Erie v. Hunter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STORM ERIE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NANCY HUNTER NO. 21-00267-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

In this civil rights action, Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights

were violated when he was forced to attend a religious service by Defendant Nancy

Hunter, a psychiatric aide at the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System. Now

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs action on the sole basis that she is shielded

from hability by the qualified immunity doctrine. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff opposes

Defendant's motion. (Doc. 11). For reasons below, Defendant’s motion will be denied,

and this matter will be referred to the Magistrate Judge for entry of a scheduling

order.

I, RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The Court accepts the following allegations as true for present purposes:

Plaintiffis a patient committed by court-order to the care of Fastern Louisiana

Mental Health System (ELMHS), a state-run mental health facility located in

Jackson, Louisiana. (Doc. 1 at §f 7-8). Currently, Plaintiff is housed in ELMHS’s

Secure Forensic Facility GFF). dd. at J 8, 16). As a consequence of his commitment,

Plaintiffs “movement” is restricted and maintained by ELMHS employees. (/d. at

12). If Plaintiff disobeys the order of any ELMHS employee he risks being “written

up,” a sanction that may “result in loss of privileges and decreased freedoms.” (Id. at

{] 13).

Defendant is a psychiatric aide employed by ELMHS. (id. at 9 1-2, 18). On

Saturday, January 9, 2021, at around 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff was in his room when

Defendant approached him and stated that he and all other residents housed in the

SFF would be required to attend a religious service in the recreational center. (Id. at

15-18). Plaintiff responded that he did not want to attend, to which Defendant

replied that “she was going to get a guard and force everyone to go” because “she was

the only aid on the ward so she could not leave anyone in their room.” (Id. at §/ 18-

19). “Under the threat of forced compulsion, and afraid of being written up or more

substantial punishment, [Plaintiff] attended the religious service,” which was

“decidedly Christian ... (not agnostic) and lasted one hour.” (Id. at 9 20-21).

Plaintiff promptly reported the events of January 9 to his attorney who, in

turn, provided ELMHS’s Chief Executive Officer, Hampton Lea, written notification

of the same. (/d. at {| 28). Counsel’s letter prompted a response from “an attorney for

the Louisiana Department of Health,” who stated that “ELMHS is investigating the

matter ,.. [and] will be in touch once the investigation is completed.” (Id. at { 29).

Approximately one month later, on February 8, 2021, Plaintiff was summoned

to a meeting with SFF’s director Gino Bertucci, where Mr. Bertucci shared with

Plaintiff the results of ELMHS’s investigation. Ud. at □ 31). At this meeting, Mr.

Bertucci informed Plaintiff: (i) that Defendant “admitted that the incident occurred”:

Gi) that ELMHS “conceded that the events in question occurred and that [Plaintiff]

was, indeed, forced to attend a religious service”; and (ii) that ELMHS “was going to

‘re-educate’ the staff and that the staff could not force someone to go to a church

function.” (dd. at || 33-35). Despite the Department of Health’s prior correspondence

with Plaintiffs counsel, no attempt was made to contact Plaintiffs counsel, or to

involve counsel in Plaintiffs meeting with Mr. Bertucci. (id. at J 32).

Il. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action on May 10, 2021. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs Complaint

alleges that his forced attendance at the January 9 religious service violated his First

Amendment right to be free from state action advancing and prescribing religious

beliefs and expression. (/d. at | 39-44). Plaintiffs pursues his First Amendment

claim against Defendant in her individual capacity only, and seeks an award of

damages (actual, nominal, and punitive) and attorneys’ fees and costs. Ud. at J 48,

50).

Now, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs First Amendment claim, on the

sole basis that she is shielded from lability by the doctrine of qualified immunity

“because her conduct in the specific situation in which she was confronted was not

clearly unlawful.” (Doc. 8-1 at 5).! Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion, arguing that

Defendant’s qualified immunity defense fails because Plaintiffs First Amendment

rights were plainly violated when he “was forced to attend a religious church service

against his will and expressly stated his objections,” and that his rights were clearly

' Defendant also purports to seek dismissal of claims under the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, and encourages the Court to decline

supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. (Doc. 8 at 4-5, 12). As noted in Plaintiffs

opposition briefing, Plaintiff is not pursuing any such claims, and no such claims appear in

Plaintiffs Complaint. (Dec. 11 at 12). Aceordingly, the Court does not address these

additional arguments.

established because the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that state actors

cannot “force [or] influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against

his will,” Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). (Doc. 11 at 7-8).

Iii. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against

the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

Here, the only issue is whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability for civil damages

“when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” City of

Escondido, Calif. v. Emmons, 189 §. Ct. 500, 503 (2019). Its intended purpose is to

strike a balance “between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights

and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties” by making it possible for

government officials “reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to

liability for damages.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 188, 195 (1984)). Put differently, “[q]ualified immunity

gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken

judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Asheroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The Fifth Circuit’s two-pronged test for qualified immunity asks (1) “whether

the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show

that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right

was ‘clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.8d 185, 190-91 (5th Cir.

2020). A court may analyze these prongs in either order, and resolve the case on a

single prong. fd. at 190.

Relevant here, to determine whether a constitutional right was “clearly

established” at the time of the alleged violation, the Court looks for guidance from

controlling Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit authority. See McClendon v. City of

Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). “[I]n the absence of directly controlling

authority, a ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ [from other Circuits] might,

under some circumstances, be sufficient to compel the conclusion that no reasonable

officer could have believed that his or her actions were lawful.” Id. (quoting Wilson.

u. Layne, 526 U.S. 608, 604 (1999)).

The “clearly-established” prong imposes a “demanding standard” that “is

difficult to satisfy.” Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 191. Importantly, “fa] right is ‘clearly

established’ only if it ‘is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Cunningham, 988 F.3d at 191

(quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). The “right must be defined with

specificity,” not “at a high level of generality.” Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503 (quotation

marks omitted). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd,

563 U.S. at 741. The “salient question” is “whether the state of the law at the time of

the state action gave the state actors fair warning that their alleged treatment of the

plaintiff was unconstitutional.” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329 (quoting Roe v. Texas

of Protective & Regul. Servs., 299 F.8d 395, 409 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also

Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of

the particular conduct is clearly established.” (quotation marks omitted)).

“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of

proving that it is inapplicable.” Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir.

2012).

B. Discussion

Applying this framework, the Court determines that Plaintiff has carried his

burden of proving that qualified immunity is inapplicable at this early stage of the

proceedings. The specific constitutional right at issue is Plaintiffs right, under the

Kstablishment Clause, to be free from state action forcing him to attend a Christian

religious service. Plaintiff correctly notes that the Supreme Court has spoken directly

to this issue, and held unequivocally that the state may not “force ... a person to go

to... church against his will’:

The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at

least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a

church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,

or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a

person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force

him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be

punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for

church attendance or non-attendance.

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Indeed the Supreme Court has emphasized, reaffirmed,

and extended this principle so many times that now “fi]t is beyond dispute that ...

[the] government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its

exercise].]” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (citing authorities)); Santa Fe

Indep, Sch, Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (same).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, as an agent of the state of Louisiana,

forced him to attend a one-hour Christian service against his express protests, under

threat of immediate physical force and additional sanctions to follow. These

allegations fly straight into the teeth of the Establishment Clause’s prohibition

against state action coercing a person to participate in religion. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587:

iverson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Plaintiffs allegations establish a constitutional violation

for present purposes.?

Further, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs right to be free from forced

attendance at a religious service was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged

violation. As noted in Plaintiffs opposition briefing, for three-quarters of a century

the Supreme Court has held that, at minimum, the Establishment Clause prohibits

the state from forcing an individual to attend church and/or participate in religious

2 Tiven Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated.

Instead, Defendant limits her argument to whether Plaintiffs constitutional rights were

“clearly established.” (Doc. 8-1 at 5 (“Ms. Hunter is entitled to the defense of qualified

immunity because her conduct in the specific situation in which she was confronted was not

clearly unlawful.”)).

activities. Hverson, 330 U.S. at 15; Lee, 505 U.S. at 587; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.,

530 U.S. at 302. Plaintiffs allegations establish that Defendant simply disregarded

this great weight of unambiguous authority, and forced Plaintiff to attend a religious

service against his will, reasoning “she could not leave anyone in their room.” (/d. at

{{ 18-19).3 Suffice for now to say that the state of the law in January 2021 gave

Defendant “fair warning that [her] alleged treatment of the plaintiff was

unconstitutional.” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329 (quotation marks omitted).

Defendant disagrees that Plaintiffs right to be free from religious coercion was

clearly established when she forced him attend the religious service, and raises a

variety of objections. None are persuasive.

First, Defendant argues that her actions were reasonable under the

circumstances because she was the only psychiatric aide on duty, was required to

maintain supervision of all residents at all times, and Plaintiff's protest presented

her the unenviable choice of either accommodating Plaintiffs right to be free from

religious coercion or prohibiting all residents from attending church service. (Doc. 8-

1 at 8). In this light, Defendant contends that she exercised “fair and reasonable

judgment in ensuring the safety and security of the residents under her care while

also allowing those residents who wish to attend the service to do so.” (Doc. 8-1 at 11).

This argument fails on multiple levels. First, the “clearly established” prong of

the qualified immunity analysis does not measure the reasonableness of a defendant’s

3 What motivated Defendant to force Plaintiff's attendance at the church service may

ultimately bear on the success of Plaintiffs claim (for reasons addressed below). This issue of

Defendant’s motivation/intent, however, cannot be reasonably determined from Plaintiffs

allegations, and deserves evidentiary development.

actions against the “circumstances” presented; rather, it measures the

reasonableness of the defendant’s actions against the “state of the law” at the time

the defendant acted. McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329. As explained, when Defendant

forced Plaintiff to attend the religious service, the law quite clearly held that the state

may not “coerce anyone to ... participate in religion or its exercise.” Lee, 505 U.S. at

587. Defendant’s alleged acts unambiguously violated this mandate.

Second, assuming for present purposes that Defendant only had two options

available to her, she nonetheless chose the option that favored religion, raising the

specter that Defendant “violate[d] that central Establishment Clause value of official

religious neutrality.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860,

(2005). Ultimately, whether Defendant’s choice to force Plaintiff's attendance at the

religious service violated the Establishment Clause’s guarantee of religious

neutrality will turn on whether she acted “with the ostensible and predominant

purpose of advancing religion.” Id. Defendant’s “predominate” purpose for requiring

Plaintiffs attendance—i.e., Defendant's motive/intent—cannot be determined from

the allegations of Plaintiffs complaint (which, again, must be viewed in Plaintiffs

favor). Rather, Defendant's predominate purpose can only be determined through the

discovery process.

Third, whether, deed, Defendant had only two options in the face of

Plaintiffs resistance is a question of fact that also cannot be determined from

Plaintiffs allegations. And, again, the answer to this question may bear on the issue

of whether Defendant’s predominate purpose was to advance religion in violation of

the Establishment Clause.

Next, Defendant objects that Plaintiffs allegations establish only that “he was

‘forced’ to attend the church service,” not that he was “forced ... to participate in said

service.” (Doc. 8-1 at 9). This objection is a non-starter. The law draws no distinction

between coerced attendance and coerced participation: each is equally offensive under

the Establishment Clause. Hverson, 380 U.S. at 15 (the state cannot “force nor

influence a person to go to ... church against his will”); Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587 (the

state cannot “coerce anyone to... participate in religion or its exercise”).

Additionally, Defendant directs the Court’s attention to three “analogous”

cases rejecting pro se prisoners’ claims that prison officials forced them to attend

religious services in violation of the Establishment Clause: Miller v. Bayou Dorcheat

Corr. Ctr., No. 16-cv-0225, 2017 WL, 4414159 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2017); Triplett v.

LeBlanc, No. 13-cv-248, 2015 WL 893057 (M.D. La. Mar. 2, 2015); and Allen. vu. Jones,

No. 08-cv-01731, 2010 WL 2680932 (W.D. La. May 7, 2010). (See Doc. 8-1 at 9-12 &

fn. 49). Without saying so, Defendant invites the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs

listablishment Clause claim based on the standards and reasoning set forth in these

prisoner cases.

Defendant’s “analogy” also fails on multiple levels. As an initial matter, it

assumes that prisoners and civil detainees are equals under the law, and that, □

therefore, the same standards applicable to prisoners’ constitutional claims are

applicable to civil detainees’ claims. Yet, Defendant offers no controlling authority to

10

support this assumption.4 And, indeed, the Supreme Court instructs otherwise,

stating expressly that civil detainees “are entitled to more considerate treatment and

conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are

designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982). The basis of this

distinction is easily understood: unlike imprisonment, “[clivil detention is by

definition non-punitive.” Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002); see

also Bohannan v. Doe, 527 F. App'x 288, 289 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “civil

proceedings to commit citizens ... are not intended to have punitive effects” (collecting

cases)).

Second, even if the Court assumes that the same standards apply, Defendant

still cannot prevail at this stage. Why? Because even a prisoner does not surrender

his constitutional rights at the prison gate. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)

(“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections

of the Constitution.”). Rather, the same constitutional rights apply, but their scope is

narrowed to allow incidental infringements “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests,” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, such as “institutional order, safety, and

security.” Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, the

Kstablishment Clause prohibits the state and its agents from forcing a prisoner (or a

parolee) to participate in religious-based activities as a condition of punishment or

4 Other Circuits have addressed the issue of what standard applies to civil detainees’

constitutional claims, and determined that the proper standard is a “variant” of the standard

applicable to prisoners’ claims. E.g., Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir, 2019);

Brown, v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases), Defendant, however,

has not directed the Court’s attention to any Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit case addressing

the issue, and this Court’s own research has not identified any such case.

11

rehabilitation. See Janny v. Gamez, 8 F.4th 883, 915 (10th Cir. 2021) (rejecting parole

officer’s qualified immunity defense and explaining that the Establishment Clause

clearly prohibits requiring a parolee to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous—a

religious-based substance abuse program---as a condition of parole ((discussing

authorities)), cert. dismissed, 142 S. Ct. 878 (2022). Again, whether Plaintiffs forced

attendance at a religious service was reasonably related to institutional safety, or

was an unlawful condition of Plaintiffs rehabilitation cannot be determined by the

allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint, and must be developed through discovery.

Finally, the “analogous” prisoner cases cited by Defendant are, in fact,

substantially dissimilar to the case presented here. Miller involved an inmate whose

Kstablishment Clause claim was dismissed at summary judgment because he failed

to prove his allegation that he was forced to attend a religious service at risk of

punishment. Miller, 2017 WL 4414159, at *1. Here, by contrast, we have an allegation

awaiting evidentiary development.

Similarly, Allen involved a prisoner whose allegations of coerced religious

participation did not survive summary judgment. The plaintiff alleged that he was

forced to attend a religious service but, in fact, his attendance was required because

he chose voluntarily—but incorrectly—to leave his cell during “church call out,” and

prison policy required that any prisoner outside his cell at such time go to church. On

these facts, the Court determined that the plaintiff's forced attendance was merely a

“coincidental effect” of having left his cell at the wrong time, and, further, that the _

prison’s policy of mandatory attendance during church call out did not advance

12

religion, and served the “secular security purpose [of] controlling inmate movement

at all times (not just during church services).” Allen, 2010 WL 2680982, at *4, Here,

by contrast, Plaintiff alleges that he was removed from his room, and that his forced

attendance was not the result of any mistake or inadvertence on his part.

Finally, Triplett involved an inmate minister's allegations that he was stripped

of his prison ministry duties after he failed to attend a scheduled church call-out. At

the same time, however, the plaintiff conceded “that his job assignment at the prison

was as an inmate minister, which assignment, by definition, included attending to

the religious and spiritual needs of fellow inmates.” Triplett, 2015 WL 893057, at *8.

The Court dismissed plaintiffs constitutional claim, reasoning that plaintiff lost his

minister duties as a disciplinary action for having “failed to attend an obligatory

function,” not in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. Id. (“In the

Court's view, this contention does not implicate the plaintiff's First Amendment

religious rights, any more than would disciplinary action for any inmate who failed

to attend an obligatory function that related to the inmate's job assignment at LSP.”).

Here, by contrast, Plaintiff is not attempting “to shoe-horn a simple garden-variety

claim of disciplinary action into an assertion of his constitutional right to the free

exercise of religion.” See id. Rather, he has alleged a direct (not incidental) violation

of his right to be free from forced attendance at a religious service. In sum, none of

the cases cited by Defendant are even remotely “analogous” to the issues presented

here, much less dispositive.

Finally, Defendant criticizes Plaintiff for failing to identify “any case with the

13

same, or even similar, factual context to the case at hand” to establish that forcing a

civil detainee to attend a religious service violates the Establishment Clause. (Doc.

12 at 6). The Court is not swayed. The law does not “require a case directly on point,”

rather, existing precedent must have placed the ... constitutional question beyond

debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Again, it is beyond debate that the Establishment

Clause prohibits state actors from coercing anyone to “participate in religion or its

exercise,” Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, a principle which has been repeatediy extended to

prohibit the state from forcing a detainee to choose between a religious activity or

punishment, or forcing a detainee’s participation in a religious activity as a

mandatory condition of rehabilitation. See, e.g., Janny, 8 F.4th at 913-916 (discussing

cases).

To repeat: the state of the law in January 2019 gave Defendant “fair warning”

that her alleged actions violated the Establish Clause. McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329.

And while Defendant’s motive/intent may ultimately bear on the outcome of

Plaintiff's Establishment Clause claims-~particularly if those motives are consistent

with the state’s interest in maintaining safety of all ELMHS residents—such issues

cannot be determined from the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint and require factual

development through discovery.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To

Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doe. 8) be and is hereby DENIED.

14

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred to the Magistrate

Judge for entry of a scheduling order. wf

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 23 “day of March, 2022

O_aD

if

JUDGE BRIAN AGJAC]

UNITED STATES D¥STRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

15