Murray v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMES MURRAY, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-592-JWD-RLB

JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Compel Discovery from Secretary LeBlanc

(“Motion to Compel”). (R. Doc. 98). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 100).

Also before the Court is Defendant James LeBlanc and Defendant Seth Smith’s Motion

to Stay Discovery (“Motion to Stay”). (R. Doc. 99). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 101).

I. Background

Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 15, 2021 raising various allegations

regarding their confinement at the Madison Parish Correctional Center (“MPCC”). (R. Doc. 1).

The operative pleading in this action is the Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 64), which was

filed in accordance with the district judge’s ruling dismissing without prejudice all claims raised

against James LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”), the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety

and Corrections (“DPSC”). (R. Doc. 59).

Plaintiff has named the following as defendants: LeBlanc; Seth Smith (“Smith”), Chief of

Operations of DPSC; Sammie Byrd, the Sheriff of Madison Parish (“Sheriff Byrd”); LaSalle

Management, LLC (“LaSalle”), the privately-owned operator of MPCC; and various wardens

and correctional officers at MPCC (Arthur Anderson, Chris Stinson, Tommy Farmer, Steven

Chase, Cantrell Guice, John Murray, Wendell Hughes, Edward McDowell, Johnathan Knox,

Jonta Shepherd, Esco Tillman, and Robert Thornton). LaSalle and the individuals employed at

MPCC are collectively referred to as the “LaSalle Defendants.”

Plaintiffs in this case were all confined at MPCC, which houses both sentenced and pre-

trial prisoners from around the State of Louisiana. (R. Doc. 64 at 1; see R. Doc. 64 at 21-35).

Plaintiffs allege that LaSalle, LeBlanc, Smith, and Sheriff Byrd are responsible for ensuring the

safety of the individuals held at MPCC. (R. Doc. 64 at 1-2). Plaintiffs allege that they were pre-

trial detainees while confined and attacked at MPCC and, after the attacks, were placed in

“punitive lockdown conditions” where they were deprived of exercise and natural light. (R. Doc.

64 at 1; see R. Doc. 64 at 21-37).

Plaintiffs allege that the foregoing defendants “have allowed fatally dangerous conditions

of confinement to flourish at MPCC,” with each “aware that MPCC has no functional

classification, investigation, or staff supervision in place” and each “aware that these conditions

allow threat of serious injury from rampant violence to go unchecked.” (R. Doc. 64 at 2).

Plaintiffs maintain that, because of these conditions, they were stabbed and beaten by attackers

who should not have been confined with them on the same unit. (R. Doc. 64 at 2).

Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants knew of the levels of extreme

violence at the facility, the lack of a classification plan, the lack of investigation and response to

known drivers of violence, and the chronic understaffing, but nevertheless continued to operate

the facility with minimal adjustments, including continuing to house sentenced DPSC prisoners

in the facility, allowing an intolerable risk of harm to come to those held in Defendants’ custody,

including Plaintiffs.” (R. Doc. 64 at 39). Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants knew of the

failure of individuals at MPCC to perform crucial duties, including failures to develop and

implement a classification plan, failures to respond appropriately to imminent risks of harm by

correctional officers under their supervision, and failures to investigate incidents of harm.” (R.

Doc. 64 at 39). Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants failed to train, supervise, or discipline

individuals who engaged in these behaviors[, which] was a moving force behind the harm

experienced by Plaintiffs.” (R. Doc. 64 at 41).

Plaintiffs seek recovery for violation of their rights under the Fourteenth and Eight

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, for violation of their rights under the Louisiana

Constitution’s rights to due process and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and under

the state law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. (R. Doc. 64 at

37-44). In particular, Plaintiffs seek recovery against LeBlanc and Smith in their individual

capacities for violations of the Fourteenth and Eight Amendments. Plaintiffs bring a separate

state law claim seeking recovery from the defendants’ insurer, Old Republic Union Insurance

Company. (R. Doc. 64 at 44-45). Plaintiffs pray for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, judgment

against the defendants for the asserted causes of action, attorney’s fees, and compensatory and

punitive damages. (R. Doc. 64 at 41).

On November 7, 2022, LeBlanc filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the defense of qualified

immunity with respect to the claims brought against him in his individual capacity. (R. Doc. 66).

On February 16, 2022, Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the defense of qualified

immunity with respect to the claims brought against him in his individual capacity. (R. Doc. 91).

There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the instant motions, Plaintiffs conducted

discovery with respect to Sheriff Byrd and the LaSalle Defendants. In fact, the Court has

previously ordered those defendants to provide supplemental discovery responses and

productions with respect to written discovery. (R. Doc. 90).

On March 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel with respect to

discovery served on LeBlanc on February 6, 2023. (R. Doc. 98). Plaintiffs represent that LeBlanc

did not provide any discovery responses and would not participate in a Rule 37 conference in

light of his qualified immunity defense. (R. Doc. 98-1 at 2). Plaintiffs note in support of their

motion that LeBlanc had not moved for a stay of discovery prior to the filing of the Motion to

Compel. (R. Doc. 98-1 at 4). Plaintiffs did not, as required by the Court’s local rules, “quote

verbatim” the discovery requests at issue or otherwise provide the Court with a copy of the

discovery requests as an attachment to the Motion to Compel. See LR 37. LeBlanc filed his

opposition to this Motion to Compel only after seeking a stay of discovery in this action, as

discussed below. (R. Doc. 100).

On April 4, 2023, LeBlanc and Smith filed the instant Motion to Stay on the grounds that

they have both raised the defense of qualified immunity in their respective Motions to Dismiss.

(R. Doc. 99). Plaintiffs oppose a stay of discovery to the extent it pertains to claims raised

against these defendants in their official capacities or with respect to any of the remaining

defendants. (R. Doc. 101).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Legal Standards

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a protective

order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)’s

“good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to

show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of

fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int’l, Inc, 134

F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garret, 571 F.2d 302, 3026 (5th Cir.

1990) (citation omitted).

“Trial courts possess broad discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air Line Pilots

Ass’n Int’l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial court

has broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may

dispose of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987).

“The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just immunity from

liability, but immunity from suit.” Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)

(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985)). Qualified immunity shields

government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions unless their

conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

The Fifth Circuit has clarified that all discovery involving a defendant raising the defense

of qualified immunity must be stayed until resolution of the defense of qualified immunity:

The Supreme Court has now made clear that a plaintiff asserting constitutional

claims against an officer claiming [qualified immunity] must survive the motion

to dismiss without any discovery.

Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022). In Carswell, the Fifth Circuit concluded

that a district court abused its discretion by deferring its ruling on a motion to dismiss on

qualified immunity grounds and subjecting the public official defendants to discovery on the

plaintiff’s Monell claims, which created an undue burden in light of increased litigation costs and

complications caused by bifurcated discovery. Id. at 310-314. The Fifth Circuit expressly held

that the required stay of discovery is not limited to claims to which the defense of qualified

immunity is raised. Id.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the Supreme Court’s concerns about the

burdens of litigation imposed on public officials. It also noted that these same burdens would be

present if the Court allowed discovery to proceed against defendants in different capacities or

against co-defendants that make no claim for qualified immunity:

It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be

deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely

that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for

petitioners and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does

not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position.

Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders, then, they

would not be free from the burdens of discovery.

Id. at 313 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685-86 (2009)). “In other words, the Court

ruled out even ‘minimally intrusive discovery’ against official defendants before a ruling that

plaintiff had met his burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense at the pleading

stage.” Carswell, 54 F.4th at 313 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686).

Consistent with Carswell, the undersigned has stayed all discovery where a defendant has

alleged qualified immunity and there was no practical manner to allow discovery to proceed

against a co-defendant that has not raised a defense of qualified immunity without prejudicing

the defendants who have raised the defense of qualified immunity. See Kador v. Gautreaux, No.

23-11-SDD-RLB, 2023 WL 3102559 (M.D. La. Apr. 26, 2023); Miller v. LeBlanc, No. 21-353-

BAJ-RLB, 2022 WL 17490971 (M.D. La. Dec. 7, 2022); Henderson v. Bd. of Supervisors, No.

21-297-JWD-RLB, 2022 WL 2654978 (M.D. La. July 8, 2022); Cavalier v. La Dept. of Pub.

Safety & Corrections, et al., No. 21-656-JWD-RLB, 2022 WL 3456533 (M.D. La. Aug. 17,

2022).1

1 The Henderson and Cavalier decisions relied on the now-withdrawn version of the Carswell opinion. See Carswell

v. Camp, 37 F.4th 1062 (5th Cir. 2022), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh'g, 54 F.4th 307 (5th Cir.

2022).

B. Analysis

LeBlanc and Smith seek a stay of discovery until at least June 15, 2023, or until the

district judge has ruled on their pending Motions to Dismiss. (R. Doc. 99). In support of the

requested stay, LeBlanc and Smith primarily rely on the Carswell decision.

In opposition to the Motion to Stay, Plaintiffs argue that LeBlanc and Smith’s “expansive

interpretation” of the Carswell decision is at odds “with Fifth Circuit’s long standing and valid

precedent which does not permit blanket stays of discovery.” (R. Doc. 101 at 2). In making this

argument, Plaintiffs do not rely on Carswell or this Court’s decisions relying on Carswell.

Instead, Plaintiffs ask this Court to allow discovery in accordance with Lion Boulos v. Wilson,

834 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1987). (R. Doc. 101 at 2-6).

Plaintiffs are correct that the original Carswell decision explicitly overruled Lion Boulos

and its progeny. See Carswell, 37 F.4th 1062 (5th Cir. 2022). That opinion was withdrawn.2 The

superseding decision instead states that, with respect to Lion Boulos and its progeny, the Fifth

Circuit panel is “clarify[ing] the governing law” and “harmoniz[ing] [the] circuit’s discovery

practices with the Supreme Court’s instructions.” Carswell, 54 F.4th at 314. This Court will

follow the clarification of the law as set forth in the Carswell decision.

The Carswell decision clarified the limitations of the discovery allowed under Lion

Boulos by emphasizing three points. First, the purpose of this limited discovery is “only” to

allow the district court to rule on the defendant’s assertions of qualified immunity; it’s purpose is

“not to provide a backdoor for plaintiffs to circumvent the defendant’s immunity from suit.”

2 Plaintiffs speculate that the original Carswell opinion was withdrawn because a Fifth Circuit panel cannot overrule

a previous Fifth Circuit panel. (R. Doc. 101 at 3). See United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2014)

(“It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of our court may not overturn another panel’s

decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our

en banc court.”) (quoting Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2008)).

Carswell, 54 F.4th at 311 (citing Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 2012)). Second,

the defendant-official asserting qualified immunity may seek an immediate appeal under the

collateral order doctrine to challenge whether “any pre-ruling discovery sought or ordered in the

district court crosses the line from permissible Lion Boulos discovery to impermissible vitiation

of the official’s immunity from suit.” Carswell, 54 F.4th at 311 (citing Ramirez v. Guadarrama,

3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021)). Finally, “Lion Boulos and its progeny must be understood in

light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has now made clear that a

plaintiff asserting constitutional claims against an officer claiming QI [qualified immunity] must

survive the motion to dismiss without any discovery.” Carswell, 54 F.4th at 311 (5th Cir. 2022)

(discussing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662)).

The Carswell decision summed up its clarification of the law, including Lion Boulos as

limited by Iqbal, by emphasizing that a determination of whether the defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage must be made before any discovery is allowed:

None of this means, of course, that the QI determination must be made once-and-

for-all at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Today we only hold that where the

pleadings are insufficient to overcome QI, the district court must grant the motion

to dismiss without the benefit of pre-dismissal discovery. Similarly, where the

pleadings are sufficient to overcome QI, the district court must deny the motion to

dismiss without the benefit of pre-dismissal discovery. In the latter scenario,

however, our precedent gives the defendant-official at least two choices after his

motion to dismiss is denied. First, the defendant can immediately appeal the

district court’s denial under the collateral order doctrine. See Backe, 691 F.3d at

647–49; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27, 105 S.Ct. 2806. Or second—à la Lion

Boulos and its progeny—the defendant can move the district court for discovery

limited to the factual disputes relevant to whether QI applies, then reassert QI in a

summary judgment motion. Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 481 (5th

Cir. 2021) (“Before limited discovery is permitted, a plaintiff seeking to

overcome QI must assert facts that, if true, would overcome that defense.”). Why

does the defendant alone enjoy this choice? Because only the defendant-official

enjoys qualified immunity from suit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685, 129 S.Ct. 1937

(“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the

concerns of litigation, including avoidance of disruptive discovery.” (emphasis

added) (quotation omitted)).

Carswell, 54 F.4th at 312.

Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, the Court finds it appropriate to stay

all discovery in this action until resolution of the pending Motions to Dismiss. In granting

LeBlanc’s previous motion to dismiss, the district judge summarized the law governing qualified

immunity and discovery, holding that Plaintiffs were “not entitled to any discovery at this time”

because they failed to overcome qualified immunity in their pleading and the Court did not have

any difficulty reaching that conclusion without further clarification of the facts. (R. Doc. 59 at

37-39). While Plaintiffs were provided another opportunity to amend their pleading, that Third

Amended Complaint is now subject to further qualified immunity challenges. Accordingly, it is

appropriate for the Court to stay discovery until the district judge can determine whether the

Third Amended Complaint, without more, survives the qualified immunity challenges raised by

LeBlanc and Smith.

To be clear, the Carswell decision forecloses any discovery involving LeBlanc and Smith

while their qualified immunity defenses remains pending. Given the assertions of the qualified

immunity defense, the Court must stay all discovery with respect to these defendants, including

discovery pertaining to claims to which the qualified immunity defense does not apply, because

such discovery would present an undue burden to LeBlanc and Smith. Carswell, 54 F.4th at 313-

314.

Furthermore, the Court finds no plausible manner in which discovery could proceed

against the remaining defendants without implicating, and unduly burdening, LeBlanc and

Smith. Plaintiffs suggest that the elements related to the claims brought against the LaSalle

Defendants and Sheriff Byrd with respect to their knowledge, patterns, customs, and practices at

MPCC do not implicate the qualified immunity defenses raised by LeBlanc and Smith, and that

written discovery regarding LeBlanc and Smith as sued in their official capacities should also be

allowed to proceed. (R. Doc. 101 at 4-6). The Court disagrees. All discovery with respect to

LeBlanc and Smith must be stayed until the Motions to Dismiss are decided. Carswell, 54 F.4th

at 311. Furthermore, the underlying factual allegations are so intertwined that allowing discovery

to proceed against any of the other defendants would inherently, and inappropriately, require

LeBlanc and Smith to participate in the discovery process. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 68-65. (“Even if

petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from

the burdens of discovery.”). The Court finds no plausible manner in which bifurcated discovery

could proceed with respect to the other defendants without implicating, and unduly burdening,

LeBlanc and Smith.3

Given the allegations in this action, as well as the Fifth Circuit’s directives in Carswell,

the Court finds it appropriate to stay all discovery in this action until resolution of the pending

Motions to Dismiss. Even if such discovery is not completely foreclosed by Carswell, the Court

finds good cause pursuant to Rule 26(c) to stay all discovery given the undue burden that such

discovery would impose on LeBlanc and Smith while their qualified immunity defenses are

pending.

III. Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that the James LeBlanc and Seth Smith’s Motion to Stay Discovery

(R. Doc. 99) is GRANTED, and discovery is STAYED until further order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Compel Discovery from

Secretary LeBlanc (R. Doc. 98) is DENIED in light of the forgoing stay of discovery and

3 The Court notes again that prior to the filing of the instant motions, Plaintiffs sought and obtained written

discovery from Sheriff Byrd and the LaSalle Defendants. It appears that most (if not all) of the remaining discovery

regarding those defendants would consist of depositions, which would unduly burden LeBlanc and Smith, who

would need to participate (through counsel) to protect their interests.

violation of Local Rule 37. Plaintiffs may re-serve the written discovery requests at issue in the

Motion to Compel, if applicable, after the resolution of Defendant James LeBlanc and Seth

Smith’s Motions to Dismiss. (R. Docs. 66, 91).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall contact the undersigned after the

resolution of the Motions to Dismiss (R. Docs. 66, 91) for the issuance of new discovery

deadlines if necessary.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall bear their own costs.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 16, 2023.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE