Smith v. Edwards

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEX A., by and through his guardian,

MOLLY SMITH, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS 22-573-SDD-RLB

GOVERNOR JON BEL EDWARDS,

in his official capacity as Governor of Louisiana;

WILLIAM SOMMERS, in his official

capacity as Deputy Secretary of the

Office of Juvenile Justice,

JAMES M. LEBLANC, in his official capacity

as Secretary of the Louisiana Department

of Public Safety & Corrections

RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,1

filed by Alex A., by and through his guardian, Molly Smith (“Plaintiff”), which also included

a request for injunctive relief. Defendants, Governor Jon Bel Edwards, in his official

capacity as Governor of Louisiana, William Sommers (“Sommers”), in his official capacity

as Deputy Secretary of the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”), and James M. Leblanc, in

his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety &

Corrections (“DOC”)(collectively “Defendants”), filed an Opposition2 to Plaintiff’s motion.

The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order3 and set the matter

1 Rec. Doc. No. 3.

2 Rec. Doc. No. 28.

3 Rec. Doc. No. 15.

for a Preliminary Injunction hearing,4 which was held on September 6 through September

8, 2022.5 The Parties were granted leave to file post-hearing memoranda.6

This case presents an untenable proposition to house adolescents, some as young

as 12 years old, who have been determined to be juvenile delinquents, at the notorious

Angola Penitentiary in a cell block which once housed death row inmates. A few of the

adolescents adjudicated as “delinquent” and placed in the secure care of the OJJ present

formidable security and safety risks. OJJ is charged with a rehabilitative, not punitive,

mission. But a small handful of youth have wreaked havoc, endangering themselves,

other youth, OJJ staff, and members of the general public. Ongoing and repeated acts of

violent and disruptive behavior by a few has reduced OJJ to becoming security enforcers

instead of rehabilitators.

For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction shall be denied. The prospect of putting a teenager to bed at night

in a locked cell behind razor wire surrounded by swamps at Angola is disturbing. Some

of the children in OJJ’s care are so traumatized and emotionally and psychologically

disturbed that OJJ is virtually unable to provide a secure care environment. While locking

children in cells at night at Angola is untenable, the threat of harm these youngsters

present to themselves, and others, is intolerable. The untenable must yield to the

intolerable.

The Court finds that OJJ has shown that it will provide a constitutional level of care

to youth transferred to the Temporary Transitional Treatment Unit (“TTU”) proposed to be

4 Rec. Doc. No. 14.

5 Rec. Doc. Nos. 67, 68, & 69.

6 Rec. Doc. Nos. 73 & 74.

located at Angola. The Court is mindful that the specter of the prison surroundings alone

will likely cause psychological trauma and harm. However, the public interest and the

balance of harms require that OJJ be afforded the latitude to carry out its rehabilitative

mission for the benefit of all youth in its care.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2022, in response to several recent incidents of serious events at OJJ

secure care facilities, including riots, attempted and successful escapes, and acts of

violence against staff, other youth, and members of the public, Louisiana’s Governor John

Bel Edwards held a press conference announcing that the state will “temporarily move”

approximately 25 youth in the custody of OJJ from Bridge City Center for Youth (“BCCY”),

a juvenile secure care facility, to the grounds of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola

(“LSP” or “Angola”).7

On August 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the Defendants

on behalf of a putative class of all current and future persons held at BCCY who might be

transferred to LSP or another adult prison. Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. § 794.8 The Plaintiff moved for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order

seeking to: (1) enjoin Defendants from transferring or incarcerating Plaintiff or any

proposed Class member at LSP, and (2) enjoin Defendants to immediately return any

youth who may have already been transferred to LSP to BCCY or another appropriate

OJJ facility for youth.9

7 PX 7; Rec. Doc. No. 4-2, p. 1.

8 Rec. Doc. No. 1.

9 Rec. Doc. No. 3. Memorandum in support filed at Rec. Doc. No. 9.

On August 23, 2022, the Court held a telephonic status conference, during which

Defendants stipulated that no youth had been or would be moved to Angola until on or

after September 15, 2022.10 The Court denied Plaintiff’s emergency motion for a TRO

and set this matter for a Preliminary Injunction hearing.11 The Court set expedited

deadlines for discovery, including depositions and disclosure of experts.12 The Parties

conducted limited, expedited discovery. The Preliminary Injunction hearing was held from

September 6 through September 8, 2022.

I. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (“PLRA”) EXHAUSTION

The Parties dispute whether Alex A. exhausted administrative remedies under the

PLRA before filing this action. At the Preliminary Injunction hearing, neither Plaintiff nor

Defendants presented evidence on this issue, and they offered no arguments other than

those previously briefed. Thus, the Court will rule on this issue based on the pleadings

before the Court.

Alex A. lodged an emergency Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”)

grievance, which was denied.13 Defendants contend that, following denial of the

emergency ARP, Alex A. was required to engage the general ARP procedure, which he

did not do, and thus he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The general ARP

process takes 51 days, which Plaintiff claims would render the emergency process

meaningless.

Defendants maintain that there is nothing in the ARP policy of OJJ that exempts a

youth from utilizing the “still available” general ARP process before filing suit; thus,

10 Rec. Doc. No. 14.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 PX 2.

Plaintiff’s claims are not exhausted and not properly before the Court. The same

argument advanced by the Defendants was recently rejected by another section of this

Court. In J.H. v. Edwards,14 Judge deGravelles noted that:

The Fifth Circuit has explained the following about exhaustion of remedies

under the PLRA:

The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust “such administrative

remedies as are available” before filing suit in federal court to

challenge prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion

obligation is mandatory—there are no “futility or other [judicially

created] exceptions [to the] statutory exhaustion requirements....”

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 149 L. Ed.

2d 958 (2001). So long as the State's administrative procedure

grants “authority to take some action in response to a complaint,” that

procedure is considered “available,” even if it cannot provide “the

remedial action an inmate demands.” Id. at 736, 121 S. Ct. 1819

(emphasis added); see also id. at 739, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (“Congress

meant to require procedural exhaustion regardless of the fit between

a prisoner's prayer for relief and the administrative remedies

possible.”).

By contrast, a remedy is not “available”—and exhaustion is not

required—when:

1. The procedure “operates as a simple dead end” because “the

relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any

relief,” or “administrative officials have apparent authority, but decline

ever to exercise it.”

2. The “administrative scheme [is] so opaque that ... no reasonable

prisoner can use them.”

3. Or when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking

advantage of a grievance process through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, ––– U.S. ––––,

136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859–60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (quotation

omitted).15

14 No. 20-293-JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 3448087 (M.D. La. June 24, 2020).

15 Id. at *41 (quoting Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 804 (5th Cir. 2020)).

Turning to OJJ’s ARP policy, the Court observed that: “the ARP Policy does not

appear to require youth to exhaust the standard two-step procedure after they have filed

an emergency procedure.”17 OJJ’s emergency ARP policy provides:

If a youth's ARP contains statements which indicate he believes he is at

immediate risk of harm and any delay in responding to the grievance would

subject the youth to substantial risk of immediate personal injury or cause

other serious or irreparable harm, the ARP Coordinator shall immediately

forward the ARP, or that portion of the ARP which alleges substantial risk

of imminent personal injury or cause serious or irreparable harm, to the

Facility Director, Regional Director, and IS. The Regional Director shall

provide an initial response with 48 hours and issue a final decision with five

(5) calendar days.18

Based on the plain language in the ARP policy, the Court in J.H. reasoned: “both

the ARP Policy and the youth ARP Instructions indicate that the Emergency ARP results

in a ‘final decision,’ which would logically mean that the Youth could proceed to the ‘next

step’ of filing suit.”19

In this matter, without mentioning J.H., Defendants endeavor to get around the

Court’s ruling on exhaustion by stating:

103. OJJ’s ARP does not except Youths from addressing grievances

through the standard two-step process if they do not receive emergency

relief where requested. See generally ARP Policy (Doc. No. 28-1). In other

words, the ARP includes no provision for complete curtailment of the two-

step grievance process, even where a Youth is denied emergency relief. In

fact, the ARP specifically states that a Youth may seek judicial review after

the conclusion of Step 2 of its standard process but contains no such

language in the emergency grievance provision. See id. at 9-10. Thus, the

ordinary grievance process remains “available” within the meaning of the

PLRA even after an inmate has sought administrative relief under an

emergency grievance. See, i.e., Brown v. Eardley, 184 F. App’x 689, 691-

92 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding administrative remedies were still available to

inmate through standard grievance process even though warden did not

17 Id.

18 Rec. Doc. No. 28-1, pp. 3-16 (emphasis added). The same language was analyzed by Judge DeGravelles

in the J.H case, id. at *43.

19 Id.

respond to emergency grievances within the three days required under

applicable regulations); Brazell v. Ruh, 2015 WL 2452410, at *3-4 (E.D. Ark.

May 21, 2015) (same).20

Despite this argument, the ARP policy is unchanged from the policy language

evaluated by Judge deGravelles in J.H.21 The Court finds that the denial of Alex A.’s

emergency ARP constituted a final decision upon which Plaintiff could rely in filing suit.

Alternatively, the Court finds that, following a denial of the emergency ARP, the remaining

procedure “operates as a simple dead end” because the second step procedure, urged

by the Defendants, “lacks authority to provide any relief.”22 Furthermore, if applied as

advocated by the Defendants the “administrative scheme [is] so opaque that ... no

reasonable prisoner can use them.”23

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court has considered the Parties’ pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, the

evidence admitted during the hearing, and the applicable law.24 The Court’s credibility

findings, findings of fact, and conclusion of law are set forth below pursuant to Rule 52(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If any finding is in truth a conclusion of law, or if

any conclusion stated is in truth a finding of fact, it shall be deemed so. Where a particular

fact was controverted, the Court weighed the evidence and determined that the evidence

presented by the party supporting that fact was more persuasive.

20 Rec. Doc. No. 49, pp. 20-21.

21 Rec. Doc. No. 28-1, pp. 13, 25.

22 Valentine, 956 F.3d at 804.

23 Id.

24 The Court considered all exhibits filed into the record in this matter even if not specifically referred to

herein.

A. Witnesses

1. Maghen Gagnard (“Gagnard”) is the Executive Staff officer at LSP, and she reports

to Warden Tim Hooper. Gagnard testified credibly about the Memorandum of

Understanding (“MOU”) entered into by LSP/DOC and OJJ.25

2. Alex A., represented by and through his mother Molly Smith, is an adjudicated

juvenile delinquent currently in the care and custody of OJJ at the Bridge City

Center for Youth.26 The Court considered Alex A.’s age (17), his learning

disabilities and his history of PTSD and weighed his testimony accordingly. The

Court finds that Alex A. was a good historian of his fears surrounding possible

transfer to an OJJ facility on the grounds of Angola.

3. Dr. Monica Stevens (“Dr. Stevens”) was accepted as an expert in the field of clinical

psychology with a specialty in child psychology and trauma.27 Since 2013, Dr.

Stevens has been an Assistant Professor in the Psychology Department at Tulane,

and she serves as a staff psychologist at the Children’s Hospital in New Orleans,

Louisiana.28 The Court found Dr. Stevens credible and knowledgeable in her field

of expertise.

4. Dr. Denise Dandridge (“Dr. Dandridge”) is a Registered Nurse with a Doctorate

degree. She has been the Director of Health Services for OJJ for 8 years. Dr.

Dandridge is responsible for the management, procurement, and oversight of all

medical and mental health services for youth in OJJ custody.29 The Court found

25 9/6/22 Testimony of Gagnard at 8:18.

26 9/6/22 Testimony of Alex A. at 10:11-10:13.

27 9/6/22 Testimony of Stevens at 11:21.

28 Id.

29 9/6/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 2:23.

Dr. Dandridge both credible and knowledgeable about the medical and mental

health services provided by OJJ and OJJ’s policies and procedures regarding

same.

5. Otha Curtis Nelson (“Nelson”), is the Assistant Secretary of OJJ, and reports

directly to Deputy Secretary William Sommers. Nelson has a Bachelor’s Degree

in Psychology from LSU, and a J.D. from Loyola Law School. He has a long

professional history working in juvenile justice and has received professional

recognition and awards for his work in the juvenile justice field. As Assistant

Secretary, he is responsible for the oversight of secure facilities, probation, parole,

and non-secure facilities within the OJJ. He serves on OJJ’s Executive

Management Team.30 The Court found Nelson credible and knowledgeable in the

field of juvenile justice and the mission and operation of OJJ, and committed to the

rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent youth in the custody of the OJJ.

6. Vincent Schiraldi (“Schiraldi”) is a Senior Fellow at the Columbia University Justice

Lab and a Senior Research Scientist at the Columbia School of Social Work. He

was accepted by the Court as an expert in juvenile justice. Schiraldi has a

Bachelor’s Degree in Social Psychology and a Master’s Degree in Social Work

from New York University. His professional history includes experience as the

Director of the Washington, D.C. equivalent of the OJJ, the Commissioner of

Probation for New York City, and he ran two non-profit juvenile justice

organizations, the Center for Juvenile Justice Education and the Justice Policy

Institute. He has taught courses at various universities on juvenile justice and

30 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson.

related fields and has provided opinion testimony in the field of juvenile justice in

State and Federal Courts.31 The Court found Schiraldi credible, knowledgeable

and qualified by education, experience and knowledge to provide opinion

testimony in the field of juvenile justice.

7. William Sommers, Sr. (“Sommers”) is the Deputy Secretary of the OJJ. He has a

B.S. from McNeese and has worked in juvenile justice since 1987. He started with

the agency as a probation officer and subsequently promoted to many different

positions within the agency, culminating in his position as Director. He received

an award for excellence in Juvenile Justice in 2015 and has contributed to several

boards involved in juvenile justice. He was appointed to his current position in

2020.32 The Court found him credible and knowledgeable in his field, passionate

about juvenile justice, and committed to provide a safe and secure environment

for the rehabilitation of juveniles.

8. Shenell Deville (“Deville”) is the Director of Education for the OJJ. Her

responsibilities include developing policies and procedures for education services,

selecting curriculum materials, developing the budget, and supporting teachers

and students. She also oversees and ensures alignment in programming for all

secure care facilities, including BCCY-WF. Deville has worked in education for

twenty-eight years and in special education for seven years; she has served as a

principal and assistant principal; and she has served in many coordinator positions

in education and special education. She has a Bachelor’s Degree in Biological

Sciences, a Master’s Degree in Special Education, a Master’s Degree in

31 9/7/22 Testimony of Schiraldi.

32 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:00, 10:20-10:23.

Curriculum & Instruction, and a number of certifications from the Louisiana

Department of Education.33 The Court found Deville credible and knowledgeable

in the field of education and special education and well informed regarding OJJ’s

educational policies, procedures and services.

9. Angela Bridgewater (“Bridgewater”) has worked for OJJ for twenty-eight years,

currently as the Detail Program Manager with oversight of treatment services,

education, food services. She is the statewide LAMOD34 coordinator. She has a

Bachelor’s Degree in Social Work from Southern University and a Master’s Degree

in Social Work from LSU. She is a licensed clinical social worker and a board

approved clinical supervisor.35 The Court found Bridgewater credible and

knowledgeable in her field and in her oversight of programming for OJJ.

10. Deron Patin (“Patin”) is the Executive Management Advisor with the OJJ. He is

responsible for supervising the training director, supervising the public information

director, and emergency operations. He acts as the legislative liaison for OJJ, and

he handles any other special projects assigned to him, the current project being to

bring BCCY-WF online. He began his career as a Juvenile Probation Officer, was

promoted to Supervisor over the Probation Section, later became the Manager of

a Juvenile Detention Center in East Baton Rouge Parish, and he retired in the role

of Interim Director of Juvenile Services for East Baton Rouge Parish before

accepting his current position with OJJ.36 The Court found Patin credible and

33 9/8/22 Testimony of Deville at 1:03-1:08.

34 LAMOD is the Louisiana Model for juvenile justice which follows the Missouri Model.

35 9/8/22 Testimony of Bridgewater at 2:19-2:22.

36 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 3:51-3:53.

knowledgeable in the field of juvenile justice and in his current role of Executive

Management Advisor.

B. OJJ Background, Structure, and Impetus for Transfer Plan

11. The OJJ is the state agency responsible for providing rehabilitation services to

youth who have been adjudicated delinquent.37 OJJ’s Deputy Secretary for Youth

services is charged with establishing all rules and regulations for the placement,

care, and treatment of youth in the custody of the OJJ.38 The OJJ has sole authority

over the placement, care, treatment, or any other considerations deemed

necessary from the resources that are available for children judicially committed to

the Department.39

12. OJJ currently maintains five secure care facilities across the state: Acadiana

Center for Youth at Bunkie (“ACY”), Acadiana Center for Youth at St. Martinville

(“ACY-SM”), Bridge City Center for Youth (“BCCY”), Swanson Center for Youth at

Monroe (“SCY” or “Swanson-Monroe”), and Swanson Center for Youth at

Columbia (“SCY-C”).40

13. Several factors inform a youth’s placement in a secure care facility rather than a

less restrictive facility, including (1) the violent nature of the underlying criminal act;

(2) commission of a crime of sexual assault; (3) a history of repeated commission

of serious crimes; and/or (4) the youth’s failure to respond in a less restrictive

rehabilitation program/facility.41

37 La. R.S. § 15:905(A).

38 Id. at 905(B).

39 La. Ch. Code art. 908(A); State in Interest of S.T., 97-0216, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/97), 699 So. 2d1128,

1129, writ denied, 97-2627 (La. 2/13/98), 706 So. 2d 992.

40 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:26.

41 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:21; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:25.

14. OJJ secure care facilities include housing dormitories, common areas,

gymnasiums, outdoor recreational areas, schools, medical and counseling

facilities, and dining areas.42

15. Most youth in OJJ secure care facilities reside in dormitories which accommodate

twelve to fifteen Youth. The youth can move freely in their dormitories.43

16. Most youth offenders in OJJ secure care facilities have demonstrated an ability to

adapt to the secure environment and comply with behavioral rules and facility

policies.44

17. Recently there has been a significant increase in the frequency and severity of

serious incidents at OJJ secure care facilities, including destruction of property,

attempted and successful escapes, acts of violence against staff and other youth,

and injury to a member of the public. A small population of the youth, approximately

25, have engaged in violent and destructive behavior which has caused significant

disruption in OJJ’s ability to deliver educational and rehabilitation services to the

other youth in its custody.45 OJJ Deputy Secretary Sommers estimates that “about

five percent of the youth give us the most problems.”46

18. Some youth have repeatedly escaped and have engaged in violent criminal

behavior before being returned to OJJ. Youth who have escaped from OJJ secure

care facilities have been accused of motor vehicle theft, carjacking, burglary,

42 See generally 9/6/22 Testimony of Gagnard; 9/7/22 Testimony of Dr. Dandrige, Nelson at 11:11-11:12;

9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers, Deville, and Patin.

43 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson, generally; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers, generally. The Cypress Unit at

Swanson Monroe is a facility providing single rooms with locking doors.

44 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:04; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers, generally.

45 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:03 -11:30; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:06, 10:42.

46 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:36-10:37.

armed robbery, attempted murder, reckless operation of stolen vehicles, and illegal

possession of handguns.47

19. A small percentage of the OJJ population have caused substantial property

destruction across OJJ campuses, with some dorms having been destroyed to the

point of being uninhabitable.48 These youth have also become increasingly

aggressive and have engaged in serious acts of violence against other youth and

OJJ staff, resulting in “severely broken bones, crushed skulls, broken fingers, eye

sockets” resulting, in some instances, in “lifelong injuries to some [OJJ] staff

members.”49

20. Other youth have been victimized by the high-risk youth when they try to go to

sleep at night, and they have reported to Nelson that they are afraid to go to sleep

at night for fear of being attacked by these high-risk youth.50

21. The high-risk youth have created weapons like shanks, and they have used pipes

from the walls and ceilings (of facilities they have destroyed) as weapons. They

have destroyed security cameras so their behavior cannot be observed by OJJ

security.51 Rival groups have emerged who fight each other, particularly during

recreational time.52

47 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson 11:44-11:51.

48 Id. at 11:03-11:04; DX 15-40 (Unusual Recurrence Reports (“UOR”) and photographs of damage to

property from March 2021 through July 6, 2022).

49 Id. at 11:08-11:09.

50 Id. at 11:11.

51 Id. at 11:12-15.

52 Id.

22. In 2021, the Cypress Unit at Swanson, Monroe housed high-risk youth in need of

a high level of security; the Cypress Unit provided single rooms and locking

doors.53

23. In May 2021, the Cypress Unit was “completely destroyed” by the high-risk youth

housed there.54 Nelson testified that he had “never seen that type of destruction to

any building,”55 and the photographic evidence admitted supported this

testimony.56

24. Having no secure location to house these youth, OJJ transferred them to the Ware

facility in Alabama, but the youth destroyed that facility as well.57 Sommers

testified that, very soon after the youth were transferred to the Ware facility,

Alabama officials demanded their removal.58

25. More recently, on June 13, 2022, at least five youth were involved in a physical

altercation outside of the school building at SCY, referred to by Nelson as a riot.

At least four staff members were battered by the youth, and one staff member was

transported to the hospital for treatment of injuries.59

26. On June 16, 2022, around 20 youth escaped their dormitory at BCCY, took over

part of the facility, and caused a riot. The riot resulted in injuries requiring medical

attention to at least two youth. At least one staff member was hospitalized due to

injuries. Ultimately, five youth escaped the BCCY secure care facility.60

53 Id. at 11:14.

54 Id. at 11:03.

55 Id.

56 DX 36.

57 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 2:44-2:45.

58 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:43.

59 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:44; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:06.

60 Id.

27. On July 17, 2022, six youth escaped the BCCY facility. Five of the youth stole a

truck from a nearby residence, repeatedly rammed it into a Jefferson Parish

Sheriff’s Deputy’s vehicle, and led officers on a short pursuit before finally crashing

the stolen truck. Most of the escaped youth were apprehended, but one youth

managed to get away. The escaped youth then carjacked and shot the driver, who

was critically injured and remained hospitalized at the time of the hearing.61

28. The high-risk youth, primarily housed at BCCY, have destroyed the facility to the

point that it can no longer provide enough beds for the youth.62

29. Due to repairs and improvements that have become necessary, OJJ lacks high

security accommodations for the high-risk youth in OJJ custody.63

30. OJJ is in the process making substantial repairs to the structures and

reinforcement of the security infrastructure at some of its facilities.64

31. High-risk youth are stepped up to a higher level of secure care and therapeutic

intervention in what is known as a Transitional Treatment Unit (“TTU”).65

32. A new TTU at Swanson-Monroe is expected to come online in April 2023.67

33. Before the July 17, 2022 escape from BCCY, OJJ had been looking for an

acceptable facility to utilize as a TTU.68 Specifically, OJJ had looked into options

at Jetson and a jail in St. Charles Parish.69 No facility on the grounds of Angola

was under consideration.70 After July 17, 2022, however, OJJ determined that

61 Id. at 11:45-11:50.

62 DX 1.

63 See generally Testimony of Nelson & Sommers.

64 See generally Testimony of Nelson, Sommers, & Patin.

65 DX 2 & DX3.

67 DX 1; 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:40-9:42.

68 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:03-10:04; 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:50-11:51.

69 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:04.

70 Id. at 10:03.

none of the options being considered could provide the level of safety and security

required to house the high-risk youth.71 Thus, the facility on the grounds of Angola

known as the Reception Center and three other jails were considered as potential

options.72

34. Local politics and the “not in my backyard” community reaction to the July 17, 2022

escape from BCCY, and the aftermath, contributed to the urgency to locate a

facility that provided a high level of security.73

35. The Court finds that the evidence overwhelmingly established an immediate need

for a more secure facility.74

C. The Bridge City Center for Youth at West Feliciana (“BCCY-WF”) Plan

36. In response to the need for a greater level of individualized treatment in a more

restrictive housing environment, OJJ is establishing a TTU to effectively deliver its

rehabilitative services.78

37. OJJ has begun renovations at several secure care facilities across the state,

including a newly-renovated TTU at Swanson-Monroe, and these efforts continue.

The new TTU at Swanson will have 72 beds and is scheduled to be completed at

the end of April 2023. The TTU at BCCY-WF is a temporary placement until the

Swanson-Monroe TTU is online.80

38. While repairs are being made at existing secure care facilities and pending the

completion of the TTU at Swanson-Monroe, OJJ identified the Reception Center,

71 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 2:44-2:45.

72 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:05.

73 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:42-9:43; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:05.

74 See Findings of Fact Nos. 17-27.

78 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:03-10:04; -11:51; DX 3.

80 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:40-9:42, 9:50.

an unused building on the campus of LSP that, with minor modifications, can

temporarily serve as a TTU.81 This building was most recently used to house

female inmates evacuated from the St. Gabriel Women’s Prison following the 2016

flood.82 Before this building was repurposed to serve as the Reception Center, it

was the death row cell block at LSP.83

39. The proposed temporary TTU at Angola is to be called Bridge City Center for Youth

at West Feliciana (“BCCY-WF”).84

40. While far from ideal, the Court finds that the BCCY-WF location has adequate

physical facilities needed to temporarily house high-risk youth.85

41. The Court finds that this temporary solution is necessary pending completion of

the permanent TTU at Swanson-Monroe.86

42. At full capacity, BCCY-WF will house between twenty-four to thirty youth who are

eligible for placement in the TTU pursuant to OJJ policy.87 The plan is to populate

BCCY-WF in three phases, with eight youth being placed at the facility in each

phase. BCCY-WF will not open on day one with twenty-four youth.88

43. BCCY-WF should be capable of receiving youth by the end of September 2022.89

81 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson, generally; 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin, generally.

82 9/6/22 Testimony of Gagnard at 9:44.

83 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:41.

84 DX 1; 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:40-9:42, 11:51.

85 DX 1; Testimony of Sommers, generally.

86 DX 1; 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:40-9:42.

87 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:03; 2:37.

88 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 4:15.

89 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 9:50; 9/8/22 at 4:38 - Counsel for Defendants stipulated that no youth

would be transferred to BCCY-WF before September 23, 2022.

44. The Court finds that the evidence established that no youth will be transferred to

BCCY-WF until the facility is ready, properly staffed, and can fully provide

educational, medical, mental health, recreational, and food services.90

D. Relationship Between BCCY-WF, LSP, and DOC Security

45. On August 29, 2022, OJJ and DOC signed a Memorandum of Understanding

(“MOU”) outlining the relationship, rights, and responsibilities regarding BCCY-

WF.91

46. Federal law requires that juvenile delinquents may not be housed in any institution

where they could have sight or sound contact with adult inmates.92 Federal law

also contemplates the existence of “collocated facilities” and requires that

individuals who work with both juveniles and adult inmates be trained and certified

to work with juveniles.93

47. BCCY-WF is approximately 100 yards inside the main gates of LSP and

approximately 1.5 miles from the nearest adult housing unit.94

48. The Court finds that the evidence established that youth housed at BCCY-WF will

not come in contact with adult inmates.95

49. The Court finds that the evidence established that OJJ is eliminating the

opportunity for youth to be within sight and sound of adult inmates.

90 DX 1; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:46; 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 4:01, 1:14.

91 PX 32; 9/7/22 Testimony of Gagnard at 9:30.

92 34 U.S.C. § 11133(12)(A). Brief and inadvertent contact does not constitute a violation. 34 U.S.C. §

11103(25).

93 34 U.S.C. § 11133(12)(B).

94 DX 1; DX 6.

95 DX 1; 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 1:47-1:48; 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:46-10:49.

50. The existing perimeter fence around BCCY-WF will be wrapped in solid fabric to

block views.96

51. OJJ will provide all maintenance services except for repairs to damage to the

facility’s infrastructure.97 OJJ has contracted for private lawn and grounds

maintenance for the perimeter, both inside and outside the fenced area of BCCY-

WF. DOC will install signage around BCCY-WF to notify trustees that the facility

is off-limits. DOC staff will be used as necessary for maintenance to the facility, but

no LSP inmate labor will be used inside or outside the building for any reason.98

52. OJJ will run BCCY-WF independent of LSP. However, the MOU provides that DOC

may assist OJJ with staffing by providing interior and perimeter roving security.

DOC is presently providing roving security at other OJJ secured facilities where

staffing shortages exist.99

53. DOC may provide cafeteria operations, maintenance, and exterior security

support.100

54. DOC security will not be on tiers or delivery service; they are only there to assist if

called for a disturbance.101

55. LSP will have no operational authority over the TTU,102 and LSP will provide

supplemental security for BCCY-WF only upon request.103

96 DX 1.

97 DX 1; PX 32.

98 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 3:56-3:57.

99 DX 1.

100 DX 1.

101 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 4:18.

102 9/6/22 Testimony of Gagnard at 9:45; PX 32.

103 Id. at 9:30; PX 32.

56. Utilizing DOC security officers as a measure of last resort is not a new policy nor

is it unique to BCCY-WF; DOC security officers have historically been used in this

manner at all existing OJJ secure care facilities.104

57. The parties to the MOU acknowledge that, “[d]uring this temporary timeframe,

DOC/LSP staff shall utilize chemical spray, electron control weapons (“Tasers”)

and the use of force continuum for which they are trained.”105 This procedure,

available to DOC supplemental security officers, is not unique to the BCCY-WF

facility but is true of all OJJ secure care facilities.106 Any use of force on the

continuum requires permission by an OJJ supervisor.107

58. OJJ will be responsible for the training of any LSP/DOC personnel.108

59. Based on the above, the Court finds that the TTU at BCCY-WF will be run by OJJ

alone; DOC will only be utilized in a manner consistent with the terms of the MOU

and historical practices. The Court further finds that OJJ has taken the appropriate

measures to insulate the youth at BCCY-WF from contact with adult inmates at

LSP and to eliminate sight and sound of LSP inmates.

E. TTU Policy, Programs, and Services

60. The Youth Services Policy for the TTU states that the purpose of the TTU is “[t]o

establish the program objectives and the criteria for the placement of youth and

youth with disabilities in the Transitional Treatment Unit (TTU) located at the Bridge

City Center for Youth at West Feliciana. All students with disabilities assigned to

104 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 4:18; PX 32.

105 PX 32, p. 2.

106 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 3:59, 4:18.

107 Id.

108 PX 32; DX 1 (“All incoming staff will undergo additional training to ensure security within BCCY-WF.”).

OJJ’s TTU program shall be provided a free and appropriate education (FAPE).”109

This Policy identifies a variety of general and special education services that must

be provided to youth placed in a TTU.110

61. Youth ages ten through eighteen, identified as high-risk, are eligible for placement

in the TTU.112

62. OJJ utilizes a classification system to determine what youth are appropriate for

transfer for the TTU.113 Youth are constantly being re-classified to see if they can

“step down” back into the general population of another facility or be released to

their homes and communities. OJJ employs a multi-disciplinary team to

determine, on a case-by-case basis, if a youth fits the criteria for placement at the

TTU. There is no current list of transferees to BCCY-WF because “every day is a

new day” for a child to start working their plan.114

63. The TTU is only for youth who are an imminent risk for violence, destruction, or

escape after all de-escalation efforts have been made, unsuccessfully, at a regular

campus.115

64. The TTU is intended to be a 4-6 week intensive therapeutic program. Youth can

“work their way out” of TTU by demonstrating ability to thrive in a social living

environment.116

65. Sommers testified that the goal of OJJ is to design facilities that facilitate a tiered

therapeutic model, but OJJ has historically lacked the funding to accomplish

109 DX 3.

110 Id.

112 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:01.

113 DX 2.

114 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:53-11:56.

115 Id. at 2:20.

116 Id. at 11:51.

this.117 The biggest challenge to creating a tiered system is the lack of the proper

physical plant.118

66. The existing secure care facilities in Louisiana were “just not built to keep youth

inside,” and need to be designed using “correctional construction” materials, such

as correctional grade sheetrock, etc.119

67. The TTU Youth Services Policy provides that all services and programs available

to youth in all other OJJ secure care facilities will be fully available to the youth at

BCCY-WF.120 The evidence establishing that all services required by law, by

LAMOD (where applicable), and TTU policies will be in place at BCCY-WF was

unrefuted.

68. The Court finds that the TTU at BCCY-WF is a temporary solution and will provide

all necessary programs and services to youth, and the TTU is not designed to be

punitive but to be therapeutic and rehabilitative while maintaining discipline, safety,

and security.

1. Medical & Mental Health Services

69. Dr. Denise Dandridge, the Director of Health Services for OJJ is responsible for all

medical and mental health services provided by OJJ.121

70. OJJ contracts with Wellpath, LLC (“Wellpath”) to deliver medical and mental health

services to youth at BCCY-WF.122

117 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:31.

118 Id. at 10:32.

119 Id. at 10:29, 10:34.

120 DX 3.

121 9/6/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 2:23.

122 Id. at 2:25; DX 50.

71. The scope of Wellpath’s delivery of medical and mental health services was

extended to BCCY-WF on September 1, 2022.123

72. Wellpath has provided medical and mental health services to OJJ for the last 10-

11 years; Wellpath is also contracted to provide similar services to juvenile facilities

across the country.124

73. All OJJ medical providers are hired and employed or contracted by Wellpath; Dr.

Dandridge participates in this process.125

74. Wellpath personnel have visited the proposed facility in West Feliciana and are

confident they can provide the necessary medical and mental health services at

the BCCY-WF site.126

75. Mental health counselors will be onsite at BCCY-WF 8 hours a day, Monday

through Friday. Counselors will be on-call on weekends and nights. A psychiatrist

will be available by telemedicine.127

76. A start-up team of experienced mental health providers and nursing staff have

been identified and will be on-site when BCCY-WF opens.128 This start-up team

will be onsite until new staff have been hired and fully trained.129

77. The goal is for BCCY-WF to have two mental health providers on site.130

78. Youth who are transferred to BCCY-WF will receive the same mental health and

counseling services as youth in any other OJJ facility.131

123 Id.

124 Id.

125 Id. at 2:26-2:27, 2:29.

126 Id. at 2:31.

127 Id. at 2:36-2:37.

128 Id. at 2:37.

129 Id. at 2:38-2:39; 9/7/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 9:15-9:16.

130 Id. at 2:40, 9/7/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 8:43.

131 9/8/22 Testimony of Bridgewater at 2:27.

79. OJJ will be adding Trust Based Relational Intervention to BCCY-WF.132

80. The medical directors at BCCY-WF will be Dr. Christopher Lee and Dr. Michael

Day who have a practice in Baton Rouge.133

81. OJJ will transport youth in need of medical treatment outside of BCCY-WF.134

82. Plaintiffs failed to present evidence or offer legal authority demonstrating that the

distance from the nearest hospital renders the level of medical care provided by

OJJ unconstitutional.

83. Dr. Dandridge testified that OJJ will likely contract a provider for emergency

transport services;135 however, according to the MOU, “LSP may provide

assistance to OJJ/BCCY-WF with medical transportation (ambulance) to a

designated emergency room facility in life threatening situations and as safety,

resources, and regulations permit.”136

84. Youth offenders will not be treated with adult offenders.137

85. No juvenile will ever be referred to LSP for medical care.138

86. Youth at BCCY-WF will have the same access to medical and mental health care

as in all other OJJ facilities.139

87. Youth at BCCY-WF will have the same access to prescribed medications.140

132 Id.

133 9/6/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 2:35.

134 Id. at 2:44.

135 9/7/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 9:24.

136 PX 32 at OJJ-000418.

137 9/6/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 2:42.

138 9/7/22 Testimony of Dandridge at 9:07-9:08, 9:13.

139 Id. at 9:08-9:09.

140 Id. at 9:13.

88. Youth at BCCY-WF will have the same individualized and group counseling

available.141

89. No Youth will be transferred to BCCY-WF until all medical and mental health care

services are fully available, including the physical spaces to provide such care.142

90. The Court finds that the level of medical care, including mental health care, that

will be provided by OJJ at BCCY-WF meets the constitutional standard. The Court

further finds that no child at BCCY-WF will receive medical care at LSP.

2. Education and Special Education Services

91. The same education and special education services provided to youth in other OJJ

facilities will be provided to youth transferred to BCCY-WF.143

92. All youth assigned to OJJ’s TTU program at BCCY-WF will be provided a free and

appropriate education (FAPE), including special education services.144

93. “OJJ’s TTU Program will designate at the minimum 2 special education teachers

to provide students with disabilities identified by the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”) with any special education instruction as prescribed by the

student’s Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). Related service providers are

required and will be provided by the Special School District (“SSD”)[;] the

contracted special education provider for the school site is determined by each

individual student need and identified in the Bulletin 1508 evaluation and IEP.”145

141 Id. at 9:13-9:14.

142 Id. at 9:16.

143 9/8/22 Testimony of Shenell Deville, generally.

144 DX 43.

145 Id. at OJJ-000265.

94. The Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections Youth Services contracts

with the Louisiana Special School District to provide education and related services

to the exceptional populations in OJJ secure care facilities. This contract sets forth

the responsibilities of the State to provide special education services for students

in unique settings.146 This contract governs all OJJ secure care facilities in the

state, including BCCY-WF.147

95. There will be no interruption of special education services for any student

transferred to the TTU at BCCY-WF.150

96. If a student in the TTU has an IEP that requires a psychologist, speech therapist,

occupational therapist, or any other special service deemed necessary by the IEP,

such service/provider will be provided to the student in the BCCY-WF TTU.151

97. All special educators who provide education services in the TTU must go through

specialized training.152

98. The same general education format offered at all other OJJ secure care facilities

will be offered at BCCY-WF.153

99. The student to teacher ratio at BCCY-WF will be 8 to 1, compared to the 12 to 1

student to teacher ratio typical at most other OJJ facilities.154

100. The BCCY principal will serve as the principal at BCCY-WF.155

101. Teachers at BCCY-WF will be credentialed as required by Louisiana state law.156

146 DX 44.

147 9/8/22 Testimony of Deville at 1:12.

150 Id.at 1:20-1:21.

151 Id. at 1:23.

152 Id. at 1:25.

153 Id. at 1:29.

154 Id.; DX 45, 46.

155 Id. at 1:36.

156 Id. at 1:40; DX 48.

102. No educational staff will be shared between staff at LSP and staff at BCCY-WF.157

103. All educational services will be ready and available to each student at BCCY-WF

on day one; no student will be transferred to BCCY-WF until the education

department is fully staffed and trained.158

104. The Court finds that the youth at BCCY-WF will be provided education, including

special education, in accordance with the requirements of federal and state law,

without interruption.

3. Food & Recreation Services and Visitation

105. Daily meals for BCCY-WF will be prepared by the DOC. The food will be placed

in a hot box and transported by OJJ staff from LSP to BCCY-WF. DOC staff will

not transport the food to BCCY-WF, and no inmate trustees will transport food to

BCCY-WF.159

106. The Recreation and Activity Monitoring Standard Operating Procedure applicable

to BCCY will apply to BCCY-WF.160

107. The Activity Schedule for BCCY-WF sets forth opportunities for recreation at

BCCY-WF.161

108. While the designated recreation areas at the facility as of the date of the hearing

were sorely lacking, unrefuted evidence submitted at the hearing established that

OJJ is having concrete poured for basketball courts and is undertaking other

improvements to serve recreational needs.162

157 Id. at 1:50.

158 Id. at 1:52.

159 9/8/22 Testimony of Bridgewater at 2:22.

160 Id. at 2:29-2:30; DX 54.

161 Id. at 2:31; DX 56.

162 9/8/22 Testimony of Patin at 4:04.

109. Sommers vehemently stated that there would be contact visitation at BCCY-WF.

He also testified that OJJ will hopefully be able to offer transportation for parents

to and from BCCY-WF.163

110. The Court finds that, based on the unrefuted evidence of upgrades that OJJ is in

the process of making to the BCCY-WF facility, youth at BCCY-WF will be provided

constitutionally adequate meals and opportunities for recreation. The Court further

finds that youth will have the opportunity for contact visitation with family.

F. The BCCY-WF Plan - Rehabilitative/Therapeutic Model v. Correctional Model

111. The Parties in this matter agree that the goal of juvenile justice is rehabilitation, not

punishment.164

112. Vincent Schiraldi was accepted by the Court as an expert in juvenile justice and

gave opinion testimony to the Court on the appropriateness of Defendants’ Plan

for BCCY-WF.165

113. Schiraldi explained that the goal of rehabilitation is to provide services, support,

and opportunities to enable a young person to “matriculate out of delinquent

behavior”; punishment is the act of being confined or incarcerated that deprives a

juvenile of their liberty as a matter of public safety and deterrence to committing

crimes.167

114. In Schiraldi’s opinion, juvenile justice systems should not mirror adult justice

systems. Youth should not be sent to adult prisons.168

163 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:39.

164 9/7/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 3:38; 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 10:34; 9/8/22 Testimony of

Sommers at 10:23.

165 Id. at 3:30; PX 11, 12.

167 Id. at 3:38-3:40.

168 Id.

115. A juvenile facility should provide a normalized environment, to the degree

possible.169

116. Schiraldi conceded that, “eventually you may have to restrain a kid, put your hands

on a kid,” but this should be a last resort.171

117. Schiraldi toured the proposed BCCY-WF facility in the first week of September

2022.172

118. Schiraldi opined that BCCY-WF is an inappropriate environment for youth because

it “screams prison.”173 Its atmosphere suggests a correctional model rather than a

rehabilitative model.174

119. The indoor space designated for recreation is inadequate.175

120. The existing outdoor recreational space are likewise inadequate, consisting of a

basketball goal erected in a grassy area in view of a guard tower.176

121. The existing visitation space is a non-contact, mesh screen separating the juvenile

from a visitor.177

122. The youth’s living quarters will be prison cells with barred sliding doors that lock

them in.178

169 Id. at 3:49. Schiraldi testified that he had visited BCCY in 2016 and observed that the facility was old,

but it had an internal gym, outdoor field and basketball, a vocational building, school building, and dorms.

171 Id. at 4:05-4:06.

172 Id. at 4:24.

173 Id. at 4:25.

174 Id. Schiraldi took photographs from this visit admitted en globo at PX 20.

175 Id. at 4:43.

176 Id. at 4:40; PX 20, p. 100.

177 PX 20.

178 PX 20, p. 80. Schiraldi also raised the issue of lack of privacy in the open showers (PX 20 at Alex A. –

000282), but Patin testified that shower curtains have been ordered to correct this issue. 9/8/22 Testimony

of Patin at 4:05.

123. The nearest hospital in West Feliciana Parish is 24 miles away from LSP, and the

contracted hospital is 134 miles away.179

124. While Schiraldi opines that the use of adult prison cells as rooms for youth is “de

facto” solitary confinement, the Court disagrees for the reasons stated below.

Schiraldi concedes that confining youth to their cells at night is not solitary

confinement, but it is isolation, and therein lies the psychological harm.180

125. Solitary confinement has a very negative affect on young people; it exacerbates

already existing mental health problems, it can exacerbate or cause the onset of

mental illness and depression, and causes an increased risk of suicide.181

126. Unlike the situation in OJJ secure care facilities across the Louisiana, Schiraldi’s

experiences in renovating juvenile facilities in Washington, D.C. allowed him to

renovate a vacant facility while youth were housed elsewhere. As renovations

were complete, the youth would be moved into renovated areas, and renovations

would start on the vacated areas.183

127. Years ago, both Louisiana and New York consulted with the Missouri Youth

Services Institute regarding its model for juvenile justice.184

128. The Missouri Model for juvenile justice is a therapeutic model; it is not the model

used by the majority of states in the country. Further, the Missouri Model is not

the only therapeutic model in the United States. Some states utilize a trauma

informed therapy model, and some states utilize a more correctional approach.185

179 Id. at 4:50.

180 Id. at 5:00.

181 Id. at 4:53-4:54.

183 9/8/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 8:40-8:42.

184 9/7/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 4:19.

185 9/8/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 8:42-8:44.

129. Bridgewater, the Statewide LAMOD Coordinator for all OJJ facilities,186 explained

that LAMOD is the Louisiana model for juvenile justice, modeled after the Missouri

model. With LAMOD, youth are taught various social skills. The LAMOD

philosophy allows the youth to work in groups, and peer-to-peer interaction is very

important. Youth are allowed to confront each other and discuss issues. There

are four stages of LAMOD, and youth progress from one stage to another while

completing assignments and learning new skills. The last stage is citizenship, and

there are rewards and incentives for completing the stages and learning the

various skills associated with each stage.187 The LAMOD approach is defined as:

“[a] holistic therapeutic approach to how we engage, work with, and treat youth

staff, families and communities.”188

130. Schiraldi agreed that rehabilitation of a juvenile is not the only interest served by

the juvenile justice system; the safety of youth, staff, and the public are also

interests served by the juvenile justice system.189 There must be a balancing of

these interests.190 Rehabilitation can many times serve all these interests, but not

always.191

131. When a youth is acting out violently, one of the last resort options is physical

restraint.192

132. Nelson believes in the LAMOD therapeutic model and finds it works well for

compliant youth that are willing to use the program and adapt; however, LAMOD

186 9/8/22 Testimony of Bridgewater at 2:21.

187 Id. at 2:27-2:28.

188 DX 2 at OJJ-0000004.

189 9/8/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 8:44.

190 Id.

191 Id. at 8:45.

192 Id. at 8:47.

does not work well with aggressive, violent youth that attack staff and peers

because they can freely move around and act out.196

133. Nelson testified, “We don’t punish kids placed in our custody.”197

134. Sommers stated that the goal of OJJ is “to rehabilitate every kid we get.”198

135. Sommers would prefer to use the Missouri model for juvenile justice in every

situation but lamented, “you cannot do therapy if a faction of youth are disrupting

everything.”199

136. To the issue of solitary confinement, Nelson testified that, legally, no child can be

confined in their room for more than 8 hours and then only after an assessment;

the child must be checked on an hourly basis; once the child has calmed down,

they are released back into the general population. Sleeping in your room at night

is not solitary confinement.200

137. As for the photographs of the proposed BCCY-WF site that show that the visitation

area is that of an adult prison, with a screen separating the offender from a visitor

and no opportunity for physical contact,201 Sommers testified that these

photographs do not depict the plan for visitation at BCCY-WF: Visiting through

plexiglass “is not gonna happen … a momma needs to hug her son … we will have

that type of visitation at West Feliciana, no doubt.”202

138. The photographs of the facility taken by Schiraldi on September 1, 2022 are, in

some instances, shocking and depressing. However, the Court finds that these

196 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 11:12-11:13.

197 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 10:34.

198 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:23.

199 Sommers at 10:31. Sommers also notes that Missouri has nineteen facilities to Louisiana’s four. Id.

200 Nelson at 2:20-2:23.

201 PX 20, Bates Nos. Alex A – 000378-000384.

202 9/8/22 Testimony of Sommers at 10:39

photographs are not representative of the renovations and improvement underway

and planned for BCCY-WF.203

139. The Court finds that OJJ is committed to rehabilitation of youth that will be placed

in the temporary TTU at BCCY-WF. The Court further finds that the goal of using

the facility on the grounds of Angola is not punishment but rehabilitation in a setting

that allows OJJ to deliver therapeutic services while maintaining order, security,

and safety for all youth in the custody of OJJ. However, the Court also finds that

some aspects of the facility could have harmful psychological effects on youth

placed at BCCY-WF.

G. Alex A. - Evidence of Harm204

140. Alex A. is a seventeen-year-old who has been in the custody of OJJ since May 9,

2021, and is currently housed at BCCY.205

141. Alex A. became aware of the “Angola plan” by overhearing OJJ staff discussions

and seeing news reports that some youth in OJJ custody would be moved to the

grounds of Angola.206

142. Alex A. testified that DOC guards at BCCY behave differently than OJJ security

guards, stating that DOC guards “mace us for nothing.”207

143. Since learning about this transfer plan, Alex A. has had trouble sleeping and has

had nightmares. He testified that the other kids “don’t care.”208

203 See, generally, Testimony of Dandrigde, Deville, and Patin.

204 The juvenile Plaintiff is proceeding under a pseudonym to protect his identity. The Court has also

considered Alex A.’s redacted Declaration admitted into evidence under seal as PX 1.

205 9/6/22 Testimony of Alex A. at 10:11-10:13.

206 Id. at 10:21.

207 Id. at 10:23.

208 Id. at 10:23-10:24. This live testimony contradicted Alex A.’s Declaration, wherein he attested that other

youth at BCCY “are also terrified of being moved to Angola.” PX 1, ¶ 22.

144. Alex A. admitted that he has a history of aggressive behavior and problems with

anger management,209 and he receives counseling for anger management.210

145. Alex A. gets angry when he is told to do things by staff that he does not want to do

and when other youth annoy him.211

146. Alex A. testified that getting angry sometimes makes him “want to kill.” He admitted

that anger has caused him to “choke somebody [another youth] out,” break

someone’s nose, and he stated he might kill someone if he got angry enough,

including OJJ staff.212

147. Alex A. has been treated for a history of anxiety manifested by hair pulling.213

148. Many of Alex A.’s fears are based on incorrect assumptions; however, it is not Alex

A.’s obligation to ask OJJ about the transfer plan, it is OJJ’s obligation to properly

communicate with its youth and their parents.

149. Dr. Monica Stevens was accepted as an expert in the field of clinical psychology

with a specialty in child psychology and trauma.214

150. Generally, the human brain is not fully formed until the age of 25 years old.215

Before the age of 25, the prefrontal cortex activity and development will be

209 Id. at 11:00-11:05. (Alex A. was accused in May 2022 of destruction of property- throwing a fire hydrant

through a window, which he denies; he admits he threw a liquid in a social worker’s face in August 2022;

he denies climbing the fence and leaving campus in July 2022; he denies that he pushed a staff member

onto his back to leave a classroom; he denies that he was written up a few times for exposing himself; he

admits that he masturbated toward female staff; denies that he threatened to hit female staff; he admits he

hit another Youth multiple times in August 2022; he admits he was involved in a dorm versus dorm campus

riot where he knocked out staff to unconsciousness with his fist because they were in his way. See DX 58-

67).

210 Id. at 11:05-11:06.

211 Id. at 11:06-11:07.

212 Id. at 11:08-11:09.

213 Id. at 11:14.

214 9/6/22 Testimony of Stevens at 11:21.

215 Id. at 11:47.

impaired/impacted if survival stressors are placed on adolescents.216

151. An ideal setting to rehabilitate delinquent youth is therapeutic rather than punitive.

The environment should not be traumatizing.217

152. Five days before the Preliminary Injunction hearing, Dr. Stevens conducted a 30-

minute non-clinical interview with Alex A. via Zoom.218 This was the first time the

two met.219

153. Alex A. fears physical harm, including sexual violence, based on a belief that the

youth will encounter LSP inmates upon arrival to Angola.220

154. Dr. Stevens concluded that very little information about this transfer was

communicated to Alex A., and part of a rehabilitative aspect in assisting youth is

to provide them “plenty of notice” to absorb major changes.221

155. Dr. Stevens concluded that the psychological impact of Angola’s reputation as a

scary prison plagued with aggression and violence has resulted in serious

anticipatory stress for Alex A.222 The specter of the move to Angola is traumatic

and thus harmful to the developing adolescent brain.

156. Alex A. is experiencing discomfort, and his hair pulling is rare in general and

particularly for his demographic. He is having nightmares and is hyper vigilant, all

hallmarks of traumatization.223

216 Id. at 1:27.

217 Id. at 11:31.

218 Id. at 1:40.

219 Id.

220 Id. at 1:09-1:10.

221 Id. at 11:37.

222 Id. at 11:38-11:39.

223 Id. at 11:14-11:15.

157. Placement of Alex A. in a facility designed to house adult inmates will exacerbate

his PTSD.224

158. The goal of rehabilitation is disserved by re-triggering traumatized youth by placing

them in an environment that looks and feels punitive, like LSP.225

159. Placing any child in a maximum-security facility designed for adults is

unreasonably psychologically harmful to children.226

160. The Court finds that there is a high-risk that the placement of adolescents in a

facility designed to house adult inmates will be psychologically harmful and

traumatizing. However, the Court finds that OJJ needs to place high-risk youth in

a facility that provides a high level of security, both for the protection and safety of

high-risk youth and all youth in OJJ custody. This finding is validated by Alex A.’s

testimony and conduct record.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only if Plaintiff clearly

demonstrates (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat

that Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the

threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the Defendants, and (4) that granting

the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.227 While the first two factors

224 Id. at 11:16.

225 Id. at 1:24.

226 Id. at 1:28-1:29.

227 Gumns v. Edwards, No. 20-231-SDD-RLB, 2020 WL 2510248, at *3 (M.D. La. May 15, 2020)(Dick,

C.J.)(citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir.

2012) (quotation and citation omitted); Justin Industries v. Choctaw Securities, L.P., 920 F.2d 262 (5th

Cir.1990).

are most critical,230 the movant is required to “clearly carry the burden as to all four

elements;” failure to do so requires a denial of the motion.231

In the context of detention, and in accordance with the PLRA, “preliminary

injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the federal right, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the

harm.”232 Even though adjudicated delinquents are not incarcerated per se, the Fifth

Circuit has held that “the deference given to correctional officials in the adult context

applies to correctional officials in the juvenile context as well.”233

Federal Courts eschew toward “minimum intrusion into the affairs of state prison

administration; state prison officials enjoy wide discretion in the operation of state penal

institutions.”234 In a case challenging a state prison transfer policy, the Supreme Court

warned against federal courts making decisions regarding “the day-to-day functioning of

state prisons and involv[ing] the judiciary in issues and discretionary decisions that are

not the business of federal judges,”235 noting that “[t]he federal courts do not sit to

supervise state prisons, the administration of which is an acute interest to the States.”236

The same deference is owed to state juvenile justice agencies.237

As this Court held in Lavergne v. Cain, “[w]hen weighing any form of injunctive

relief, federal courts must be mindful not to jump at the chance to take prison

230 Barber v. Bryant, 833 F.3d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 2016).

231 Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2003).

232 Hood v. Vessel, 2013 WL 12121562, at *1 (M.D. La. May 14, 2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)).

233 Mabry v. Lee County, 849 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2017).

234 Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211-1212 (5th Cir. 1977)(citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.

396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)).

235 Mecham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-229 (1976).

236 Id. at 229 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-492, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439

(1973); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Johnson v. Avery,

393 U.S. 483, 486, 89 S.Ct. 747, 749, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969)).

237 Mabry, 849 F.3d at 238.

administration into their own hands and out of the hands of the people entrusted with such

tasks by the state.”239 “[U]nwarranted intrusions by the courts can be disruptive to the

prison administrators, who are often in the best position to operate the prison in a fashion

that is best for the security of prisoners and outsiders alike.”240

B. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful

conditions of confinement and deprivation of due process.241 Plaintiff contends that, “[b]y

transferring Youth adjudicated delinquent to the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola,

a maximum-security adult prison, Defendants violate their duty to provide conditions of

reasonable health and safety to the youth it holds in its custody, and demonstrate

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, in violation of

Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution” and that

“Defendants’ actions are also punishment of Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.”242 Plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, claiming that, “[b]y transferring youth adjudicated

delinquent to the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, a maximum-security adult prison

… the required educational and rehabilitative services for Plaintiffs with disabilities cannot

be provided.”243

239 2016 WL 5899972 at *2 (M.D. La. Oct. 7, 2016)(citing Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211-12 (5th

Cir. 1977) (“The Supreme Court has articulated for the federal courts a policy of minimum intrusion into the

affairs of state prison administration; state prison officials enjoy wide discretion in the operation of state

penal institutions.”)).

240 Id. (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006)(discussing the importance of preserving penal

institution's administrative authority)).

241 Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 13.

242 Id.

243 Id.

1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”)

Plaintiff claims that disabled youth will not receive special education

accommodations or mental health services at BCCY-WF. The evidence does not bear

this out. First, Plaintiff’s RA claim is predicated on a faulty assumption and unproven

assertion that youth will be placed in the LSP adult prison with adult inmates. The

evidence established that no youth will be placed in LSP with adult inmates.

Second, to the extent Plaintiff attempted to show that disabled youths’ special

education and mental health needs will not be accommodated at BCCY-WF, Plaintiff

failed to carry his burden of showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

Plaintiff’s argument that special education services and mental health services will be

unavailable or deficient at BCCY-WF went unproven.244 Plaintiff failed to refute the

evidence establishing that special education services, as well as mental health services,

will be provided to youth transferred to BCCY-WF to the same or greater extent and in

the same manner these services are provided to all youth in OJJ custody. The evidence

established that there will be increased opportunities for counseling at BCCY-WF, and

Trust Based Intervention will be an additional therapeutic tool provided at BCCY-WF to

address the youth’s particularized needs.245 The evidence established that mental health

services will be more robust at BCCY-WF, and there was utterly no showing that special

education requirements will be adversely impacted.

244 For example, Plaintiff contends: “If he is denied those services, it will be discrimination on the basis of

his disability.” Rec. Doc. No. 73, p. 16 (emphasis added).

245 9/8/22 Testimony of Bridgewater at 2:27, 2:33-2:34.

Third, Plaintiff attempts to amend his Complaint via his post-hearing memorandum

to add a claim for disability discrimination, claiming that “Defendants’ failure to address

and accommodate Plaintiff’s non-classroom needs, namely his anxiety and fear related

to the threatened transfer to Angola, is disability-based discrimination.”246 Plaintiff also

argues, in conclusory fashion, “Defendants’ failure to provide any information about their

plans to Plaintiff and other youth at risk of being transferred to LSP, despite knowing that

the young people are aware of the impending transfer, constitutes discrimination as well

because it exacerbates his mental health disabilities.”247 These allegations do not appear

in Plaintiff’s Complaint or in his motion for injunctive relief. The Complaint alleges a failure

to accommodate claim under the RA, not disability discrimination.

Even if such a claim could be somehow gleaned from Plaintiff's Complaint, there

was not a shred of evidence that Defendants intentionally failed to provide youth with

mental disabilities at BCCY with the details of the plan because of their disabilities.249

A disability discrimination claim is not properly before the Court,250 and there has been

utterly no showing of likelihood of success on the merits of such a claim.

2. Section 1983 Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ plan to transfer youth to BCCY-WF violates his

Fourteenth Amendment rights because it subjects him to unlawful conditions of

confinement, violates his due process rights, and unlawfully constitutes punishment.

246 Rec. Doc. No. 73, p. 15.

247 Id.

249 See Tellis v. LeBlanc, No. CV 18-541, 2021 WL 4267513, at *8 (W.D. La. Sept. 20, 2021)(emphasis

added).

250 See Humana Insurance Company v Tenet Health System, No. 3:16-cv-2919-B, 2016 WL 6893629 (N.D.

Tex, Nov. 21, 2016).

Preliminarily, the Court notes the Supreme Court’s holding in Reno v. Flores, that

“‘the best interests of the child’ is not the legal standard that governs parents' or guardians'

exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met,

the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed

even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves.”251

In support of his claims, Plaintiff elicited testimony of “best practices” or prevailing

industry standards; however, the Constitution does not require “best practices.” Courts

addressing the constitutional claims of juveniles in secure care stress this point.

In Alexander S. by and through Bowers v. Boyd,253 the court noted that its role in

the case was to ensure that minimally acceptable standards for treatment and

rehabilitation were met by the juvenile justice agency.254

[I]t is not necessary that the state provide the best possible services and

training available to the Plaintiffs. The test in this case is whether the state

is providing minimally adequate or reasonable services and training

necessary to ensure the protected interests of the Plaintiffs. It is not

appropriate that the state be held to a standard which imposes an

affirmative duty to succeed in the purpose of correcting the juveniles'

behavior. Although such a standard may be desirable, it is not

constitutionally mandated. All that is required is that the juveniles be housed

under conditions that provide them with a reasonable opportunity to correct

their behavior. Obviously, this standard incorporates the security, program,

and service functions that are basic to juvenile corrections.255

Similarly, in Hughes v. Judd,256 the court stressed that the juvenile-plaintiffs’

attempt to import “best practices” into the constitutional standard was improper:

The Sheriff argues, again convincingly, that the plaintiffs strive to avert the

Constitution by substituting for the governing constitutional standard an

impromptu, improvised standard equivalent to “best practices” as

251 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)(citation omitted).

253 876 F.Supp. 773 (D. S.C. 1995).

254 Id. at 798.

255 Id.

256 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla 2015).

understood at and for the moment by persons who are, in effect,

professional advocates and critics, that is, persons other than the

corrections and detention professionals whose professional judgment

receives under the governing constitutional law a strong presumption of

correctness and whose supervision is subject to judicial intervention under

the Fourteenth Amendment only in the extraordinary circumstance. Suffice

to say that, if the Fourteenth Amendment requires intervention into the

management of the juvenile detention facility that the Sheriff operates at

CCJ, the Fourteenth Amendment requires a wholesale intervention into

detention and incarceration at most of the facilities in the United States, an

intervention possible only by an unprecedented and precipitous lowering of

the constitutional threshold.257

a. Conditions of Confinement Liability Standard

Plaintiff maintains that the constitutional standard to be applied in this matter is an

objective deliberate indifference standard as discussed in Kingsley v. Hendrickson.268 In

Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees need only show the objective

prong of the “deliberate indifference” test in the context of an excessive force claim.

Defendants respond that Plaintiff incorrectly relies on Kingsley, which doesn’t

apply to this case. Defendants contend:

The Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected the Kingsley objectively

unreasonable standard for cases not involving excessive force against pre-

trial detainees. See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415,

419–20 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting one dissenting judge’s invitation to extend

Kingsley). This Court has repeatedly recognized this holding. See Guillory

v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hosps., No. CV 16-787-JWD-RLB, 2018 WL

1404277, at *8 (M.D. La. Mar. 20, 2018) (“deliberate indifference standard

remains a subjective one as set out in Hare despite the intervening case of

Kingsley”).269

The Plaintiff’s argument was considered and rejected by another Section of this

Court in J.H.v. Edwards:

263. Defendants argue that the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

standard applies, even for actions against juveniles. There is support in the

257 Id. at 1174-1175.

268 576 U.S. 389 (2015).

269 Rec. Doc. No. 49, p. 22.

Fifth Circuit for this position; indeed, the Fifth Circuit expressly said in

Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977),“The [E]ighth [A]mendment

applies to juvenile detention centers as well as to adult prisons.” Id. at 998

n.1. One reported district court decision within this circuit also followed

Morales. Vega v. Parsley, 700 F. Supp. 879, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (“The

Fifth Circuit has held that the Eighth Amendment applies to juvenile

detention centers.” (citing Morales, supra)).

264. Further, while Plaintiffs urge that the “objectively unreasonable” or

“rational relationship” test discussed by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.

389, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 192 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2015), applies, Defendants are

correct that the Fifth Circuit has limited Kingsley'[s] “objectively

unreasonable” standard to cases involving excessive force against

pretrial detainees.” (citations omitted) 270

Thus, the Court concludes that, in this Circuit, the deliberate indifference standard

applies to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim which requires proof of both the

objective component and the subjective component.

In Valentine v. Collier, the Fifth Circuit articulated the proper Eighth Amendment

standard to apply in a conditions of confinement case:

In a constitutional claim alleging deliberate indifference to the conditions of

a prisoner's confinement, the plaintiff must satisfy both the “subjective and

objective requirements” of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). To

satisfy the objective requirement, the plaintiff must show an “objectively

intolerable risk of harm.” Ibid. To satisfy the subjective requirement, the

plaintiff must show that the defendant: “(1) was ‘aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’;

(2) subjectively ‘dr[e]w the inference’ that the risk existed; and (3)

disregarded the risk.” Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970) … The plaintiff must

show a denial of “basic human needs.” Ibid. “Deliberate indifference is an

extremely high standard to meet.” Cadena v. El Paso Cty., 946 F.3d 717,

728 (5th Cir. 2020).271

270 J.H., 2020 WL 3448087 at *31 (emphasis added).

271 956 F.3d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 2020).

Both Valentine and Farmer hold that deliberate indifference requires “a subjective

‘state of mind more blameworthy than negligence,’ akin to criminal recklessness.”272 Also,

although a court may disagree with a defendant’s actions, “mere disagreement” “does not

establish deliberate indifference.”273

i. Objective Component

Plaintiff alleged the following serious risks of harm in placing youth at BCCY- WF:

(1) risk of contact between adult inmates at LSP and youth at BCCY-WF, including

potential violations of the sight/sound prohibition found in the Juvenile Justice

Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA“) and the potential assault and sexual assault of

youth by adult inmates; (2) risk of loss of or reduction to programs and services at BCCY-

WF, including education, medical, rehabilitative, mental health, and recreational services

due to understaffing; (3) risk that youth will be housed in unfinished and unfit facilities at

BCCY-WF; (4) risk that DOC staff at LSP will run BCCY-WF; and (5) risk of excessive

solitary confinement.274 Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an objective risk of serious

harm for the asserted claims.

The public policy underpinning the JJDPA is the principle that juvenile rehabilitation

is undermined by placing juveniles in adult jails or prisons. Best practices counsel against

housing juveniles in an adult penal institution. The JJDPA “mandates that incarcerated

youths may not be placed in situations in which they have any clear visual or verbal

contact that is ‘not brief and inadvertent’ with adult incarcerated persons.”275 The JJDPA

272 Id. at 802 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 839–40.

273 Id. at 803.

274 Rec. Doc. Nos. 1 & 9.

275 34 U.S.C.A. § 11133(11)(B), (12), (13) (West) (stating that juveniles “shall not have sight or sound

contact with adult [prisoners]”).

contemplates the existence of “collocated facilities” and requires that individuals who work

with both juveniles and adult inmates be trained and certified to work with juveniles.277

There is no record evidence that the Defendants’ transfer plan violates the JJDPA. The

evidence established that there will be no sight or sound (or any other) contact between

adult inmates at LSP and youth housed at BCCY-WF.278

There is no evidence that a serious risk of the loss of standard services and

programs provided to youth will result from the transfer plan. The testimony of OJJ

employees was consistent and unrefuted that no youth in OJJ custody will be transferred

to BCCY-WF before the facility is structurally ready, adequately staffed with multi-

discipline professionals, and all special education, mental health, and other services are

in place.279 Deville testified that OJJ is required by law to comply with Louisiana Bulletin

for Special Education 1508, which is a guideline for interpreting what disability or disorder

a student might have that needs accommodation.280 Federal law requires this

determination be made within sixty days.281 Thus, by law, OJJ cannot withhold or delay

special education services in any facility.

277 34 U.S.C. § 11133(12)(B).

278 See generally testimony of Nelson and Patin. Schiraldi, Plaintiff’s expert, admitted that the JJDPA does

not prohibit any “rare” or “inadvertent” sight and sound contact that could possibly occur between LSP

inmates and BCCY-WF youth offenders.

279 See generally testimony of Nelson, Sommers, Dandridge, Deville, Bridgewater, and Patin. Plaintiff

quibbles with this argument, noting that Bridgewater admitted that the only LAMOD phases that will be

offered to youth at BCCY-WF will be morning check-in and morning check-out. However, Bridgewater

explained the reason for this distinction, stating that group counseling can only happen when it is “feasible

and safe to do so.” 9/8/22 Testimony of Bridgewater at 2:25. Bridgewater further explained that the youth

subject to transfer are not amenable to working in a group process. The youth at BCCY-WF will receive

individual counseling and will also be introduced to Trust Based Intervention, a tool not currently used at

other OJJ facilities. Id. at 2:27. Bridgewater testified at length that there will actually be more opportunities

for counseling at BCCY-WF and that any change in modality is based on the specific nature and

characteristics of each child and a determination of how the child can best succeed. This does not reflect

a decline or removal of a mental health or therapeutic program; rather, it is evidence of a plan to offer

particularized treatment to youth in the TTU in a manner that is best for each individual child.

280 9/8/22 Testimony of Deville at 1:09-1:10, 1:18.

281 Id. at 1:21.

While the photos of the proposed BCCY-WF are disturbing, the testimony was

unrefuted that much was left to be done to ready the site.282 There is no evidence of a

serious risk that youth will be transferred to BCCY-WF before it is ready. Despite the

condition of the facility on the date the photographs were taken, Defendants presented

evidence of a clear and detailed plan to complete the facility in a manner sufficient to

provide all security, programming, and behavioral intervention needs before the transfer

of any youth.

Plaintiff’s claim that the DOC would operate BCCY-WF is not supported by any

record evidence. To the contrary, the record evidence established that the OJJ, not the

DOC, will be entirely responsible for the operation of BCCY-WF. According to the MOU,

the role of DOC officers at BCCY-WF will be extremely limited, and DOC security officers

will provide staffing support at BCCY-WF only upon express request and authorization by

OJJ. Should DOC staff be utilized at BCCY-WF in any capacity, OJJ will provide training

to DOC staff on policies and procedures applicable to serving youth populations. There

is no serious risk that untrained DOC staff will run BCCY-WF.283

There is also insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that there is a serious

risk of excessive or abusive solitary confinement. Although youth will be confined to their

cells while sleeping at night, there was no evidence that OJJ has any intent to unlawfully

subject youth to solitary confinement at BCCY-WF. Nelson testified that, legally, no child

can be confined in their room for more than eight hours. Only after an assessment could

youth be confined to their room for a longer period; during such time, the youth must be

checked on an hourly basis, and once the youth has calmed, they must be released back

282 See PX 20.

283 See PX 32; DX 1.

into the general population. Sleeping in a room, albeit a cell, at night is not solitary

confinement.284

The Court does find, however, that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of a

serious risk of psychological harm to juveniles by placing them in facilities that were

designed to house adult prisoners. To be clear, the Court is not finding that the facility in

general poses this risk, and the Court has already found that Defendants proved they

were undertaking aggressive measures to clean, paint, repair, and modify the facility. But

the photographs of prison cells, barred sliding doors, open toilets in the cells, guard towers

and razor wire surrounding the entire facility do, indeed, “scream prison” as Schiraldi

testified.285 Dr. Stevens testified at length about the harmful psychological impact

juveniles could suffer by being housed in a prison facility meant for adults, particularly

because, at under 25 years old, they are cognitively underdeveloped, and they are likely

already suffering from a history of trauma.286 Schiraldi testified that using adult prison

cells as rooms for youth has the effect of solitary confinement because the isolation

causes the psychological harm.287 Dr. Stevens opined that placing any child in a

maximum security facility designed for adults is unreasonably psychologically harmful to

children.288

The fact that there are developmental differences between adult and juvenile

offenders has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Roper v.

Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals under 18 years old at

284 9/7/22 Testimony of Nelson at 2:20-2:23.

285 9/7/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 4:25.

286 See generally, 9/6/22 Testimony of Stevens.

287 9/7/22 Testimony of Schiraldi at 5:00.

288 96/22 Testimony of Stevens at 1:28-1:29.

the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.289

In making this determination, the Court noted that ‘“[y]outh is more than a chronological

fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence

and to psychological damage.’”290 More recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the

Supreme Court noted the line of Supreme Court precedent holding certain punishments

disproportionate when applied to juveniles.291

The Plaintiff presented objective evidence of a serious risk of psychological harm;

thus, the Court next considers the subjective component of the deliberate indifference

standard.

ii. Subjective Component

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to present evidence to demonstrate a likelihood

of success that he could satisfy the subjective component of the deliberate indifference

standard. While it is obvious that OJJ officials are aware of the ages of the youth eligible

for transfer and arguably aware of the mental health status of these youth, there is no

evidence that OJJ officials subjectively drew the inference that housing youth on the

grounds of Angola in the designated facility poses a serious risk of psychological harm.

First, as set forth above, the Court found the OJJ witnesses who testified in this

matter to be credible and deeply committed to the rehabilitation of youth in their custody.

Many of these OJJ employees have invested decades of their professional lives to

juvenile justice. Not a single OJJ witness struck the Court as cavalier or dismissive about

289 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

290 Id. at 569 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).

291 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016).

the needs of the youth to be rehabilitated, and none testified in a manner which was

suggestive of a vengeful or retaliatory intent in creating this transfer plan.

Plaintiff characterizes Nelson as being subjectively indifferent to the needs of high-

risk youth because he testified that there are some youth, a small percentage, that will

not be rehabilitated, either because they refuse to participate in the therapeutic programs

offered by OJJ or because of other characteristics of the youth. But Nelson unequivocally

testified that OJJ’s goal is always rehabilitation and never punishment, and OJJ never

stops trying to find ways to rehabilitate even the most resistant youth.

A wealth of unrefuted evidence established that the high-risk youth have

completely destroyed all secure care facilities in the state. Sommers testified that OJJ

has been renovating these facilities and that the permanent home for the TTU will be in

Swanson-Monroe in April of 2023. Sommers also explained that OJJ was considering

approximately five facilities to place youth while these renovations continued. But, after

the July 17, 2022 escape from BCCY-WF, Sommers knew these other potential facilities

did not provide the level of security necessary to address the increasingly violent and

destructive youth. It was only then that Defendants began to consider the Reception

Center on the grounds of Angola as a facility that, with minimal modifications, could

provide a level of security necessary to address this problem. The evidence shows that,

since that time, OJJ has invested considerable time and money to make the Reception

Center as appropriate as possible to house the youth and to maintain all services and

programs available to all youth in OJJ custody. There is no evidence to support the

proposition that OJJ made a “knee-jerk” reaction decision to “send youth to Angola.”

Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a likelihood of

success on the merits of his conditions of confinement claim.

b. Standard Applied to Punishment of Juveniles

Plaintiff also claims that the facility itself is inherently punitive rather than

rehabilitative in violation of state and federal law. It is the public policy of the state of

Louisiana that commitment of a juvenile to the care of OJJ “is not punitive nor is it in any

way to be construed as a penal sentence, but as a step in the total treatment process

toward rehabilitation of the juvenile[.]”292 According to the Louisiana Supreme Court,

“[T]he unique nature of the juvenile system is manifested in its noncriminal, or civil, nature,

its focus on rehabilitation and individual treatment rather than retribution, and the state's

role as parens patriae in managing the welfare of the juvenile in state custody.”293

In Bell v. Wolfish, the United States Supreme Court established that, under the

due process clause, “a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.”294

The Court also held that a pretrial detainee can demonstrate that he was subjected to

unconstitutional punishment in either of two ways: (1) by showing “an expressed intent to

punish on the part of the detention facility officials,” or (2) by showing that a restriction or

condition is not rationally related to a legitimate government objective or is excessive in

relation to that purpose.295 The Supreme Court in Schall v. Martin applied the Bell

principles for pretrial detainees to juveniles because, like pretrial detainees, juveniles

have not been found guilty of a crime.296

292 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:906(B).

293 In re C.B., 708 So.2d 391, 396-7 (La. 3/11/98).

294 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

295 Id. at 538–39, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see also Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398.

296 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984). Courts across the country apply the Bell test to constitutional claims brought

by juveniles in detention facilities.

The “expressed intent to punish” prong prohibits an intent to punish a pretrial

detainee for the alleged crime for which he is detained.297 It also prohibits officials from

subjectively seeking to punish detainees simply because they are detainees,298 or to

serve vengeful or other illegitimate interests.299 However, this prong does not

“categorically prohibit discipline imposed by jail officials for infractions committed while in

pretrial detention.”300

The Court finds there is no evidence that OJJ officials “expressed intent to punish”

the youth subject to transfer. The Court next considers whether placing high-risk youth at

BCCY-WF is “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and

whether [it] appear[s] excessive in relation to that purpose.”301 As the Bell Court made

clear, “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are

essential goals” of a detention facility.302

There is overwhelming evidence in this matter that the transfer plan is rationally

related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose. OJJ has an obligation to

attempt to rehabilitate all youth placed in its custody. But, as Sommers testified, “you

cannot do therapy if a faction of youth are disrupting everything.”303 The violent and

destructive conduct and the escapes require OJJ to create barriers to the youths’ ability

297 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.

298 See id. at 539.

299 See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 375 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds, 912 F.3d 79 (3d Cir.

2018)(holding the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a substantive due process violation under the “expressed

intent to punish” prong where placement of the plaintiff in solitary confinement was allegedly a vindictive

response to a challenge brought by the plaintiff's lawyer).

300 J.H. v. Williamson County, Tennessee, 951 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 2020)(citing e.g., Rapier v. Harris,

172 F.3d 999, 1002–03 (7th Cir. 1999); Kanu v. Lindsey, 739 F. App'x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018); Stamper v.

Campbell Cnty., 415 F. App'x 678, 678–81 (6th Cir. 2011)).

301 Bell, 441 U.S. at 561; see also Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995).

302 Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.

303 Sommers at 10:31. Sommers also notes that Missouri has nineteen facilities to Louisiana’s four. Id.

to continue this behavior, and BCCY-WF provides those structural barriers and a higher

level of security in general. For example, BCCY-WF has reinforced concrete walls and

high ceilings, making it impossible for the youth to damage the facility, and multiple secure

fences that will help prevent escapes. OJJ has an obligation to protect all other youth in

its custody (and its staff) from the violent attacks that have taken place; transferring youth

to BCCY-WF allows OJJ to segregate violent youth away from the youth who complain

that they cannot sleep at night for fear of being attacked.304 The transfer plan also serves

the interests of the high-risk youth because it increases rather than decreases the

rehabilitative and counseling services available to them. All of these actions qualify as

“maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline” which “are

essential goals” of a detention facility.

The next question is whether the discipline utilized is excessive. In making this

determination, courts are to keep in mind that jail administrators are afforded “wide-

ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their

judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security.”305 Nevertheless, this deference is not unlimited; a detention facility is not

permitted to impose conditions that are excessively “harsh ... to achieve objectives that

could be accomplished [with] ... alternative and less harsh methods.”306

Plaintiff argues that housing youth in a facility designed for adult inmates on the

grounds of Angola is “appallingly inappropriate.”307 Initially, the Court agreed. However,

304 Nelson Testimony

305 Id. at 547.

306 Id. at 539, n.20.

307 Rec. Doc. No. 9, p. 25. The Court notes that many of the same alleged risks of harm that formed the

basis of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim are also raised here as purported punishment and/or

excessively harsh conditions. Because these claims have already been dispelled, the Court will not repeat

them here.

the hearing testimony demonstrated that several other options were being considered

before July 17, 2022, and only after that date did the Reception Center enter these

considerations. The Reception Center was ultimately chosen because it was the only

building under consideration with the structural construction to address the security and

safety issues facing OJJ. Thus, choosing the Reception Center after the events of July

17, 2022 was not excessively harsh in response to the legitimate purpose of preserving

internal order and discipline and maintaining institutional security; indeed, the evidence

established that it was the only option that could quickly accomplish these goals. Thus,

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to his

unconstitutional punishment/due process claim.

c. Supporting Jurisprudence

The Court finds the following cases analogous and instructive to the issues raised

by Plaintiff.

In Alexander S., the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

addressed Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by juveniles incarcerated at a

correctional institution who challenged their conditions of confinement.308 Plaintiff sued

the Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) challenging a host of conditions similar to

those alleged in the instant case: food, shelter, sanitation, living space, health care,

recreation, programs, classification, discipline, and personal safety.309 Regarding the

need for discipline in the juvenile detention facilities, the court found:

An effective discipline system is necessary in a juvenile correctional

institution to aid staff in controlling violence and other inappropriate

behavior, to maintain safety and security, and to serve as a training tool for

the overall purpose of correcting the juveniles' behavior. The Plaintiffs

308 876 F.Supp. 773 (D. S.C. 1995).

309 Id. at 783.

mount a variety of attacks against the system of discipline in place at DJJ

facilities, which depends primarily upon the use of lock-up units and CS gas

to punish juveniles for disciplinary infractions. The Plaintiffs challenge the

procedures by which juveniles are placed in lock-up units and the Spartan

conditions of the lock-up cells themselves. They also seek to have the court

impose a one-hour limitation on the duration of their stay in lock-up facilities.

They seek an order of this court imposing “less intrusive and more effective

methods of maintaining security and control.” The Plaintiffs also seek to

have the court prohibit the use of CS gas altogether.310

Except for the DJJ’s use of CS gas, the court determined that the disciplinary

procedures at DJJ facilities were not unconstitutional.311 Regarding the use of CS gas,

the court took issue not with the fact that it was an option to use, but the fact that it was

being “used on a fairly regular basis … for purposes other than the protection of staff or

others.”312 The court concluded that “the indiscriminate use of CS gas violates the

juveniles' constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause.”313 The court further found

that “gas should be used only when a genuine risk of serious bodily harm to another exists

and other less intrusive methods of restraint are not reasonably available.”314

The plaintiffs also raised the issue of fire safety in the individual cells of the two

lock-up units with padlocks on all the cell doors.315 The court described these two

“disciplinary units” at DJJ as having thirty individual cells all secured with padlocks.316

Because each padlock had to be unlocked by hand, the court concluded that this process

created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiffs in the event of a fire.317 Notably,

the court mentioned no constitutional violations merely because more aggressive

310 Id. at 785.

311 Id.

312 Id. at 786.

313 Id.

314 Id. The OJJ Continuum of Force policy does not allow “indiscriminate use” of chemical spray.

315 Id.

316 Id.

317 Id.

juveniles were in disciplinary units containing individual lock-up cells.

The plaintiffs also raised the need for a classification system to protect passive

juveniles from more aggressive juveniles.318

Classification, for the purposes of this case, is the process of separating

aggressive juveniles from passive ones and determining appropriate levels

of restraint for each juvenile based upon the threat the juvenile presents to

other juveniles and to the public. The juveniles possess a clearly recognized

liberty interest in being free from unreasonable threats to their physical

safety. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16, 102 S.Ct. 2452,

2457–58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). On the other hand, the general public is

entitled to reasonable protection from juveniles incarcerated at DJJ.

For these reasons, juveniles in DJJ facilities should be screened and

classified, so that the aggressive juveniles are identified and separated from

more passive juveniles. The level of restraint to be used for each juvenile

should be based upon some rational professional judgment as to legitimate

safety and security needs. Inherent in this right is a system of periodic

review of the initial placement to evaluate whether subsequent events

demonstrate the need for a reclassification of the juvenile's security

requirements.319

The issue of programming was also challenged. The plaintiffs argued that, with

proper rehabilitative programming, juveniles would be released faster. “Because such

programming improves the juveniles' behavior while confined, it reduces the need for

disciplinary lock-up and enhances the safety of the institution for the juveniles and the

staff.”320 The court found that

[U]nder the Constitution, a minimally adequate level of programming is

required in order to provide juveniles with a reasonable opportunity to

accomplish the purpose of their confinement, to protect the safety of the

juveniles and the staff, and to ensure the safety of the community once the

juveniles are ultimately released. Minimally adequate program services

should be designed to teach juveniles the basic principles that are essential

to correcting their conduct. These generally recognized principles include:

(1) taking responsibility for the consequences of their actions; (2) learning

appropriate ways of responding to others (coping skills); (3) learning to

318 Id. at 787.

319 Id. The OJJ has a classification system in place for this purpose.

320 Id. at 790.

manage their anger; and (4) developing a positive sense of

accomplishment.321

In Hughes v. Judd, a case decided by the Middle District of Florida, several

juveniles, as representatives of other juveniles similarly situated, brought a Section 1983

action asserting that Grady Judd, in his capacity as Sheriff of Polk County, Florida, and

Corizon Health, Inc., a health care provider retained by the Sheriff, violated the juveniles'

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment during the juveniles' detention at the Central

County Jail (CCJ) in Bartow, Polk County, Florida.322 The plaintiffs alleged constitutional

claims similar to those asserted in the instant case.

In Hughes, the Sheriff assumed new statutory responsibility for juvenile detainees

and transferred them from the facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice

(DJJ) to the Juvenile Detention Facility, a self-contained, newly refurbished section of

CCJ.323 The court found that “the pre-adjudicated juveniles and the direct-file juveniles

have lived at CCJ but in separate dorms. The juveniles are separated—out of ‘sight and

sound’—from the adult inmates, who are housed in a separate building across a large

field at the adjoining adult campus of CCJ.”324 The plaintiffs alleged constitutional

violations based on being housed on the grounds of an adult prison and being

incarcerated in “an adult model.” The court rejected this claim:

The plaintiffs' claim that CCJ, owing to location and origin, is managed as

an adult facility. However, the evidence establishes that CCJ is “not run as

an adult model” but rather “with a juvenile focus or juvenile-specific focus.”

(XXII 31:12–14) The plaintiffs also attempt to prove, contrary to the

predominant and clearly convincing evidence, that juveniles are left

“unsupervised” and observed only remotely through cameras, that deputies

interact with the juveniles only to physically abuse them, that the deputies

321 Id.

322 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

323 Id. at 1235.

324 Id.

do “nothing” to prevent the “inevitable conflict” between juveniles, that “jail-

house justice” rules apply, and that punishment is the “default.” The

evidence soundly refutes each of the plaintiffs' claims, notwithstanding

several episodes to the contrary. Consistent with the Sheriff's constitutional

mandate to maintain security, safety, and control (XVII 134:20–135:16),

discipline of juveniles occurs only after violation of a facility rule or after

disobedience of a detention deputy's lawful order. Discipline in this

circumstance is not punishment in the constitutional sense, Bell, 441 U.S.

at 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861, but is discipline on the “regulation” side of the

“punitive/regulatory” dichotomy in Salerno and later cases.325

The court also reinforced the principle that juvenile detention administrators do not

violate the Constitution by utilizing a discipline program to maintain order, safety, and

security in a detention facility:

Nonetheless, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95

L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), finds that the regime of pre-trial detention codified in

the Bail Reform Act of 1984 “is regulatory in nature and does not constitute

punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.” 481 U.S. at

748, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Salerno holds that “the punitive/regulatory distinction

turns on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may

rationally be connected is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive

in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’” 481 U.S. at 747, 107 S.Ct.

2095. Quite obviously, this reasoning directly applies to Florida's system of

detention. The management of a detention facility and the preservation

of safety and security at the facility present a compelling “alternative

purpose” for regulatory measures, including temporary suspension of

a privilege or the imposition of administrative confinement, however

denominated, without implicating the Due Process Clause and without

requiring an adversary hearing before every enforcement of the

rules.326

C. Irreparable Harm

Having found that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on his

RA and Section 1983 claims, the Motion for injunctive relief fails. Nonetheless, the Court

will analyze the proof on the irreparable harm element. “‘Irreparable harm requires a

325 Id. at 1236.

326 Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).

showing that: (1) the harm to Plaintiff[] is imminent (2) the injury would be irreparable and

(3) that Plaintiff[] ha[s] no other adequate legal remedy.”’327 A plaintiff seeking injunctive

relief:

must show that “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172

L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). “[A] preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to

prevent the possibility of some remote future injury.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Wright & Miller, supra, § 2948.1); Morrell v. City of

Shreveport, 536 Fed.Appx. 433, 435 (5th Cir.2013). There must be more

than “an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant.” Holland Am. Ins. Co.

v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir.1985). Accordingly, the

party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that the threatened harm

is “more than mere speculation.” Janvey, 647 F.3d at 601; see also

Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674, 51 S.Ct. 286, 75 L.Ed.

602 (1931) (“[An injunction] will not be granted against something merely

feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future.”); Wis. Gas

Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“[T]he injury must be both

certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.”). Therefore, “[a]

presently existing actual threat must be shown.” Morrell, 536 Fed.Appx. at

435 (alteration in original)(quoting United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,

262 (5th Cir.2001)).328

For the same reasons the Court found that there was a serious risk of

psychological harm to Plaintiff (and similarly situated youth) due to his age and that he

suffers from PTSD and other mental health issues, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

presented evidence to support the likelihood that psychological harm is imminent upon

his transfer to BCCY-WF.

To be clear, the Court does not find that Alex A.’s nightmares, fears, or anxiety

caused by his mistaken belief that he would be transferred to LSP to be confined with

adult inmates constitute irreparable psychological harm. Alex A. testified that his only

327 J.H. by and through N.H. v. Edwards, 2020 WL 3448087 at *44 (quoting Gonannies, Inc. v. Goupair.Com,

Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Chacon v. Granata, 515 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir.

1975))).

328 Monumental Task Committee, Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F.Supp.3d 573, 583 (E.D. La. 2016).

concern about BCCY-WF was the risk of being assaulted by adult inmates. Plaintiff further

testified that, if convinced he will not be assaulted by adult inmates, then he will no longer

be afraid of a transfer to BCCY-WF.329

However, Dr. Stevens’ expert opinions did not apply only specifically to Alex A. but

to any juveniles in state custody based on the lack of brain development in adolescents

and the likelihood that most incarcerated juveniles are suffering from trauma and/or other

mental health issues. Relying on her expertise in juvenile trauma, Dr. Stevens testified

that housing juveniles in a facility designed for adult inmates would place these juveniles

in a defense posture and force them to regulate survival stressors rather than normal,

appropriate stressors for adolescents, like stress related to their studies. The Court is

persuaded that transferring emotionally vulnerable adolescents, many of whom have

mental health issues and cognitive disfunction, to a prison camp on the grounds of Angola

will likely have deleterious psychological ramifications. This solution is distressing and not

without consequence. That our society has such a choice to make is emblematic of grave

underlying systemic social issues.

The Court’s finding of likely irreparable psychological harm, however, does not

alone carry Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction burden.

D. Balance of Harms

While Plaintiff focuses entirely on the alleged risk of harm to himself and the

purported class, Plaintiff fails to advance any meaningful argument addressed to the

serious potential risk of harm that an injunction would cause to Defendants.

In this case, as in Valentine, the State of Louisiana has “assigned the prerogatives”

329 See generally 9/6/22 Testimony of Alex A.

of juvenile detention policy to Defendants, and granting Plaintiff’s injunction would

“prevent the State from effectuating the Legislature’s choice and hence imposes

irreparable injury.”330 As the Valentine court explained, the Supreme Court “has

repeatedly warned that it is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger

interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and

procedures, than the administration of its prisons.”331 The Supreme Court has counseled

that the operation of juvenile detention centers is no different.

The harm to Defendants if the Court grants the injunction is “particularly acute”

because an injunction would interfere with OJJ’s “system-wide approach” to respond to

the changing needs of the youth in its care.332 Issuing an injunction would undermine

Defendants’ “ability to continue to adjust its policies” by “lock[ing] in place a set of

policies.”333 If Defendants are not free to act “without a permission slip from the district

court, … [t]hat constitutes irreparable harm.”334

The youth eligible for transfer to BCCY-WF present a demonstrated risk to other

youth in OJJ care, OJJ staff, and when they escape, a risk to the public.

The evidence demonstrated that the TTU program will provide intensified, targeted

rehabilitative services and therapies to assist the youth who are not responding to OJJ’s

standard programming. An injunction would defeat the purpose of the OJJ’s TTU

program—"to teach the youth to overcome their maladaptive behaviors, to re-enter

traditional OJJ secure care facilities, and ultimately to return to their homes and

330 Valentine, 956 F.3d at 803.

331 Id. (quotations omitted).

332 Id.

333 Id.

334 Id.

communities as productive members of society.”336 As Defendants succinctly state:

“These youth cannot be effectively rehabilitated unless they can first be securely housed

in a facility such as BCCY-WF (and ultimately, Swanson-Monroe) that allows OJJ staff to

control and monitor the youth’s activity and prevent the youth from engaging in violence,

property destruction, or escape attempts while their therapy is ongoing.”337

An injunction would subordinate rehabilitative therapies to security enforcement.

OJJ’s therapeutic and educational programing would become subordinate to providing

safety and security from high-risk youth. Housing high-risk youth in a cell block that once

was Angola’s death row is far from ideal. However, the Court finds that OJJ has made the

necessary provisions to provide the youth subject to transfer to BCCY-WF with

constitutionally adequate care and rehabilitative services. The Court finds that the

interests of the youth subject to transfer are subordinate to the needs of, and opportunities

for, the overwhelming majority of the youth in OJJ’s care who do not pose a security

threat. As the Supreme Court held: “So long as certain minimum requirements of child

care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other

children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves.”338 The

needs of this small group of high-risk youth are subordinate to the health, safety, and

welfare of the other youth in the program, OJJ staff, and the public.

The Court finds that the balance of harms weighs against granting the injunction.

E. Public Interest

Plaintiff argues it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of

336 Rec. Doc. No. 74, pp. 15-16.

337 Id. at 16.

338 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)(citation omitted).

constitutional rights; however, the Court finds no evidence that Plaintiff’s (or the proposed

class’s) constitutional rights would be violated by the transfer Plan.

Louisiana has vested OJJ with discretionary authority concerning secure care for

the juveniles in its custody. The Constitution affords juveniles in secure care no

constitutionally protected interests that outweigh the Defendants’ or the public’s interests

in the administration of juvenile justice.339

The public has an interest in seeing adolescents adjudicated delinquent

rehabilitated. So too, the public has an interest in maintaining public safety. There can

be no meaningful rehabilitation of youth if OJJ’s principal objective is reduced to

maintaining order. As aptly observed by the court in Hughes, “[n]o one wants any of these

juveniles to be where they are [but] [t]hat some are defiant, aggressive, and enduringly

turbulent . . . renders their safe and peaceful management complex.”340 The Court must

consider and balance the “many other acute and competing needs of society.”341 These

youth deserve more than the circumstances they have endured that have brought them

to this point. In terms of their secure care, they “deserve and should have more—perhaps,

quite a bit more—than the constitutionally permissible minimum.”342 Nonetheless, the

Court finds that the constitutional minimum is satisfied under the circumstances of this

case.

339 Patterson v. Daniels, No. 12-1674, 2010 WL 2100546, at *21 (E.D. La. March 22, 2013) (referencing

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1983) and Merit v. Lynn, 848 F. Supp. 1266, 1267–68 (W.D.

La. 1994)).

340 Hughes, 108 F.Supp.3d at 1176-1177.

341 Id.

342 Id.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction343 is

DENIED. This matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Scheduling Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 23rd day of September, 2022.

S

________________________________

SHELLY D. DICK

CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

343 Rec. Doc. No. 3. This motion was previously terminated when the Court denied the emergency request

for a TRO; this Ruling denies the request for preliminary injunctive relief.