Buchicchio v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NICHOLAS BUCHICCHIO CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

JAMES M. LEBLANC, ET AL. NO. 22-00147-BAJ-EWD

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff, formerly a prisoner detained by the Louisiana Department of Public

Safety and Corrections (DPSC), alleges that prison officials unlawfully delayed his

release for twelve weeks after the expiration of his sentence, in violation of his right

to due process and various other duties.

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants DPSC

Secretary, James LeBlanc; Chief of Corrections of the West Baton Rouge Transitional

Work Facility, Steven Juge; and Sheriff of West Baton Rouge Parish, Mike Cazes.

(Docs. 28, 29). For reasons below, Plaintiff’s due process and indemnification claims

against Sheriff Cazes will be dismissed. Otherwise, Defendants’ motions will be

denied.

I. ALLEGED FACTS

The following allegations are drawn from Plaintiff’s operative Amended

Complaint (Doc. 21), or are otherwise subject to judicial notice,1 and are accepted as

1 The Court accepts Defendants’ invitation to consider the following documents, in addition

to the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint: (1) Plaintiff’s January 21, 2020

Uniform Commitment Order, entered by Judge Mary Doggett of the Ninth Judicial District

Court for the Parish of Rapides (Doc. 28-2); (2) the March 3, 2021 Minute Entry of the Rapides

Parish Clerk of Court, reflecting Judge Doggett’s Order granting Plaintiff’s pro se Motion to

true for present purposes:

In 2017, Plaintiff lived in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, and was serving a term

of probation for a prior conviction in Florida.

On March 13, 2017, Rapides Parish authorities arrested Plaintiff for theft.

Plaintiff was initially booked at the Rapides Parish jail, and then returned to Florida

where he pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his probation. The Florida court

revoked Plaintiff’s probation, and remanded Plaintiff to Florida’s Department of

Corrections to serve his sentence. (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 33-35).

On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff completed his Florida sentence and returned to

Rapides Parish for proceedings related to the underlying theft offense(s). Upon

arrival, Plaintiff was again incarcerated at the Rapides Parish jail. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37).

On January 16, 2020, Plaintiff appeared before Judge Mary Doggett of the

Clarify/Modify Sentence (Doc. 28-3); and (3) the certified transcript of the March 3, 2021

Zoom hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion To Clarify/Modify Sentence (Doc. 29-2). These documents

are referenced throughout Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and are cited as the basis of

Plaintiff’s entitlement to immediate release as of March 3, 2021. Further, these documents

are public judicial records subject to judicial notice without converting Defendants’ Rule 12

motions to motions for summary judgment. Fed. R. Evid. 201.

Additionally, the Court takes judicial notice of the January 25, 2023 final Report of

the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, titled “Investigation Of The Louisiana

Department Of Public Safety & Corrections” (hereinafter, the “DOJ Report”), which presents

the DOJ’s findings regarding the pervasive practice of overdetention at DPSC. The DOJ

Report is readily available on the DOJ’s website, is generally known within the territorial

jurisdiction of this Court, is not subject to reasonable dispute, and bears directly on the issues

under review in this action (as set forth below). See United States v. Herrera-Ochoa, 245 F.3d

495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2001) (taking

judicial notice of DOJ report advising Alabama Department of Corrections that use of

hitching post was improper corporal punishment and was not acceptable use of restraints),

reversed on other grounds, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The DOJ report is available at:

https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1564036/download (visited Feb. 15, 2023).

Ninth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Rapides (“Ninth JDC”), and pleaded

guilty to 10 counts of theft between $5,000-$25,000, in violation of La. R.S.

§ 1467(b)(2) (2014). (Doc. 28-2 at p. 1). At the same January 16 appearance, Judge

Doggett sentenced Plaintiff to seven years imprisonment on each count, “sentences

on each count … to run concurrent with each other,” with credit for all time served—

in Louisiana and Florida—from the date of Plaintiff’s initial arrest. (Id.). As a result,

Plaintiff was entitled to immediate release from custody. Still, Plaintiff was detained

in Rapides Parish for two additional weeks, until his release on February 11, 2020.

(Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 38-44).

After his release, Plaintiff returned to Florida, intending to rebuild his life. In

June 2020, Plaintiff secured an interview for a job managing a condominium complex

in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Plaintiff’s prospective employer paid for Plaintiff’s

travel to St. Croix to meet in person and visit the grounds. Plaintiff landed the job

and planned to accept. On his return to Florida, however, St. Croix airport authorities

informed Plaintiff of an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and that law enforcement

would be waiting to detain him in Miami. Baffled, and unaware of any outstanding

warrant, Plaintiff nonetheless voluntarily boarded his flight. Sure enough, airport

authorities arrested Plaintiff in Miami, based on an outstanding warrant issued by

DPSC. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-54).

DPSC’s warrant was a mistake, the result of DPSC’s failure to properly

calculate Plaintiff’s release date under Judge Doggett’s January 16, 2020

Commitment Order, despite having released Plaintiff four months earlier. Under the

warrant, Plaintiff was returned to Louisiana, and imprisoned at the Elayn Hunt

Correctional Center (EHCC) during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to

pandemic protocols, Plaintiff was confined to a two-man “lockdown” cell 23 hours per

day. (Id. at ¶¶ 55-57).

Upon arriving at EHCC, Plaintiff immediately informed DPSC of its mistake,

and that he was being detained beyond his release date. Plaintiff filed an

administrative grievance explaining his situation, and that he was entitled to

immediate release as of the date of his sentencing hearing (January 16, 2021) under

Judge Doggett’s Commitment Order. On August 17, 2020, DPSC denied Plaintiff’s

grievance. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-60).

After DPSC’s denial, Plaintiff submitted a pro se “Motion to Clarify/Modify

Sentence” (the “Motion to Clarify” or “Motion”) to the Ninth JDC, seeking a hearing

before Judge Doggett to correct DPSC’s error. The Ninth JDC initially set Plaintiff’s

Motion for hearing on September 21, 2020, but DPSC caused Plaintiff to miss this

hearing by failing to provide transport to the courthouse or, alternatively, allowing

Plaintiff access to EHCC’s remote (Zoom) conferencing facilities. Plaintiff’s hearing

was delayed twice more, each time due to DPSC’s failure to provide transport or

access to Zoom conferencing technology. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-64).

In early March 2021, DPSC transferred Plaintiff from EHCC to the West Baton

Rouge Transitional Work Facility (“WBRWRC”), where Plaintiff’s detention

continued under the authority and supervision of Defendants Chief Juge and Sheriff

Cazes. (Id. at ¶¶ 65-66).

On March 3, 2021, Plaintiff finally appeared before Judge Doggett (by Zoom)

for a hearing on his Motion to Clarify. Chief Juge attended this hearing. Still pro se,

Plaintiff explained the basis of his Motion—stating that his current detention (eight

months and counting) was a mistake due to DPSC’s miscalculation of his release date

and the resulting erroneous warrant—and requested an order reaffirming that he

received credit for time served on detainer in Florida. (Doc. 29-2). The transcript of

Plaintiff’s March 3 hearing states (in relevant part):

The Court: Okay, so what you’re wanting at this point is [to] let the

minutes reflect that you’re getting credit for time served. I already have

that in the minutes, but you wanted it to specifically say, including time

served 10/16/2017 through May 7, 2019?

Mr. Buchicchio: Yes, ma’am because what had happened was, actually

DOC released me in March of last year and then rearrested [sic] because

there was an error in my release because the jail credits got all messed

up.

The Court: Okay. I mean, I don’t usually - that’s a DOC function, but I

don’t mind just putting that one entry, that you would - because you

were on detainer while in Florida, I don’t mind amending the minutes

and I’ll do that for you today. So, if the District Attorney has no objection,

I would amend the [sic] minutes to reflect that Mr. Buchicchio would be

getting credit for time served on his sentence of - when was he

sentenced? 01/16 right? Okay, so we’re going to amend that, those

minutes to reflect that he be given credit for time served and then the

amendment will be to include, and specifically credit for time served on

detainer from May 8th - no, from October 16, 2017 through May 7, 2019.

Okay?

Mr. Buchicchio: Yes, ma’am. Thank you so much.

The Court: We’ll try it. Alright. Good luck. Thank you.

(Doc. 29-2 at pp. 3-4).

Judge Doggett issued a minute entry Order the same day of the hearing (March

3), stating:

Accused present without counsel. State represented by K SANDERS.

Defendant is present via zoom Conference. For Motion(s) MTN CREDIT

FOR TXME SERVED-Defendant explained his motion to the Court.

State has no objection to giving the defendant credit for time served

while on detainer. Court ordered that the defendant receive credit for

time served specifically while on detainer since the time of 10.16.2017

until 5.7.2019. Court granted defendants [sic] motion.

(Doc. 28-3 at p. 1).

Plaintiff contends that during the March 3 hearing—a portion of which is not

transcribed due to a “[s]ide conversation off mic” (Doc. 29-2 at p. 3 (emphasis in

original))—Judge Doggett “was confused and frustrated” by Plaintiff’s ongoing

detention, and made clear that he should be released. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-70).

Despite attending the March 3 hearing, Chief Juge failed to promptly arrange

for Plaintiff’s release, or even seek an expedited recalculation of Plaintiff’s release

date. Instead, after the hearing, Chief Juge told Plaintiff that he (Chief Juge) was

“going home.” Thereafter, for twelve weeks DPSC failed to process Plaintiff’s release.

During this time, Plaintiff repeatedly confronted Chief Juge and inquired about the

delay. In response, Chief Juge “at times express[ed] confusion as to why [Plaintiff]

was still imprisoned,” but never gave an explanation, ultimately stating that the

matter was “out of his hands.” (Id. at ¶¶ 71-76).

Finally, in the face of DPSC’s inexplicable failure to act on Judge Doggett’s

March 3 Order, Plaintiff’s family contacted an attorney to assist. On May 21, 2021,

an attorney from The Promise of Justice Initiative emailed counsel for DPSC, stating

that Plaintiff was “eligible for immediate release on March 3, 2021 but is currently in

West Baton Rouge work release.” Counsel’s email continued, “[s]ince Plaintiff is now

past his proper release date, would you please expedite calculation of his time and

release him as soon as possible?” Just four days later, on May 25, 2021, DPSC freed

Plaintiff from custody. (Id. at ¶¶ 77-80).

Plaintiff alleges that his over-extended detention is the result of a well-

documented and systemic practice of overdetention at DPSC—affecting hundreds of

detainees each month. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Secretary LeBlanc has

expressly and repeatedly acknowledged this problem, yet has failed to correct it, as

detailed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Crittindon v. LeBlanc,

37 F.4th 177 (5th Cir. 2022), and, even more recently, by the U.S. Department of

Justice in its January 25, 2023 Report, titled “Investigation Of The Louisiana

Department Of Public Safety & Corrections” (hereinafter, the “DOJ Report”). Plaintiff

alleges that widespread overdetention at DPSC is the result of both a failure to adopt

policies to address the issue, and a failure “to implement sufficient training or any

legitimate mechanism for oversight or punishment of” DPSC employees responsible

for calculating inmate release dates. (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 81-105, 144-45).

Plaintiff’s allegations are substantiated by the DOJ Report, which follows a

two-year investigation into DPSC’s time computation and release practices,

spearheaded by the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, and assisted by Louisiana’s three

United States Attorney’s Offices. (DOJ Report at § III). The DOJ Report details

multiple policy failures resulting in overdetention at DPSC, including (1) failure to

adopt policies related to the delivery of sentencing paperwork for individuals housed

in parish jails (id. at § V(B)(2)(a)); (2) failure to adopt adequate time computation

processes (id. at § V(B)(2)(b)); and (3) failure to train DPSC employees regarding

“complex aspects of release date calculations that are likely to drive errors, namely the

variety of issues that may emerge on account of the numerous, and sometimes unique,

factors guiding a given calculation,” (id. at § V(B)(2)(c)). Significantly, the DOJ Report

expressly affirms Secretary LeBlanc’s actual awareness of these problems, and

potential fixes:

During the Department’s investigation, both Secretary James LeBlanc,

[DPSC]’s Chief Executive Officer, and [DPSC]’s Undersecretary of the

Office of Finance and Management acknowledged that restructuring the

Basic Jail Guidelines and [Cooperative Endeavor Agreements with

parish jails] to require the timely delivery of sentencing documents from

the parish jails is entirely within [DPSC]’s control.

Secretary LeBlanc further acknowledged that [DPSC] could institute a

policy of tracking the frequency of delayed or deficient preclass[2] packets

in order to identify the specific parish jails contributing to these issues

and address them accordingly

(Id. at § V(B)(2)(a)).

The DOJ Report’s conclusions are damning and unequivocal:

[DPSC] incarcerates thousands of individuals each year beyond their

legal release dates in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. These violations are pursuant to a pattern

or practice of infringements on the constitutional rights of incarcerated

persons.

While people convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison must serve

their time, [DPSC] routinely confines people far past the dates when

they are legally entitled to be released from custody. Since at least 2012,

more than a quarter of the people set for release from [DPSC]’s custody

each year are instead held past their release date, in violation of the due

process protections of the Constitution. These violations are severe,

systemic, and are both caused and perpetuated by serious ongoing

2 DPSC “Preclass”—or “Preclassification Department”—is responsible for collecting,

maintaining, and managing sentencing information and related records for inmates in DPSC

custody. Preclass is also responsible for calculating release dates—referred to as time

computations—for inmates in state custody, and for timely processing their release from

incarceration. (DOJ Report at § IV(B)).

deficiencies in [DPSC]’s policies and practices. [DPSC] has persisted

with these unconstitutional practices despite at least a decade of notice

and clear recommendations for fixing the problem.

(Id. at § I).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action, seeking relief only for

Defendants’ alleged failure to immediately release him following Judge Doggett’s

March 3 Order—in other words, for the twelve-week period of detention beginning

March 3, 2021, and ending May 25, 2021. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 22). Against all Defendants,

Plaintiff alleges due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article

I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution (Count 1, 2, 6); false imprisonment (Count

3); and negligence (Count 4). (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 107-136, 141-145).

Additionally, against Chief Juge only, Plaintiff alleges a claim of failure to

intervene to prevent his unconstitutional overdetention (Count 5). (Id. at ¶¶ 137-140).

Against Sheriff Cazes only, Plaintiff alleges claims of respondeat superior

liability for Chief Juge’s unlawful acts (Count 7) and indemnification (Count 8). (Id.

at ¶¶ 146-151).

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring DPSC “to end [its]

practice of overdetention,” and compensatory, special, and punitive damages. (Id. at

¶ 152).

Now, Defendants each move to dismiss Plaintiff’s action in full, with prejudice,

asserting a variety of defenses, including qualified immunity. (Docs. 28, 29). Plaintiff

opposes Defendants’ motions. (Docs. 32, 37).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard

Defendants invoke two mechanisms for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 12: Rule 12(b)(1) (Secretary LeBlanc); and Rule 12(b)(6) (Secretary

LeBlanc, Sheriff Cazes, and Chief Juge). Still, the analysis is functionally the same.

The critical issue is whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)); accord Home Builders Ass’n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143

F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (“A motion under 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it

appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim

that would entitle him to relief.”).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. Facial plausibility exists

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Hence,

the complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations,” but something “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When conducting its inquiry, the Court

accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010).

B. Discussion

i. Chief Juge

Chief Juge attacks Plaintiff’s action on multiple grounds, arguing (1) Plaintiff’s

due process claims are defeated by qualified immunity (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 11-15); (2)

Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim fails because Plaintiff cannot establish that he

was overdetained, much less that Chief Juge knew of his overdetention, (Doc. 29-1 at

pp. 10-11); and (3) Plaintiff’s false imprisonment and negligence claims are either

implausible or fatally flawed (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 15-17).

a. Due Process3

Qualified immunity shields a government official from individual liability for

civil damages when the “official’s conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

City of Escondido, Calif. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019). Its purpose is to strike

a balance “between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and

in public officials’ effective performance of their duties” by making it possible for

government officials to “reasonably anticipate when their conduct may give rise to

liability for damages.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting

3 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Louisiana Constitution’s Due

Process Clause are “nearly identical in language,” are “coextensive,” and “provide the same

due process protection.” Robinson v. St. Tammany Par. Pub. Sch. Sys., 983 F. Supp. 2d 835,

845 n.64 (E.D. La. 2013) (Jolivette Brown, J.) (quoting State v. Smith, 614 So.2d 778, 780 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 569 F. App’x 303 (5th Cir. 2014). Further, Louisiana’s two-part test

for qualified immunity is indistinguishable from the federal test. See Moresi v. State Through

Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1085–86 (La. 1990). Accordingly, the analysis

as to whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a due process violation “is the same under either

constitution,” Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 845 n.64, and the reasoning set forth herein

applies equally to Plaintiff’s federal and state due process claims.

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)). Put differently, “[q]ualified immunity

gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken

judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The Fifth Circuit’s two-pronged test for qualified immunity asks (1) “whether

the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show

that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right

was ‘clearly established.’” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190-91 (5th Cir.

2020). A court may analyze these prongs in either order, and resolve the case on a

single prong. Id. at 190. Importantly, “[a]lthough nominally an affirmative defense,

the plaintiff has the burden to negate the assertion of qualified immunity once

properly raised.” Collier v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2009).

To determine whether a constitutional right was “clearly established” at the

time of the alleged violation, the Court looks for guidance from controlling Supreme

Court and Fifth Circuit authority. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314,

329 (5th Cir. 2002). “A right is ‘clearly established’ only if it ‘is sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right.’” Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 191 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015)). The “salient question” is “‘whether the state of the law at the time of the state

action gave the state actors fair warning that their alleged treatment of the plaintiff

was unconstitutional.’” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329 (quoting Roe v. Texas Dep’t of

Protective & Regul. Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 409 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Mullenix, 577

U.S. at 12 (“The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of the particular

conduct is clearly established.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Applying this framework, Plaintiff’s allegations overcome Chief Juge’s

qualified immunity defense. Here, it bears repeating that liberty—the freedom from

arbitrary and unlawful restraint—is the most fundamental of all rights that our

Constitution was intended to protect. Indeed, it is the right from which all other

constitutional rights flow.

At the center of the Framers' dedication to the separation of powers was

individual liberty. The Federalist No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (quoting

Baron de Montesquieu for the proposition that “‘[t]here can be no liberty

where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same

person, or body of magistrates’”). This was not liberty in the sense of

freedom from all constraint, but liberty as described by Locke: “to have

a standing rule to live by ... made by the legislative power,” and to be

free from “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another

man.” J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 22, p. 13 (J.

Gough ed. 1947). At the heart of this liberty were the Lockean private

rights: life, liberty, and property. If a person could be deprived of these

private rights on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enacted by the

legislature, then he was not truly free. See D. Currie, The Constitution

in the Supreme Court: The First One Hundred Years, 1789–1888, p. 272,

and n. 268 (1985).

Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 75–76 (2015) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in the judgment); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)

(observing that the most important of “freedom's first principles” is the “freedom from

arbitrary and unlawful restraint”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 118 (1872)

(observing that “the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law” rises “above all” other rights secured by the Constitution).

Naturally, then, it is indisputable that at the time of his alleged overdetention,

Plaintiff enjoyed a “clearly established right to timely release from prison” upon

completion of his sentence. Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188 (quoting Porter v. Epps, 659

F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011)).

Of course, “timely release” is not the same as instantaneous release: it

is reasonable for jailers to have some administrative delay in processing

an inmate’s discharge. While courts have declined to define the amount

of delay that is reasonable, it is without question that holding without

legal notice a prisoner for a month beyond the expiration of his sentence

constitutes a denial of due process.

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Porter, 659 F.3d

at 445 (“Detention of a prisoner for over ‘thirty days beyond the expiration of his

sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a

deprivation of due process.’” (quoting Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.

1980)). To the point, “overdetention by thirty days is a per se deprivation of due

process.” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 191 (citing Douthit, 619 F.2d at 532). Here, Plaintiff

alleges that he was detained for twelve weeks past his release date. Under any

measure, Plaintiff has alleged a due process violation. Id.

The remaining question is whether Plaintiff’s allegations establish that a

reasonable jailer in Chief Juge’s position would know that his conduct violated

Plaintiff’s right to timely release. Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 190-91. Here, again, the

answer is obvious.

Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates

are timely released from prison. We have explained that while not a

surety for the legal correctness of a prisoner’s commitment, a jailer is

most certainly under an obligation, often statutory, to carry out the

functions of his office. Those functions include not only the duty to

protect a prisoner, but also the duty to effect his timely release.”

Porter, 659 F.3d at 445 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that Chief Juge (1) attended the March 3 hearing at which

Plaintiff explained the calculation error resulting in his unlawful June 2020 arrest

and detention; (2) heard Judge Doggett’s ruling granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify;

and, as a result, (3) knew that Plaintiff received “credit for time served on detainer

[in Florida] … from October 16, 2017 through May 7, 2019,” (Doc. 29-2 at p. 4), yet (4)

took no discernable action to re-calculate Plaintiff’s release date, or effect Plaintiff’s

release for twelve weeks. In the meantime, Plaintiff (5) repeatedly confronted Chief

Juge, who, in response, disclaimed responsibility and stated that the matter was “out

of his hands.” (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 71-76).

Faced with these alleged circumstances, a reasonable jailer in Chief Juge’s

position would have, at a minimum, promptly sought recalculation of Plaintiff’s

release date, which allegedly would have confirmed DPSC’s original error and

resulted in Plaintiff’s immediate release. See Hicks v. LeBlanc, 832 F. App’x 836, 840

(5th Cir. 2020) (“A prisoner’s right to timely release was clearly established well

before 2017, when [defendant’s] actions began to occur. A reasonable DPSC employee

also should have known to credit time served when calculating an inmate’s release

date, where the court ordered such credit to be considered.”); Hicks v. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety & Corr., 595 F. Supp. 3d 463, 476–77 (M.D. La. 2022) (Dick, C.J.) (same).

Instead, despite alleged actual notice of Plaintiff’s overdetention, Chief Juge did

nothing, allowing Plaintiff to remain detained for nearly two months beyond that

which the Fifth Circuit instructs is a “per se deprivation of due process.” Crittindon,

37 F.4th at 191. Again, by any measure, Plaintiff’s allegations establish that a

reasonable jailer in Chief Juge’s position would know that his conduct violated his

“duty to effect [Plaintiff’s] timely release.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445; see Hicks, 595 F.

Supp. 3d 482–83 (denying qualified immunity defense at Rule 12(b)(6) stage to DPSC

employee who allegedly knew that plaintiff was due to be released based on

sentencing court’s order that plaintiff be given credit for all time served, but delayed

plaintiff’s release for 60 days beyond completion of his sentence).

b. Failure To Intervene

“[A]n officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander liability

where the officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s

constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3)

chooses not to act.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation

marks omitted). Chief Juge blithely challenges Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim,

asserting that “Plaintiff has failed to show either that he was being confined in

violation of the United States Constitution … [or that] Juge knew that Plaintiff was

being overdetained.” (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 10-11). This bald denial simply ignores

Plaintiff’s allegations establishing that Chief Juge knew as of March 3, 2021 that

Plaintiff received credit for time served on detainer in Florida, yet took no discernable

action to ensure that Plaintiff’s release date was re-calculated. Chief Juge’s challenge

fails for essentially the same reasons set forth above.

c. Negligence And False Imprisonment

Finally, Chief Juge meekly challenges Plaintiff’s tort claims, arguing that

“Plaintiff’s negligence and false imprisonment ‘counts’ are, in reality, a single cause

of action”; and that, in any event, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish the elements

of actionable claims for negligence and false imprisonment. (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 16-17).

These arguments are quickly dispatched.

First, this Court has repeatedly rejected Chief Juge’s argument that Plaintiff

cannot pursue claims for negligence and false imprisonment, merely because their

elements dovetail. See Hicks, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 486–87 (discussing authorities).

Chief Juge’s objection to Plaintiff’s negligence claim is equally unpersuasive.

Chief Juge challenges only the duty element,4 arguing that he was “not ordered by

any controlling authority to release Plaintiff,” and, thus, cannot have violated any

duty to ensure that Plaintiff was timely released. (Doc. 29-1 at p. 17). Jurisprudence

is clear, however, that a jailer’s “duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from

prison” extends beyond merely processing an inmate’s release order. See Porter, 659

F.3d at 445. Rather, the jailer is charged broadly with “carry[ing] out the functions of

his office,” id., to include “credit[ing] time served when calculating an inmate’s release

date, where the court ordered such credit to be considered.” Hicks, 832 F. App’x at

840.

As alleged, at all relevant times Chief Juge was Chief of Corrections at

WBRWRC. In this position of authority, Chief Juge plausibly owed Plaintiff a duty

to, at minimum, ensure that DPSC properly re-calculated Plaintiff’s release date

4 Whether Chief Juge owed Plaintiff a duty is a question of law. Doe v. McKesson, 2021-00929

(La. 3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 524, 531. Under Louisiana law, a defendant’s duty of care may arise

from statute, jurisprudence, or even “general principles of fault.” Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-

0874 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/20), 305 So. 3d 365, 372, writ denied, 2020-00835 (La. 10/20/20), 303

So. 3d 315. “There is a ‘universal duty on the part of the defendant in negligence cases to use

reasonable care so as to avoid injury to another.’” Doe, 339 So. 3d at 531 (quoting Boykin v.

La. Transit Co., 707 So.2d 1225, 1231 (La. 1998)).

following Judge Doggett’s March 3 Order restating that Plaintiff received credit for

time served on detainer in Florida. Instead, Chief Juge allegedly took no action to

effect Judge Doggett’s Order, plausibly breaching his duty to ensure Plaintiff’s timely

release. In turn, Chief Juge’s alleged breach was plausibly the cause-in-fact of

Plaintiff’s injury (overdetention), and Plaintiff’s alleged overdetention was within the

scope of the duty breached. As such, Chief Juge’s alleged nonfeasance was plausibly

the “but for” cause of Plaintiff’s injury. See McKesson, 339 So. 3d at 532. Weighing all

allegations and reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s “claim for relief

is sufficiently plausible to allow him to proceed to discovery.” McKesson, 339 So. 3d

at 532; accord, Hicks, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 487 (denying DPSC employees’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim based on alleged 60-day overdetention, where

plaintiff alleged that each employee “played some part in investigating and/or

recalculating Plaintiff’s release date and failed to ensure his legal release after

application of 110 days of [time served] credit”).

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim follows suit. Under Louisiana law, false

imprisonment consists of “two essential elements: (1) detention of the person; and (2)

the unlawfulness of the detention.” Hicks, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 486 (quoting Hernandez

v. Theriot, 709 F. App’x 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that

he was unlawfully detained for twelve weeks following Judge Doggett’s March 3

Order, and that Chief Juge knew of the overdetention and was in position to do

something about it, yet did nothing. The elements are met. This claim merits

discovery to determine the nature of Chief Juge’s specific conduct and authority with

regard to Plaintiff’s detention. See id. (denying DPSC employees’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim based on alleged 60-day overdetention).

ii. Sheriff Cazes

Sheriff Cazes seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s action on essentially the same

grounds as Chief Juge, adding that Plaintiff’s claims of vicarious liability and

indemnity fail because Plaintiff cannot establish an underlying tort committed by

Chief Juge. (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 17-18).

a. Due Process5

Plaintiff’s due process claims against Sheriff Cazes are more difficult to

discern. Plaintiff pursues Sheriff Cazes only in his official capacity as Sheriff of West

Baton Rouge Parish, where Sheriff Cazes “employs” Chief Juge and is “responsible

for the operations, supervision, and policies at WBRWRC.” (Doc. 21 at ¶ 31; see also

id. at ¶¶ 107-125). As such, Plaintiff’s claims are, in fact, claims against the West

Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, presumably for implementing a policy that

resulted in Plaintiff’s alleged overdetention, or for failing to properly train and

supervise Chief Juge. See Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“Because official capacity suits are really suits against the governmental entity,

Goodman’s attempt to hold Hickman liable for failing to train and supervise

Ashabranner, if in his official capacity, is subsumed within her identical claim

against Harris County.”).

The problem here is that to succeed under either theory, Plaintiff must identify

5 Again, this section’s analysis applies equally to Plaintiff’s federal and state due process

claims. Supra, n.3.

a Sheriff’s Office policy (or lack thereof) that was the “moving force” behind his

overdetention. In re Foust, 310 F.3d 849, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Bryan

County, Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Goodman, 571 F.3d at 396.

Simply being Chief Juge’s employer is not enough. Foust, 310 F.3d at 861 (“In § 1983

suits against the county or governmental officials in their official capacities, … the

courts apply neither qualified immunity nor state respondeat superior doctrines.”).

But while Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is chock-full of allegations establishing that

Secretary LeBlanc failed to implement policies to address overdetention at DPSC, and

that this failure predictably resulted in Plaintiff’s overdetention (addressed below),

no allegations establish the same as to Sheriff Cazes or the Sheriff’s Office. Rather,

it appears that Sheriff Cazes is sued in his official capacity merely because he

“employs” Chief Juge. That will not work. Foust, 310 F.3d at 861. Plaintiff’s official

capacity due process claims against Sheriff Cazes must be dismissed.

b. Negligence And False Imprisonment

Under Louisiana law, Sheriff Cazes—as Chief Juge’s employer—may be liable

for Chief Juge’s tortious on-the-job conduct. La. C.C. art. 2320; see Russell v. Noullet,

98-0816 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So. 2d 868, 871 (“The principle of vicarious liability is

codified in La. Civ. Code art. 2320, which provides that an employer is liable for the

tortious acts of its employees ‘in the exercise of the functions in which they are

employed.’”). Sheriff Cazes objects to Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim solely on

the basis that Plaintiff has failed to allege actionable negligence and false

imprisonment claims against Chief Juge.6 (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 17-18). Having

determined that Plaintiff’s tort claims against Chief Juge may proceed, it follows that

Plaintiff has alleged actionable respondeat superior claims against Sheriff Cazes.

Plaintiff’s claim for “indemnity” is another matter. As this Court has explained,

“[i]ndemnity permits ‘a party not actually at fault, whose liability results from the

fault of others’ to recover from those parties at fault.” Allied World Nat’l Assurance

Co. v. Nisus Corp., 21-cv-00431, 2022 WL 2708746, at *4 (M.D. La. July 12, 2022)

(Jackson, J.) (quoting Nassif v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 739 So.2d 183, 186 (La. 1999)).

As a general rule, indemnity claims are pursued only by defendants or third-party

plaintiffs. See id. In this case, however, there is no counterclaim that puts Plaintiff

in position to seek indemnity from Sheriff Cazes (or any other party). Nor has

Plaintiff cited any authority allowing him to seek indemnity where he has not first

been made a defendant to the action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s indemnity claim is

purely speculative, and must be dismissed. E.g., Fletcher v. Whittington, No. 18-cv-

1153, 2022 WL 3459459, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2022) (Hicks, C.J.) (dismissing

plaintiff’s claim for indemnity against the Bossier Parish Police Jury arising from the

6 Sheriff Cazes also baldly asserts that “Plaintiff’s Louisiana state law claims are prescribed

and, ipso facto, there can be no claim.” (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 17-18). This statement comes out of

the blue, and is not accompanied by any argument or authority. The Local Civil Rules require

that parties support their arguments with “a concise statement of reasons ... and citations of

authorities,” M.D. La. LR 7(d), and this Court has repeatedly admonished that it will not

speculate on arguments that have not been advanced, or attempt to develop arguments on a

party’s behalf. Doe v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of Louisiana Sys., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023

WL 143171, at *17, n.13 (M.D. La. Jan. 10, 2023) (Jackson, J.). Pursuant to the Court’s Local

Rules, and consistent with the general rule that a party’s failure to adequately brief an issue

acts as a waiver, Sheriff Cazes has (for present purposes) waived his challenge to the

timeliness of Plaintiff’s tort claims. See id.

tortious acts of Bossier Parish Sherriff’s Office employee-defendants because “such a

claim for indemnity, even if one exists, would be an action personal to the named

individual defendant”).

iii. Secretary LeBlanc

Secretary LeBlanc argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider

Plaintiff’s official capacity due process claims (Doc. 28-1 at pp. 2-7); that Plaintiff’s

individual capacity due process claims are defeated by qualified immunity (id. at pp.

13-20); and that Plaintiff’s tort claims are implausible (id. at pp. 20-22).

a. Due Process7

1. Official Capacity

Again, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Secretary LeBlanc are, in

reality, claims against DPSC. Goodman, 571 F.3d at 396. Plaintiff seeks declaratory

relief and an injunction requiring DPSC “to end [its] practice of overdetention.” (Doc.

29 at ¶¶ 29, 152(a), (g)). Secretary LeBlanc objects, arguing that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over these claims because any equitable relief must

redress an ongoing constitutional violation, but here Plaintiff alleges that his

unlawful overdetention ended in May 2021. (Doc. 28-1 at pp. 2-7). Thus, Plaintiff runs

afoul of Ex parte Young’s requirement that an official capacity claim must “seek

prospective relief to redress ongoing conduct,” Williams On Behalf of J.E. v. Reeves,

954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908)),

and Article III’s requirement that the alleged injury or threat of injury cannot be

7 And, again, this section’s analysis applies equally to Plaintiff’s federal and state due process

claims. Supra, n.3.

“conjectural or hypothetical.” Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)

(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).

The Court is not convinced on the present showing. First, black letter law

provides that Plaintiff may establish Article III standing even when the alleged

injury has abated, provided that he shows “a real and immediate threat of repeated

injury.” Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 464 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Deutsch v.

Annis Enterprises, Inc., 882 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2018)). Here, Plaintiff’s

allegations establish a plausible basis to conclude that he may still be subject to

unlawful detention based on DPSC’s ongoing failure to properly compute and process

his release.

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, DPSC’s system for calculating release

dates and processing release paperwork is in utter disarray. (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 86-95). As

a result of various alleged factors—including data-entry entry backlogs, inconsistent

methods for calculating release dates, and outright “incompetence” (id. at ¶¶ 82, 86,

90-91)—DPSC fails to timely release 200 detainees per month on average, at a

taxpayer cost of nearly $2.8 million per year.8 (Id. at ¶ 92-93).

8 Against this backdrop, Louisiana consistently ranks as the “incarceration capital” of the

United States, imprisoning more of its population, per capita, than any other state. See U.S.

Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (Bureau of Justice Statistics), Prisoners in

2021 – Statistical Tables (Dec. 2022), at Table 7 (Imprisonment rates of U.S. residents, based

on sentenced prisoners under the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities, by

sex, age, and jurisdiction, 2020 and 2021), available at

https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/p21st.pdf (visited Feb. 15,

2023). Although the wisdom of preserving this dubious distinction may be a policy-matter

beyond this Court’s jurisdiction, plainly it is the Court’s constitutional duty to intervene when

the State endeavors to detain its citizens without lawful authority, beyond their release dates.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is.”).

And the threat of overdetention continues even after a prisoner is released, as

illustrated by Plaintiff’s own story. Plaintiff alleges that with credit for time served

on detainer in Florida, he was eligible for release on January 16, 2020, the same day

he was sentenced for the 10 underlying theft offenses. It took two weeks (until

February 11), but he was eventually released from Rapides Parish jail and returned

to Florida, intending to turn his life around. Plaintiff was heading in the right

direction until June 2020, when he allegedly traveled to the U.S. Virgin Islands to

obtain employment, and was arrested on his return based on a mistaken warrant

issued by DPSC. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-54).

Allegedly, the warrant was issued solely due to DPSC’s miscalculation of his

release date, which inexplicably occurred even after he had already been released.

Thereafter, DPSC allegedly imprisoned Plaintiff without lawful authority for eleven

months, until May 25, 2021, despite Plaintiff’s dogged efforts to convince DPSC of its

error. As alleged, even the circumstances of Plaintiff’s May 25 release are

problematic, raising more questions than answers. How, after failing to calculate and

process Plaintiff’s release for 79 days after Judge Doggett’s March 3, 2021 Order, did

DPSC manage to get its affairs in order a mere 4 days after an email exchange

between Plaintiff’s attorney and DPSC? Is DPSC’s May 25 release paperwork

complete and correct so as to ensure that Plaintiff is not unlawfully detained the next

time he boards an airplane to seek employment, or was Plaintiff let loose without

proper paperwork to avoid the nuisance of a contracted battle with Plaintiff’s counsel?

Plaintiff’s liberty hinges on the answers to these questions of fact, which

plainly cannot be addressed without discovery. Until then, Plaintiff’s allegations

establish a reasonable basis to infer that he faces a real and immediate injury

(unlawful detention) the next time he passes through airport security, or, for that

matter, is stopped for a traffic violation.9 Cf. Ghedi, 16 F.4th at 464 (frequent-flier

plaintiff alleged injury in fact sufficient to pursue Fourth Amendment unlawful

detention claim against Transportation Security Administration: “On these facts we

can reasonably infer that his next flight, and thus injury, is both real and immediate.

Therefore, he has plausibly alleged an injury in fact under Article III.”); Penix v. U.S.

Parole Comm’n, 979 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1992) (parolee plaintiff alleged injury in

fact sufficient to challenge legality of unexecuted parole violator warrant: “The injury

Penix alleges is the incarceration that would result instantaneously from the

warrant’s execution. Although presently unexecuted, the execution of the parole

violator warrant at any time would result in Penix’s immediate incarceration, and he

would remain in custody until his hearing[.]”).

And because Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Secretary LeBlanc seeks

prospective declaratory and injunctive relief aimed to eliminate this real and

9 Remarkably, in his reply memorandum, Secretary LeBlanc highlights an allegation that

does not appear in Plaintiff’s July 15, 2022 Amended Complaint: specifically, that “Plaintiff

… was recently detained again ‘because [DPSC] failed to update a national

database to show Mr. Buchicchio has served his sentence and was lawfully (albeit

belatedly) released.’” (Doc. 33 at p. 2, n.1 (emphasis added)). To be clear, this new

“allegation”—which appears for the first time in Plaintiff’s October 3, 2022 opposition

memorandum, (see Doc. 37 at p. 20), and is not supported by an affidavit—does not factor

into the Court’s Rule 12 analysis above. Rather, the Court’s analysis relies solely on the well-

pleaded allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint, and the reasonable inferences

drawn from those allegations. Still, counsel’s representation—which the Court must assume

is made in good faith under Rule 11—is deeply troubling, and reinforces the conclusion that

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Secretary LeBlanc must proceed to discovery.

immediate threat, Plaintiff may proceed without running afoul of Ex parte Young and

the Eleventh Amendment. Williams, 954 F.3d at 736.

2. Individual Capacity

Plaintiff pursues two different theories of individual capacity liability against

Secretary LeBlanc, alleging that Secretary LeBlanc failed to implement policies to

prevent Plaintiff’s overdetention, and that Secretary LeBlanc failed to train DPSC

employees regarding how to calculate and process release dates. (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 144-

145). Secretary LeBlanc objects to each claim. (Doc. 28-1 at pp. 13-20).

a) Failure To Adopt Policies

A supervisory official who is not directly involved in a constitutional violation

may nonetheless be liable for his “failure to adopt policies if that failure causally

results in a constitutional injury.” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186, 188 (citing Porter, 659

F.3d at 446). A plaintiff asserts a viable “failure to adopt policies” claim when the

allegations plausibly establish that the supervisory official acted, or failed to act, with

“deliberate indifference,” that is, “a disregard for a known or obvious consequence of

[his] actions.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Further, the plaintiff

must plausibly allege that the supervisory official had “actual or constructive notice”

that his failure to adopt policies would result in the alleged constitutional violation.

Id. “This typically requires showing notice of ‘a pattern of similar constitutional

violations’ due to deficient policies, permitting the inference that [the defendant]

deliberately chose policies causing violations of constitutional rights.” Id. (alterations

omitted; quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447)).

Secretary LeBlanc argues that Plaintiff’s failure to adopt policies claim fails

each prong of the qualified immunity analysis because (1) Plaintiff does not

sufficiently allege deliberate indifference, or a causal connection between Secretary

LeBlanc’s alleged policy failure and Plaintiff’s alleged overdetention; and (2) Plaintiff

fails to show that Secretary LeBlanc’s conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly

established law. (Doc. 28-1 at pp. 13-20).

These objections are eight months past their expiration date, having already

been shot down by the Fifth Circuit in Crittindon.10 In Crittindon, as here, the

plaintiffs alleged that they were DPSC prisoners entitled to immediate release as of

the date of their sentencing hearings. 37 F.4th at 184. In Crittindon, as here, DPSC

allegedly detained the plaintiffs for months beyond their release dates. Id. at 184. In

Crittindon, as here, the plaintiffs pursued failure to adopt policies claims against

Secretary LeBlanc, alleging that he turned a blind eye to an administrative failure

that he “knew was leaving prisoners in jail who had served their sentences.” Id. at

181. In Crittindon, as here, Secretary LeBlanc cloaked himself in qualified immunity.

Id. at 185.

This Court and the Fifth Circuit rejected Secretary LeBlanc’s gambit. In doing

so, the Circuit affirmed its decades-old rule that “overdetention by thirty days is a

per se deprivation of due process,” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 191 (citing Douthit, 619

F.2d at 532), and flatly dismissed the same objections raised by Secretary LeBlanc

here, based on actual evidence developed in discovery:

10 On January 31, 2023, the Fifth Circuit issued its order denying en banc rehearing of in

Crittindon. Crittindon v. LeBlanc, No. 20-30304, 2023 WL 1228310 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2023).

As such, Crittindon is the law of the Circuit. The Crittindon case will proceed to trial upon

its return to this District.

Defendants [LeBlanc, Stagg, and Griffin] concede that, because of the

[Lean Six Sigma] study, they each knew that on average, it took a month

for DPSC to receive the paperwork necessary to begin calculating a

prisoner’s release date after his conviction. Defendants also knew that

some prisoners would be entitled to immediate release upon conviction.

Therefore, in cases like Plaintiffs’, where prisoners were entitled to

immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction, it was obvious

that a failure to address those processing delays would lead to

unconstitutional overdetentions. Despite this awareness, years after the

Lean Six Sigma project, Defendants have not pointed to a single effort

that any of them took to identify immediate releases more quickly

during that month-long delay. And this is despite the fact that LeBlanc

and Stagg were responsible for the Basic Jail Guidelines, while Stagg

and Griffin were responsible for running DPSC’s Pre-Classification

Department. They were each in a position to adopt policies that would

address this delay.

Id. at 187.

Crittindon—which denied Secretary LeBlanc’s qualified immunity defense at

the summary judgment stage, after development of an evidentiary record—squarely

forecloses Secretary LeBlanc’s qualified immunity defense here, at the Rule 12(b)(6)

stage. How could it not? Plaintiff’s allegations that are the foundation of his failure

to adopt policies claim are mined from the same summary judgment evidence that

defeated Secretary LeBlanc’s qualified immunity defense in Crittindon. (Doc. 21 at

¶¶ 81-105).

Indeed, by one measure, Plaintiff’s allegations establish an even greater degree

of callousness and indifference than demonstrated by Secretary LeBlanc in

Crittindon: this case allegedly involves a 96-day overdetention that occurred in 2021,

four years after the Crittindon plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit in this District. In

other words, after obtaining actual knowledge that the Crittindon plaintiffs were

detained for months beyond their release dates, Secretary LeBlanc allegedly still

failed to implement policies aimed to prevent Plaintiff’s twelve-week overdetention.

(See Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 102-104). Plaintiff alleges that “the problem continues to the

current day.” (Id. at ¶ 105).

In sum, under Crittindon, Plaintiff’s allegations that Secretary LeBlanc failed

to adopt policies to prevent his unlawful detention easily overcome Secretary

LeBlanc’s qualified immunity defense at this stage.

b) Failure To Train/Supervise

An unconstitutional failure to train is not the same as an unconstitutional

failure to adopt policies; each is a distinct theory of Monell liability. Pinder v. Skero,

No. 16-cv-03479, 2017 WL 11612501, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2017) (Harmon, J.)

(“ratification, failure to train, and other policies, patterns, and practices are generally

pled and recognized as distinct theories of Monell liability”); accord Ramos v. Taylor,

--- F.Supp.3d ---, 2022 WL 17815128, at *9-*12 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2022) (Pitman, J.);

compare Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)

(establishing municipal liability for unlawful policies, practices, and customs), with

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1989) (establishing municipal

liability for failure to train). Secretary LeBlanc objects briefly (but effectively) to

Plaintiff’s failure to train claims, asserting that they are conclusory because “[n]o

facts with regard to training or supervision are pleaded.” (Doc. 28-1 at pp. 14-15).

The point is well-taken. Although the Amended Complaint is replete with

allegations establishing Secretary LeBlanc’s unconstitutional failure to adopt policies

to prevent overdetention at DPSC, supra, Plaintiff’s failure to train allegations are

limited to one unadorned sentence, stating: “the widespread practices described in

the preceding paragraphs were allowed to flourish because Defendant LeBlanc

declined to implement sufficient training or any legitimate mechanism for oversight

or punishment of officers and agents.” (Doc. 21 at ¶ 145). This allegation, standing

alone, is speculative and conjectural, and would ordinarily be too thin to sustain

Plaintiff’s claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Here, however, Plaintiff’s failure to train claims are resuscitated by the DOJ

Report, which provides the factual matter that the Amended Complaint is missing.

The DOJ report summarizes its findings regarding DPSC’s failure to train its

employees as follows:

[DPSC]’s training programs for the intake and time computation groups

further drive errors and delays. All analysts within Preclass receive the

same initial orientation training. This training consists of four modules:

(1) Verifying Paperwork; (2) Updating CAJUN; (3) Time Computation;

and (4) After Time Computation. According to Preclass personnel, the

initial module-based training covers only the basics of Preclass

functions and does not address the more complex aspects of

release date calculations that are likely to drive errors, namely

the variety of issues that may emerge on account of the

numerous, and sometimes unique, factors guiding a given

calculation. Further, not all basic Preclass functions are reflected in

the module training program. For instance, the modules do not contain

instructions on the release date calculation check system or the monthly

auditing system, key time computation group functions.

As a result, a significant portion of the on-the-job training for the time

computation group takes place either after an error has occurred or

concerns about an individual case have been raised. During weekly staff

meetings, for instance, supervisors conduct additional trainings for the

time computation analysts that range from 30 minutes to two hours

depending on the topic. These trainings often involve scenario-based

topics based upon observed difficulties or concerns experienced by the

analysts. Lastly, there are one-on-one spontaneous trainings that are

conducted in response to unusual release date calculation scenarios.

These one-on-one trainings may also be conducted in response to

observed errors in an analyst’s calculations, though they are not

informed by monthly release date calculation audit results. This

approach is reactive as opposed to proactively ensuring that

each analyst is prepared for the variety of scenarios they are

likely to encounter.

[DPSC] also insufficiently updates the training materials for its

initial orientation modules, which were originally created in

2013 and have not been revised since late 2018. Given the frequent

turnover in the Preclass and known gaps in time computation analysts’

preparedness, ensuring the thoroughness of the initial module training

program is critical.

(DOJ Report at § V(B)(2)(c) (emphasis added)).

Taking the DOJ Report at face value, DPSC’s current training is deficient,

reactive, and outdated. Common sense dictates that these training deficiencies

plausibly resulted in the miscalculated release date that triggered DPSC’s June 2020

warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.11 On this showing, Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claims are

also plausible, and may proceed to discovery.12

b. Negligence And False Imprisonment

Finally, Secretary LeBlanc half-heartedly challenges Plaintiff’s tort claims,

asserting that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim fails because Plaintiff alleges that

he was entitled to immediate release as of the date of his original sentencing hearing

(January 16, 2020), yet seeks relief only for the alleged overdetention occurring from

March 3, 2021 to May 25, 2021, and that Plaintiff’s negligence claim fails because

11 Secretary LeBlanc further objects (in a footnote) that Plaintiff’s failure to train claims fail

because “there is no allegation that Plaintiff’s sentence was computed incorrectly.” (Doc. 28-

1 at p. 15, n.12). This objection is meritless given Plaintiff’s allegations that DPSC’s June

2020 arrest warrant was a mistake, resulting from DPSC’s failure to properly calculate his

original release date based on Judge Doggett’s January 16, 2020 Commitment Order. (Doc.

21 at ¶ 55).

12 To be clear, the Court’s Rule ruling on Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claims is based on the

facts set forth in the DOJ Report, which, again, is readily available, is not subject to

reasonable dispute, and bears directly on the issues under review in this action. Supra, n.1.

“Plaintiff does not allege that LeBlanc, personally, had been notified of an alleged

error” that resulted in his overdetention. (Doc. 28-1 at pp. 21-22). Not only are these

arguments difficult to understand, they are not supported by any authority. Again,

the Local Civil Rules require that parties support their arguments with “a concise

statement of reasons ... and citations of authorities,” M.D. La. LR 7(d). Pursuant to

the Court’s Local Rules, and consistent with the general rule that a party’s failure to

adequately brief an issue acts as a waiver, Secretary LeBlanc has (for present

purposes) waived his challenge to Plaintiff’s tort claims. Supra, n.6.

IV. AMENDMENT

Rule 15(a) dictates that the Court should generally allow amendment before

dismissing a claim with prejudice, unless amendment clearly would be futile. See

Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th

Cir. 2002) (“district courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure

pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are

incurable”); see also Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir.

2005) (“Rule 15(a) requires a trial court to grant leave to amend ‘freely,’ and the

language of this rule ‘evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” (internal

quotations omitted)). Here, Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once, in

direct response to Defendants’ original motions to dismiss. (See Docs. 1, 4, 8, 20).

Plaintiff’s opposition papers include a perfunctory request to amend again, but

Plaintiff provides no explanation regarding how he might improve if granted a third

bite at the apple. (Doc. 32 at p. 19; Doc. 37 at p. 22). Again, issues not briefed are

waived. Supra, n.6. Absent any explanation or argument from Plaintiff, the Court

determines that further amendment would be futile, and serve merely to delay this

action from proceeding to discovery and trial.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Second Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To

Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 29) submitted by Defendants

Chief Juge and Sheriff Cazes be and is hereby GRANTED IN PART, and that

Plaintiffs due process and indemnification claims against Sheriff Cazes be and are

hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In all other respects, Chief Juge’s and

Sheriff Cazes’ Motion is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Secretary LeBlanc’s Motion To Dismiss

First Amended Complaint For Damages (Doe. 28) be and is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be and is hereby REFERRED

to the Magistrate Judge for entry of a trial date and a scheduling order.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ist of February, 2023

Ao Q

JUDGE BRIAN g KSON

UNITED STATES BYSTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

oo