Opinion

Washington v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board

Court
District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed
Feb 17, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.5%

“Our reading of Rule 26(e)(2) and (3) is consistent with the Rule's basic purpose of preventing prejudice and surprise, neither of which occurred in the case at bar.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Our reading of Rule 26(e)(2) and (3) is consistent with the Rule's basic purpose of preventing prejudice and surprise, neither of which occurred in the case at bar.”
  • “Whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERRY WASHINGTON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO.21-00192-BAJ-RLB

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH

SCHOOL BOARD

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 36), Plaintiff’s

Motion in Limine (Doc. 37), and Defendant’s Supplemental Motion in Limine

(Doc. 52).1 The Motions are all opposed. (Docs. 41, 43, 59). For the reasons stated

herein, Defendant’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part, Plaintiff’s Motion

is denied, and Defendant’s Supplemental Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff’s Supplemental,

Amending, and Restated Petition alleges that Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish

School Board (“the School Board”) by and through its agents and employees, Principal

Karen Triche and Assistant Principal (“AP”) Robert Wells, harassed him based on his

age, retaliated against him for opposing unlawful age-based discrimination, and

ultimately constructively discharged him due to his age (over 40 years old) in

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s Supplemental Motion in Limine

because it was filed 144 days after the Motion in Limine deadline. (See Doc. 59 at pp. 1–2).

However, considering that the Motion in Limine deadline elapsed before the Court issued its

Ruling on Defendant’s dispositive motion, Defendant’s late filing is excused.

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Louisiana

Employment Discrimination Law (LEDL). (See Doc. 6 at p. 4). On December 19, 2022,

the Court granted in part the School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

22), and, except for the age-based discrimination claim, dismissed all of Plaintiff’s

claims. (See Doc. 51 at p. 28–29).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“It is well settled that motions in limine are disfavored.” Auenson v. Lewis,

1996 WL 457258, at *1 (E.D. La. 8/12/1996) (citing Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T

Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993)). “Motions in limine are

frequently made in the abstract and in anticipation of some hypothetical

circumstance that may not develop at trial.” Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777,

784 (5th Cir. 1980) (superseded on other grounds). “An order in limine excludes only

clearly inadmissible evidence; therefore, evidence should not be excluded before trial

unless it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Rivera v. Robinson, 464 F.

Supp. 3d 847, 853 (E.D. La. 2020) (quoting Auenson, 1996 WL 457258, at *1)

(emphasis added). Instead, courts should reserve evidentiary rulings until trial so

that questions as to the evidence “may be resolved in the proper context.” Auenson,

1996 WL 457258, at *1.

III. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the Parties’ motions, the Court notes that ADEA imposes

time limits on persons asserting claims.2 “In Louisiana, a Plaintiff has 300 days from

2 In a previous ruling, the Court satisfied itself that Plaintiff’s age-based discrimination claim

is timely under LEDL’s one-year prescriptive period. (See Doc. 51 at pp. 16–17).

the date of the alleged discriminatory conduct to file a charge of discrimination with

the EEOC.” See Minnis v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech.

Coll., 55 F. Supp. 3d 864, 874 (citing Janmeja v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ.

& Agric. & Mech. College, 96 Fed. Appx. 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2004)). Thus, under ADEA,

any alleged discriminatory conduct occurring or claims arising prior to 300 days of

filing are time-barred and cannot form the basis for Plaintiff’s age-based

discrimination claim. See id. Plaintiff filed his charge of discrimination on July 23,

2020. (See Doc. 51 at p. 14–16). Accordingly, conduct or claims that occurred or arose

prior to September 27, 2019 are time-barred.

Plaintiff, however, argues that evidence that would otherwise be barred by

ADEA’s 300-day limit remains admissible because it “clearly evinces an age-based

discriminatory bias.” (See Doc. 59 at p. 5). He cites decisions by the U.S. Supreme

Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to support his argument

that comments or conduct that occurred years before a challenged employment

decision are nonetheless admissible at trial. See id.

After reviewing the cases, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has

mischaracterized them. For example, Plaintiff claims that in Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc., “it did not matter that the [age-based comments] were

attenuated or had been made even years earlier. The comments nonetheless served

as evidence, in the court’s view, of the discriminatory decision to fire the plaintiff

[that occurred] much later.” (See Doc. 59 at p. 5) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)). But contrary to what Plaintiff represents, the

age-based comments did not occur years before the employee was fired, but two

months before. See Brief for Respondent at 17, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (No. 99-536), 2000 WL 135161, at *17 (“According

to Petitioner's own testimony, these two statements were made to him ‘about two

months before I was dismissed.’”).

Similarly, in Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., the age-based comments were

made in “late 1995,” and the employee was fired in May 1996. See 342 F.3d 569, 571,

573 (5th Cir. 2003). Finally, in Rachid v. Jack In The Box, the exact dates of the

discriminatory comments were not provided. See generally 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir.

2004). Instead, the Fifth Circuit noted that the employee’s manager “repeatedly made

ageist comments to and about [the employee],” and that a rational finder of fact could

conclude that age played a role in the employee’s termination. Rachid, 376 F.3d at

315–16.

Although the Fifth Circuit has held that “age-related remarks are

appropriately taken into account when analyzing the evidence…even where the

comment is not in the direct context of the termination,” this is a far cry from

admitting at trial evidence that is time-barred under ADEA. Palasota, 342 F.3d at

578. Instead, the Circuit’s holding is better characterized as a relaxation of the

requirement that a comment be “proximate in time to the termination,” so long as the

comment is not the only evidence of age discrimination. See id. at 576–77 (“so long as

remarks are not the only evidence of pretext, they are probative of discriminatory

intent”).

In sum, the Court sees nothing to support setting aside ADEA’s 300-day limit

when considering the evidence that will be admissible at trial.

A. Defendant’s Motion in Limine

Defendant’s Motion in Limine contains 9 discreet Motions in Limine labelled

A through I. (Doc. 36-1).

i. Motion in Limine A

In Motion in Limine A, Defendant seeks to exclude any argument or evidence

that Plaintiff was denied a promotion or pay in 2018, 2019, or 2020 because of his

age. Specifically, Defendant asserts that arguments, evidence, and documents

relating to Plaintiff’s allegations that he was: 1) denied the position of head boys track

and field coach in 2018, 2019, and 2020; 2) initially denied a two percent stipend of

base pay for work he completed in July 2019; and 3) not reimbursed for a work-related

trip in December 2019 should be excluded from trial because Plaintiff did not allege

claims for failure to promote, disparate treatment, or unpaid wages. (See Doc. 36-1 at

p. 3). Defendant argues that absent such claims, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

denial of promotion or pay “are irrelevant to the issues triable by the jury.” (See Doc.

36-1 at p. 4). In response, Plaintiff contends that “the employment actions associated

with the boy’s track and field coaching position, stipend, and reimbursement [are]

evidence of a hostile work environment based on age,” and thus relevant to Plaintiff’s

age-based harassment claim. (See Doc. 41 at pp. 2–3).

On December 19, 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s age-based harassment

claim with prejudice, thus mooting Plaintiff’s argument against Motion in Limine A.

(See Doc. 51 at p. 28). Nevertheless, the Court has considered whether Plaintiff’s

allegations regarding promotion and pay in 2018, 2019, and 2020 are relevant to his

constructive discharge claim and concludes they are not. Many of these events are

time-barred under ADEA and cannot form the basis of Plaintiff’s constructive

discharge claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Minnis, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 874.

Furthermore, these events are not relevant to the factors courts consider when

assessing a constructive discharge claim. See Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10

F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled

to resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following factors

relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction

in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5)

reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or

humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or

(7) offers of early retirement on terms that would make the employee worse off

whether the offer was accepted or not.”).

Accordingly, Motion in Limine A is granted. Plaintiff shall not introduce

evidence or argument regarding his allegations that he was denied promotion or pay

in 2018, 2019, or 2020 at trial. Furthermore, Bates Labeled Exhibit-001, Bates

Labeled Exhibit 2 - 001–002, and Bates Labeled Exhibit 4 - 001–002 are excluded

from use at trial.

ii. Motion in Limine B

In Motion in Limine B, Defendant seeks to exclude any argument or evidence

that the Tara High School football team was forced to vacate wins during the 2019

season because of an error by Barry Jackson. (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 5). Defendant argues

that as the head of the football program, Plaintiff, not Barry Jackson, was responsible

for Tara High School’s forfeitures of the wins. (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 5). Furthermore,

Defendant maintains that “it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not removed from his

position as head coach of the football team solely because of his win-loss record,” and

thus the error by Barry Jackson “is not relevant to the claims triable before the jury.”

See id.

In response, Plaintiff points out that Defendant itself has made Plaintiff’s

win-loss record relevant by “contending throughout these proceedings that

[Plaintiff’s] win/loss record was a legitimate, non-discriminatory/retaliatory basis for

removing him as head football coach.” (See Doc. 41 at p. 4). The Court agrees.

Defendant has consistently maintained that Plaintiff’s “abysmal” win/loss record

contributed to Defendant’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for removing him as

head football coach. (See Doc. 22-1 at pp. 12–13; Doc. 34 at pp. 6–7). After raising

Plaintiff’s win/loss record as a defense, Defendant cannot now assert that argument

or evidence regarding the win/loss record is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims and thus

excludable at trial. Consequently, Motion in Limine B is denied.

iii. Motion in Limine C

In Motion in Limine C, Defendant seeks to exclude any argument or evidence

that Plaintiff’s assignment to teach the Journeys to Careers course in 2018 was a

means to force him into retirement. (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 7). Defendant argues that

“Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to connect his placement in the Journeys to

Careers course with his retirement or his removal as head football coach.” See id. In

response, Plaintiff offers testimonial evidence that the Journeys to Careers course

was “commonly known to be taught by individuals about to retire,” and that by

assigning the course to Plaintiff, Defendant was “trying to get rid of [him].” (See Doc.

41 at pp. 6–7).

Even assuming, arguendo, that by assigning Plaintiff to teach Journeys to

Careers Defendant evinced its age-based animus towards Plaintiff, this evidence is

not admissible at trial because it is time-barred. Accordingly, Motion in Limine C is

granted, and Plaintiff shall not introduce evidence or argument regarding his

assignment to teach the Journeys to Careers course at trial.

iv. Motion in Limine D

In Motion in Limine D, Defendant seeks to exclude any argument or evidence

concerning stray remarks of non-decisionmakers, including those not made at the

time of any purported employment action. (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 7). Specifically,

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s allegations that he was subjected to disparaging

remarks from Robert Wells about his age should be excluded from evidence” because

they are “stray remarks which are not probative of discrimination.” (See Doc. 36-1 at

p. 8). In response, Plaintiff accuses Defendant of merely repeating the arguments

made in its Motion for Summary Judgment, and maintains that AP Wells’ comments

are “entirely relevant, probative, and supports [his] claim that he was…fired because

of his age.” (See Doc. 41 at p. 8).

To constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, comments in the workplace

must be: (1) related to the plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (2) proximate in time to

the challenged employment decision; (3) made by an individual with authority over

the challenged employment decision; and (4) related to the challenged employment

decision. See Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F. 3d 473,

476 (5th Cir. 2015). However, so long as the comments are not the only evidence of

age discrimination, they can be probative of discriminatory intent, “even where the

comment[s] [are] not in the direct context of the termination and even if uttered by

one other than the formal decision maker, provided that the individual is in a position

to influence the decision.” See Palasota, 342 F.3d at 577–78.

Here, the parties dispute whether AP Wells was in a position to influence

Plaintiff’s alleged constructive discharge. Ultimately, it will be up to the jury to decide

who to believe. Having previously ruled that conduct occurring or claims arising prior

to September 27, 2019 are time-barred, the Court denies Motion in Limine D to the

extent it seeks to exclude comments from AP Wells that occurred after September 27,

2019.

v. Motion in Limine E

In Motion in Limine E, Defendant seeks to exclude any argument or reference

to Defendant’s size or wealth, Plaintiff’s size or wealth, Defendant’s ability to pay a

judgment, or “any other matter promoting an inference that this is a ‘David and

Goliath’ situation.” (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 9). Defendant argues that “any such reference

would be irrelevant,” “would invite the jury to treat [Defendant] less favorably than

Plaintiff,” and “would result in unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, mislead[ing]

of the jury, and cause undue delay.” (See Doc. 36-1 at pp. 9–10).

Plaintiff agrees that “evidence related to whether or not taxpayer monies are

and/or would be involved depending upon the outcome of the jury’s decision should be

excluded.” (See Doc. 41 at p. 8). He also agrees that comparisons between the wealth

and size of the parties, unless it is relevant to an element of a claim or defense, should

be excluded at trial. (See Doc. 41 at p. 9). Since the parties agree that comparisons of

the wealth and size of the parties and references to taxpayer monies should be

excluded at trial, such element of Motion in Limine E is denied as moot.

Otherwise, Plaintiff argues that his status as a former teacher and Defendant’s

status as a political subdivision “are facts that cannot and should not be excluded.”

See id. The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s status as a former teacher is a critical fact in

this suit and should not be excluded. However, currently, the Court has no way of

knowing what testimony at trial could make Defendant’s status as a political

subdivision relevant. “[E]videntiary rulings…should often be deferred until trial so

that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice can be resolved in

proper context.” Rivera v. Salazar, No. C.A. C-04-552, 2008 WL 2966006 (S.D. Tex.

July 30, 2008). Accordingly, such element of Motion in Limine E is also denied.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that evidence of his lost wages and medical expenses

are admissible at trial because they are available monetary remedies under ADEA

and LEDL. (See Doc. 41 at p. 9). Absent evidence that Plaintiff failed to timely disclose

a computation of his damages, the Court sees no reason to exclude this evidence at

this time. (See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii), 37(c)(1)). Accordingly, without

affirmatively ruling on whether lost wages and medical expenses can in fact be

awarded under ADEA and LEDL, the Court also denies such portion of Motion in E.

In sum, Motion in Limine E is denied.

vi. Motion in Limine F

In Motion in Limine F, Defendant seeks to exclude “argument regarding any

discovery issues and/or discovery orders by this Court. For example, arguments that

Defendant failed to produce evidence or withheld evidence would be excluded. (See

Doc. 36-1 at p. 10). In response, “Plaintiff submits [that] such references should not

be excluded to the extent Defendant attempts to introduce evidence not previously

produced because of objections it made during discovery.” (See Doc. 41 at p. 9).

The Court cannot envision how discovery issues or orders will be relevant at

trial. Nonetheless, rather than exclude an entire portion of evidence without context,

the Court will defer ruling on this issue until trial. Motion in Limine F is denied

without prejudice.

vii. Motion in Limine G

Motion in Limine G seeks to “preclude Plaintiff from soliciting improper

opinion testimony from witnesses as to what they believe constitutes a ‘hostile work

environment,’ ‘discrimination,’ or ‘retaliation,’ on the basis that such testimony is

improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.” (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 10).3 According to

Defendant, these are all terms of art under statutes and case law, thus requiring legal

3 Because Plaintiff’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims were dismissed, the

Court doesn’t anticipate that those terms will still be relevant at trial.

analysis to establish. See id. Plaintiff argues that “references to those phrases should

be permitted because those are the claims at issue.” (See Doc. 41 at p. 9).

The Fifth Circuit has instructed that “[a]lthough a witness may not give legal

conclusions, an opinion is not objectionable simply because it embraces an ultimate

issue for the jury’s determination.” United States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107, 118

(5th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, while lay witnesses are

precluded from offering legal conclusions at trial, they can testify in support of

Plaintiff’s alleged facts of age-based discrimination and nothing more. Consequently,

Motion in Limine G is granted.

viii. Motion in Limine H

In Motion in Limine H, Defendant seeks to exclude evidence or testimony

regarding attorneys’ fees or court costs because the Court, not the jury, awards them.

(See Doc. 36-1 at p. 11). In response, Plaintiff agrees that attorney’s fees and court

costs are determined by the Court but maintains that he should nonetheless be

permitted to present evidence of his costs. (See Doc. 41 at p. 10).

The Court agrees that if Plaintiff prevails on his age-based discrimination

claim, evidence of his attorney fees and court costs will be instructive when the Court

determines an award amount. However, such evidence is not relevant to Plaintiff’s

case-in-chief before the jury. Accordingly, Motion in Limine H is granted, with the

caveat that Plaintiff will be permitted to provide evidence of attorney’s fees and court

fees to the Court should it become necessary.

ix. Motion in Limine I

In Motion in Limine I, Defendant seeks to exclude “documents not produced in

discovery, other than those used only for rebuttal.” (See Doc. 36-1 at p. 11). In

response, Plaintiff represents that he “does not anticipate using any document not

produced in discovery,” except for impeachment or rebuttal purposes, in accordance

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. (See Doc. 41 at p. 10). The Court credits

Plaintiff’s representation, and therefore denies Motions in Limine I as moot.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine contains 8 discreet Motions in Limine labelled 1

through 8. (Doc. 37).

i. Motion in Limine 1

In Motion in Limine 1, Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence and testimony

related to his prior litigation against Defendant. (See Doc. 37-2 at p. 2). He argues

that the prior litigation is “completely irrelevant to the present case” and would

“certainly confuse and mislead the jury as to the actual issues in this matter.” (See

Doc. 37-2 at p. 4). In rebuttal, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s prior litigation

demonstrates that Plaintiff understood that his head coaching position was separate

and distinct from his position as teacher,” and that “Plaintiff’s understanding of the

distinction is relevant here because Plaintiff argues [ ] that he has been constructively

discharged not only from his head football coaching position, but also from his

teaching position.” (See Doc. 43 at p. 3). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s prior

lawsuit “demonstrates that he understood that his teaching position could not be

challenged by [Principal Karen] Triche because it was protected by the Louisiana

Teacher Tenure Law.” See id.

To prove constructive discharge, “an employee must offer evidence that the

employer made the employee’s working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable

employee would feel compelled to resign.” Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d

292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the inquiry for the jury is not whether Principal Triche

could in fact challenge Plaintiff’s teaching position, but whether his working

conditions would have compelled a reasonable employee to resign. At present, the

Court cannot envision how Plaintiff’s prior litigation against Defendant will be

relevant to the question of Plaintiff’s working conditions at Tara High School.

Nonetheless, the Court will defer ruling on this issue until trial. Motion in Limine 1

is denied without prejudice.

ii. Motion in Limine 2

In Motion in Limine 2, Plaintiff seeks to exclude “any and all evidence and/or

testimony about other coaches’ complaints about [him].” (See Doc. 37-2 at p. 4). He

argues that “this evidence should be excluded because it is hearsay.” See id. In

response, Defendant avers that it will not introduce evidence and testimony about

complaints that Principal Triche and AP Wells received about Plaintiff to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. (See Doc. 43 at p. 4). Rather, it intends to use the

complaints as evidence that Principal Triche had legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for removing Plaintiff as head football coach. (See Doc. 43 at p. 5).

“When an employee is discharged based on complaints of other employees, the

issue is not the truth or falsity of the allegation, but whether the employer reasonably

believed the employee's allegation and acted on it in good faith.” Nobles v. Cardno,

Inc., 549 F. App'x 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, Defendant is allowed to introduce

evidence of other employees’ complaints about Plaintiff at trial, provided it otherwise

adheres to the Federal Rules of Evidence when soliciting testimony about the

complaints. Accordingly, Motion in Limine 2 is denied.

iii. Motion in Limine 3

In Motion in Limine 3, Plaintiff seeks to exclude the admission of, and

testimony related to, Defense exhibit “Employment File of Terry Washington,”

EBRPSB_000002–000004, 000027–000056, 000066–000069, 000073–000187,

000192–000226, and 000232–000332 “because they are not relevant, lack any

probative value, will confuse the issues/jury, and are unduly prejudicial.” (See Doc.

37-2 at p. 5). In response, Defendant represents that except for impeachment

purposes, it does not intend to use EBRPSB_000002–000004, 000066–000069,

000073–000187, 000192–000226, and 000232–000332 at trial. The Court credits

Defendant’s representation, and therefore denies this part of Motion in Limine 3 as

moot.

However, Defendant is opposed to the exclusion of EBRPSB_000027–000056.

It argues that these exhibits are relevant, fit within the business records exception to

hearsay, and contain “statements made by Plaintiff [that] are being offered against

him.” After reviewing EBRPSB_000027–000056, the Court agrees that it contains

evidence that may be relevant at trial, that it appears to be a business record, and

that it contains statements by Plaintiff. Accordingly, this portion of Motion in Limine

3 is also denied. The Court will address Plaintiff’s objections to EBRPSB_000027–

000056 in the normal course at trial.

In sum, Motion in Limine 3 is denied.

iv. Motion in Limine 4

In Motion in Limine 4, Plaintiff seeks to exclude the admission of, and

testimony related to, Defense exhibit “EBRPSS 2019 HR Boot Camp Schedule-at-a-

Glance,” EBRPSB_000412–000415. (See Doc. 37-2 at p. 7). He argues that the exhibit

appears to be a chart that summarizes voluminous writings and should be excluded

because none of the underlying documents were produced, as is required by Federal

Rule of Evidence 1006. See id. Plaintiff further argues that the exhibit is not relevant

and lacks probative value. In response, Defendant avers that EBRPSB_000412–

000415 is not a summary chart, but a document that could be authenticated by a

Defense witness at trial. (See Doc. 43 at p. 7). Accordingly, the Court will defer ruling

on the admissibility of this document until trial. Motion in Limine 4 is denied without

prejudice.

v. Motion in Limine 5

In Motion in Limine 5, Plaintiff seeks to exclude the admission of, and

testimony related to, Defense exhibit “U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission’s file for Charge No. 461-2020-02235C,” EBRPSB_000412–000424,

000428, 000432–000435, 000458–000471, 000495–000499, and 000458–000471

because “they are not relevant, are improper summary documents under Federal

Rule of Evidence 1006, and cannot be authenticated.” (See Doc. 37-2 at p. 8). In

response, Defendant represents that except for impeachment purposes, it does not

intend to introduce EBRPSB_000412–000424, 000428, 000432–000435, 000458–

000471, 000495–000499, and 000458–000471 at trial. The Court credits Defendant’s

representation, and therefore denies Motion in Limine 5 as moot.

vi. Motion in Limine 6

In Motion in Limine 6, Plaintiff seeks to preclude Defendant from introducing

at trial any supplemental or demonstrative exhibits, blowups, or other enlargements

that weren’t listed in the Joint Pretrial Order. (See Doc. 37-2 at p. 8). In response,

Defendant represents that it does not intend to use these items of evidence. (See Doc.

43 at p. 7). The Court credits Defendant’s representation, and therefore denies Motion

in Limine 6 as moot.

vii. Motion in Limine 7

In Motion in Limine 7, Plaintiff seeks to exclude the testimony of Defense

witness Nicola Hall at trial because “Defendant failed to disclose her identity prior to

the filing of the Joint Pretrial Order.” (See Doc. 37-2 at p. 9). Plaintiff argues that

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 required Defendant to supplement its Initial

Disclosures, including information about its intended witnesses, and that

Defendant’s failure to do so precludes Hall’s testimony. See id. In response, Defendant

explains that Hall’s testimony would replace that of Daphne Donaldson, who was

timely disclosed but no longer works for Defendant. (See Doc. 43 at p. 5–6). Hall is

Donaldson’s successor in the role of Defendant’s Chief Human Resources Officer, and

Defendant represents that Hall’s testimony would be limited to the same topics as

Donaldson’s. See id.

The Fifth Circuit has held that, “where the failure to disclose relevant evidence

if harmless, exclusion is not required by the federal rules.” Caskey v. Man Roland,

Inc., 83 F.3d 418, *3 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)). Absent argument

from Plaintiff that he will be prejudicially surprised by Hall’s testimony at trial, the

Court sees no need to exclude her testimony at this juncture. See Reed v. Iowa Marine

& Repair Corp., 16 F.3d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Our reading of Rule 26(e)(2) and (3)

is consistent with the Rule's basic purpose of preventing prejudice and surprise,

neither of which occurred in the case at bar.”). Should Hall’s testimony stray from

Defendant’s representations, the Court will address objections in the ordinary course

at trial. Accordingly, Motion in Limine 7 is denied.

viii. Motion in Limine 8

In Motion in Limine 8, Plaintiff seeks to exclude reference to taxpayer monies.

Because the parties have already agreed that references to taxpayer monies should

be excluded at trial, Motion in Limine 8 is denied as moot.

C. Defendant’s Supplemental Motion in Limine

Defendant’s Supplemental Motion in Limine contains 5 discreet Motions in

Limine labelled A through E. There is significant overlap between Defendant’s first

Motion in Limine and its Supplemental Motion in Limine. As such, when applicable,

the Court rests on its prior rulings, and will only address the new evidentiary

objections raised by Defendant.

i. Motions in Limine A, B, and C

Motions in Limine A, B, and C seek to exclude any argument or evidence

related to Plaintiff’s dismissed claims. (See Doc. 52-2 at pp. 3, 4, and 5). Plaintiff

represents that he “does not intend to pursue claims that were dismissed by the

Court.” (See Doc. 59 at p. 2). The Court credits Plaintiff’s representation and denies

as moot Motions in Limine A, B, C to the extent they seek to exclude evidence of

Plaintiff’s dismissed claims.

Defendant also seeks to exclude Plaintiff Exhibit 10, “Letter from Terry

Washington to defendant, undated,” EBRPSB_000410– 000411 because Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim has been dismissed with prejudice. (See Doc. 52-2 at p. 3). Defendant

argues that the exhibit is no longer relevant because it “does not include any reference

that Plaintiff faced unlawful discrimination.” See id. In response, Plaintiff argues

that the exhibit is relevant because it contains evidence of his alleged constructive

discharge. (See Doc. 59 at p. 4). After reviewing EBRPSB_000410– 000411, the Court

agrees that it contains evidence that could be relevant at trial. Accordingly,

Defendant’s request to exclude EBRPSB_000410– 000411 from use at trial is denied.

ii. Motion in Limine E

In Motion in Limine E, Defendant seeks to exclude “any argument or evidence

for mental pain and suffering and/or punitive damages” because they are barred

under ADEA. (See Doc. 52-2 at p. 6). In rebuttal, Plaintiff argues that evidence of his

mental pain and suffering is admissible because LEDL affords him the right to seek

compensatory damages for such losses. (See Doc. 59 at pp. 6–7). Furthermore,

Plaintiff points out that he did not state a claim for punitive damages in his Amended

Complaint, making this request meritless. See id. The Court agrees with Plaintiff on

both points, and consequently denies Motion in Limine E.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 36) be and is

hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Motions in Limine A, C, G,

and H are granted. In all other respects, Defendant’s Motion in Limine is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 37)

be and is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Supplemental Motion in

Limine (Doc. 52) be and is hereby DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 17th day of February, 2023

_____________________________________

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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