Opinion

Dixon v. D.R. Horton, Inc. - Gulf Coast

Court
District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed
Feb 10, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALICIA R. DIXON, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

D.R. HORTON, INC., ET AL. NO. 22-01005-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant D.R. Horton, Inc. — Gulf Coast’s (“D.R. Horton”)

Motion To Stay Pending Arbitration (Doc. 15). D.R. Horton’s motion is

unopposed. For reasons set forth below, D.R. Horton’s motion will be granted, and

this action will be stayed, pending arbitration.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

D.R. Horton and Plaintiffs executed a contract of sale for the purchase of a

Lafayette Parish residence on April 10, 2014. (Doc. 15-3). The same parties re-

executed the contract on June 6, 2014. (Doc. 15-2).

The contract includes an arbitration clause which covers “any claim,

controversy or dispute of any kind,” and requires that the parties “agree to resolve

such dispute by binding arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act and the

Federal Arbitration Act.”! (Doc. 15-2, p. 10, § 14). In addition to signing and re-

full arbitration clause is as follows:

Buyer and Seller agree that if any claim, controversy or dispute

of any kind arises between Buyer and Seller, whether arising for

a tort, the Contract, any breach of the Contract in any way

related to this transaction, including but not limited to claims or

disputes arising under the Unfair Trade Practices and

Consumer Protection Law and/or the terms of the express

limited warranty referenced in Paragraph 13 of the Contract,

THE BUYER AND SELLER AGREE TO RESOLVE SUCH

signing the contract, Plaintiffs specifically affixed their initials alongside the section

describing the arbitration clause in both copies of the contract. (See Docs. 15-3, p. 2,

14; 15-2, p. 10, § 14).

Further, between 2009 and 2021, D.R. Horton and Defendant Bell Mechanical

Services, LLC, executed three separate independent contractor agreements. (Doc. 7-

5, pp. 17-50). In those contracts, the parties agreed that “[Bell Mechanical] shall be

bound by any arbitration procedures and rules accepted by [D.R. Horton] where

necessary to facilitate resolution in a single forum.” (Doc. 7-5, pp. 21, 30, 48).

Il. ANALYSIS

A. Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (“FAA”), expresses a strong

federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 218, 217-18 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465

U.S. 1, 10, (1984); Safer v. Nelson Fin. Group Inc., 422 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2005).

DISPUTE BY BINDING ARBITRATION UNDER THE

UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT AND THE FEDERAL

ARBITRATION ACT under the direction and procedures

established by the AAA “Construction Industry Arbitration

Rules” except as specifically modified herein or dictated by

applicable statutes including the Uniform Arbitration Act and/or

the Federal Arbitration Act. Any dispute shall be submitted for

determination by an arbitrator or a board of three (8)

arbitrators, as agreed upon between Buyer and Seller, to be

selected for each controversy. The decision of the arbitrator(s)

shall be in writing and signed by such arbitrator(s), or a majority

of them, and shall be final and binding upon the parties. Hach

party shall bear the fees and expenses of counsel, witnesses and

employees of such party, and any other costs and expenses

incurred for the benefit of such party. All other fees and expenses

shall be divided equally between Buyer and Seller.

(Doc. 15-2, p. 10, | 14).

Most relevant here, Section 3 of the FAA states:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United

States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in

writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,

upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is

referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application

of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has

been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the

applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such

arbitration.

9 U.S.C. § 3. “Section 3...is broad enough to permit the stay of an entire action even

though only some of the issues in the lawsuit are referable to arbitration.” Cybertek,

Inc. v. Bentley Sys., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 864, 871 (D. Neb. 2002) (discussing

authorities); see also Miller v. Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 545 F.2d 1019, 1020—21 (5th

Cir. 1977) (“Once being satisfied .. . ‘that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding

is referable to arbitration under such an agreement,’ the district court seems to be

required by [Section 3] to, upon application, ‘stay the trial of the action until such

arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing

the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”).

The Court applies a two-step analysis to assess whether an issue is referrable

to arbitration. Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008).

First, the Court determines whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the

particular dispute. Id. This first step, itself, is divided into two questions: “(1) is there

a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims and (2) does the dispute in question fall

within the scope of that arbitration agreement.” Sherer, 548 F.3d at 381. “[A]ny

doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor

of arbitration.” Safer, 422 F.3d at 294.

Second, upon being satisfied that the parties have agreed to arbitrate a

dispute, the Court asks whether “any federal statute or policy renders the claims

nonarbitrable.” Sherer, 548 F.3d at 381 (quoting Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC □□□

Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2004)).

The Supreme Court instructs that the FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of

discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct

the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement

has been signed.” Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 218.

B. Discussion

At the first step of the analysis, Plaintiffs and D.R. Horton indisputably agreed

to arbitrate claims arising during the term of the contract of sale. (See Docs. 15-3, p.

2, § 14; 15-2, p. 10, § 14). Further, at least some of Plaintiffs’ claims against

Defendants fall squarely within the arbitration clause’s scope. Plaintiffs allege breach

of contract, negligence, redhibition, and claims attacking the validity and

enforceability of the contract and arbitration clause, among other claims against

Defendants, (Doc. 5-1, pp. 12-34). These allegations clearly fall within the types of

potential causes of action contemplated by the agreed-upon arbitration clause. (See

Doc. 15-2, p. 10, { 14).

In addition, as it relates to Plaintiffs’ attacks on the validity of the contract and

arbitration clause, pursuant to the FAA, the contractual incorporation of the AAA

Rules constitutes a per se delegation of all issues relating to the merits, validity, or

enforceability of an arbitration clause to the arbitrator. See, e.g., Edwards v.

Doordash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2018); Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott

Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); Arnold v. Homeaway,

Inc., 890 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2018).

The only remaining question is whether a federal statute or policy renders

these issues nonarbitrable. The Court is not aware of any such statute or policy, and

no party has identified any.

In sum, the Court determines that the above-captioned matter is appropriately

stayed, pending arbitration pursuant to the parties’ contractual agreements.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant D.R. Horton’s Motion To Stay Pending

Arbitration (Doc. 15) be and is hereby GRANTED, and that this action be and is

hereby STAYED pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, pending arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims

against Defendants, pursuant to the parties’ contractual agreements.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall, throughout the duration

of this stay, jointly file a notice with the Court every 90 days informing the Court of

the status of the arbitration.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties resolve this matter through

arbitration, the parties shall immediately file a notice of settlement consistent with

the requirements of Local Rule 16(c), and/or a stipulation of dismissal consistent with

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)G@i).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions in the above-

captioned matter be and are hereby TERMINATED without prejudice to the

movants’ rights to re-assert their arguments (as appropriate) pending completion of

arbitration and reinstatement of this case to the Court’s active docket.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall

ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case for statistical purposes.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this Fey of February, 2023

JUDGE BRIAN —

UNITED STATE ISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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