report of Marine Casualty, the skiff

got underway at approximately 8:30 p.m.198

111. The weight limit of the KING’s skiff was 500 pounds, or 740 pounds including all

persons and gear.199

112. At the time crewmembers group boarded the skiff to return to the KING, they

collectively weighed in excess of 900 pounds: Austin Winemiller testified that he weighed “about

192 Id. (61:14–16 on transcript).

193 Id. at 69 (68:7–18 on transcript). Claimants objection is overruled.

194 Id. at 70 (69:8–11 on transcript).

195 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 159–60 (Testimony of Jamie May).

196 Id. at 123 (Testimony of Jamie May)

197 Doc. 311-2, Testimony of Austin Winemiller, at 219, 317 (569:12–19 and 667:10–16 on transcript,

respectively).

198 Exhibit 1, USCG 2692 Report of Melvin L. King, at Bates stamp YRT0375.

199 Exhibit 24, Photograph of Skiff Weight Limits, at Bates stamp YRT0455. See also Doc. 320, Pretrial Order,

at 4, Established Fact 24.

300” pounds at the time of the incident;200 Standridge’s autopsy report lists his weight at 229

pounds;201 Jackson’s autopsy report lists his weight at 205 pounds;202 and May’s personnel file

lists his weight as 173 pounds.203

113. May was operating the skiff on its return trip to the KING.204

114. At some point during its return trip, the skiff and the CECILE collided.

115. Following the incident, May and Winemiller’s Blood Alcohol Concentration

(“BAC”) was measured by the U.S. Coast Guard via breathalyzer approximately five hours after

the incident. May was found to have a 0.138% BAC, while Winemiller was found to have a 0.027%

BAC.205 Approximately seven hours after the incident, May’s BAC was 0.128% when he was

tested via blood draw at Iberville Hospital.206

116. Dr. Swift determined that based on May’s pre-accident alcohol consumption and

post-accident BAC, he would have had a BAC of approximately 0.20% at 8:30 p.m. on February

10, 2020—five times the U.S. Coast Guard’s threshold for intoxication and over twice the legal

limit for operating a vehicle or watercraft in Louisiana.207

117. Dr. Swift testified that someone with a 0.20% BAC would “have some serious

impairment,” problems with “ataxia, meaning you have a wide-based gait,” “problems with

200 Doc. 311-2, Testimony of Austin Winemiller, at 88 (438:4–6 on transcript).

201 Exhibit 72, Autopsy Report of Lloyd Standridge, at Bates stamp YRT0387.

202 Exhibit 73, Autopsy Report of Norsalus Jackson, at Bates stamp YRT1360.

203 Exhibit 93, Personnel File of Jamie May, at Bates stamp YRT1152.

204 Doc. 320, Pretrial Order, at 6, Established Fact 45.

205 Id. at 7, Established Fact 58.

206 Id., Established Fact 59.

207 Doc. 352, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, at 174 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

judgment,” and “to the untrained eye, it would appear as somebody who’s seriously inebriated.

Someone who’s obviously drunk.”208 When asked about what effect May’s estimated 0.20% BAC

would have on his ability to operate the skiff, Dr. Swift testified, “he would be seriously impaired

from operating any kind of vehicle, much less a boat.”209 Dr. Swift testified that one of the

symptoms of someone with a 0.20% BAC would be having blackouts, which is consistent with the

evidence and May’s testimony that he could not remember what happened that night and that he

blacked out.210 According to Dr. Swift, of all the YRT employees at Jack Miller’s, May “was in

the worse [sic] position to operate the skiff.”211

118. Based on the number of drinks consumed by Standridge, and the testimony

regarding his condition as the YRT employees left Jack Miller’s, Dr. Swift concluded: “using the

Coast Guard standard of 0.04% [BAC], he was significantly above that and was impaired.”212

Using a baseline threshold of 0.02% BAC per alcoholic beverage, Standridge’s reported alcohol

consumption would equate to a BAC of 0.12% to 0.14%.213 According to Dr. Swift, someone with

this BAC would have problems with vision, thought processing, and have “physical problems in

terms of balance and coordination.”214 These issues are consistent with Winemiller’s testimony

that Standridge was drunk and needed assistance walking out of the bar.215

208 Id. at 174–75 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

209 Id. at 178 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

210 Id. at 178–79 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

211 Id. at 175 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

212 Id. at 182 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

213 Id. at 181 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

214 Id. at 181–82 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

215 Id. at 182 (Testimony of Dr. Swift).

119. The Court found Swift’s testimony and opinions credible and well supported and

accepts same. His conclusions are essentially uncontradicted.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction

120. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of Article III, Section 2 of the

United States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1333, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

B. Applicable Substantive Law

121. The applicable substantive law is the general maritime law and the Limitation of

Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq.

C. Analysis

1. Application of Limitation of Liability Act

122. This case arises in connection with CJM’s Limitation of Liability action. The

Limitation Act limits a vessel owner’s liability to the value of the vessel, post casualty, plus any

pending freight.216 The limit is removed, however, if the negligence or unseaworthiness that caused

the damage was within the “privity or knowledge” of the vessel owner.217

123. This “privity or knowledge” element implies some sort of “complicity in the fault

that caused the accident.”218 Privity means some “personal cognizance or participation in the fault

or negligence which causes the loss,” and knowledge results from actual or constructive

knowledge of a “condition likely to produce or contribute to a loss.”219

216 46 U.S.C. § 30523.

217 Id.

218 Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

219 Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Tug Claribel, 222 F. Supp. 521, 524 (E.D. La. 1963).

124. Knowledge refers not only to what the ship owner knows, but what it is charged

with discovering.220 “Knowledge, when the shipowner is a corporation, is judged not only by what

the corporation’s managing officers actually knew, but also by what they should have known with

respect to conditions or actions likely to cause the loss.”221

125. When a ship owner seeks to limit its liability to the value of the vessel, the

Limitation Act employs a burden-shifting approach. The individual claiming injury caused by the

ship bears the initial burden of establishing that his injures arose as a result of the owner’s

negligence or the vessel’s unseaworthiness. If successfully met, the burden then shifts to the ship

owner to prove that the negligent act or the unseaworthy condition was not within its privity or

knowledge.222

126. In this case and for reasons detailed in its Findings of Fact, the Court finds that

Claimants have failed to meet their burden of showing that the accident was the result of CJM’s

negligence or the unseaworthiness of the CECILE. There is therefore no need for CJM to prove its

entitlement to limitation.

2. General Maritime Law Negligence

127. Claimants allege that CJM was negligent in causing Standridge’s death.

128. “[N]egligence is an actionable wrong under general maritime law,” and the

elements of that tort are “essentially the same as land-based negligence under the common

220 Brister, 946 F.2d at 358.

221 Trico Marine Assets Inc. v. Diamond B Marine Servs. Inc., 332 F.3d 779, 789–90 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1473–74 (5th Cir. 1991)).

222 Brister, 946 F.2d at 355. See also Matter of Dredge Big Bear, 525 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (M.D. La. 2021)

(deGravelles, J.) (citing In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 753 (E.D. La.

2014) (citing In re Signal Int’l, 579 F.3d 478, 496 (5th Cir. 2009))).

law.”223 To prevail on a maritime negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant

owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach actually and

proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff sustained an injury.224

129. “The standard of care, or duty, is a question of law that is established by statutes,

rules, regulations, maritime custom, or general principles of negligence law.”225 The standard of

care in maritime negligence cases is “reasonable care under existing circumstances.”226 Stated

another way, under maritime law, the duty of care can be derived from duly enacted laws,

regulations or rules, custom, or the dictates of reasonableness and prudence.227

“However, negligence per se applies when a statute or regulation ‘establishes a clear minimum

standard of care’ and replaces the general standard of care.”228

130. Under general maritime law, a party’s negligence is actionable only if it is the “legal

cause” of the claimant’s injuries.229 Legal cause requires that “the negligence must be ‘a substantial

factor’ in the injury.”230 “The term ‘substantial factor’ means more than ‘but for the negligence,

223 In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotations

omitted).

224 Id. See also In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991); Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co.,

220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000).

225 SCF Waxler Marine LLC v. M/V ARIS T, 427 F. Supp. 3d 728, 759 (E.D. La. 2019), aff’d sub nom., SCF

Waxler Marine, L.L.C. v. Aris T M/V, 24 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

226 Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

227 S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc., 608 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. S.S.

Marie Leonhardt, 202 F. Supp. 368, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).

228 SCF Waxler Marine, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (quoting Dougherty v. Santa Fe Marine, Inc., 698 F.2d 232,

234–35 (5th Cir. 1983)).

229 Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Chavez v. Noble Drilling

Corp., 567 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1978)).

230 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Express Boat Co., 759 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1985)).

the harm would not have resulted.’”231 “In addition, foreseeability is also relevant to the proximate-

cause determination.”232

3. Summary of Court’s Conclusions re Liability and Causation

131. Utilizing these principles and for reasons detailed in its Findings of Fact, the Court

finds that CJM was not negligent and that the sole and exclusive cause of Standridge’s death was

his negligence combined with that of May, Evans, and YRT.

132. Even if CJM was negligent, given that the overloaded skiff was unlighted at

approximately 8:30 p.m. on a February night, the Court finds that it is highly questionable whether

a secondary lookout would have been able to see the skiff and warn Fitch in time for him to have

successfully avoided the collision. Certainly, there is no convincing proof to that effect.

4. Statutory Violations and The Pennsylvania Rule

133. Claimants invoke the Pennsylvania Rule in support of their claim.

134. The Pennsylvania Rule instructs that a party who violates a statutory rule intended

to prevent maritime accidents is presumed to have caused the accident.233 “In such a case the

burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the

causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been.”234 Under The Pennsylvania

Rule, if a vessel operator violates a Rule of the Road, the burden of proof switches to the operator

to prove that said violation could not have been a cause-in-fact of the accident.235

231 Id. (quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1975)). See also Chisholm v. Sabine

Towing & Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1982).

232 SCF Waxler Marine, 24 F.4th at 477 (citing In re Signal Int’l, 579 F.3d 478, 490 n.12 (5th Cir. 2009)).

233 See Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1471–72 (5th Cir. 1991). See also

Candies Towing Co. v. M/V B & C Eserman, 673 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982).

234 The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1874) (emphasis added).

235 See Pennzoil, 943 F.2d at 1472 (citing Candies Towing, 673 F.2d at 93).

135. Claimants argue that Fitch and CJM violated, among others, Rule 5 and its own

TSMS provision adopting same.236

136. “[W]hat constitutes a proper look-out within the meaning of the statute is an issue

of fact to be determined upon making explicit reference to ‘prevailing circumstances and

conditions.’”237 “The duty to maintain a proper look-out, whether statutory or customary, varies

with the circumstances of each situation.”238

137. Here, the Pennsylvania Rule does not apply to the claims asserted by the Standridge

Claimants because they have failed to show that CJM or the CECILE violated a statutory provision.

138. For reasons explained in its Findings of Fact, the Court also finds that the failure to

post an additional lookout at the head of the tow, under the specific circumstances of this case, was

not negligent nor was it a violation of Rule 5 or CJM’s TSMS.

139. Also, the Court finds there was no negligence or statutory violation in connection

with the CECILE’s radar or its use, that there was no negligence or statutory violation in

connection with Fitch’s undertaking multiple responsibilities at the time of the accident, and that,

in any event, this was not a cause of the accident.

140. In addition, for reasons stated in its Findings of Fact, The Court finds that Claimants

failed to prove any other statutory violation or act of negligence on the part of CJM.

5. The Fault of Standridge, May, Evans, and YRT

141. Even if Claimants had proved some act of negligence on the part of CJM, it is clear

that the vast majority of fault for this tragic accident lies with Standridge himself, May, and YRT

236 33 C.F.R. § 83.05 (Rule 5); Exhibit 39, Chester Marine’s TSMS, section 7.23.4, at TBS001002.

237 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Tugs “Cissi Reinauer”, 933 F. Supp. 1205, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

238 Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438, 449–50 (D.S.C. 1994).

(both for its vicarious liability for the conduct of May and Evans and also its independent fault for

fostering a culture that permitted the free use of alcohol and drugs both on and off the vessel during

its employees’ normal work hours). Indeed, the Court finds that this collective fault is the sole and

exclusive reason for the collision.

142. As is detailed in the Court’s Findings of Fact, Standridge was clearly drunk at the

time he was killed. His drinking that afternoon with those under his command, organizing the

second trip to Jack Miller’s Landing, his continued consumption of copious amounts of alcohol

while at Jack Miller’s, and then his either causing or allowing him and his crew to travel back to

the KING in the dark in an unlighted and overloaded vessel was grossly negligent.

143. The Court rejects Claimants’ argument that Standridge’s intoxication was not a

substantial contributing factor in the collision.239 While Standridge was not at the controls of the

skiff at the time of the collision, his intoxication was a significant contributing reason which caused

or allowed the trip to proceed via boat back to the KING and a likely contributing reason he

allowed May, also highly intoxicated, to take the helm. But whether these decisions were due to

intoxication or just bad judgment, they constitute gross negligence.

144. The Court rejects Claimants’ argument that Standridge was pilot (not co-captain)

of the KING and had no authority over his fellow crew members on this “recreational” skiff. The

evidence convinces the Court that Standridge and Evans were co-captains and one or the other

would be in command of the vessel during their respective watches. But whether pilot or captain,

he had authority over the others in the skiff at the time of the collision.

145. Whether those on the skiff were in the course and scope of their employment at the

time of the collision is a factor in deciding whether Standridge had legal command over the other

239 See Doc. 357, at 21–22.

crew members beneath him. The evidence also shows that Standridge and the others on the skiff

were in the course and scope of their employment on their way back to the KING.

146. In Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit made clear that the

ingestion of an intoxicant in violation of a company’s policy does not, by itself, remove a worker

from the course and scope of his employment.240 The violation of such a policy is, as the Court in

Beech stated, “relevant” but “not dispositive.”241

147. On this issue, the Court finds Diamond Offshore Management Co. v. Guidry

persuasive.242 There, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of an intoxicated

seaman who was killed in an automobile accident while allegedly returning to his drilling vessel

after a two-hour drinking stint at a karaoke bar, finding that the jury had not been properly charged

on the issue of course and scope of employment. The decedent’s employer argued that because the

decedent worked on the drilling rig for two to three hitches, he was not entitled to take advantage

of the Aguilar v. Standard Oil line of cases.243 The Court responded that “[a]ssuming Sellers is

correct, Guidry’s two-hour venture from his rig mid-hitch is not so far removed from his work

there as to be, as a matter of law, outside the scope of his employment.”244

148. In remanding the case for trial with proper instructions and jury interrogatories to

be given to the jury on the issue of course and scope, the court stated,

240 Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., L.L.C., 691 F.3d 566, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing with favor Frederick v. Swift

Transp. Co., 616 F.3d 1074, 1079–80 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that a worker who had violated employer’s

policies by using methamphetamine while driving employer’s truck on assigned route was within the course

and scope of her employment)).

241 Id.

242 Diamond Offshore Mgmt. Co. v. Guidry, 171 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2005).

243 Id. at 842–43 (relying on Sellers v. Dixilyn Corp., 433 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1970)).

244 Id. at 843.

While there was thus some evidence that Guidry was in the course

of his employment, that evidence was not conclusive. The jury was

free to disbelieve the plaintiff’s expert. Auth also testified that

employees did not further Diamond’s interests when they were off-

duty and that going to a bar would not be business-related.

McWilliams’ credibility was in question because Diamond had

terminated his employment under circumstances he believed were

not justified. Further, a seaman’s misconduct while on shore leave,

such as intoxication, may take him outside the course of

employment. Thus, the issue whether Guidry was in the course of

his employment at the time of the accident was one for the jury.245

149. But the Court’s conclusion would be the same whether Standridge was a pilot or

captain at that time and whether he was or wasn’t in the course and scope of his employment, since

he was the senior member of those who made the trip to Jack Miller’s (indeed, he organized the

trip) and he had a personal as well as professional responsibility to himself and his fellow crew

members to act with due care for his safety and that of the others. He had the practical, if not the

legal, authority to influence the conduct of his fellow crew members. That obligation was

profoundly disregarded by him with tragic consequences for him and Norsalus Jackson.

150. Furthermore, Standridge knew, or certainly should have known, of the requirement

that the skiff have a lookout, have proper lighting, and not be overloaded. The Court finds that

these failures constitute violations of Rules of the Road 23 (lighting)246 and Rule 5 (lookout)247 for

which both Standridge and May are responsible, and, in addition, the vessel violated Rule 16 (right-

of-way).248

245 Id.

246 Doc. 353, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, at 239–40 (Captain Schropp).

247 The intoxicated May was the only lookout, as all others in the skiff were facing toward the stern.

248 Id. at 237–38 (Captain Schropp).

151. But the Court need not rely on the Pennsylvania Rule to establish causation. The

Court rejects Claimants argument that these violations were not the proximate cause of the

accident249 and finds that the overwhelming evidence shows that these violations and the conduct

which gave rise to them were significant contributing factors in the collision.

152. Jamie May was heavily intoxicated at the time the return trip to the KING began.

Yet, he negligently undertook or agreed to pilot the skiff. He was in no condition to act as a lookout

nor were his companions. Even if they had been, however, he had no additional lookout facing

forward at the time of the collision. Thus, May also violated Rule 5.

153. In addition, he violated Rules 9(a)(i)250 and 9(b),251 and May should have been able

to see the CECILE’s lights long before a secondary lookout on the CECILE would have been able

to see or hear the skiff (Rule 16).252

154. In sum, The Court finds that May was grossly negligent by: (1) operating the skiff

while significantly intoxicated; (2) failing to ensure the skiff was displaying the appropriate

navigation lights; (3) failing to operate the skiff as far as safe and practicable to its starboard side;

(4) failing to keep a lookout; and (5) failing to act in a manner expected of a prudent seaman by

consuming alcohol while on the job.

249 See, e.g., Doc. 357 at 17–19, 22–25.

250 33 C.F.R. § 83.09(a)(i) requires a vessel in a narrow channel to “keep as near to the outer limit of the channel

or fairway which lies on her starboard side as is safe and practicable.”

251 33 C.F.R. § 83.09(b) requires vessels under 20 meters in length to “not impede the passage of a vessel that

can safely navigate only within a narrow channel or fairway.”

252 33 C.F.R. § 83.16 requires vessels to “take early and substantial action to keep well clear” of other vessels.

155. These failures were a substantial contributing factor in the collision, and the Court

rejects Claimants’ argument to the contrary.253

156. The Court finds that even if Evans did not know that Standridge and the others had

left in the skiff (and there is direct testimony that he did), he clearly should have. The skiff would

have been stored in plain view of the wheelhouse.

157. But even if he was initially unaware that they had left the KING, he became aware

later that they had. Although he was suspicious that they had been drinking (“up to no good”), he

failed to investigate further and simply told them to return and, when they did, to bring him some

crawfish from Jack Miller’s Landing.

158. Had Evans investigated properly, he would have discovered that these

crewmembers were intoxicated and taken the reasonable steps necessary to get them back to the

KING safely.

159. In summary, the Court finds that Captain Evans was negligent by: (1) failing to

monitor the whereabouts of his crew; (2) failing to alert YRT shoreside management that four of

his crewmembers were missing; (3) failing to alert YRT shoreside management that he believed

his crew was “up to no good” and likely consuming alcohol; (4) failing to ensure that area vessels

knew the skiff would be on the waterway returning to the KING; (5) failing to ensure that one of

his crewmembers was sober or in a position to safely operate the skiff; and (6) failing to ensure

that the skiff had navigation lights for its return trip.

160. The Court finds that Evans’s negligence was a substantial contributing cause of the

accident.

253 See Doc. 357, at 15–28.

161. Evans was clearly in the course and scope of his employment for YRT at the

operative time (no one contests otherwise).

162. As stated above, the Court finds that Standridge and May were both in the course

and scope of their employment at the time of the collision.

163. In addition to whatever role YRT’s vicarious fault played in the accident, the Court

finds that it was independently at fault for allowing a culture of alcohol and drug use on board its

vessel to exist.254 The evidence in this regard is discussed in detail in its Findings of Fact.

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, and for the reasons stated, the Court finds that CJM is without fault in

causing the accident sued upon and is entitled to exoneration from liability. Judgment will be

signed accordingly.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 28, 2023.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

254 Garay v. Carnival Cruise Line, Inc., 904 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990).