Hicks v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ELLIS RAY HICKS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS 19-108-SDD-RLB

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY &

CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended

Complaint1 by Defendants, James LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”), and Terry Lawson (“Lawson”)(or

collectively, “Original Defendants”). Plaintiff, Ellis Ray Hicks (“Plaintiff”) filed an

Opposition to this motion,2 to which LeBlanc and Lawson filed a Reply.3 Also before the

Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim4 by newly-added Defendants,

Tracy Dibenedetto (“Dibenedetto”), Angela Griffin (“Griffin”), and Sally Gryder

(“Gryder”)(or collectively, “New Defendants”). Plaintiff filed an Opposition to this motion,5

to which Dibenedetto, Griffin, and Gryder jointly filed a Reply.6 Plaintiff also filed a

Supplement Regarding New Authority,7 which the Court considered. For the following

reasons, the Court finds that Original Defendants’ motion should be granted in part and

denied in part, and New Defendants’ motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

1 Rec. Doc. No. 84.

2 Rec. Doc. No. 85.

3 Rec. Doc. No. 87.

4 Rec. Doc. No. 90.

5 Rec. Doc. No. 95.

6 Rec. Doc. No. 109.

7 Rec. Doc. No. 115.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This suit arose from the alleged over-detention of Plaintiff following completion of

his legal sentence of imprisonment. Plaintiff originally brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against two Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections employees, LeBlanc

and Lawson, alleging that he was unlawfully detained for 60 days after the expiration of

his prison sentence. Plaintiff sued LeBlanc and Lawson in both their official and individual

capacities, asserting Fourteenth Amendment due process and First Amendment free

speech violations, a Monell failure to train/supervise claim, false imprisonment,

negligence, respondeat superior, indemnification, and a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under

the Louisiana Constitution.

In a previous Motion to Dismiss, LeBlanc and Lawson raised the following issues:

that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by (1) Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, (2)

the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine, and (3) qualified immunity.8 This Court dismissed the

claims for monetary damages against LeBlanc and Lawson in their official capacities

under sovereign immunity.9 This Court held that the Heck doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s

claims.10 Finally, this Court held that LeBlanc and Lawson were not entitled to qualified

immunity.11 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court’s ruling that Lawson was

not entitled to qualified immunity but reversed this Court’s ruling that LeBlanc was not

entitled to qualified immunity.12 Therefore, based on this Court’s prior dismissal of official

capacity claims against LeBlanc,13 the Fifth Circuit’s reversal granting qualified immunity

8 Rec. Doc. No. 22.

9 Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 12.

10 Id. at 15.

11 Id. at 20.

12 Hicks v. LeBlanc, 832 F.App’x. 836 (5th Cir. 2020).

13 Rec. Doc. No. 47.

to LeBlanc for individual capacity claims,14 and Plaintiffs’ concession that all declaratory

relief has been dismissed in this matter, all federal claims and state law constitutional

claims against LeBlanc are DISMISSED with prejudice. LeBlanc remains a Defendant in

this matter based on the state law tort claims asserted against him for the reasons

explained below.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment15 on the

Louisiana tort claim of false imprisonment. Defendants LeBlanc and Lawson also sought

summary judgment on this claim.16 However, the Court denied both motions.17

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint,18 asserting claims against Lawson

and LeBlanc and adding DiBenedetto, Gryder, and Griffin as Defendants. Defendants

Lawson and LeBlanc filed a Motion to Dismiss,19 and Defendants DiBenedetto, Gryder,

and Griffin filed a separate Motion to Dismiss;20 these motions are addressed by this

Ruling.

II. DEFENDANTS’ POSITIONS, GENERALLY

Original Defendants assert the following in support of their Motion to Dismiss

Second Amended Complaint.21 First, Original Defendants maintain the Court should

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief.22 Second, although the Court has

previously determined that the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s claims

arising out of the alleged over-detention, Original Defendants request reconsideration and

14 Hicks, 832 F.App’x. 836.

15 Rec. Doc. No. 67.

16 Rec. Doc. No. 73. Defendants requested summary judgment in their opposition brief.

17 Rec. Doc. No. 93.

18 Rec. Doc. No. 83.

19 Rec. Doc. No. 84.

20 Rec. Doc. No. 90.

21 Rec. Doc. No. 84.

22 Rec. Doc. No. 84-1, p. 2–8.

reversal of that prior Ruling in light of the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Colvin v.

LeBlanc.23 Finally, Original Defendants claim that Plaintiff abandoned his state law claims

by failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Corrections Administrative

Remedy Procedure (“CARP”).24

In their Motion, New Defendants argue: (1) Heck v. Humphrey bars Plaintiff’s §

1983 claims;25 (2) that Plaintiff’s failure to have his sentence computation invalidated

through CARP bars his state law claims;26 (3) they are entitled to the defense of qualified

immunity for the individual capacity claims asserted against them;27 and they are

substantively entitled to dismissal of the state law claims brought against them.28

III. PLAINTIFF’S POSITION, GENERALLY

In response to Original Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses all claims

for declaratory relief.29 Next, Plaintiff claims that, since this Court has already addressed

the applicability of the Heck doctrine, it should not reconsider its prior Ruling on the

issue.30 Alternatively, should the Court reconsider the issue, the Heck doctrine does not

bar the instant suit, even in light of the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Colvin.31 Plaintiff

also maintains that CARP does not bar his state law claims.32

In response to New Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff maintains that the Heck doctrine

does not bar this suit and that CARP does not bar his state law claims.33 Additionally,

23 Id. at 8–12.

24 Id. at 12–13.

25 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 3–7.

26 Id. at 7–9.

27 Id. at 9–17.

28 Id. at 17–20.

29 Rec. Doc. No. 85, p. 3.

30 Id. at 3–4.

31 Id. at 4–7.

32 Id. at 7–8.

33 Rec. Doc. No. 95, p. 1–5.

Plaintiff contends that New Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.34 Finally,

Plaintiff argues that New Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the state law claims

against them.35

IV. LAW & ANALYSIS

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”36 The court

may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matter of which a court may take judicial notice.”37 “To survive

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’”38 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, the United

States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attached by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”39 A complaint is also

insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’”40 However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

34 Id. at 5–8.

35 Id. at 8-9.

36 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr.

Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).

37 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).

38 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205.

39 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and brackets

omitted) [hereinafter Twombly].

40 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations

omitted) [hereinafter Iqbal].

is liable for the misconduct alleged.”41 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the

plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted

unlawfully.”42 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will

not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”43 On a motion to dismiss, courts

“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”44

Rather, the inquiry is whether the allegations in the Complaint plausibly state a claim for

relief.

A. Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Original Defendants

1. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff has conceded that the claim for declaratory relief should be dismissed, and

the Court granted Original Defendants’ requested relief on July 14, 2021.45 Thus, this

request for relief is denied as moot.

2. Applicability of Heck v. Humphrey as to All Defendants Following Colvin v.

LeBlanc

Original Defendants request reconsideration of the Court’s prior Ruling46 on the

applicability of the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure47 based on Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Colvin v. LeBlanc,48 which

41 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

42 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

43 Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, No. 11-2060, 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2012)

(quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).

44 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

45 Rec. Doc. No. 86 (docketed July 15, 2021).

46 Rec. Doc. No. 47 (holding “Heck v. Humphrey does not bar Plaintiff’s claims relating to his alleged over-

detention.”).

47 Rec. Doc. No. 84-1, p. 8–10.

48 2 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2021).

Original Defendants argue “reaffirms that sentence computation challenges are barred by

Heck.”49 New Defendants make the same argument in their motion.

While Original Defendants and Plaintiff argue over the proper procedural vehicle

to reconsider this prior Ruling, the Court must address the same arguments raised by

New Defendants. Thus, the Court finds the procedural issue moot and, further, the Court

has discretion to reconsider the issue in any event.50

The Court recently addressed an over-detention case wherein this exact argument

was made regarding Colvin. In Frederick v. LeBlanc,51 this Court found that Colvin did

not change the Court’s holding that Heck did not bar a plaintiff’s over-detention case:

James Colvin was sentenced to eighty years in prison after a 1983 jury

conviction in Caddo Parish, Louisiana. In 1986, he escaped from the

Louisiana State Penitentiary, only to be recaptured, sentenced to a new,

lengthy prison term, and ultimately paroled in 2004. Colvin then robbed a

bank, for which he earned a new term of imprisonment. After he was

transferred – without a valid detainer, he contended – from the United

States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania to the Elayn Hunt

Correctional Center in Louisiana, Colvin “filed an Administrative Remedy

Procedure, requesting immediate release and credit for time served in

federal custody.” Colvin later alleged in his §1983 suit that, although a

records clerk at Elayn Hunt initially changed his release date from January

1, 2052 to January 1, 2053 to properly credit him for the time he spent in

federal custody, when he was again transferred to Rayburn Correctional

Center, a different records clerk “reverted” his release date to 2052.

Defendants claim that Colvin “unequivocally reaffirms that sentence

computation challenges are barred by Heck.” This statement is at odds with

the Court’s view of the case. In fact, the Fifth Circuit appears to disagree

that Colvin is a simple case of computation, noting that although the district

court “characterized Colvin's claim as only involving the miscalculation of

his release date . . . Colvin actually challenges two independent acts: (1)

the “artificial enhancement” of his sentence, and (2) his illegal extradition.”52

On appeal, Colvin repackaged his “artificial enhancement” argument to

instead complain that his release date was incorrect because he was not

49 Rec. Doc. No. 84-1, p. 9.

50 See Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010)(citations omitted).

51 Frederick v. LeBlanc, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2021 WL 4448919 (M.D. La. 2021).

52 Frederick, at *2-*3 (quoting Colvin, 2 F.4th at 499).

properly credited under Louisiana’s good time statutes for the time he

previously served in federal prison. Noting that this argument was waived

because it was raised for the first time on appeal, the Fifth Circuit

nevertheless held that “a § 1983 damages action predicated on the

sentence calculation issue is barred by Heck because success on that claim

would necessarily invalidate the duration of his incarceration.”53 This is dicta

and does not bind the Court. In any event, the Court is not persuaded that

Colvin, an incarcerated individual seeking to hasten his release date by

thirty years, is similarly situated to Frederick, whose complaint arises out of

a roughly three-month period between July and October 2017 when, he

alleges, his lawful sentence was fully served but he continued to be

detained anyway.

Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants consistently misapprehend the

nature of Frederick's claim. In the Court's view, Frederick's suit does not

seek to invalidate his conviction or sentence because the essence of his

complaint is that not that his sentence was invalid – he does not argue this.

Instead, he asserts that he was held beyond the expiration of his admittedly

valid sentence. While Frederick does allege that DOC miscalculated his

release date, this allegation does not challenge the validity of his sentence

as rendered by the sentencing judge. Frederick's claim arises after his

lawful sentence had been served and DOC allegedly continued to detain

him anyway. Overall, the Court finds that it would be misguided to apply

Heck here, where the challenge is not directed at Frederick's conviction and

sentence but rather DOC's procedures for calculating his release date and

releasing him timely. In other words, Frederick contends that DOC failed to

abide the court's lawful sentence by over detaining him.54

The Court stands by its analysis and finds that the reasoning and holding in Frederick

regarding Colvin applies equally to the facts of the present case.

3. State Law Claims & Exhaustion Through CARP

All Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred because

Plaintiff failed to assert those claims through the Corrections Administrative Remedy

Procedure (CARP).55 Defendants rely on the case of Madison v. Ward, decided in 2002,

which states, “[a] prisoner alleging an error in time computation must pursue his claim

53 Id. (quoting Colvin, 2 F.4th at 499).

54 Id. (emphasis in original)(record citations omitted).

55 Rec. Doc. No. 84-1, p. 12–13.

through CARP, with appellate review first at the district court and then with [the First

Circuit Court of Appeal].”56 According to Defendants, a prisoner cannot claim damages

for or arising from any alleged error in the computation unless and until the prisoner’s

sentence is corrected through CARP.57 Further, Defendants note that this Court “has

acknowledged the CARP procedures for reviewing sentence computations and found that

federal district courts lack jurisdiction to ‘review, modify, or nullify final orders of state

courts.’”58 Thus, “this Court similarly lacks jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify the

underlying administrative decision that the inmate declined to appeal through the state

courts.”59

In response, Plaintiffs rely on the case of McNeal v. DPS&C, in which the Middle

District held that the Louisiana Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) “does not apply

because Mr. McNeal was not a ‘prisoner,’ and this is not a ‘prisoner suit.’”60 The Middle

District noted that the PLRA provides that “[n]o prisoner suit shall assert a claim under

state law until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. If a prisoner

suit is filed in contravention of this Paragraph, the court shall dismiss the suit without

prejudice.”61

However, Defendants correctly point out that the CARP and the PLRA are two

different acts: the CARP is codified in La. R.S. 15:1171–15:1179 while the PLRA is

codified in La. R.S. 15:1181–15:1191.62 Defendants maintain that Plaintiff abandoned his

56 Id. (citing 2000-2842 (La. App.1 Cir. 7/3/02), 825 So. 2d 1245, 1255).

57 Id.

58 Id. at 13 (quoting London v. Dept. of Corr., No. 14-362, 2014 WL 3563416, at *3 (M.D. La. July 18, 2014)).

59 Id.

60 Rec. Doc. No. 85, p. 7 (quoting 18-736, 2020 WL 798321, at *9 (M.D. La. Feb. 18, 2020)).

61 Id. (citing McNeal v. DPS&C, 18-736, 2020 WL 798321, at *9 (M.D. La. Feb. 18, 2020)).

62 Rec. Doc. No. 87, p. 7.

state law claims by failing to pursue them through CARP, not that Plaintiff failed to satisfy

the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA.63

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss state law claims

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust them through CARP is denied. Recently, in Warren v.

LDPS&C,64 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal explained the distinction between

the two acts:

The purpose of the PLRA, La. R.S. 15:1181, et seq., is to provide for civil

actions with respect to prison conditions or effects of officials’ actions on

prisoners’ lives. In accordance with the PLRA, a prisoner suit is defined as

“any civil proceeding with respect to the conditions of confinement or the

effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined

in prison.” Prisoner suits are subject to the administrative procedures of

[CARP], La. R.S. 15:1171, et seq., which must be exhausted prior to filing

suit in district court. The PLRA further provides that exclusive venue for

delictual actions for injury or damages shall be the parish where the prison

is situated to which the prisoner was assigned when the cause of action

arose.

The administrative remedy procedure set forth in CARP is the formal

grievance mechanism that all offenders committed to the custody of DPSC

must use before they may proceed with a suit in federal or state court. Under

the provisions of CARP, an offender aggrieved by an adverse decision by

DPSC rendered pursuant to the prescribed administrative remedies may

seek judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court; however, this

provision specifically excludes administrative decisions relative to

delictual actions for injury or damages. Delictual actions for injury or

damages shall be filed separately as original civil actions pursuant to

La. R.S. 15:1177(C). These delictual actions are reviewed de novo by

the district court after the exhaustion of the administrative remedies

set forth in CARP.65

Tort claims are excluded from judicial review under La. R.S. 15:1177(A); however,

the Louisiana legislature “created a specific administrative remedy procedure for prisoner

tort claims and reserved the right of a prisoner to file a tort suit in district courts for de

63 Id.

64 Warren v. LDPS&C, 2020-0247 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/21), 320 So.3d 453.

65 Id. at 455 (emphasis added).

novo review after he first exhausted the administrative remedy procedure for tort claims

set forth in CARP.”66 Thus, for tort claims, the district courts do not function as courts of

review but rather as courts of original jurisdiction.67 Nonetheless, a prisoner must first file

an administrative claim pursuant to section 15:1172 before filing a tort action in district

court.68

In this matter, Plaintiff filed an ARP, which he exhausted through the DPSC’s two-

step process.69 Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the CARP does not impose a

requirement for review first at the Louisiana 19th Judicial District Court and then at the

Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on this tort action. Louisiana Revised Statutes

section 15:1177(A) expressly excludes tort actions from this requirement. Instead, section

15:1177(C) requires the filing of a separate tort suit as an original civil action in district

court. That is precisely what Plaintiff has done in this action, which was originally filed in

the Louisiana 19th Judicial District Court and removed by Defendants to this Court. Thus,

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

B. Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Tracy Dibenedetto, Angela Griffin, and

Sally Gryder (RD #90)70

1. Whether New Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

The New Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity for the constitutional

claims brought against them in their individual capacities. In Harlow v. Fitzegerald, the

United States Supreme Court established the principle that “government officials

66 Alonzo v. Cain, 2014-0172, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/14), 154 So.3d 551, 553–54.

67 Id. at 555 n.6.

68 Id.

69 Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 41; Rec. Doc. No. 109, p. 6 (“The Plaintiff undisputedly filed an ARP, which he

exhausted through the DPSC’s two-step process, but did not appeal the agency’s decision by filing a

Petition for Judicial Review in the 19th Judicial District Court.”).

70 To the extent there is overlap of the issues in Original and New Defendants motions, those issue were

addressed above and apply to all Defendants in both motions.

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”71 “When a defendant invokes

qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of

the defense.”72

A claim of qualified immunity requires the Court to engage in the well-established

two-step analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz.73 As stated by the

Fifth Circuit in the context of a motion for summary judgment:

First, we determine whether, viewing the summary judgment evidence in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant violated the plaintiff's

constitutional rights. See, e.g., Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750

(5th Cir. 2005); McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322–23 (5th

Cir.2002) (en banc); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir.

2001). If not, our analysis ends. If so, we next consider whether the

defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly

established law at the time of the conduct in question. See, e.g., Tarver,

410 F.3d at 750; Glenn, 242 F.3d at 312. To make this determination, the

court applies an objective standard based on the viewpoint of a reasonable

official in light of the information then available to the defendant and the law

that was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions. See

Glenn, 242 F.3d at 312; Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730,

736 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Tarver, 410 F.3d at 750 (“If officers of

reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights

were violated, the officer's qualified immunity remains intact.”).74

When the defense of qualified immunity is raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “it is

the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for ‘objective legal

reasonableness’.”75 The plaintiff must support his claim with “sufficient precision and

71 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

72 Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing McClendon v. City of Columbia,

305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).

73 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 229 (2009). See Lytle v. Bexar

County, Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009).

74 Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2007).

75 McClendon, 305 F.3d at 323 (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996)).

factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defendant’s conduct at the

time of the alleged acts.”76 When greater detail is required to address the defense of

qualified immunity, the Court may insist that a plaintiff file a reply pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 7(a) tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity.77

“The district court need not allow any discovery unless it finds that plaintiff has supported

his claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the

illegality of defendant’s conduct at the time of the alleged acts.”78

Another section of this Court, in addressing an over-detention claim, explained

that:

Therefore, while the court is not to give the “assumption of truth” to

conclusions, factual allegations remain so entitled. Once those factual

allegations are identified, drawing on the court's judicial experience and

common sense, the analysis is whether those facts, which need not be

detailed or specific, allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)]; Twombly, 55[0] U.S. at 556.

This analysis is not substantively different from that set forth in Lormand,

supra, nor does this jurisprudence foreclose the option that discovery must

be undertaken in order to raise relevant information to support an element

of the claim. The standard, under the specific language of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), remains that the defendant be given adequate notice of the claim

and the grounds upon which it is based. The standard is met by the

“reasonable inference” the court must make that, with or without discovery,

the facts set forth a plausible claim for relief under a particular theory of law

provided that there is a “reasonable expectation” that “discovery will reveal

relevant evidence of each element of the claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257;

Twombly, 55[0] U.S. at 556.79

76 Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc).

77 Id. at 1433–34.

78 Id.

79 Parker v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety, No. 18-1030-JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 4353564, at *5 (M.D. La.

July 29, 2021)(quoting Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Oceanografia, S.A. De C.V., No. 10-00177, 2011 WL

938785, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 9, 2011) (citation omitted)).

Plaintiff sues New Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages,

alleging a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.80 Additionally, the Plaintiff sues

under Louisiana’s Due Process Clause, found in Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana

Constitution.81 In this case, the Fifth Circuit has held as to the Original Defendants that

the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis was satisfied because Plaintiff’s due

process rights were violated.82 The Fifth Circuit explained that “[t]he Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause is violated where a prisoner remains incarcerated after

the legal authority to hold him has expired.”83 Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the

qualified immunity analysis by adequately alleging his over-detention.84 Thus, the

remaining inquiry is whether each of the New Defendants’ alleged conduct was

objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.

As explained by Judge deGravelles of this Court in Parker,

“Despite the defense of qualified immunity, ‘[i]f [the jailer] negligently

establishes a record keeping system in which errors of this kind are likely,

he will be held liable.’” Id. at 446 (quoting Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210,

1215 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). “[T]he Fifth Circuit has recognized that a

jailer is ‘under relatively little time pressure’ and ‘has the means, freedom,

and the duty to make necessary inquiries.’” Thomas v. Gryder, No. 17-

1595, 2019 WL 5790351, at *7 (M.D. La. Nov. 6, 2019) (quoting Douthit,

619 F.2d at 535 (quoting Whirl, 407 F.2d at 792, and Bryan, 530 F.2d at

1214)).

However, “[a] defense of official immunity is available to a jailer who has

acted in reasonable good faith.” Id. (quoting Bryan, 530 F.2d at 1214).

Moreover, “a prison official's failure to follow prison policies or regulations

does not establish a violation of a constitutional right” Id. (quoting Lewis v.

Sec'y of Pub. Safety and Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017)).

80 Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 98.

81 Id. at ¶ 101.

82 Hicks v. LeBlanc, 832 F.App’x. 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2020).

83 Id.

84 See generally id.

“[N]egligent conduct does not implicate the due process clause.” Id.

(quoting Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 1992)). Ultimately,

the “determination of whether a jailer violates the Due Process Clause by

unduly detaining an individual depends on ‘the context of this case.’” Id.

(quoting Grant v. Guzman, No. 17-2797, 2018 WL 1532960, at *12 (E.D.

La. Mar. 29, 2018) (quoting Douthit, 619 F.2d at 532)).85

For the context in this case, in finding that Lawson was not entitled to qualified

immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Fifth Circuit held:

Further, Lawson's alleged actions were objectively unreasonable in light of

clearly established law at the time of his misconduct. A prisoner's right to

timely release was clearly established well before 2017, when Lawson's

actions began to occur. See id. A reasonable DPSC employee also

should have known to credit time served when calculating an inmate's

release date, where the court ordered such credit to be considered.

See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 883.1 (“The sentencing court may

specify that the sentence imposed be served concurrently with a sentence

imposed by a federal court or a court of any other state....”); La. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 880 (“A defendant shall receive credit toward service of his

sentence for time spent in actual custody prior to the imposition of

sentence.”); see also Boddye v. La. Dep't of Corr., 175 So. 3d 437, 441 (La.

Ct. App. 2015) (“It is well settled that the determination of the sentence a

defendant is to serve, and what, if any, conditions are to be imposed on that

sentence, is made by the trial judge, not the defendant's custodian.”);

Dorman v. Ward, 718 So. 2d 474, 476 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that

where an inmate is convicted of a new felony in Florida while on parole

supervision on a prior offense in Louisiana, the sentencing court may give

credit for time served in Florida toward his Louisiana sentence for parole

revocation). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Lawson's

qualified immunity defense against Hicks’ Fourteenth Amendment claim.86

With this holding and legal principles in mind, the Court turns to the allegations

against the New Defendants and their assertions of the qualified immunity defense.

85 Parker, 2020 WL 4353564, at *11.

86 Hicks, 832 Fed. App’x 836, 840-841 (emphasis added).

a. Allegations/Arguments as to Tracy DiBenedetto

Plaintiff alleges that DiBenedetto was a “DOC employee who was responsible for

handling all DOC inmate grievances and supervised Mr. Lawson.”87 Plaintiff sues

DiBenedetto for failing to instruct DOC employees to correct Plaintiff’s time, or computing

the time herself, despite knowing that he was not being credited with a single day of

Arkansas time.88 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that DiBenedetto reviewed Plaintiff’s “ARPs

requesting that his time spent detained in Arkansas prior to his trial, 110 days, be included

in his time calculation and informed Mr. Hicks that the current calculation was correct and

would not be modified.”89 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that DiBenedetto told Lawson that

the inclusion of the 110 days was “dependent [on] whether he was held ‘under the same

circumstances’ or Louisiana had a ‘hold’ on him—two conditions not required by the Court

in his sentencing order granting him credit for all time in Arkansas.”90 Plaintiff further

alleges that DiBenedetto once again told Lawson to determine whether the two conditions

were met after telling Plaintiff that he had received his credit.91

DiBenedetto contends that “it is significant that there is a glaring absence of law

that clearly establishes the parameters of what officials in Ms. DiBenedetto’s position, i.e.,

those who receive and respond to inmate grievances, are mandated to do in the

circumstances under penalty of personal liability under § 1983.”92 She relies on the

decision in Traweek v. Gusman wherein DiBenedetto was a named defendant in an over-

detention case, and the Traweek court found that “any failure by DiBenedetto to move

87 Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 14.

88 Id. at ¶ 30.

89 Id. at ¶ 41.

90 Id. at ¶ 42.

91 Id. at ¶ 43.

92 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 11.

heaven and earth to secure Traweek’s release the moment she supposedly learned of

his over[-]detention is not cognizable for purposes of negating DiBenedetto’s entitlement

to the broad qualified immunity afforded to officials in her position.”93 DiBenedetto

maintains she is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, as her conduct was not objectively

unreasonable under the jurisprudence.94

In response, Plaintiff reiterates his allegations95 and contends that “[t]he Complaint

is [] clear that Ms. DiBenedetto knew about Mr. Hicks’ sentence, but actively prevented it

from being executed properly.”96 Thus, Plaintiff maintains that qualified immunity should

be denied as to DiBenedetto because she was also involved in the failure to properly

credit Plaintiff with his court-ordered credit.97

DiBenedetto claims Plaintiff is not directly responsive to her qualified immunity

argument; rather, Plaintiff focuses on an email to Lawson that purportedly “overcomes

the qualified immunity defense of Ms. Dibenedetto.”98 DiBenedetto argues that her actions

were reasonable in light of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 880(e), which

DiBenedetto accurately described to Lawson when stating “under the same

circumstances.”99 Additionally, DiBenedetto argues that Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure article 901(C)(3) was another basis for her instruction to Lawson regarding the

“hold.”100 According to DiBenedetto, she “never instructed Mr. Lawson, or anyone, to deny

jail credit to the Plaintiff . . . Dibenedetto merely provided a correct statement of Louisiana

93 Id. at 11–12 (quoting Traweek v. Gusman, No. 19-1384, 2021 WL 199387, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2021)).

94 Id. at 12.

95 Rec. Doc. No. 95, p. 6.

96 Id.

97 Id.

98 Rec. Doc. No. 109, p. 8–9.

99 Id. at 10.

100 Id.

law.”101 DiBenedetto notes that qualified immunity applies even when there is an “error

[that] is ‘a mistake of law, mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law

and fact.’”102

The Court finds that DiBenedetto’s Motion to Dismiss on qualified immunity should

be denied. At this stage, this Court need only consider the factual allegations and ask

whether those allegations overcome the assertion of qualified immunity.

First, DiBenedetto’s argument that “it is significant that there is a glaring absence

of law that clearly establishes the parameters of what officials in Ms. DiBenedetto’s

position, i.e., those who receive and respond to inmate grievances, are mandated to do

in the circumstances under penalty of personal liability under § 1983,”103 misses the mark

because, as the Fifth Circuit has explained in this very case, “[a] reasonable DPSC

employee also should have known to credit time served when calculating an inmate's

release date, where the court ordered such credit to be considered. See La. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 883.1.”104 Here, Plaintiff has alleged that DiBenedetto instructed Lawson

on the application of credits to his sentence; thus, Plaintiff has alleged that DiBenedetto

affirmatively participated in Plaintiff’s over-detention. Clearly established law provides that

a prison official must ensure an inmate’s timely release.105 DiBenedetto’s alleged

affirmative action of improperly instructing Lawson on applying Plaintiff’s credits, despite

a sentence clearly requiring “credit for all time served, including the time served in the

101 Id.

102 Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,

567 (2004)).

103 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 11.

104 Hicks, 832 Fed. App’x at 840.

105 Id. at 841.

State of Arkansas,” is sufficient to defeat DiBenedetto’s claim of qualified immunity at this

stage.

Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against DiBenedetto “raise

a reasonable hope or expectation … that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each

element of a claim. ‘Asking for [such] plausible grounds to infer [the element of a claim]

does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough

facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal [that the elements of the

claim existed].’”106 Evidence may later demonstrate that DiBenedetto’s actions in this

matter were objectively reasonable such that she is entitled to qualified immunity;

however, based on the allegations, taken as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations

against DiBenedetto overcome qualified immunity. The need for discovery is obvious.

The following allegations raise questions as to the objective reasonableness of

DiBenedetto’s actions: the necessity of multiple calculations and re-calculations; the

lengthy delay in responding to and processing Plaintiff’s ARP; and the ostensible lack of

urgency to ensure that Plaintiff timely received his credits once it was finally determined

that Plaintiff was entitled to them. This is particularly true where “a jailer is under relatively

little time pressure’ and ‘has the means, freedom, and the duty to make necessary

inquiries.’”107

The Court also finds that this case is distinguishable from Traweek on this issue.108

In Traweek, the plaintiff claimed that Dibenedetto “did nothing more than provide and

106 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)).

107 Thomas v. Gryder, No. 17-1595, 2019 WL 5790351, at *7 (M.D. La. Nov. 6, 2019)(citations omitted).

108 The Court notes that it has the discretion to adopt the analysis and reasoning of a sister court on one

issue in a case and still disagree with that court’s holding on a different issue in the case. It is true that this

Court relied on Traweek as to one issue in a previous ruling; however, the Court is not bound to adopt all

analyses and reasoning as to all issues involved in Traweek.

conduct a half-hearted investigation after receiving emails from Mr. Traweeks’ attorney

that put her on notice of Mr. Traweek’s overdetention.”109 Traweek also claimed bystander

liability for “failing to intervene in defense of Traweeek’s constitutional rights.”110 The

allegations in this case are something different—that Dibenedetto affirmatively

participated by instructing Lawson on the application of credits despite a clear order from

the judge, and that DiBenedetto failed to adequately perform her own duty to timely

address inmate grievances.

This Court addressed a similar fact pattern in Thomas v. Gryder.111 In Thomas,

Sally Gryder, also a Defendant in the present case, and other DOC employees were sued

in a case of over-detention. The plaintiff alleged that he had been held 589 days past the

end of his sentence.112 The plaintiff alleged that the DOC originally calculated his release

date correctly as June 15, 2015, but during his imprisonment, Gryder recalculated his

release date four times.113 By the fourth calculation, Gryder was “double checking” the

plaintiff’s release date when she noticed a problem between the Bill of Information and

Sentencing Order, so she sought “clarification.”114 An investigation ensued, resulting in

a new release date of February 28, 2017, after an erroneous finding that the plaintiff had

been charged with sexual battery, a crime for which good time credits cannot apply.115

The plaintiff sent letters to Gryder and the Warden objecting to the new release

date. He filed a motion for correction with the criminal court, and the court issued an Order

109 Traweek v. Gusman, No. 19-1384, 2021 WL 199387, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2021).

110 Id.

111 2019 WL 5790351.

112 Id. at *1.

113 Id. at *2.

114 Id. at *3.

115 Id.

in July 2016 correcting the issue.116 Gryder testified that she did not receive the order

until litigation ensued, but Plaintiff submitted a declaration saying he sent the order to her

on August 17, 2016.117 The plaintiff sent Brenda Acklin a copy of the letter and sentencing

transcript on December 5, 2016, and Gryder stated that she realized that the plaintiff

should have been released in “early December, 2016.”118 After receiving the transcript,

Gryder sent an email to the Assistant DA asking for an updated minute entry and

processed the plaintiff for release in January 2017.119 The plaintiff was finally released

on January 13, 2017.120

The Defendants moved for summary judgment,121 and Gryder asserted the

defense of qualified immunity as to her individual capacity claims. The Court found that,

although Plaintiff disagrees that Ms. Gryder had sufficient cause to seek

clarification of Plaintiff's sentence, it was objectively reasonable for Ms.

Gryder to do so. It is undisputed that the Bill of Information and the

Sentencing Order list the charges differently. If Plaintiff had been sentenced

to five years (rather than two) for sexual battery, his correctly computed

sentence would have resulted in a release date of February 28, 2017. The

parties agree that the Defendants have an obligation to ensure that

prisoners are not released early.122

The Court further found that,

Because it was not objectively unreasonable for Ms. Gryder to seek

clarification in the first place, it was not objectively unreasonable for Ms.

Gryder to rely on that clarification once received. Moreover, “a prison

official's failure to follow prison policies or regulations does not establish a

violation of a constitutional right” and “negligent conduct does not implicate

the due process clause.” Here, where the amended minute entry and

116 Id.

117 Id.

118 Id.

119 Id. at *4.

120 Id.

121 The Court recognizes that this matter is not at the summary judgment stage, but the fact pattern and

legal principles applied in Thomas are instructive in this matter.

122 Thomas, 2019 WL 5790351 at *7 (citation omitted).

confirmation from the DA occurred in response to Ms. Gryder's request for

clarification, it would be especially inconsistent to require that Ms. Gryder

continue to rely on the earlier Sentencing Order, and the Court finds that

constitutional minima are met where Ms. Gryder sought to be more

conscientious rather than less with respect to her calculation of Plaintiff's

release date.123

However, the Court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the date

on which Gryder knew the fourth recalculation was based on inaccurate information:

While Ms. Gryder testified that she did not see the July 2016 Order until

litigation commenced, Plaintiff has filed a Declaration stating that he sent

the July 2016 Order to Ms. Gryder on August 17, 2016. Plaintiff was not

released until almost five months after he allegedly provided Ms. Gryder

with official, corrected information. In Whirl, the Fifth Circuit considered the

liability of a jailer who had held plaintiff in jail almost nine months after

dismissal of indictments against him. Notice of the dismissal was sent to the

sheriff's office, but the sheriff testified that “he was not apprised of these

proceedings.” The Fifth Circuit found that the sheriff's ignorance for nine

months after termination of proceedings against Whirl was unreasonable.

Further, the court noted that “[f]ailure to know of a court proceeding

terminating all charges against one held in custody is not, as a matter of

law, adequate legal justification for an unauthorized restraint.” While the

question here is not as clear cut as that set out in Whirl, based on the

timeline of “clarifications” from the criminal court and the Assistant DA,

Plaintiff has raised a material issue of fact regarding when Ms. Gryder knew

she had recalculated Plaintiff's release date based on incorrect information.

Accordingly, while the Court finds that Ms. Gryder is entitled to qualified

immunity for Plaintiff's over-detention from June 5, 2015 through August 17,

2016 and therefore summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against

Ms. Gryder for that period of time is appropriate, a genuine issue of material

fact precludes summary judgment in favor of Ms. Gryder for the time period

of August 18, 2016 through January 13, 2017.124

Thus, the Court gave Gryder qualified immunity for acts that were objectively

reasonable under her job description and duties; however, the Court found a fact issue

123 Id. (citations omitted).

124 Id. at *8.

regarding when Gryder knew or should have known of the correct information during a

certain time period.

In Parker v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,125 another

Section of this Court relied heavily on Thomas v. Gryder in addressing a Rule 12(b)(6

Motion to Dismiss. Parker involved a claim of over-detention, and Brenda Acklin (“Acklin”)

was sued in her individual capacity as “a DOC employee who was tasked with calculating

incarceration time ensuring Mr. Parker’s proper release date.”126 Parker alleged that he

was held an additional 337 days in prison, despite numerous complaints and requests for

relief by him, his family, and his lawyer.127 Parker alleged that his release date was

properly calculated; however, when that date came, he was not released.128 Ultimately,

Parker was held based on an erroneous classification that he was a sex offender.129

Parker sought relief from the DOC, and his lawyer repeatedly tried to resolve the

situation.130 Parker was finally released after 337 days of illegal imprisonment.131

Acklin moved for dismissal of Parker’s constitutional claim against her, arguing that

she was entitled to qualified immunity.132 Although Acklin knew Parker’s correct release

date when he was first incarcerated, she allegedly misinterpreted handwritten notes

placed on paperwork, leading her to misclassify Parker as a sex offender.133 Parker also

alleged that Acklin could have simply checked the sex offender database to discover that

125Parker, 2020 WL 4353564.

126 Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).

127 Id.

128 Id. at *2.

129 Id. at *2-*3.

130 Id. at *3.

131 Id. at *4.

132 Id. at *9.

133 Id. at *12

he was not a sex offender. Because she failed to do so, “[t]his error directly led to his

over-detention.”134

In evaluating these allegations, Judge deGravelles held that:

Assuming these allegations to be true, a jury could reasonably conclude

that Acklin had the correct information in Plaintiff’s reports that he had never

been convicted of a crime for which he had to register as a sex offender but

that, despite this, Acklin made the notation in his file requiring him to have

a residency plan as a sex offender. This is critical because, in Thomas, the

Court found that the defendant not entitled to qualified immunity for those

days for which she allegedly had correct information about the plaintiff’s

release date. Thomas, 2019 WL 5790351, at *7-8. By the same reasoning,

Acklin is not entitled to qualified immunity.135

Further, unlike Thomas, this is not an instance where Acklin was “more

conscientious” about calculating Plaintiff's release date than would

otherwise be required. Indeed, Thomas states that, according to the Fifth

Circuit, “a jailer is ‘under relatively little time pressure’ and ‘has the means,

freedom, and the duty to make necessary inquiries.’” Id. at *7 (quotation

omitted). This is critical because Plaintiff specifically alleges that a search

of the relevant database would demonstrate that Plaintiff was not a sex

offender, and a reasonable juror could conclude that, by failing to verify this

information, Acklin breached her “duty to make necessary inquiries.” Id.

It must be emphasized that the question is not whether Plaintiff will prevail

at trial against Acklin. The only question at this stage is whether the Second

Amended Complaint contains enough factual matter (taken as true) to raise

a reasonable hope or expectation that discovery will reveal relevant

evidence of each element of a claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257. Plaintiff

has met that burden at this stage. As alleged, Acklin's conduct was

objectively unreasonable under clearly established law, so DPSC

Defendant's motion must be denied.136

134 Id.

135 Id. at *13.

136 Id.

Based on the cases discussed above,137 both decided by this Court, the Court

finds that DiBenedetto is not entitled to qualified immunity at this procedural stage.

Discovery may later demonstrate that DiBenedetto acted objectively reasonably in her

conduct, but the Court must accept the current allegations as true on this motion.

b. Allegations as to Sally Gryder

In the present case, Gryder is named as “a DOC employee who supervised and

trained Mr. Lawson at David Wade Correctional Center.”138 Plaintiff alleges, “[a]lthough

Ms. Gryder reviewed Mr. Hicks’ sentence, and time calculation, which included no

Arkansas credit, she did not instruct him to include credit for time served in Arkansas.”139

Plaintiff alleges that Gryder ordered Lawson to re-calculate Plaintiff’s sentence but, again,

“no time served in Arkansas was included in this sentence.”140 Plaintiff further alleges

that, “[a]lthough Ms. Gryder reviewed Mr. Hicks’ sentence, and time calculation, which

included no Arkansas credit, she did not instruct him to include credit for time served in

Arkansas.”141 Furthermore, Lawson received a letter from Arkansas, and Gryder

instructed Lawson to re-calculate Plaintiff’s sentence yet again.142

Later, Gryder allegedly requested that Lawson contact “Faulker County Sheriff’s

Office to determine how much time Mr. Hicks spent incarcerated in Arkansas pre-trial.”143

Gryder re-calculated the release date and determined that Plaintiff was due for immediate

137 The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that these cases have nothing to do with the present case

because Plaintiff herein asserts a simple claim challenging the computation of his sentence. Inasmuch as

the present case deals with the proper application of credits in reaching a correct release date, both Gryder

and Parker are directly on point.

138 Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 15.

139 Id. at ¶ 25.

140 Id. at ¶ 26.

141 Id. at ¶ 28.

142 Id. at ¶ 34.

143 Id. at ¶ 62.

release.144 However, Plaintiff alleges that, “[e]ven though Ms. Gryder was aware that Ellis

was over-detained on April 20, 2018, she manually changed his release date from April

20, 2018 to April 25, 2018, deliberately holding him for an additional five (5) days.”145

Gryder argues that, with respect to the factual allegations surrounding the initial

reviews of Lawson’s calculation, she cannot be subject to liability since these events

occurred before the alleged constitutional violation.146 Further, with respect to instructing

Lawson to call the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office and the re-calculation for immediate

release, Gryder maintains that “[n]one of that conduct is objectively unreasonable in light

of any clearly established jurisprudence.”147 Finally, Gryder contends, with respect to her

addition of five days to the sentence, that the “conclusory allegations and minimal facts

pled do not show conduct by Sally Gryder that was objectively unreasonable in light of

clearly established law.”148

In response, Plaintiff focuses on the manual changing of Plaintiff’s release date.149

Although Gryder states that the five days were to provide time to complete the procedure

for release, Plaintiff notes that “five days is 250% of what courts have found to be

presumptively unconstitutional for the administrative tasks incident to release.”150 Plaintiff

also relies on the following:

The Court has been unable to find any case, whether within or outside of

the Eleventh Circuit, in which the detainment of a properly identified

individual for days beyond his scheduled release date was held

constitutionally permissible. . . . Accordingly, based on the arguments and

144 Id. at ¶ 63.

145 Id. at ¶ 66.

146 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 15–16.

147 Id. at 16.

148 Id. at 17.

149 Rec. Doc. No. 95, p. 6–7.

150 Id. at 7 (citing Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 17; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F.Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C.

2011); Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988); Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730

(8th Cir. 2001); Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp. 2d 903 (C.D .Cal. 2004))(original emphasis).

record currently before the Court, dismissal of Plaintiffs' over-detention

claims on qualified immunity grounds would be improper.151

In reply, Gryder claims that the pertinent issue is not the length of the delay, but

rather the Plaintiff’s statement that the delay was without reason.152 As a result, the

limited question that remains is why Gryder changed the release date, and Gryder

requests that this Court withholds its ruling on this issue and order narrowly tailored

discovery on why Gryder changed the release date.153 The Court agrees that discovery

is necessary to determine her entitlement to qualified immunity.

The Court finds that Gryder’s Motion to Dismiss must be DENIED. Plaintiff has

alleged facts suggesting that Gryder knew that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate release.

Instead of releasing Plaintiff, Gryder allegedly altered the release date, thereby holding

Plaintiff for five extra days. Plaintiff cites to persuasive authority indicating that five days

is unreasonable for processing delays. Gryder provides no other explanation for the

addition of the five days, aside from the admission that “the facts suggest it was changed

to provide Terry Lawson with time to complete the release clearing checklist.”154 Thus,

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, will show that Gryder knowingly over-

detained Plaintiff in violation of the law.

c. Allegations as to Angela Griffin

Griffin is named as Gryder’s and Lawson’s superior who works from DOC

Headquarters.155 Plaintiff alleges that “Griffin was aware that Mr. Hicks had not been

properly credited for his time served in Arkansas, yet she failed to instruct Ms. Gryder,

151 Id. (quoting Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp. 2d 1340, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2005)).

152 Rec. Doc. No. 109, p. 11 (citing Traweek v. Gusmand, 414 F.Supp. 3d 847, 867 (E.D. La. 2019)).

153 Id. at 11–12.

154 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 17.

155 Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 16.

Mr. Lawson, or any other DOC employee to recalculate with the proper credits at any time

prior to April 2018, when Ellis had already been over-detained.”156

Griffin argues that Plaintiff has made inconsistent, contrary allegations that “Griffin

instructed Lawson to recalculate Plaintiff’s sentence in 2017 after a jail credit letter was

sent from Arkansas to Lawson on July 3, 2017.”157 Griffin notes that Plaintiff admits that

“some of the time Mr. Hicks served in Arkansas” was credited in that new sentence

calculation, but that Plaintiff does not allege whether he was fully credited.158 Based on

these allegations, Griffin contends that it is Lawson who knew of the extra 110 days of

credit; Plaintiff does not allege that Griffin was informed of the extra 110 days of credit.159

Additionally, Griffin “had no further involvement until April 20, 2018.”160

Next, Griffin argues that her knowledge that Plaintiff was due for immediate release

in April of 2018 came from Gryder.161 Plaintiff alleges that Griffin requested that Lawson

contact the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office to determine “how much time Mr. Hicks spent

incarcerated in Arkansas pre-trial.”162 While Plaintiff alleges that Gryder emailed Griffin to

let her know that Plaintiff was due for immediate release, there is no allegation that Griffin

knew that Gryder “manually changed his release date from April 20, 2018 to April 25,

2018, deliberately holding him for an additional five days.”163 Griffin contends that the

same allegations were made against LeBlanc, but they were dismissed by the Fifth

Circuit.164

156 Id. at ¶ 67.

157 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 12 (quoting Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 34).

158 Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 35).

159 Id.

160 Id.

161 Id. at 13.

162 Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 62).

163 Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. No. 83, ¶ 66).

164 Id. at 13–14.

In response, Plaintiff discusses a failure-to-intervene theory.165 Plaintiff cites to

Whitney v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013), which states that bystander liability

applies when defendant: “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s

constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3)

chooses not to act.”166 Thus, Plaintiff maintains that the Motion should be denied on this

ground.

In reply, Griffin claims “Plaintiff does not respond to any of the arguments raised

by Defendant Angela Griffin.”167 Griffin also notes the glaring absence of cases in which

courts have found bystander liability for a sentence miscalculation.168 Thus, Defendants

maintain that the Motion should be granted.

First, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene argument; Plaintiff has not

alleged such a claim, and it is axiomatic that “reply briefs cannot be used to raise new

arguments.”169 The Court will disregard any arguments as to this theory.

As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit stated in this case, “[a] supervisory official

may be held liable only if (1) [s]he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) [s]he implements unconstitutional policies that causally

result in the constitutional injury.”170 The Plaintiff has failed to allege that Griffin

affirmatively participated in the constitutional deprivation or that Griffin was a policymaker.

As noted by Defendants, Plaintiff does not allege that Griffin was aware of the initial

omission of 110 days of credit, nor of Plaintiff’s later over-detention by Gryder after

165 Rec. Doc. No. 95 p. 8.

166 Id.

167 Rec. Doc. No. 109, p. 8.

168 Id.

169 Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 451 (5th Cir. 2016)(citation omitted)

170 Hicks v. LeBlanc, 832 F.App’x. 836, 841 (5th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff was due for immediate release. In fact, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Griffin’s

involvement effectuated his release. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff has failed to

overcome Griffin’s assertion of the defense of qualified immunity, and Griffin’s motion as

to the constitutional claims asserted against her is GRANTED.

2. False Imprisonment/Negligence Claims against New Defendants

New Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot meet the essential element of actual

detention by each Defendant in proving the tort of false imprisonment.171 According to

New Defendants, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that “Plaintiff was imprisoned,

detained, or held by Angela Griffin, Sally Gryder, or Tracy Dibenedetto.172 Thus, New

Defendants maintain that the false imprisonment claims must be dismissed.

Plaintiff claims this argument was already made by Original Defendants and

rejected by this Court.173 “This Court held that Defendant Lawson’s involvement with Mr.

Hicks’ time computation and release process was sufficient to state a claim for false

imprisonment, but that it ‘is up to the jury to determine which Defendants are liable, in

what capacity, and in what proportions.”174

In reply, New Defendants suggest that Plaintiff has a single cause of action under

Louisiana law.175 They argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims are an amalgamation of false

imprisonment and negligence; thus, they should be considered under a duty-risk

analysis.176 As a result, New Defendants maintain that the claim of false imprisonment

should be dismissed.

171 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, pp. 18-19

172 Id.

173 Rec. Doc. No. 95, p. 8.

174 Id. at 8–9 (quoting Rec. Doc. No. 93, p. 14).

175 Rec. Doc. No. 109, p. 12–13.

176 Id. at 13.

As to negligence, New Defendants contend that, although Plaintiff alleges that all

Defendants owed him the “duty to effect his timely release,” each of the Defendants hold

different positions and, thus, owe different duties.177 Additionally, New Defendants

contend that “there is absolutely no indication that any one of the persons sued held the

authority to order Plaintiff’s release from the physical custody of the parish sheriff.”178

Plaintiff maintains that “[t]he Amended Complaint’s factual allegations that [New]

Defendants were each involved in Mr. Hicks’ time computation and release process, when

combined with the undisputed fact that he was over-detained by two months, is (sic)

sufficient to at least state a claim for negligence.”179 Plaintiff contends that “[i]t should be

up to the jury to determine which Defendants are liable, in what capacity, and in what

proportion for the state law torts.”180

a. Analysis

“Under Louisiana law, ‘[f]alse imprisonment is the unlawful and total restraint of the

liberty of the person.’”181 “It consists of the following two essential elements: (1) detention

of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention.”182

The Parker defendants made essentially the same argument as New Defendants

herein regarding maintaining both a false imprisonment and a negligence claim. The

Court stated that it “laments Plaintiff’s lumping together of all Defendants together in his

counts, [but] Plaintiff has adequately put [Defendants] on notice of the allegations against

177 Rec. Doc. No. 90-1, p. 19.

178 Id. at 19–20.

179 Rec. Doc. No. 95, p. 9.

180 Id.

181 Hernandez v. Theriot, 709 F. App'x 755, 757–58 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kelly v. W. Cash & Carry Bldg.

Materials Store, 745 So. 2d 743, 750 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Crossett v. Campbell,

122 La. 659, 48 So. 141, 143 (1908))).

182 Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 690 (La. 2006))

them and has sufficiently described the basis for imposing liability for this claim.”183 The

Court denied the motion to dismiss the false imprisonment claim, finding that “[a]t the very

least, the complaint, on its face, contains enough factual matter, when taken as true, to

raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each

element of the claim.184

The Court finds in the present case that Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for

false imprisonment against these Defendants. In each New Defendants’ role as a DOC

employee, they are charged with the responsibility of ensuring an inmate’s timely release.

Based on the Court’s prior rulings in this matter, it is an established fact that Plaintiff was

held beyond his release date;185 thus, he was incarcerated for 60 days beyond his correct

release date without legal authority. Additionally, the Court finds that the nature of each

Defendant’s specific conduct and authority with regard to Plaintiff’s detention is better

ascertained following discovery. Here, Plaintiff has alleged enough to survive dismissal

of his false imprisonment claim against the New Defendants.

Regarding negligence claims, the Court in McNeal v. Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections186 dispensed with Defendants’ argument that, following the

Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the false imprisonment claim,

Plaintiff’s other state law claims became moot.187 The Court held, “[i]mportantly,

Defendants fail to cite any law for the proposition that because this Court granted Plaintiff

summary judgment on one Louisiana law claim, that the others are now moot.

183 Parker v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, No. 18-1030-JWD-EWD, 2021 WL 2697528,

at *6.

184 Id. (citing Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257).

185 See Rec. Doc. No. 93, p. 7.

186 McNeal v. DPSC, No. 18-736-JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 7059581 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2020).

187 Id. at *12.

Additionally, under the Federal Rules, a plaintiff is allowed to plead in the alternative. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2).”188 The Court rejects this argument asserted by the New Defendants

herein for the same reason.

Also, while Defendants claim Plaintiff has failed to articulate the specific duties

each New Defendant owed to Plaintiff that was allegedly breached, the Fifth Circuit in this

case has already identified the duty owed by those in the positions of New Defendants:

“A reasonable DPSC employee also should have known to credit time served when

calculating an inmate's release date, where the court ordered such credit to be

considered.”189 It is alleged that each New Defendant played some part in investigating

and/or recalculating Plaintiff’s release date and failed to ensure his legal release after

application of 110 days of credit.

The New Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss false imprisonment and negligence claims

is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended

Complaint190 by LeBlanc and Lawson is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All

federal claims against LeBlanc are dismissed with prejudice. The Motion to Dismiss state

law claims against LeBlanc and Lawson is DENIED.

New Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim191 is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. The motion to dismiss constitutional claims based on qualified

immunity is DENIED as to DiBenedetto and Gryder. The motion to dismiss constitutional

188 Id.

189 Hicks, 832 Fed. App’x at 840.

190 Rec. Doc. No. 84.

191 Rec. Doc. No. 90.

claims based on qualified immunity as to Griffin is GRANTED. These claims are

dismissed without prejudice. The motion to dismiss state law claims against Tracy

DiBenedetto, Sally Gryder, and Angela Griffin is DENIED.

Because this was the first Complaint containing allegations against Griffin, Plaintiff

shall have limited, narrow leave to amend the Complaint as to Griffin, only. Plaintiff shall

not add new parties or new claims, without prior leave of Court and for good cause shown.

Amendment is allowed solely to attempt to cure the deficiencies as to the constitutional

claims asserted against Griffin. Should Plaintiff choose to amend as to Griffin, Plaintiff

shall also, contemporaneous with the Amended Complaint, file a Rule 7(a) response to

Griffin’s assertion of qualified immunity. Plaintiff must file the Amended Complaint and

Rule 7(a) response on or before April 13, 2022. No extensions of time shall be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 30th day of March, 2022.

S

________________________________

SHELLY D. DICK

CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA