Scott v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TIMIKA SCOTT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CITY OF BATON ROUGE/PARISH

OF EAST BATON ROUGE, ET AL. NO. 22-00488-BAJ-EWD

RULING AND ORDER

This case levels serious allegations regarding the quality of medical care

provided to detainees at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (EBRPP). But does it

raise a viable constitutional claim? This question cannot be answered at present

because Plaintiff’s Complaint, in its current form, is so scattershot that its claims of

an unconstitutional healthcare system at EBRPP are indeterminable. On this basis,

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims will be dismissed, and Plaintiff will be required to

resubmit her Complaint, conforming her allegations to the federal pleading

requirements, so that Defendants and the Court may be apprised of the actual

conditions and policies that are the basis of her constitutional claims.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2021, Gwendolyn Simon—a retired government employee, active

church member and volunteer, mother, grandmother, and lifelong resident of Baton

Rouge, Louisiana—was arrested for the first time, following a domestic altercation.

(Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 13-14). At 1:30 a.m., Ms. Simon was booked into EBRPP’s jail on

charges of aggravated battery and simple damage to property. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15).

Fifteen hours later Ms. Simon was dead. She was not mentally ill, and her death was

not self-inflicted, caused by violence, or otherwise attributable to the physical

conditions of her confinement. Rather, as alleged, she died of complications of

congestive heart failure, due to prison officials’ refusal to dispense her prescribed

heart medication (Lasix). (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19, 25-27).

In this action, Plaintiff Timika Scott, Ms. Simon’s daughter, seeks to hold

multiple parties accountable for her mother’s death, including Ms. Simon’s jailers—

East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Sid Gautreaux, and EBRPP Supervisor Dennis

Grimes—the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge (the “City-Parish”), and

a private company contracted by the Sheriff and the City-Parish to provide medical

care to detainees at EBRPP—CorrectHealth East Baton Rouge, LLC (“CorrectHealth

EBR”). (Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 3-9). Plaintiff’s claims include all the hallmarks of a traditional

state-law wrongful death and survival action. (Id. at ¶¶ 49-58).

Additionally, and most relevant here, Plaintiff contends that the events

preceding Ms. Simon’s death implicate constitutional concerns, first because EBRPP

allegedly maintains a healthcare “system” in which pre-trial detainees “with serious

chronic health issues are denied access to appropriate medical care,” (id. at ¶¶ 43-44,

“Count 1”), and, second, because EBRPP allegedly implements de facto “policies”

under which pre-trial detainees “with serious chronic health issues are denied access

to appropriate medical care,” (id. at ¶¶ 45-48, “Count 2”). Plaintiff pursues these

constitutional claims against multiple Defendants, in their “official capacities” only.

Now, the City-Parish, Sheriff Gautreaux, Supervisor Grimes, and

CorrectHealth EBR (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”) each seek dismissal of

Plaintiff’s action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Doc. 27,

Doc. 29, Doc. 31). For reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s

Complaint, in its current form, suffers multiple flaws, the sum of which obscures any

meaningful review of the merits of her constitutional claims. On this basis, the Court

will grant the Moving Defendants’ motions. Still, the Court will allow Plaintiff the

opportunity to amend her complaint to conform with the federal pleading standards,

and to state actionable federal claims.1

II. ANALYSIS

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal

standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial

plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Hence, the complaint need not set out “detailed

factual allegations,” but something “more than labels and conclusions, and a

1 For present purposes, the Court limits its analysis to the Moving Defendants’ challenge to

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, as these are the only claims providing a basis for federal

jurisdiction. Pending receipt of Plaintiff’s amended complaint (if any), the Moving Defendants

may, of course, renew their challenge to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations (as they relate

to her federal and state law claims).

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is required. Twombly, 550

U.S.at 555.

There are, of course, many ways for a plaintiff to stumble at the pleading stage.

Perhaps the most vexing—at least from the Court’s view—is when the complaint

patently violates Rule 8’s command of “a short and plain statement,” in favor of a

shotgun approach that packs so many redundancies and irrelevant allegations into

what might be a meritorious claim that it is impossible to accurately understand the

scope of the dispute. This Court has expressly cautioned litigants (and their counsel)

against this “everything but the kitchen sink” approach, explaining that “shotgun

pleadings” come in various forms, but their “unifying characteristic … is that they

fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants

adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests.” O'Neal v. Universal Prot. Serv., LLC, No. 21-cv-00737, 2022 WL 1631970, at

*5 (M.D. La. May 23, 2022) (Jackson, J.) (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015)).

Shotgun pleadings are pernicious because they unfairly burden

defendants and courts by shifting onto them the burden of identifying

plaintiff's genuine claims and determining which of those claims might

have legal support. If tolerated, shotgun pleadings harm the court by

impeding its ability to administer justice. The time a court spends

managing litigation framed by shotgun pleadings should be devoted to

other cases waiting to be heard.

Id. (quoting In re Ozcelebi, 635 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2021)).

Here, perhaps, Plaintiff’s Complaint raises concerns of constitutional

magnitude. Stripped of superfluous detail, Plaintiff alleges that unnamed prison

officials knowingly refused Ms. Simon her prescribed heart medication—ignoring

repeated requests from Ms. Simon, Plaintiff, and even other pre-trial detainees—

directly resulting in Ms. Simon’s death from complications of congestive heart failure.

(Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 17, 19-27, 43, 45). Withholding critical care from a detainee, even once,

may establish a basis for constitutional liability, at least when the claim is targeted

at an individual state officer. See, e.g., Marlowe v. LeBlanc, No. 18-cv-00063, 2023

WL 2957810, at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (citing authorities).

Here, however, Plaintiff does not pursue individual capacity claims against the

EBRPP staff and medical personnel that refused Ms. Simon her medication. Instead,

she pursues only “official capacity” claims, adding an additional layer of complexity

that ultimately is her undoing. See Carter v. Gautreaux, No. 19-cv-105, 2021 WL

2785332, at *3 (M.D. La. July 2, 2021) (Dick, C.J.) (“If a plaintiff establishes that an

individual acted with deliberate indifference, and the plaintiff seeks to hold that

individual's municipal actor-employer liable, the plaintiff must satisfy additional

requirements.”).

First, Plaintiff inexplicably “lumps” multiple Defendants together for purposes

of her “official-capacity” claims. (See Doc. 29-1 at p. 19). But why? As a rule, “official

capacity suits are really suits against the governmental entity.” Goodman v. Harris

Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2009); accord Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165 n.14 (1985); Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978).

Including more “official capacity” defendants than is necessary to set a target on the

offending entity is “redundant” and merely invites confusion. See Perron v. Travis,

No. 20-cv-00221, 2021 WL 1187077, at *4 (M.D. La. Mar. 29, 2021) (Jackson, J.).

Count 1—Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim—alleges that “insufficient

services for medical care” at EBRPP resulted in Ms. Simon’s death. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 43).

Sheriff Gautreaux, EBRPP’s “keeper,” La. R.S. § 15:704, and a party to the December

16, 2021 Health Service Agreement under which medical care at EBRPP is

outsourced to CorrectHealth EBR, (Doc. 43-1), is the appropriate Defendant to

answer this “official capacity” claim.2 Why also include the City-Parish,

CorrectHealth EBR, and CorrectHealth, LLC (CorrectHealth EBR’s Atlanta-based

parent company)? “Official capacity” claims against these entities proceed in the same

manner as Plaintiff’s claim against the Sheriff. E.g. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14

(official capacity claims against public officials and local government unites are

indistinguishable); Bowers v. McGee, No. 14-cv-0131, 2015 WL 6554020, at *2 (M.D.

Tenn. Oct. 29, 2015) (Brown, M.J) (official capacity claims against “private contractor

‘state actors’” … proceed in the same manner” as any other official capacity claim);

accord Carter v. Gautreaux, No. 19-cv-105, 2020 WL 6251186, at *5 (M.D. La. Oct. 22,

2020) (Dick, C.J.). Under the normal rules, the scope of municipal liability is not

somehow expanded by simply adding more “official capacity” defendants, see Castro

Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cpir. 2001); Goodman, 571 F.3d at 396, and

2 Even naming Sheriff Gautreaux as the Defendant to this “official capacity” claim creates

tension with the Supreme Court’s general rule that “[t]here is no … need to bring official-

capacity actions against local government officials” because “under Monell, … local

government units can be sued directly.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14. This Court has

previously ruled, however, that EBRPP itself is “not a legal entity capable of being sued.”

Mason v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Prison Sheriff Off., No. 16-cv-0205, 2016 WL 8223432, at *2

(M.D. La. Dec. 8, 2016) (Wilder-Doomes, M.J.) (citing authorities), app’d 2017 WL 522952

(M.D. La. Feb. 8, 2017) (Dick, C.J.). As such, Sheriff Gautreaux is the appropriate stand-in

for EBRPP.

Plaintiff offers no explanation in her Complaint or her 12(b)(6) opposition regarding

why these additional Defendants are essential to this Claim, adding something that

the Sheriff does not already provide. The City-Parish,3 CorrectHealth EBR, and

CorrectHealth, LLC are redundant to Sheriff Gautreaux, and will be dismissed from

Count 1. E.g., Perron, 2021 WL 1187077, at *4 (dismissing redundant “official

capacity” defendants); Marlowe v. LeBlanc, No. 18-cv-00063, 2023 WL 2957810, at *3

(M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (same); Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800

F. Supp. 2d 826, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (Ellison, J.) (same).

Count 2—Plaintiff’s unconstitutional policies claim—alleges that Ms. Simon’s

death resulted from EBRPP policies that deprived pre-trial detainees “with serious

medical conditions, namely, chronic congestive heart failure, of treatment.” (Doc. 23

at ¶ 45). Again, Sheriff Gautreaux, EBRPP’s “keeper” and daily overseer, is the

appropriate Defendant to answer this charge. And, again, Plaintiff offers no reason

why the City-Parish (whose authority does not extend to daily oversight), and

Supervisor Grimes (who is plainly duplicative of Sheriff Gautreaux), and

CorrectHealth EBR, and CorrectHealth, LLC are also required. These Defendants

are not necessary and will be dismissed from Count 2, eliminating redundancy.

Unfortunately, the confusion does not end here. In addition to having named

3 The Court acknowledges some superficial appeal to keeping the City-Parish as a Defendant

to Count 1, insofar as the City-Parish’s authority expressly extends to contracting for

EBRPP’s health care services, La. R.S. § 15:703, and, indeed, the City-Parish is also a party

to the December 16, 2021 Health Service Agreement. (Doc. 43-1). But, again, Plaintiff cannot

expand the scope of official capacity liability simply by adding more Defendants. See Castro

Romero, 256 F.3d at 355; Goodman, 571 F.3d at 396. Sheriff Gautreaux is both necessary and

sufficient to defend Plaintiff’s official-capacity conditions of confinement claim.

redundant Defendants, Plaintiff has muddied her “official capacity” claims even more

by basing them on irrelevant allegations.

Again, Plaintiff pursues two separate theories of constitutional liability to

challenge the medical care provided to Ms. Simon—unconstitutional conditions

(Count 1) and unconstitutional de facto policies (Count 2). Nonetheless, Plaintiff

concedes that each claim shares essentially the same element: to prevail, Plaintiff

must show “a pattern of acts or omissions sufficiently extended or pervasive … to

prove an intended condition or practice” at EBRPP. See Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591

F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 631 F.3d 203, 208

(5th Cir. 2011) (observing that there is “no meaningful difference between” proving

“persistent and widespread customs” sufficient to establish an unconstitutional de

facto policy “under the Monell test,” and “an intended condition or practice” sufficient

to establish unconstitutional conditions of confinement).

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim (Count 1) alleges that Ms. Simon

died due to “insufficient services for medical care” provided by EBRPP’s contracted

healthcare provider, CorrectHealth EBR. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 43). Such a claim is hardly

new or unique. E.g., Carter, 2021 WL 2785332. Here, however, Plaintiff flails wildly

in her attempts to show that insufficient medical care was “an intended condition” at

EBRPP, see Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 452, complaining of everything from “defects in

physical design,” (Doc. 23 at ¶ 38), to “a decrepit physical facility,” (id. at ¶ 39), to

“overpopulation,” (id. at ¶ 39(j)), to “violence on a daily basis,” (id. at ¶ 39(w)), none

of which have any relevance to Plaintiff’s allegations that Ms. Simon died due to

prison officials’ knowing failure to administer her medication. To put a finer point on

it, and as just one example, how does the following allegation in any way prove a

pattern of insufficient medical services?

According to a recently filed class action: “The jail was built in 1965,

with no substantive renovations since the 1980s. Even the parts of the

facility that are not condemned are crumbling and decrepit. The

buildings where people are housed are in terrible condition. The roof

leaks, the walls and floors are filled with mold and rust, the showers and

toilets are broken or bug-infested on many of the housing lines (“lines”),

the windows are so dirty that detainees cannot see out of some of them,

and rats have overrun some dorm areas, requiring detainees to sleep

with their food to prevent it from being eaten by vermin. On some lines,

the walls are streaked with blood and other bodily fluids. The bars on

the housing lines are ‘gunked up with mold, juice, spit, and old food.’”

(Doc. 23 at ¶ 39(dd)). Plaintiff does not explain.

The same surplusage plagues Plaintiff’s unconstitutional policies claim. As

stated, this claim challenges EBRPP’s de facto policy of failing to treat pre-trial

detainees “with serious medical conditions, namely, chronic congestive heart failure.”

(Doc. 23 at ¶ 45). But the prior incidents Plaintiff cites to prove a pattern of similar

abuse include examples of pre-trial detainees refusing to take their medication (the

opposite of that alleged here), (id. at ¶ 30(a)), 39(f), 38(g)), detainees committing

suicide, (id. at ¶ 39(t)), detainees being killed by other detainees, (id. at ¶ 39(r)), and

detainees being sexually assaulted by other detainees, (id. at ¶ 39(u), 39(v)). The

majority of these prior incidents appear to involve detainees suffering serious mental

health issues. While appalling, these prior incidents are not even remotely similar to

the alleged abuse at issue here, and plainly cannot sustain a claim that EBRPP

implemented a de facto policy of failing to treat pre-trial detainees suffering from

“chronic congestive heart failure.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838,

851 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A pattern requires similarity and specificity; prior indications

cannot simply be for any and all ‘bad’ or unwise acts, but rather must point to the

specific violation in question.” (quotation marks omitted)).

It is not this Court’s job to pan Plaintiff’s flood of irrelevant allegations in an

effort to find one or two flecks of gold that might possibly support her constitutional

claims. Plaintiff’s shotgun approach renders her stated claims virtually meaningless,

depriving Defendants of notice of the actual claims against them, and the grounds

upon which each claim rests. See O'Neal, 2022 WL 1631970, at *5. Plaintiffs’

constitutional claims (Counts 1 and 2), as written, will be dismissed.

When a complaint fails to state an actionable claim, the Court should generally

afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend before dismissing the claim with

prejudice, unless it is clear that to do so would be futile. See Jones v. Robinson Prop.

Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005); Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley

Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). Here, it is not clear that

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are necessarily futile, particularly given her core

allegation that prison authorities withheld critical care from Ms. Simon. As such, the

Court will give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, and allow her to amend her

Complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. 27,

Doc. 29, Doc. 31) each be and are hereby GRANTED IN PART, and that Plaintiff’s

official-capacity federal constitutional claims (Counts 1 and 2) be and are hereby

DISMISSED for the reasons set forth herein. In all other respects, the Moving

Defendants’ motions be and are hereby DENIED, without prejudice to the Moving

Defendants’ right to re-assert their arguments pending submission of Plaintiff's

amended complaint (if any).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall submit an amended

complaint addressing the deficiencies set forth herein within 21 days of the date of

this Order. Plaintiff's failure to timely submit an amended complaint will be

deemed a waiver, and result in dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's

constitutional claims (Counts 1 and 2).

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, thi ‘Sy of May, 2023

Ar R SC

JUDGE BRIAN A. KSON

UNITED STATES TRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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