The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
DEFEND LOUISIANA PAC, ET AL. NO. 21-00346-BAJ-SDJ
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Federal Election Commission’s Motion For
Default Judgment (Doc. 12) against Defendants Defend Louisiana PAC and
Taylor Townsend, in his official capacity as treasurer of Defend Louisiana PAC.
(Doc. 12). The Motion is unopposed.
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Alleged Facts
This suit arises out of Defendants’ alleged violation of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). (Doc. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiff, the
Federal Election Commission (the “Commission”), filed suit against Defendants
Defend Louisiana PAC (“Defend Louisiana”) and Taylor Townsend, in his official
capacity as treasurer of Defend Louisiana.1 (Id. at p. 1).
1 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a political action committee or “PAC” as “[a]n organization
formed by a special-interest group to raise and contribute money to the campaigns of political
candidates who seem likely to promote its interests; a group formed by a business, union, or
interest group to help raise money for politicians who support the group's public-policy
interests. — Abbr. PAC.” Political-Action Committee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
Plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff is an independent agency of the
U.S. Government with exclusive jurisdiction over the administration, interpretation,
and civil enforcement of FECA. (Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff is authorized to initiate
civil actions in U.S. district courts to obtain judicial enforcement of FECA. (Id. (citing
52 U.S.C. §§ 30107(e), 30109(a)(6)).
Defend Louisiana is an independent expenditure-only political committee
located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.2 (Doc. 1, ¶ 6). Defend Louisiana registered with
the Commission on April 29, 2016. (Id.). Defend Louisiana also maintains a bank
account at Whitney Bank in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. (Id.). During the 2016 election
cycle, Defend Louisiana made independent expenditures totaling over $600,000. (Id.).
Defendants failed to disclose or provided inadequate disclosures for more than
$90,000 in independent expenditures. (Id. at ¶ 1).
i. First Cause of Action: Inadequate Purpose for Independent
Expenditures
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and
11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(B) by failing to provide adequate purpose statements for
eight independent expenditures totaling over $45,500 on Schedule E of
Defend Louisiana’s pre-runoff report. (Id. at p. 12). In support, Plaintiff alleges the
following.
On November 8, 2016, no candidate won 50% of the vote in the
Louisiana U.S. Senate open primary/general election. (Id. at ¶ 21). U.S. Senate
2 Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “expenditure” as “[t]he act or process of spending or using
money, time, energy, etc.; esp., the disbursement of funds” or “[a] sum paid out.” Expenditure,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
candidates Foster Lonnie Campbell and John Neely Kennedy competed in a runoff
election held on December 10, 2016. Ud. at § 22). Defend Louisiana made $551,525.44
in independent expenditures that supported Campbell or opposed Kennedy during
the 2016 Louisiana runoff election. Those independent expenditures triggered the
requirement that Defend Louisiana file both a pre-runoff and post-runoff election
report. Ud. at § 23).
On November 28, 2016, Defend Louisiana filed its pre-runoff report. U/d.). On
Schedule E of the pre-runoff report, Defend Louisiana disclosed sixteen independent
expenditures totaling $209,049.79 that supported U.S. Senate Candidate
Foster Lonnie Campbell, Jr. in the 2016 Louisiana U.S. Senate runoff election. (/d.).
Eight of those independent expenditures, totaling $45,000, had a stated purpose of
“Community Outreach,” as shown in Table One below Cd. at J 24).
Table One: Independent Expenditures with Inadequate Purpose Statements
APAC 10/27/2016 $5,500
LIFE 10/27/2016 Foster Lonnie Campbell
NOEL 10/27/2016 Foster Lonnie Campbell
PAC 10/27/2016 | Community Outreach Foster Lonnie Campbell $5,000
BOLD 10/31/2016 Foster Lonnie Campbell
Tr" [ng lemmtowen| —emetamscona | supe
United 10/31/2016 | Community Outreach Foster Lonnie Campbell $10,000
Foster Lonnie Campbell
Foster Lonnie Campbell
C~—SCTC TT Tota 845,500
“Community Outreach” is a purpose statement often understood to mean “get-
out-the-vote” or “voter registration” that is insufficiently specific to provide public
disclosure regarding how Defend Louisiana used its funds Ud. at J 25 (citing 11
C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)@)(B)).
On January 31, 2017, Defend Louisiana filed an amended pre-runoff report,
but did not change its purpose statements in Schedule E. Ud. at § 26). Townsend
signed Defend Louisiana’s original and amended pre-runoff reports in his capacity as
treasurer. (Id. at 4 27).
ii. Second Cause of Action—Undisclosed Independent
Expenditures
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(1) by failing to
disclose three independent expenditures totaling $45,475.65 on Schedule E of
Defend Louisiana’s post-runoff report. Ud. at p. 12). In support, Plaintiff alleges the
following facts.
On December 12, 2016, Defend Louisiana filed a 48-hour report disclosing
three independent expenditures disseminated on December 10, 2016, totaling
$45,475.65. Ud. at § 28). On January 9, 2017, Defend Louisiana filed a post-runoff
report covering the period of November 21, 2016, through December 30, 2016. The
report included a Schedule E disclosing nine independent expenditures totaling
$297,000. However, the Schedule E did not disclose the three independent
expenditures, as shown in Table Two below, that Defend Louisiana previously
included in the December 12, 2016 48-hour report. (/d. at J 29).
Table Two: 48-Hour Report Activity Not Disclosed on Schedule E
ee ee supported Opnosedi ees eres
a tal | 85,475.05 |
On January 31, 2017, Defend Louisiana filed an amended post-runoff report.
(Id. at ¶ 30). The amended post-runoff report did not contain any changes to Schedule
E. (Id.).
iii. Administrative Proceedings
On May 2, 2017, the Commission’s Reports Analysis Division sent
Defend Louisiana a Request for Additional Information that: (1) notified it that
“Community Outreach” is an inadequate purpose statement; and (2) sought
clarification of the purpose of the eight independent expenditures that were
designated “Community Outreach” in its pre-runoff report. (Id. at ¶ 31).
Defend Louisiana did not respond to the Request for Additional Information.
(Id at ¶ 32).
On May 7, 2017, the Commission's Reports Analysis Division sent a second
Request for Additional Information to Defend Louisiana requesting information
pertaining to the three independent expenditures that were disclosed in the 48-hour
report but not reported on Schedule E of the post-runoff report. (Id. at ¶ 33). Defend
Louisiana did not respond to the second Request for Additional Information.
(Id. at ¶ 34).
The Reports Analysis Division made multiple additional attempts to contact
Defend Louisiana and Townsend via phone and email to resolve the defects with the
pre-runoff report and post-runoff report, but Defendants failed to correct the reports.
(Id. at ¶ 35).
On June 28, 2018, the Commission notified Defendants that they may have
violated FECA. (Id. at ¶ 36). The Commission also notified Defendants that it referred
the matter to the Commission’s Office of General Counsel for a possible enforcement
action under 52 U.S.C. § 30109. (Id. at ¶ 36).
The letter explained to Defendants that the violations included failing to
provide adequate purposes for eight independent expenditures in Defend Louisiana's
pre-runoff report and for failing to disclose three independent expenditures in its
post-runoff report. (Id. at ¶ 37). The letter also gave Defendants the opportunity to
respond, but neither provided a written response. (Id.).
On May 15, 2019, the Commission decided by a vote of 4-0 to find reason to
believe that Defend Louisiana and Townsend violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(l) and
30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) by failing to provide adequate purposes for eight independent
expenditures in Defend Louisiana’s pre-runoff report and by failing to disclose three
independent expenditures in its post-runoff report. (Id. at ¶ 38).
On May 23, 2019, the Commission notified Defendants of its “reason-to-believe
findings” in a letter, which attached the factual and legal analysis supporting the
Commission’s determination. (Id. at ¶ 39 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2)). During the
ensuing investigation, Defendants failed to respond to the Commission's
reason-to-believe letter. (Id. at ¶ 40 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2)).
On July 2, 2020, the Commission decided by a vote of 4-0 to find probable cause
to believe that Defend Louisiana and Townsend violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(l) and
30104(b)(6)(B)(iii). (Id. at ¶ 41 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3)).
On July 23, 2020, the Commission notified Defendants of its “probable cause
findings” in a letter, which also contained a proposed conciliation agreement.
(Id. at ¶ 42). The Commission's mandated conciliation period began on July 23, 2020,
when the Commission notified Defendants of its probable cause finding and certified
its probable cause vote. (Id. at ¶ 43). The Commission was required to conciliate for
at least 30 days—until at least August 23, 2020. (Id.). The Commission attempted to
conciliate for a period of 90 days. (Id. at ¶ 44). Defendants did not respond to the
Commission’s attempts to negotiate a conciliation agreement. (Id.).
On March 8, 2021, the Commission decided by a vote of 6-0 to authorize a civil
action against Defendants for failing to provide adequate purposes for eight
independent expenditures in Defend Louisiana's pre-runoff report and for failing to
disclose three independent expenditures in its post-runoff report. (Id. at ¶ 45). The
Commission alleges that it has satisfied all of the jurisdictional requirements in
FECA that are prerequisites to filing this action. (Id. at ¶ 46).
iv. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
The Commission points to the following relevant statutory and regulatory
provisions. FECA establishes a system to disclose the financing and spending of
money in federal election campaigns. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30146; (See Doc. 1, ¶ 8). It
does so by regulating “contribution[s]” and “expenditure[s].” Id. § 30101(8)(A), (9)(A);
(See Doc. 1, ¶ 8). Under the Act, a “contribution” includes any “gift, subscription, loan,
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose
of influencing any election for Federal office.” Id. at § 30101(8)(A); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 8).
An “expenditure” includes “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office.” Id. at § 30101(9)(A); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 8).
Under FECA, “any committee, club, association, or other group of persons
which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year
or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year,”
id. at § 30101(4)(a) and has “the major purpose of . . . the nomination or election of a
candidate” is a political committee. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976) (per
curiam); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 9).
Groups that fall within the definition of a “political committee” are required to
register with the Commission, appoint a treasurer, and meet other organizational
requirements. 52 U.S.C. § 30103; (See Doc. 1, ¶ 10). The treasurer is required to sign
and file regular reports disclosing the committee’s receipts and disbursements.
52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(l); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 10).
Requiring political committees dedicated to making independent expenditures
to file reports disclosing receipts and disbursements: (1) serves the public “interest in
knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is funding that speech,” and
(2) “deters and helps expose violations of other campaign finance restrictions, such as
those barring contributions from foreign corporations or individuals." SpeechNow.org
v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 11).
Political committees that are not authorized by a federal candidate—so called
“unauthorized committees”—may choose to file their disclosure reports either:
(1) monthly; or (2) quarterly during election years with an additional “pre-election
report” due 12 days before an election and a “post-election report” due 30 days after
the election. 52 U.S.C. § 30104; (See Doc. 1, ¶ 12).
Unauthorized committees must include independent expenditures in these
reports. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 13). Independent expenditures
are those that expressly advocate for “the election or defeat of a clearly identified
federal candidate [] and that [are] not made in concert or cooperation with or at the
request or suggestion” of the candidate or his or her committee or agents, “or a
political party committee or its agents.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 13).
Included in the information political committees must disclose on their
regularly scheduled reports is the full name and address of each “person who receives
any disbursement during the reporting period in an aggregate amount . . . of $200
within the calendar year . . . in connection with an independent expenditure by the
reporting committee,” as well as “the date, amount, and purpose of” the independent
expenditure. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(vii);
11 C.F.R. § 104.4(a); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 14). This itemized list of a committee’s independent
expenditures is required to be included on Schedule E of the form on which
unauthorized committees report. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(vii); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 14).
“[P]urpose means a brief statement or description of why the disbursement was
made.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(A); (See id. at ¶ 15). These descriptions must “provide
sufficient public disclosure of how a committee used its funds.” (See Doc. 1, ¶ 15).
Amendments to Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971; Regulations Transmitted to
Congress, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,080, 15,086 (Mar. 7, 1980); see also Statement of Policy:
“Purpose of Disbursement” Entries for Filings With the Commission, 72 Fed. Reg. 887
(Jan. 9, 2007) (explaining that the “entry, when considered along with the identity of
the disbursement recipient, must be sufficiently specific to make the purpose of the
disbursement clear”); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 15).
Examples of purpose statements that are sufficiently specific include: “dinner
expenses, media, salary, polling, travel, party fees, phone banks, travel expenses,
travel expense reimbursement, and catering costs.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(B); (See
Doc. 1, ¶ 15). “[S]tatements or descriptions such as advance, election day expenses,
other expenses, expenses, expense reimbursement, miscellaneous, outside services,
get-out-the-vote and voter registration,” on the other hand, do not provide sufficient
public disclosure of how a committee used funds. Id.; (See Doc. 1, ¶ 15).
If a political committee makes independent expenditures for an election that
aggregate to $10,000 or more in a calendar year, in addition to reporting those
expenditures on the committee’s regular periodic reports the committee must also
report those expenses on a “48-hour report,” i.e., a separate report due within that
time frame after the communication is publicly disseminated. 11 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(2);
(See Doc. 1, ¶ 16). This 48-hour reporting obligation arises for each additional
aggregate $10,000 in independent expenditures the political committee makes in a
single election. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 15). The information required to be reported about
disbursements for independent expenditures on 48-hour reports is the same
information required on Schedule E of regular periodic reports. Id.; (See Doc. 1, ¶ 15).
Political committees making expenditures related to Louisiana U.S. Senate
elections must adhere to reporting requirements and deadlines for both the Louisiana
open primary/general election and any subsequent runoff election. FEC Advisory Op.
2000-29, https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2000-29/2000-29.pdf; (See Doc. 1, ¶ 18).
When a runoff election is necessary, political committees must file pre-runoff and
post-runoff election reports disclosing campaign financing and spending. Id.; see also
FEC, Primary and General Election Report Notice, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/dates-and-deadlines/2020-reportingdates/prior-notices-
2020/election-report-notice-louisiana/. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 18).
FECA authorizes a U.S. district court to order a defendant who has violated
FECA to pay a civil penalty. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(B). For violations that are not
knowing and willful, “the civil penalty shall not exceed the greater of $20,528 or an
amount equal to any contribution or expenditure involved in the violation.”
11 C.F.R. § 111.24 (a)(l); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 19). In addition to imposing civil penalties,
FECA authorizes U.S. district courts to “grant a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order” against any defendant who has violated the Act. 52
U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(B); (See Doc. 1, ¶ 20).
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed suit on June 14, 2021. (Doc. 1). Despite being personally served
on June 29, 2021, Defendants have not appeared in this case. (Doc. 6; Doc. 7). On
August 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default. (Doc. 8). The Clerk of
Court entered Clerk’s Entries of Default on the same day. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff now
moves for a Default Judgment against Defendants. (Doc. 12).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted a
three-step process to obtain a default judgment. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown,
84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). First, a default occurs when a party “has failed to
plead or otherwise defend” against an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Next, an entry of
default must be entered by the clerk when the default is shown “by affidavit or
otherwise.” See id.; New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141. Third, a party may apply
to the court for a default judgment after an entry of default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b);
New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141.
After a party files for a default judgment, courts must apply a two-part process
to determine whether a default judgment should be entered. First, a court must
consider whether the entry of default judgment is appropriate under the
circumstances. Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). Several
factors are relevant to this inquiry, including the following: (1) whether there are
material issues of fact; (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether
the grounds for default have been clearly established; (4) whether the default was
caused by excusable neglect or good faith mistake; (5) the harshness of the default
judgment; and (6) whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default
on a motion by Defendant. Id. Default judgments are disfavored due to a strong policy
in favor of decisions on the merits and against resolution of cases through default
judgments. Id. Default judgments are “available only when the adversary process has
been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.”
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276
(5th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
Second, the Court must assess the merits of Plaintiff's claims and determine
whether Plaintiff has a claim for relief. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v.
Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Hamdan v.
Tiger Bros. Food Mart, Inc., No. CV 15-00412, 2016 WL 1192679, at *2
(M.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Whether Default Judgment Is Appropriate
The Court must determine whether default judgment is appropriate under the
circumstances by considering the Lindsey factors. Lindsey v. Prive Corp.,
161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, Defendants failed to file an Answer or
Rule 12 Motion in response to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 1). Consequently, there are
no material issues of fact. See id.; Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). The grounds for default have been clearly
established in the record. (Doc. 6–Doc. 9); See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. No evidence
before the Court indicates either substantial prejudice or that Defendants’ failure to
respond or appear was the result of “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” See id.
Further, Defendants’ failure to file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend the
instant lawsuit mitigates the harshness of a default judgment. See id.; see also
Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F. Supp. 3d 807, 814 (M.D. La. 2014). Finally, the
record contains no facts giving rise to good cause to set aside the default judgment if
challenged by Defendants. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. The Court finds that the
Lindsey factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
B. Whether Plaintiff’s Complaint Establishes a Viable Claim for
Relief
The Court must also assess the merits of Plaintiff’s claims to determine
whether Plaintiff’s Complaint establishes a viable claim for relief.
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hamdan v. Tiger Bros. Food Mart, Inc., No. CV 15-00412, 2016 WL 1192679, at *2
(M.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016). The Court will address each of Plaintiff’s two causes of
action in turn.
i. First Cause of Action: Inadequate Purpose for Independent
Expenditures
First, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that Defendants violated
52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(B) by failing to provide
an adequate purpose statement for eight independent expenditures totaling $45,500
on Schedule E of Defend Louisiana’s 2016 pre-runoff report. Section
30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) provides:
(b) Contents of reports
Each report under this section shall disclose—
(B) for any other political committee, the name and address of each--
(iii) person who receives any disbursement during the reporting period
in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the calendar
year (or election cycle, in the case of an authorized committee of a
candidate for Federal office), in connection with an independent
expenditure by the reporting committee, together with the date,
amount, and purpose of any such independent expenditure and a
statement which indicates whether such independent expenditure is in
support of, or in opposition to, a candidate, as well as the name and office
sought by such candidate, and a certification, under penalty of perjury,
whether such independent expenditure is made in cooperation,
consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, any
candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such committee[.]
11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(B) provides:
(b) Reporting of disbursements. Each report filed under § 104.1 shall
disclose the total amount of all disbursements for the reporting period
and for the calendar year (or for the election cycle, in the case of an
authorized committees) and shall disclose the information set forth at
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(4) of this section. The first report filed by
a political committee shall also include all amounts disbursed prior to
becoming a political committee under § 100.5 of this chapter, even if
such amounts were not disbursed during the current reporting period.
(3) Itemization of disbursements by political committees other than
authorized committees. Each political committee, other than an
authorized committee, shall report the full name and address of each
person in each of the following categories, as well as the information
required by each category;
(i) Each person to whom an expenditure in an aggregate amount or value
in excess of $200 within the calendar year is made by the reporting
committee to meet the committee's operating expenses, together with
the date, amount, and purpose of such operating expenditure;
(B) Examples of statements or descriptions which meet the
requirements of 11 CFR 104.3(b)(3) include the following: dinner
expenses, media, salary, polling, travel, party fees, phone banks, travel
expenses, travel expense reimbursement, and catering costs. However,
statements or descriptions such as advance, election day
expenses, other expenses, expenses, expense reimbursement,
miscellaneous, outside services, get-out-the-vote and voter
registration would not meet the requirements of
11 CFR 104.3(b)(3) for reporting the purpose of an expenditure.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defend Louisiana provided purpose statements of
“Community Outreach” for eight expenditures, totaling $45,000. (Doc. 1, ¶ 24).
Plaintiff further asserts that the purpose of “Community Outreach” is similar to “get-
out-the-vote” or “voter registration” and is insufficiently specific to provide public
disclosure of how the committee used its funds (Id. at ¶ 25 (citing 11 C.F.R. §
104.3(b)(3)(i)(B)). Defendants have failed to challenge the facts alleged or arguments
presented in any manner.
In the absence of any indication to the contrary from Defendants, the Court
finds that Defendants violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and
11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(B) by failing to provide an adequate purpose statement for
eight independent expenditures totaling $45,500 on Schedule E of Defend Louisiana’s
2016 pre-runoff report.
ii. Second Cause of Action—Undisclosed Independent
Expenditures
Second, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that Defendants violated
52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(1) by failing to disclose three independent expenditures totaling
$45,475.65 on Schedule E of Defend Louisiana’s post-runoff report. Section
30104(a)(1), “Reporting Requirements,” provides:
(a) Receipts and disbursements by treasurers of political committees;
filing requirements
(1) Each treasurer of a political committee shall file reports of
receipts and disbursements in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection. The treasurer shall sign each such report.
Plaintiff alleges that Defend Louisiana’s post-runoff report failed to disclose
three independent expenditures totaling $45,475.65. (Id. at p. 12). Again, Defendants
failed to dispute these facts.
In the absence of any indication to the contrary from Defendants, the Court
finds that Defendants violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(1) by failing to disclose three
independent expenditures totaling $45,475.65 on Schedule E of Defend Louisiana’s
post-runoff report.
C. Relief Sought
A defaulting defendant “concedes the truth of the allegations of the Complaint
concerning defendant's liability, but not damages.”
Ins. Co. of the W. v. H & G Contractors, Inc., 2011 WL 4738197, *4
(S.D. Tex., Oct. 5, 2011). A court's award of damages in a default judgment must be
determined after a hearing, unless the amount claimed can be demonstrated “by
detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.” United Artists Corp. v. Freeman,
605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). If a court can mathematically calculate the amount
of damages based on the pleadings and supporting documents, a hearing is
unnecessary. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alima, No. 3:13–CV–0889–B,
2014 WL 1632158, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2014) (citing James v. Frame,
6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Here, Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) a civil penalty against Defendants
in the amount of $41,056 for violating 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 30104(a)(1);
(2) a permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants from further violations
of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 30104(a)(1); (3) a Court Order requiring
Defendants to correct their reports. (Doc. 12-2). The Court will address each in turn.
i. Civil Penalty
First, Plaintiff requests that the Court impose a civil penalty on Defendants in
the amount of $41,056 for violating 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 30104(a)(1).
Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court “assess the statutory amount of $20,528
as the civil penalty for each of the two series of violations, for a total amount of
$41,056 against Defendants.” (Doc. 12-1, p. 10 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 111.24 (a)(1) (“the
civil penalty shall not exceed the greater of $20,528 or an amount equal to any
contribution or expenditure involved in the violation.”). Considering the undisputed
facts before the Court, the Court orders Defendants to pay a civil penalty in the total
amount of $41,056.00 for violating 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 30104(a)(1).
ii. Permanent Injunction
Second, Plaintiff requests that the Court permanently enjoin Defendants from
future violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(1) and 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii). (Doc. 12-1, p. 11;
Doc. 1, ¶ 20 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(B)) (“In any civil action instituted by the
Commission under subparagraph (A), the court may grant a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order, including a civil penalty”). Because the
Court has found that Defendants violated the Act, the Court permanently enjoins
Defendants from further violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and
30104(a)(1).
iii. Order to Correct Reports
Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendants to correct the
reports at issue. (Doc. 12-1, p. 11). Again, Defendants have failed to dispute the facts
before the Court. Accordingly, Defendants shall correct the following:
(1) Defend Louisiana PAC’s November 28, 2016 pre-runoff report by providing
adequate purpose statements for the eight independent expenditures designated as
“Community Outreach”; and (2) Defend Louisiana PAC’s January 9, 2017 post-runoff
report to include the three independent expenditures listed in Defend Louisiana
PAC’s December 12, 2016 48-hour report.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
(Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defend Louisiana PAC and Taylor
Townsend, in his official capacity as treasurer, shall pay a civil penalty in the total
amount of $41,056.00 for violating 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 30104(a)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defend Louisiana PAC and Taylor
Townsend, in his official capacity as treasurer, are permanently enjoined from further
violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(6)(B)(iii) and 30104(a)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Defend Louisiana PAC and
Taylor Townsend, in his official capacity as treasurer, shall correct
Defend Louisiana PAC’s November 28, 2016 pre-runoff report by providing adequate
purpose statements for the eight independent expenditures designated as
“Community Outreach.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Defend Louisiana PAC and
Taylor Townsend, in his official capacity as treasurer, shall correct Defend Louisiana
PAC’s January 9, 2017 post-runoff report to include the three independent
expenditures listed in Defend Louisiana PAC’s December 12, 2016 48-hour report.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 22nd day of July, 2022
_________________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA