Miller v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRINITY MILLER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL. NO. 21-00353-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is the 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16, the

“Motion”), submitted by Defendants James M. LeBlanc, Darrel Vannoy, and

Brandalynn McMullen. The motion is opposed. (Doc. 28). For reasons to follow,

Defendants’ Motion will be granted, subject to Plaintiffs’ right to submit an amended

complaint consistent with the relief set forth herein.

I BACKGROUND

a. Facts

This is a wrongful death and survival action. Plaintiffs are the children of

former Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) inmate Michael Miller (“Miller’, or

“Decedent”). (Doc. 1, 4[3-4). Miller died while in custody LSP from an apparent drug

overdose after ingesting a “bag” of illegal drugs that Defendant Correctional Officer

Brandalynn McMullen tried to confiscate from him. (Doc, 1 918, 19). Plaintiffs allege

the following operative facts:

In March 2020, the LSP suspended all visits by lawyers and family members.

(Doc. 1 910). [tis not specifically alleged who gave Decedent the drugs or how he came

into possession of the drugs. It is merely alleged that between March 2020 and June

2020 prison staff “smuggled methamphetamine and heroin into LSP and distributed

these drugs to Mr. Miller.” (Doc. 1 911). On June 20, 2020, Decedent was in his dorm

area when Officer McMullen conducted a pat down search of his body. (Doc. 1 413).

During the search, Officer McMullen discovered a bag of drugs on Decedent’s person,

at which time Decedent grabbed the bag and swallowed it. (Doc. 1 4 15). Thereafter,

Officer McMullen allegedly ignored LSP policy by failing to provide Decedent with

medical care and, instead, intentionally ordered that Decedent be placed in a

disciplinary lockdown cell. (Doc. 1 917-18). Decedent was never evaluated by medical

personnel.

At some point while in disciplinary lockdown, “Other Officers” noticed that

Decedent began exhibiting signs of medical distress similar to that of a drug overdose.

(Doc. 1 921). “Other Officers” left Decedent in his cell and made no effort to seek

medical aid despite obvious signs that he was in medical distress. (Doc. 1 922-23, 25).

An autopsy later revealed that he died on June 21, 2020 from “Mixed Drug

(methamphetamine and heroin) toxicity.” (Doc. 1 428).

b. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed suit on June 18, 2021, against Defendants James LeBlanc,

Darrel Vannoy, Officer McMullen, and “Other Currently Unknown Defendants.”

(Doc. 1). Plaintiffs assert three claims. First, a Section 1983 claim against Defendants

LeBlanc and Vannoy, in their individual capacities, for the establishment of a system

in which inmates with serious medical issues are denied access to appropriate

medical care. (Doc. 1 88). Second, a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Vannoy,

in his individual capacity, for failure to supervise the officers of the Louisiana State

Penitentiary to ensure that prisoners receive appropriate care for serious medical

needs. (Doc. 1 439). Third, a Section 1983 claim against Defendant McMullen and the

other unnamed Defendants, in their individual capacities, for deliberate indifference

to Decedent’s constitutional right to appropriate medical care. (Doc. 1 440).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against

the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). When a defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity in a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the district court must’—as always—do no more than

determine whether the plaintiff has ‘file[d] a short and plain statement of his

complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone.” Anderson v.

Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 589-90 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427,

1433 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Here, the only issue raised in the Motion sub judice is whether Defendants are

entitled to qualified mmunity. Qualified immunity shields a government official from

lability for civil damages “when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” City of Escondido, Calif. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 508 (2019). Its

intended purpose is to strike a balance “between the interests in vindication of

citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their

duties” by making it possible for government officials “reasonably [to] anticipate

when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” See Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 6389 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)). Put

differently, “[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly

applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 748 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has devised a two-

pronged test for qualified immunity. Courts must consider (1) “whether the facts,

viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the

official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right was

‘clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190-91 (5th Cir. 2020).

A court may analyze these prongs in either order, and resolve the case on a single

prong. Jd. at 190.

Plaintiffs need not point to a “case directly on point” for a court to determine a

law is clearly established. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 871 (5th Cir. 2011).

However, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Jd.

HI. DISCUSSION

a. Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Provide Medical Care

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that that Defendants LeBlanc and Vannoy

violated Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by “establishing and maintaining

a system that they knew would result in inmates with serious medical conditions,

namely, drug overdoses, being placed in a location (LSP extended disciplinary lock-

down) where they would be deprived of treatment for those serious medical

emergencies.” (Doc. 1 § 38). Plaintiffs now concede, however, “that the Fourteenth

Amendment is inapplicable to this claim, and that it should be dismissed.” (Doc. 23,

p. 7). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to provide

medical care will be dismissed.

b. Eighth Amendment Failure to Provide Medical Care Claim

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants LeBlane and Vannoy violated Decedent’s

Kighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by establishing an

unconstitutional health care system that deprived him of access to emergency and

life-saving medical services. (Doc. 23, p. 7). Defendants LeBlanc and Vannoy assert

that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim

asserting a systematic failure to provide medical care. (Doc. 16-1, p. 9).

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel

and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Although the Constitution does

not mandate comfortable prisons, it prohibits inhumane ones. Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 887, 349 (1981).

To plead an Kighth Amendment violation based on the conditions of an

inmate's confinement, a plaintiff must allege conditions that “pos[e] a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d

811 (1994). The plaintiff must also allege that the defendant prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 834. This requires more

than an allegation of mere negligence, but less than an allegation of purpose or

knowledge. Id. at 835-36, 1148.Ct. 1970. Rather, a prison official acts with deliberate

indifference when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Id. at 837, 114 8.Ct. 1970.

Whether a risk is substantial and the threatened harm is serious represents

an objective test; whether prison officials consciously disregarded the risk represents

a subjective one. Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Ball,

792 F.3d at 592. Furthermore, “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite

knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the

usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may

conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the

risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114.8.Ct. 1970 Gnternal citation omitted),

For example, the Fifth Circuit has determined that a plamtiff successfully

established that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference when the

complaint alleged that defendants routinely reviewed reports of injuries and deaths

and discussed those issues in meetings with their deputies. Hinojosa v. Livingston,

807 F.3d 657, 667 (6th Cir, 2015). In making this determination, the Fifth Circuit

noted that the complaint alleged multiple actions taken by prison officials, suggesting

that they were personally “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and also drfew] the inference.” Jd.

at 667. The Court also noted that the complaint specifically alleged that defendants

were personally aware of thirteen other deaths from conditions similar to those of the

plaintiffs, occurring within the proceeding ten years. Id. at 667.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants LeBlanc and Vannoy violated

Decedent's Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment by

establishing and maintaining a system that they knew would deprive adequate

medical treatment to inmates suffering from drug overdoses. (Doc. 1 438). Plaintiffs

point to Lewis v. Cain, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63293 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2021) as

evidence that Defendants LeBlanc and Vannoy knew that LSP’s medical system was

deficient. The Court in Lewts acknowledged that systemic deficiencies in a prison’s

health-care system can sometimes provide the basis for a finding of deliberate

indifference at an institutional level. Lewis, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63293, p. 101

(citing Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants Vannoy and Leblanc have “been unable

to curb ongoing drug smuggling by LSP employees” and this unfettered illicit drug

trafficking created a substantial risk of serious harm to Decedent. See (Doc. 1 49).

However, as currently pled, Plaintiffs’ complaint is devoid of any allegation that

Defendants Vannoy and Leblanc were personally aware of an “unconstitutional

medical system” or the “unfettered drug trade.” Moreover, the allegations in the

Complaint do not state with any level of specificity how many officers have been

implicated in the alleged “drug trade,” whether any such officers investigated for

possible drug distribution are also connected to Decedent’s drug use, or whether any

such officer should have provided Decedent with medical care.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide medical

care against Defendants LeBlanc and Vannoy are dismissed without prejudice. The

Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), to cure the deficiencies set forth herein within 14 days of the

issuance of this ruling.

e. Kighth Amendment Failure to Supervise Claim

Defendant Vannoy asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity from

Plaintiffs’ Highth Amendment claim for failure to supervise Officer McMullen and

the other Unknown Officers. (Doc. 16-1, p. 9).

Under section 1988, a supervisory official may be liable for failure to train if

the plaintiff shows that:

“(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate

official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise

and the violation of the plaintiffs rights; and (3) the failure to train or

supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.”

Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, Smith v.

Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998). In this context, deliberate

indifference means that the supervising official both knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 1148.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

To establish deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a

pattern of violations and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously

likely to result in a constitutional violation.” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th

Cir.2003) internal quotation omitted). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations

by untrained [or unsupervised] employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate

deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train [or supervise].” Connick v.

Thompson, 568 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (Thomas, J.) (quoting Bryan Cnty. Comm'rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)); see also Est. of Davis ex rel, McCully v. City of N.

Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 n.34 (th Cir. 2005) (Claims of inadequate

supervision and claims of inadequate training both generally require that the

plaintiff demonstrate a pattern.” (citations omitted)). While the specificity required

should not be exaggerated, our cases require that the prior acts be fairly similar to

what ultimately transpired. Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills,

406 F.3d 375, 383 (6th Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiffs assert that Officer McMullen’s failure to provide Decedent with

necessary medical treatment reflects a LSP policy, pattern, and practice of punishing

suspected drug users rather than providing them with appropriate medical care.

(Doc. 1 (24). Significantly, however, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not facts establishing

other, similar instances, sufficient to plausibly establish a pattern of such practices.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Kighth Amendment claim for failure to supervise will

be dismissed without prejudice. Again, the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend

their complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) to cure the

deficiencies set forth herein within 14 days of the issuance of this ruling.

d. Officer McMullen

Finally, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Officer McMullen violated Decedent’s

rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Privileges and

Immunities Clause. Now, again, however, Plaintiffs concede that these claims are

“inapplicable.” (Doc. 23 at p. 14 n.76). Accordingly; Plaintiffs’ claims against Officer

McMullen under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth

Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause will be dismissed with

prejudice. Plaintiffs’ Kighth Amendment claims against Officer McMullen remain.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 16) be and is hereby GRANTED as set forth herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall submit their amended

complaint, if any, within 14 days of the date of this Order. Plaintiffs unexcused

failure to timely submit an amended complaint will result in all claims

dismissed herein being dismissed with prejudice.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 2g of September, 2022

JUDGE BRIAN A.(JAS KSON

UNITED STATES BISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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