Ainsworth v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ETHAN P. AINSWORTH

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 21-736-JWD-EWD

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

COMPANY, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Joint Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 19)

(“Motion to Transfer”) filed by Defendants Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”),

Ralph Roland (“Roland”), and John Chop Trucking LLC (“John Chop”) (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff Ethan P. Ainsworth (“Plaintiff”) opposes the Motion. (Doc. 29.) Union

Pacific has filed a reply. (Doc. 34.) Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully

considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and

is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, the Motion to Transfer is denied. However, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this case shall be transferred sua sponte to the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana, Alexandria Division.

I. Relevant Factual Background

This case arises out of a collision between a train and an 18-wheeler vehicle. (Doc. 1 at 2,

¶ VI.) On or about October 10, 2021, at approximately 3:40 p.m., the locomotive upon which

Plaintiff was working collided with an 18-wheeler vehicle in or around Cheneyville, Louisiana.

(Id.) At the time of the collision, Plaintiff was operating the locomotive—that is, the train engine

attached to the railway train—as an engineer employed by Union Pacific, the owner of the train.

(Id. at 2–3, ¶¶ V., VI., VII.) The 18-wheeler that collided with said train was owned by John Chop

and operated by John Chop’s employee, Roland. (Id. at 3, ¶ VI.) As the train was traveling north,

“Roland negligently pulled the 18-wheeler onto the railroad crossing, causing the train [Plaintiff]

was operating to strike the 18-wheeler.” (Id. at 3, ¶ VII.) “At the time of the collision, [Plaintiff]’s

engineer seat failed to lock in the forward position.” (Id.) “As a result of the collision and Union

Pacific’s defective seat, [Plaintiff] sustained serious injuries to his neck, back, right shoulder, and

other parts of his body.” (Id.)

Thereafter, on December 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants. Plaintiff’s claims

against Union Pacific arise under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act

(“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. to recover damages for the personal injuries he sustained while

employed by Union Pacific. (Id. at 1–2, ¶ II.) Plaintiff’s claims against John Chop and Roland

arise under both federal and Louisiana law. (Id. at 2, ¶ II.)

According to the Complaint, Union Pacific is “a foreign corporation organized under the

laws of and domiciled in the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business located in the

State of Nebraska, and whose principal place of business within the State of Louisiana is in the

Parish of East Baton Rouge, and which is authorized to do and doing business in the State of

Louisiana[.]” (Id. at 1, ¶ I.) In addition, the Complaint provides that John Chop is “a Louisiana

Limited Liability Company, domiciled in the Town of Lecompte, Parish of Rapides, State of

Louisiana, authorized to do and doing business in the State of Louisiana[,]” and that Roland is a

natural person domiciled in the Village of Plaucheville, Parish of Avoyelles, State of Louisiana.

(Id.)

II. Parties’ Arguments

In sum, Defendants ask the Court to transfer this matter to the Western District of

Louisiana, Alexandria Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because they submit that the

Western District of Louisiana would be a more proper and convenient forum than the Middle

District of Louisiana. (Doc. 19 at 1.) To support this contention, they first point out that the

accident occurred in the Western District and that Plaintiff, his treating medical providers, Roland,

John Chop, all first responders, and other non-party witnesses identified thus far reside within the

Western District of Louisiana. (Id.; see id. at 5 (citing the Complaint as showing that Plaintiff

resides in LaSalle Parish, which is located in the Western District).) The first responders who

presented to the accident scene are from the Cheneyville Police Department and Acadian

Ambulance’s Central Louisiana branch, both of which are also located in the Western District. (Id.

at 5.) Further, Defendants claim that apart from Roland, who only lives eighty miles from the

Middle District, every other party witness, non-party fact witness, and first responder, as well as

Plaintiff’s medical providers, are all located more than 100 miles from this Court. (Id. at 6.)

In addition, Defendants aver that this case should be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404

because the venue transfer factors—that is, the “private and public interest” factors—taken in

totality weigh in favor of transferring this case to the Western District. (Id. at 7, 11.) As discussed

more fully below, because the Court finds that venue is improper in the Middle District, a full

recitation of Defendants’ arguments regarding § 1404 transfer for convenience is not necessary

here.

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motion to Transfer. (Doc. 29.) First, in arguing transfer to

the Western District is not proper, Plaintiff claims that “there is a strong presumption in favor of

the plaintiff’s choice of forum when an admittedly proper venue is selected.” (Doc. 29-1 at 1 (citing

Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2003)).) Further, according to

Plaintiff, to overcome this presumption, the defendants seeking transfer to another venue must

“clearly demonstrate that a transfer is ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest

of justice.’ ” (Id. (citing In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations

omitted)).) Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not met their burden, and thus, this case should

remain where filed, in the Middle District of Louisiana. (Id. at 2.)

Like Defendants, Plaintiff also argues that the public and private interest factors control

the “convenience” inquiry for determining whether transfer is appropriate. (Id. at 3.) Again,

because the Court finds that venue is improper in the Middle District, a full recitation of Plaintiff’s

arguments regarding transfer for convenience under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is not necessary here.

Finally, Plaintiff also generally asserts that Union Pacific and John Chop have regular and

systematic contacts in parishes situated in the Middle District. (Id. at 8.) For these reasons, Plaintiff

asks the Court to deny Defendants’ Motion to Transfer. (Id.)

Union Pacific filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, re-urging Defendants’ contention that

their request for transfer of this matter to the Western District should be granted. (Doc. 34.)

According to Union Pacific, Plaintiff improperly argues that his own convenience should weigh

heavier in the Court’s balance of the private and public interest factors before it. (Id. at 2.) The

remainder of Union Pacific’s reply continues to focus on the public and private interest factors,

which Union Pacific argues clearly weigh in favor of transfer to the Western District under 28

U.S.C. § 1404. Again, because analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and its accompanying factors is

unnecessary here, the Court will not repeat Union Pacific’s detailed arguments on this point.

III. Applicable Law and Analysis

“Upon objection to venue, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that venue is proper,

but the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all conflicts in favor

of the plaintiff.” Walters v. T.H. Hill Assocs., Inc., No. 12-723, 2013 WL 5375488, at *1 (M.D.

La. Sept. 19, 2013) (citing Ginter ex rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Predergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439,

448–49 (5th Cir. 2008)). “When venue is challenged, the court must determine whether the case

falls within one of the three categories set out in § 1391(b). If it does, venue is proper; if it does

not, venue is improper, and the case must be dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a).” Atl. Marine

Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. W. Dist. Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 56 (2013). Put another way, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(a) allows a court to dismiss or transfer an action only if that action has been originally

brought in an improper venue.

In contrast, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is only authorized if the movant establishes

that: “(1) venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) venue is proper in the transferee district; and

(3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties, the convenience of witnesses, and the

interests of justice.” O’Quin v. Fin. Servs. Online, Inc., No. 18-36, 2018 WL 5316360, at *10

(M.D. La. Oct. 26, 2018) (deGravelles, J.) (citations omitted); see 14D Charles A. Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3827 (4th ed. 2022) (explaining that Section 1404(a)

“refers to a civil action in which venue is properly laid in the district where the case was filed[,]”

whereas “Section 1406(a) pertains to transfer of a case laying venue in the ‘wrong district.’ ”). If

it is established that venue is proper in both the transferor district and the transferee district, then

the movant must lastly show “that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient.” White Hat v.

Landry, 475 F. Supp. 3d 532, 553 (M.D. La. 2020) (deGravelles, J.) (quoting In re Volkswagen of

Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008)). To determine “whether a § 1404(a) venue transfer

is for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice[,]” courts within the

Fifth Circuit apply the public and private interest factors established by the Supreme Court in Gulf

Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 (citation omitted).

In the case at hand, Defendants seek transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) only. However, as

noted above, transfer under Section 1404(a) is only authorized if venue is proper in the forum

where the case was originally brought—here, the Middle District. For reasons that follow, the

Court finds that the Middle District is not a proper venue for this action.

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, guides the Court in determining whether

venue is proper. Under that provision, venue is proper in either:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents

of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there

is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this

section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s

personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(3).

Because the accident at issue occurred in Cheneyville, Louisiana, which is located in the

Western District, venue is not proper in the Middle District under the “transactional venue”

provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). (See Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ VI.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the

Court also finds that venue is not proper in the Middle District under the “residential venue”

provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Plaintiff argues that venue is proper here because the Court has personal jurisdiction over

Union Pacific and John Chop, making them residents of the Middle District under the venue

provisions. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in the Middle District “pursuant

to 28 USC § 1391(c), as Defendant Union Pacific’s principal place of business within the State of

Louisiana is in the Parish of East Baton Rouge and Defendant John Chop Trucking is organized

under the laws of the State of Louisiana and both have regular and systematic contacts in the

Parishes situated in the Middle District of Louisiana.” (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ IV.; see also Doc. 29-1 at 3.)

In his opposition, Plaintiff further states that Union Pacific has “regular and systematic contacts in

the Parishes situated in the Middle District. . . .” because “Union Pacific has five branch locations

in the Middle District—specifically, in Maringouin, Livonia, Port Allen, Donaldsonville, and

Addis.” (Doc. 29-1 at 8.) As for John Chop, Plaintiff states that, “although John Chop Trucking is

based in the Western District, it has regular and systematic contacts in the Middle District.” (Id.)

Plaintiff does not elaborate further on what exact contacts John Chop has in the Middle District,

let alone explain how they are “regular and systematic.”

Section 1391(c) defines “residency” for purposes of venue. That provision reads in

pertinent part:

(1) a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence

in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that

person is domiciled;

(2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under

applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a

defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s

personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff,

only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business; and

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).

Hence, by alleging venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), Plaintiff is essentially

claiming that venue is proper under the “residential venue” provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1),

because both Union Pacific and John Chop are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction in the

Middle District. As stated above, the Court disagrees.

In states with multiple judicial districts like Louisiana, if a corporate defendant is “subject

to personal jurisdiction” in the state “at the time [the] action [was] commenced,” then the defendant

“shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient

to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).

In a diversity action, a federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident

if: (1) the state’s long-arm statute permits an exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2)

an exercise of jurisdiction would comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir.

2018) (citing Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008)). As for the

first element, pursuant to La. R.S. § 13:3201(B), Louisiana’s long-arm statute, courts are permitted

to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents consistent with the Louisiana State

Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Grp., 791 So. 2d 1266, 1270 (La. 2001). As such, only

a federal due process analysis is necessary to determine whether personal jurisdiction may be

exercised over the defendant.

Generally, a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

comports with due process when “(1) that defendant has purposefully availed himself of the

benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum state,

and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,

867 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing, inter alia, International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

This Court has frequently elaborated on the “minimum contacts” requirement:

The “minimum contacts” prong is satisfied when a defendant “purposely avails

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus, invoking

the benefits and protections of its laws.” In other words, the defendant’s connection

with the forum state should be such that “he should reasonably anticipate being

haled into court there.” The “ ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a

defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’

‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party

or a third person.’ ”

“The ‘minimum contacts’ prong is further subdivided into contacts that give rise to

specific jurisdiction and those that give rise to general jurisdiction.” “Where a

defendant has ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ with the forum

state, the court may exercise ‘general’ jurisdiction over any action brought against

that defendant.” However, “[w]here contacts are less pervasive, the court may still

exercise ‘specific’ jurisdiction in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s

contacts with the forum.”

Essex Energy, L.L.C. v. Willis, No. 15-307, 2015 WL 8207468, at *3 (M.D. La. Dec. 7, 2015)

(Dick, C.J.) (footnotes and internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In this case, there is clearly no specific jurisdiction over Defendants in the Middle District

because the facts giving rise to this litigation—that is, the alleged incident and Plaintiff’s resulting

injuries—occurred in the Western District. Put another way, Plaintiff’s suit does not arise out of

or relate to Defendants’ contacts with the Middle District of Louisiana. As a result, the Court’s

analysis is limited to the issue of general jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has articulated the standard for general or “all-purpose” jurisdiction as

follows: “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)

corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler

AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.

Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Further, as this Court has explained:

Only a “limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to

all-purpose jurisdiction there.” Daimler, [571 U.S. at 137]. That “limited set” of

affiliations includes the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principle place

of business. Id.

Daimler made clear that it was not holding that “a corporation may be subject to

general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated or has its principle place of

business.” Id. “We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, a

corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or

principle place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render

the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at [139 n.19] (internal citation omitted).

O’Quin, 2018 WL 5316360, at *7 (second emphasis added).

As for Union Pacific, Plaintiff alleges that this “foreign corporation [is] organized under

the laws of and domiciled in the State of Delaware” and further alleges that Union Pacific’s

“principal place of business [is] located in the State of Nebraska[.]” (Doc. 1 at 1, ¶ I.) However,

Plaintiff additionally alleges that Union Pacific’s “principal place of business within the State of

Louisiana is in the Parish of East Baton Rouge[.]” (Id. (emphasis added).) The Court finds this

legal conclusion insufficient to show that the Court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over

Union Pacific in the Middle District for two reasons.

First, Plaintiff does not argue that Union Pacific’s principal place of business is in East

Baton Rouge Parish, but rather alleges that Union Pacific’s “principal place of business within the

State of Louisiana is in the Parish of East Baton Rouge[.]” (Id. (emphasis added).) Put another

way, in making this allegation, Plaintiff seems to only take into account Union Pacific’s activities

in the state of Louisiana, not Union Pacific’s business activities as a whole. Second, even if

Plaintiff had alleged that Union Pacific has a principal place of business in both the state of

Nebraska and East Baton Rouge Parish, that allegation too would be insufficient here to show

Union Pacific’s principal place of business is in the Middle District, because a corporation can

only have one principal place of business. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (“A

corporation’s ‘nerve center,’ usually its main headquarters, is a single place.”) (emphasis added).

Next, the Court must examine whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that either Union

Pacific’s or John Chop’s contacts in the Middle District are so “continuous and systematic” as to

render them essentially “at home” in the Middle District. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (citation

omitted); see Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, No. 15-482, 2016 WL

1254366, at *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 29, 2016) (Dick, C.J.) (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter,

768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (explaining that “[i]t is incredibly difficult

to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place

of business.”). As for John Chop, Plaintiff provides virtually no facts to explain how John Chop’s

contacts with the Middle District are so “continuous and systematic” that they essentially render

John Chop at home in that district. Essex Energy, 2015 WL 8207468, at *3 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to show the exercise of general personal

jurisdiction over John Chop in the Middle District is proper.

As for Union Pacific, Plaintiff argues that Union Pacific has “regular and systematic

contacts in the Parishes situated in the Middle District. . . .” because “Union Pacific has five branch

locations in the Middle District—specifically, in Maringouin, Livonia, Port Allen, Donaldsonville,

and Addis.” (Doc. 29-1 at 8.) In addition, as Defendants point out, Union Pacific’s registered agent

for service of process is located in Baton Rouge. (Doc. 19 at 5.) The Court finds these contacts

insufficient to meet the “exceptional case” that would justify imposing general jurisdiction here.

Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2016); Douglass v. Nippon Yusen

Kabushiki Kaisha, 46 F.4th 226, 242 (5th Cir. 2022).

Two cases in particular, Mercury Rents, Inc. v. Crenshaw Enters., LLC, No. 16-1741, 2017

WL 2380642 (W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2017) and Long v. Patton Hospitality Management, No. 15-2213,

2016 WL 760780 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2016), illustrate the high standard set by the Supreme Court

for imposing general jurisdiction on a defendant based solely on their contacts with the forum. The

Courts finds these cases instructive on the issue at hand.

In Mercury Rents, the court found the allegations of the defendant’s significant contacts

with Louisiana insufficient to support general jurisdiction. 2017 WL 2380642, at *6. In that case,

the defendant’s alleged contacts included: maintaining multiple locations; maintaining at least

three employees, including a supervisor; transacting business with various Louisiana companies

and customers; soliciting business from Louisiana customers through its website; registering for

business in Louisiana and maintaining a registered agent for service in Louisiana; registering its

trade name with the Louisiana Secretary of State; paying Louisiana state taxes; and regularly

attending a trade show held biannually in Louisiana. Id. at *5. The court held that these contacts

were not so “continuous and systematic” as to render the defendant essentially “at home” in

Louisiana. Id. at *6 (concluding that the evidence established, at best, that the defendant engaged

in significant business with Louisiana, but that its overall affiliations with Louisiana fell short of

the extremely high bar required for general jurisdiction).

Similarly, in Long, the court found the defendant’s contacts with Louisiana insufficient to

support general jurisdiction. 2016 WL 760780, at *5–6. There, the defendant’s contacts included:

registering to do business in the state; maintaining a registered agent for service in the state;

managing a property in the state; paying state and property taxes; and employing nine individuals

in the state. Id. at *4. The court found that these activities did not render the defendant essentially

“at home” in Louisiana. Id. at *6. Importantly, the court noted that Louisiana was just one of the

many states in which the defendant managed properties and stated that the plaintiff failed to

establish that the defendant was any more active in Louisiana than it was in any other state in

which it operated. Id. at *5. Thus, the court concluded that the defendant’s activities did not even

“come close to rising to the level of the principal place of business, the quintessential paradigm

for general jurisdiction.” Id.

Union Pacific’s contacts with the Middle District, as set forth above, are no more

substantial than the contacts considered in Mercury Rents and Long. As such, the Court finds that

Union Pacific’s contacts with the Middle District are not so continuous and systematic as to render

Union Pacific at home in the Middle District. See Mercury Rents, 2017 WL 2380642, at *5; Long,

2016 WL 760780, at *5–6. Consequently, the Court finds that Union Pacific’s contacts with the

Middle District—as represented by Plaintiff—are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over

Union Pacific if this district were a separate state. Because neither Union Pacific nor John Chop is

subject to personal jurisdiction in this district, they are likewise not deemed to “reside” in the

Middle District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Therefore, the Court finds that the Middle District

of Louisiana is not a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).1

Because venue is improper in the Middle District, the Court must now decide whether to

dismiss or transfer this case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Section 1406(a) provides:

“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district

shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in

which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “Under the transfer statute, a district court

may transfer a case upon a motion or sua sponte. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and § 1406.” Latino v. Dillard

Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 19-184, 2019 WL 3752969, at *1 (M.D. La. Aug. 8, 2019) (Jackson, J.)

(quoting Caldwell v. Palmetto State Savings Bank of S.C., 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987)).

Before transferring a case, the Court must first determine whether the destination venue—here, the

Western District—is a district in which the suit “might have been brought.” See Volkswagen, 545

F.3d at 312.

In this case, the Western District is where the essential facts of the litigation took place.

(See Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ VI. (the accident occurred in Cheneyville, Louisiana, which is located in the

Western District).) Thus, the Court finds that the Western District is a proper venue under 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Neither party has asked for dismissal of this case; instead, Defendants request

a transfer of venue only. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Court will in its discretion transfer

1 The Court need not determine whether venue is proper under the “fallback” venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3),

as “Section 1391(b)(3) applies only if there is no federal district that will satisfy either the residential venue or

transaction venue provisions.” 14D Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3806.1

(4th ed. 2022) (“It is not enough that the forum district does not satisfy residential or transaction venue. There must

be no federal district anywhere in the United States that satisfies either Section 1391(b)(1) or Section 1391(b)(2).”).

this case to the Western District of Louisiana, Alexandria Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a).

Finally, the Court notes that the parties focused heavily on the issue of transfer based on

convenience under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as well as the jurisprudential private and public interest

factors used by courts in making that determination. However, given the Court’s finding that the

Middle District of Louisiana is not a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the only ground for

transfer is under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See O’Quin, 2018 WL 5316360, at *10 (explaining that to

obtain transfer under § 1404(a), the movant must establish, inter alia, that venue is proper in the

transferor district). Thus, the Court need not discuss Defendants’ arguments for transfer under 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a).

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 19) filed by Defendants

Union Pacific Railroad Company, Ralph Roland, and John Chop Trucking LLC is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this case is hereby

TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana,

Alexandria Division.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 30, 2023.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA